Motivation, Markets and Client Relations in the British Private Security Industry by Drutschmann, Sebastian
This electronic thesis or dissertation has been 











The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it 
may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
 
Take down policy 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing 
details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. 
END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT                                                                         
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 
International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
You are free to: 
 Share: to copy, distribute and transmit the work  
 
Under the following conditions: 
 Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any 
way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work).  
 Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. 
 No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. 
 
Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and 












Download date: 06. Nov. 2017
This electronic theses or dissertation has been 









The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information 
derived from it may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
 
Take down policy 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk 
providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. 
END USER LICENSE AGREEMENT                                                                         
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 
Unported License. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/  
You are free to: 
 Share: to copy, distribute and transmit the work  
 
Under the following conditions: 
 Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in 
any way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work).  
 Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. 
 No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. 
 
Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings 





















Motivation, Markets and Client 
Relations in the British Private Security 
Industry 
An Economic-Sociological Perspective on UK Private Security Company 





























One persistent concern about the increasingly widespread use of private security companies 
(PSCs) is that, unlike the state-organized military, PSCs are inherently unreliable and disloyal 
because they are primarily motivated by profit and only subject to limited controls. Yet if 
these concerns were valid, one should expect misconduct to be PSCs’ default behavioural 
option. Evidence from UK PSCs operating in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2003-2009, however, 
suggests that misconduct was relatively rare, given how widely PSCs were used in both 
theatres of operation. Indeed, PSCs are frequently lauded for their professionalism and 
loyalty - particularly by their customers, who arguably have a close view of their behaviour. 
The core problem of this thesis is, therefore, the question why misconduct is actually not 
more prevalent in the UK private security industry (PSI). It argues that the dominant 
conceptualization of PSC behaviour overemphasises the importance of financial interests in 
their decision-making. Using Granovetter’s concept of embeddedness, this thesis suggests 
that the social context of PSCs, through institutions, networks and power relationships, 
shapes their economic actions. In a three-level analysis, it shows how (1) the decision-
making processes in individual PSCs, (2) competition in the market for PSC services and (3) 
the (contractual) relationship between PSCs and their clients reduce the likelihood of 
misconduct. Rather than being exclusively interested in maximising their corporate profits, 
PSCs are therefore motivated by a complex amalgam of financial and non-financial interests. 
This motivation, combined with informal regulatory influence from their labour, market and 
client relations, causes PSC behaviour to be more restricted than previously acknowledged. 
Adopting a qualitative approach and drawing on over fifty semi-structured interviews with 
UK PSC representatives and employees, their clients, policy-makers and experts as well as on 
corporate reports, biographies, academic and media research, this thesis traces the key 
factors that shaped the behaviour of UK PSCs in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2003-2009. 
By providing a more nuanced understanding of UK PSC behaviour, this study offers a new 
approach to PSC regulation. Instead of strict, formal regulation, including intrusive 
monitoring and strong sanctions, this study demonstrates the advantages of less 
antagonistic, responsive forms of regulation, which rely on fostering military professionalism 
in the PSI, on shaping public and private sector demand power in the market for PSC services 
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When you set sail for Ithaca, 
wish for the road to be long, 
full of adventures, full of knowledge. 
[...] 
Ithaca, Konstantinos Petrou Kavafis (1911) 
 
Writing a PhD is in many ways comparable to an Odyssey. You fight Laestrygonians and the 
occasional Cyclops. Sirens constantly tempting you to stray, but where they sing, there is no 
home for you. Much of it is pain and loss. Yet, as soon as you get ashore, you tell of the 
glories of your venture. What fools we all are!   
This PhD would have been impossible without Professor Christopher Dandeker. He 
enouraged me to turn what was then a mere suspicion about markets and motivations in the 
UK PSI into a PhD, he steered my way through the perilous sea of good, but unresearchable 
ideas and patiently endured my original approaches to time-management during the long 
home-stretch of this thesis‘ completion. Yet, what earned by most enduring gratitude was 
the Alexandrian quality with which he met the Gordian knots this thesis produced and 
against which I had fought Sisysphusian struggles. Professor Dandeker would take these 
problems and, after a moment of careful contemplation, collapse these fearsome creatures 
like a cold fork a hot soufflé, often using minutiae of my own argument long forgotten by 
their author. It was beautiful to watch and no PhD student could wish for a better 
supervisor.     
Immeasurable intellectual debts were also incurred from my second supervisor, Dr. 
Christopher Kinsey. Dr. Kinsey work showed me that there was an argument to be had about 
security privatization outside the normative and highly politicized debates prevalent at the 
time. He carefully steered me on that other road in the yellow wood and that has made all 
the difference. One of my regrets is that I made not more of his excellent insights and 
thoughtful analysis. Thanks are also in order for Professors Joseph Soeters, Stephen Pratten 
and Richard Laughlin, who alerted me to the importance of economic and social contexts for 
economic actions. Kateri Carmola, Anna Leander, Joakim Berndtsson, Ulrich Petersohn all 
disagreed vigorously with my analysis of the UK PSI, yet had the patience and passion to 
debate me on the issue to the benefit of this work. I am also thankful to, in no particular 
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order, Dr. Sabrina Schulz, Dr. Ryan Kelty, Dr. Rene Moelke, Dr. Stephanie Carvin, Professor 
Mervin Frost, Dr. Kateri Carmola, Ulrich Petersohn as well as Professor Christian Heath and 
Dr. Gerhard Kümmel for making my viva a great experience.         
A discussion about the markets and motivations in the UK PSI cannot function without 
closely interacting with UK PSCs and, at times, this was a painful experience. Score were the 
rejection letters I received from PSCs. All the more I am thankful for those that helped me in 
my work. In no particular order, they are Christopher Beese, Patrick Toyne-Sewell, Michael 
Brooks, Martin Brown, David Claridge, Nick Clissitt, Dominick Donald, Iain Donald, John 
Drake, Andrew Edwards, Jonny Gray, Peter Isaacs, Robin Kroha, Harry Legge-Bourke, James 
Lewry, Jonny Norman, Richard Phillips, Neil Thompson, Eric Westropp and Sebastian Willis-
Fleming. Among the PSC representatives that helped me in my work, one stands out. The 
doors Maxim Worcester opened for this thesis and the people he cajoled into helping me in 
my research are countless. More importantly, he helped me see the industry from an 
insider’s perspective, frank, unembellished and with little make-up to cover its cracks and 
crevices. Discussing the PSI and its future development was an intellectual tour de force – 
thank you for taking me along for the ride. I am also very thankful to Sarah Marshall, Rafael 
Schenz, Michael Sorge, Dr. Berthold Stoppelkamp, Sarah Marshall, Stephen Ashwell, Doug 
Cook, Christian Donn, Bill Forbes, Michael Hession, Jonathan Reed and Jusitn Priestley. My 
interviewees in the PSC employees would inevitably begin with their contention that they 
were unsure if they had anything useful to provide to my study, only to become fountains of 
wisdom minutes later. Andrew Edwards, Tim Lynch, Matt Loe, Andy Thompson, Paul Higgins, 
Rowan Smith - their pithy analysis cut like a warm knife through the butter of academic 
criticism and PSC corporate-speak.     
Finally, the unsung heroes of any thesis thesis are the family and friends of the young 
Odysseus. They pay for travel (often quite literally), provide sustenance on the long travel to 
Ithaca, endure forgotten birthdays, unreturned calls and unanswered emails, cranky moods-
spells best measured in month and all they receive in return is a tome that is not 
“entertaining reading” by any definition. Danke Dominik Drutschmann, Ursula Göbel-
Drutschmann, Ernst Göbel, Florian Jansen, Norman Frenz, Birgit Bolten, Wolfgang Meiries.  
Und dann ist da Annika. Keine hat unter diesem Machwerk so gelitten wie sie und mir 
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Chapter 1: Motivation, Markets and 
Client Relations – Modelling the 
Behaviour of Private Security 
Companies 
To what extent should states rely on private security providers in conflict environments? 
Their proponents hail private security companies (PSCs), i.e. private, for-profit companies 
that provide armed perimeter, personal and convoy security in a high-risk environment, as a 
solution for many of the problems posed by contemporary conflict environments: PSCs are 
cost-efficient, flexible and, since they are not part of the state-organized military, easier for 
conflicting parties and NGOs to interact with.1 It has even been suggested that PSCs could 
contribute troops to UN peacekeeping missions.2 Most of the literature on security 
privatization, however, emphasises the problems involved in the use of PSCs. One persistent 
concern is that, unlike the state-organized military, PSCs are inherently unreliable and 
disloyal and should therefore not be entrusted with the provision of armed security 
services.3 
Two characteristics of PSCs are believed to make security provision through PSCs inherently 
problematic: Compared to their counterparts in the state-organized military, PSCs are said to 
have greater incentives to behave in problematic ways and more opportunities to do so 
without serious consequences. Their profit interest supposedly motivates PSCs to take 
actions that appear profitable, regardless of the effect on their clients or overall mission 
success.4 PSCs have the opportunity to act on this motivation, because, as private entities, 
they largely remain outside the scope of military law.5 While most experts acknowledge that 
                                                     
1
 Brooks (2000), p. 35, Spearin (2005), p. 7, Stanger (2009), p. 93ff, Ortiz (2010), p. 7, Mears (2009), p. 7. 
2
 O’Hanlon/Singer (2004), p. 92. In 2006, the US PSC Blackwater allegedly announced its willingness to deploy 
private peacekeepers to Darfur (Witter (2006), p.1).      
3
 Baker (2011), p. 6, Schreier/Caparini (2005), p. 90. 
4
 Singer (2003), p. 152, Avant (2005), p. 48, Holmqvist (2006), p. 28. 
5
 Holmqvist (2006), p. 29, Percy (2006), p. 18, O’Hanlon/Singer (2004), p. 93. 
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PSCs are not unregulated,6 existing regulation is deemed too weak to prevent PSCs from 
engaging in problematic behaviour.7 
Hence, PSCs are widely believed to be inherently problematic. While few advocate an 
outright ban,8 most experts believe that only a yet to be devised system of strict, formal 
regulations, including intrusive monitoring and strong sanctions, could contain their 
problematic motivations, curtail their opportunities to engage in misconduct and make a 
limited use of PSCs possible.9 While there is much debate about how best to regulate the 
private security industry (PSI), most experts agree that in its absence the widespread use of 
PSCs remains problematic.10  
However, while the problematic nature of PSCs and its regulatory implications are widely 
discussed, the underlying behavioural assumptions are rarely subjected to critical review. 
This introductory chapter outlines the core puzzle of this thesis by demonstrating that the 
prevalent behavioural model is not supported by the available empirical evidence of UK PSC 
conduct in Iraq and Afghanistan. If PSCs are as focused on their profit interest and as loosely 
controlled as the literature intimates, misconduct should be their default option. Instead, 
this chapter shows that misconduct has been the exception rather than the rule in the UK 
PSI active in Iraq and Afghanistan. Indeed, UK PSCs were and are frequently lauded for their 
professionalism and loyalty.11 Indeed, there is evidence suggesting that UK PSCs performed 
services in excess of their contractual duties. This clashes with the prevalent behavioural 
model and its focus on PSCs’ profit interests, which raises two questions:  
 Why are UK PSCs not more often engaged in problematic behaviour, as expected by 
the prevalent literature? 
 Why do UK PSCs engage in behaviour that seems to contravene their profit 
interest? 
In answering these questions and drawing on the empirical evidence derived from the UK 
PSI, this thesis proposes an alternative behavioural model that focuses on three aspects of 
                                                     
6
 Percy (2006), p. 9.  
7
 Singer (2004 IV), p. 534, Stange (2009), p. 92, War on Want (2006), p. 13. 
8
 For an exception, see Musah/Fayemi (2000), p. 12.  
9
 Percy (2006), p. 63, Singer (2003), p. 234. 
10
 Holmqvist (2005), p. 58-59, Spear (2006), p. 57, Greenstock (2006).  
11
 Shays in CWC (2010), Cancian (2008), p. 65. 
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PSC behaviour, which the prevalent conceptualization of PSC behaviour misrepresents. The 
first aspect is the decision-making process within individual PSCs. The literature explains 
the motivation underlying PSC behaviour by focusing solely on their self-interested profit-
maximization. Such an atomized, parsimonious view of economic action ignores the social 
context in which PSCs operate and its influence on behaviour. Rather than monolithic, 
single-minded entities, this thesis proposes that PSCs are made up of various groups of 
actors with often diverging interests. Their corporate interest is thus more akin to an 
amalgam of compromises than a single, coherent profit-motive. To facilitate these 
compromises, companies rely on conventions, specifically the norms and values of military 
professionalism, which compete with and, at times, displace the profit-motive in PSC 
decision-making.  
The second aspect is the market for PSC services. The literature relies on an unsophisticated 
and ill-supported understanding of competition to argue that the market for private security 
fails to discourage PSCs from maximising their profit at their clients’ expense, leaving their 
clients unable to sanction misconduct. Using Michael Porter’s Five Forces Framework, this 
thesis challenges this view. It argues that the market for PSC services, as shown by the 
example of UK PSCs, provides a level of competitive pressure that is conducive for the 
adherence of conventions. It is neither too competitive to force PSCs to maximise their 
short-term profit, nor does it allow them to become so powerful that they can dictate terms 
to their customers.   
The third and final aspect is customer relations in the PSI. Again, the literature sees this 
relationship as primarily benefiting PSCs. Protected from what little competitive pressure the 
market may exert over their behaviour, PSCs supposedly can exploit their contractual 
relations by providing lower quality services or by enforcing higher prices with threats of 
service disruptions. Given that clients are dependent on the private provision of security, 
they are believed to be at the mercy of their contractual partners, unable to sanction even 
grave misconduct. The alternative approach that this thesis proposes, inspired by the 
evidence deriven from the UK PSI, stresses mutual dependency between PSCs and their 
customers. It argues that, especially when facing uncertainty and ambiguity - a common 
occurrence in the volatile environments PSCs work in - PSCs are more likely to cooperate 
with their contractual partners than to exploit their clients.        
15 
 
Yet, the purpose of this thesis is not to provide an apologia that deflects criticism from the 
PSI. Evidence from the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan indisputably shows PSCs engaging in 
misconduct. This thesis agrees that the use of PSCs needs to be better regulated. However, 
such regulation needs to be well-crafted: tight enough to deter and punish misconduct, yet 
loose enough not to stifle the industry or overburden its customers. To achieve this, an 
accurate understanding of the behaviour of PSCs is needed and it is here that this thesis 
hopes to provide important insights. Using the case of the UK PSI, it specifically hopes to 
show that PSC behaviour can be controlled without employing costly and intrusive formal 
regulation. Moreover, this thesis seeks to make a contribution to what is already a vibrant 
debate about PSCs by focussing on aspects that are important but so far largely overlooked, 
such as the UK PSI and genuine private sector demand for PSC services. Finally, this thesis 
hopes to be informative for practitioners in the PSI - customers as well as PSCs. Lately, many 
PSC representatives have disengaged from the academic debate about security privatization 
due to its increasing politicization12 and choice of focus, which is deemed irrelevant for the 
industry.13 By engaging closely with the industry and by focussing on subjects such as labour 
relations, competition and customer relations, this thesis hopes to be more relevant to PSCs. 
The first part of this chapter – sections one through four – is devoted to analysing the 
prevalent behavioural model. Section one identifies its origins in the literature and its 
theoretical underpinnings, specifically the Principal/Agent Problem and the Rational Actor 
Model. Section two and three take a closer look at the model’s view on incentives driving 
PSC behaviour and their opportunities to act on them. Section four concludes by showing 
that the available evidence does not support the prevalent behavioural model. In turn, part 
two – sections five and six – discusses this thesis’ central research question and outlines a 
theoretical alternative to the prevalent model of PSC behaviour. Part three – in four shorter 
sections – addresses methodological issues. Section seven focuses on the question of how to 
study conventions and takes a look at the available evidence. Section eight discusses the 
design of the semi-structured interviews that make up the core of the data gathered for this 
thesis. Section nine expands on research ethics and section ten outlines the scope of the 
thesis.   
                                                     
12
 Donald (2006 II), p. x, Cancian (2008), p. 71. 
13
 Worcester (2009), Kroha (2009). Beese in Carmola (2006), p. 161-162.  
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Section One: The Behavioural Model and Its Theoretical 
Underpinnings 
While the debate about security privatization rarely focuses on the behaviour of PSCs, it is 
far from true that authors discussing security privatization ‘don’t do [PSC] behaviour’.14 The 
increasing privatization of security and military services is believed to be problematic, 
precisely because PSCs allegedly behave in an ‘unreliable and untrustworthy’ manner.15 
Likewise, the need for regulation is mainly a function of concerns about the ‘mercenary 
motives of those involved with private force’ and its behavioural implications.16 Although 
rarely the focus of the discussion and lacking an explicit behavioural model, the literature’s 
conceptualization of PSC behaviour is remarkably coherent. To make the model explicit, this 
thesis carefully surveyed countless publications about PSCs for statements characterising 
PSC behaviour. Specifically, it identified themes in the literature and collected references to 
theoretical concepts used to conceptualize PSC behaviour and their underlying motivations. 
A draft of the behavioural model was previously published17 and presented to expert 
audiences to solicit additional feedback, which this study builds on.18 It is the resulting 
common understanding of how contemporary PSCs behave that this thesis describes as the 
“prevalent, if implicit behavioural model”. The remainder of this section takes a closer look 
at this behavioural model, in particular at its theoretical underpinnings.  
The (Contractual) Relationship 
The behaviour of PSCs is generally conceptualized in the context of a relationship, specifically 
a contractual relationship between a US/UK PSC and the US/UK government.19 Some have 
argued that both parties are often not connected by direct contractual relations, but 
separated by layers of subcontracting.20 However, interviews suggest that many of the 
companies and NGOs that use PSCs in Afghanistan and Iraq are themselves under contract 
with the US or the UK government.21 Such subcontracting constitutes at least an indirect 
relationship, as the US/UK government often exert control over subcontractors either 
                                                     
14
 Anna Leander, conversation with the author, ISA Convention 2009, New York. 
15
 Baker (2011), p. 6. 
16
 Pattison (2010), p. 427. 
17
 Drutschmann (2007). 
18
 The model was presented at the 2006 IUS/Canada Conference in Ottawa, the 2007 AFK Nachwuchstagung in 
Iserlohn and the 2007, 2008 and 2009 ISA Convention in Chicago, San Francisco and New York, respectively.  
19
 Owens (2008), p. 982. 
20
 Kümmel (2004), p. 18, Bennett (2010), Singer (2005), p. 5.  
21
 Willis-Fleming (2008), Pelton (2006), p. 94. 
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directly or through their subcontractors.22 James Cockayne further argues that the ‘binding 
legal authority’ states exert over PSCs also constitutes a relationship.23 While conceptualizing 
the behaviour of PSCs in relation to the public sector is not per se objectionable, this 
depiction ignores genuine private sector demand and private sector intermediaries, i.e. 
companies and NGOs that directly contract with PSCs. Moreover, defining relationships 
broadly, as advocated by Cockayne, blurs the difference between strong direct contractual 
relations and weaker forms of influence.24 Finally, the literature tends to emphasise the 
state’s role as a regulator at the expense of its role as a customer.  
 
Theoretical Underpinnings I: The Principal-Agent Problem 
To describe PSC behaviour within the contractual relationship, the PSC literature frequently 
relies on the principal-agent (P/A) problem.25 The P/A problem describes a situation where 
two actors are joined in a hierarchical relationship: The state (principal) hires a PSC (agent) 
to perform certain duties in exchange for financial compensation.26 What renders this 
relationship problematic is the asymmetric distribution of information among the 
contracting parties.27 An agent can shirk rather than work if he/she knows more about the 
tasks he/she is performing (hidden information)28 or because the agent’s behaviour cannot 
be directly observed (hidden action).29 The PSC literature adds a further possibility to shirk: 
Since PSCs are not part of the military’s ‘chain of command’ or constrained by strict, formal 
regulation, the state (principal) allegedly lacks the means to sanction the behaviour of PSCs 
(agents).30 
Again, the use of the P/A problem to discuss PSCs is not per se objectionable. However, how 
the concept is applied to PSC behaviour is problematic on two accounts. First, the intensity 
of the principal-agent problem is a function of the contracting parties’ divergent interests.31 
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The PSC literature does not allow for the possibility that the interests of principals and 
agents may coincide or that either party may benefit from the relationship in other ways 
than at each other’s expense. Secondly, the PSC literature implicitly assumes that public 
principals and private agents are inevitably divided by a significant conflict of interests. As a 
result, the literature ignores a rich debate within economics that views the principal-agent 
problem as a coordination problem. Here, the conflict of interest can be mitigated, provided 
the right incentives are introduced to align the interests of principals and agents. Goal 
alignment as a means for exerting control over PSCs thus receives limited attention in the 
PSC literature, which far too readily accepts the conflict of interest between PSCs and their 
clients as a fait accompli.32    
 
Theoretical Framework II: the Rational Actor Model 
According to Kenneth Arrow, the P/A problem’s ‘underlying principles are impeccably 
neoclassical’, i.e. principals and agents are assumed to be rational actors.33 In its weakest 
form, the rationality assumption states that an actor has a coherent hierarchy of 
preferences.34 However, the rationality assumption is frequently expanded to the notion 
that agents are ‘acting in their own self-interest’.35 Authors discussing security privatization 
are taking this to mean that PSCs are ‘driven primarily by profit, not morals’.36 PSCs are 
hence expected to shirk, i.e. to maximise their financial profit regardless of their principals’ 
interests, whenever they are given the opportunity to do so. This thesis does not object to 
the rationality assumption in its weakest form. What is problematic, however, is the 
literature’s view that - in Peter Singer’s words - PSCs are ‘driven neither by goodwill nor 
honor, but rather by profit’.37 Parsimoniously focusing on PSCs’ self-interested desire for 
financial profit provides a very simplistic, atomized view of PSC motivation, which ignores 
the social context in which PSCs operate.       
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This thesis is less concerned about the theoretical concepts the literature relies on than 
about their application and about those theories it chooses to ignore altogether. It is 
particularly interesting how limited the literature’s engagement with economic theory 
remains, given that it conceptualizes PSCs primarily as “economic actors”.  
Overall, the theoretical underpinnings of the prevalent behavioural model are rarely 
explicitly discussed in the literature. Most authors instead voice their concerns about PSC 
behaviour by focussing on their incentives and opportunities.  
 
 
Section Two: Incentives 
Concerns about PSCs’ motivations are usually discussed by (unfavourably) comparing PSCs to 
the state-organized military: While the military is considered to be largely indifferent to 
financial incentives, PSCs are allegedly compelled to shirk due to their profit motive. This 
section discusses the various reasons presented for the military’s indifference towards 
financial profit and, in turn, for its purported importance in PSCs decision-making.    
Professionalism 
Critics are concerned that PSCs lack the internal constraints that prevent the military from 
engaging in problematic behaviour. While the military increasingly exhibits characteristics of 
an occupation, e.g. temporary rather than life-long employment and cash rather than in-kind 
benefits, it retains aspects of a profession and a calling,38 e.g. voluntary submission to the 
strictures of military discipline, 24/7 availability and lengthy overseas deployments.39 
Moreover, the military differs from any other occupation or profession, because it requires 
its members to sign a ‘contract of unlimited liability’.40 As a result, the military has 
developed a strong ‘professional ethos’,41 i.e. a set of norms and values governing the 
conduct of its members. Key components are a sense of duty and a preference for social 
                                                     
38
 Moskos (1977), pp. 3-4. On military professionalism, see Huntington (1957), Janowitz (1964), Feaver (2003). 
On the military as an occupation, see Moskos/Wood (1988), Moskos/Segal (2000).   
39
 Moskos (1977), p. 3, Dandeker (1999), p. 47. 
40
 John Hackett in Baker (2011), p. 25. 
41
 Soeters (1998), p. 176. 
20 
 
esteem over financial benefits.42 In contrast, critics argue that PSC employees are motivated 
by ‘lucrepathic’ motives,43 i.e. a self-interested desire for financial profit, which makes their 
use of force unethical.44 This stereotype of the military as a ‘greedy institution’,45 i.e. one 
that issues exceptional demands to its members, with a strong professional ethos arguably 
creates a powerful self-selection mechanism: individuals that prefer financial profit or 
independence avoid the military, while it attracts those with a strong sense of duty and a 
willingness to submit to the constraints of military.     
This selection upon entry into the profession is reinforced within the military, which strongly 
emphasises its professional ethos, e.g. as an integral part of military training, its rituals and 
legal code.46 Career advancement and informal structures, i.e. peer pressure, coax soldiers 
to adopt behaviour congruent with the professional ethos or to leave the armed forces. 
While the literature focuses on the absence of a strong professional ethos within PSCs,47 a 
more salient concern may be that PSCs lack the institutional structure to support a 
professional ethos. Indeed, the stereotypes associated with PSCs, i.e. their alleged 
“lucrepathic” motivation, may attract individuals to whom ‘the motive of financial gain is 
likely to play a greater role’ and thus perpetuate precisely the kind of motivation the 
literature is concerned about.48    
Financial Structure 
The problematic motivation of PSCs is often blamed on structural characteristics, namely on 
PSCs being private, for-profit companies. In contrast, the military is said to be less affected 
by financial incentives, because it is institutionally unable to generate a profit. Rather than 
raising funds by selling its goods and services in a market, the US and UK military operate on 
a fixed budget. Even cost reductions would not return a profit, because military personnel 
receive fixed wages rather than performance-based compensation and would therefore not 
benefit from any gains accumulated through cost-cutting. In addition to isolating the military 
from market dynamics, its financial dependence encourages soldiers to align their interests 
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with their civilian masters.49 The only path available to soldiers for increasing their financial 
profit is through the higher wages associated with promotions, which are largely predicated 
on meeting the expectations of the civilian leadership. PSCs are not similarly isolated from 
market influences. Instead, their need to generate revenue exposes PSCs to market 
fluctuations. Both, a rapid increase and a sudden decrease in demand can cause PSCs to lose 
money: During a boom, existing contracts no longer cover the then-increased production 
costs, while, during a downturn, labour costs decrease more slowly than the price for PSC 
services.50 PSCs also bear client-related risks, such as suspended or non-payment. Given 
their often meagre financial reserves, economic necessity may come to dictate PSC 
behaviour in such situations. 
Most authors are concerned about PSCs’ desire for profit, but a more persuasive argument 
against PSC use may be that their need to be profitable may lead PSCs to prioritise financial 
considerations over their customers’ needs and the requirements of the mission. When 
Peter Singer argues that ‘[t]he fundamental goal of corporations is the maximization of 
profit’,51 said goal may be a matter of necessity, not of choice.  
Conclusion 
Expanding on the literature’s concerns, this section has shown that the motivational 
structure of PSCs raises questions about their widespread use. It also showed that the 
pursuit of profit may be less a result of desire than of need. Whether a PSC is motivated by a 
desire or a need for profit can produce similar behavioural outcomes, but it calls for very 
different responses from regulators and customers.  
Moreover, the literature discusses PSC motivation in too abstract a fashion: PSCs are 
motivated by financial profit because they are private, for-profit companies.52 Recently, 
individual contractors have become increasingly vocal about their motivations and 
experiences in the PSI. Unfortunately, their blogs, online news-groups and memoirs have 
largely been ignored by the PSC literature to date.53 Likewise, while interviews with PSC 
representatives play an important role in the literature, they are rarely used to explore their 
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motivations. Finally, the section highlighted that the literature’s concerns about PSC 
motivations rely on an exaggeratedly stark contrast between public and private sector 
employees. This fits uneasily with widespread concerns about experienced and highly 
qualified soldiers leaving the military to join PSCs.54 Unfortunately, the literature fails to 
explain if and how the professional ethos, which is such an integral part of soldiers’ 
motivations during their military career, disappears once they enter PSC employment.  
 
Section Three: Opportunities 
Regardless of their incentives, PSCs are more likely to engage in problematic behaviour if 
given the opportunity to do so without significant consequence, such as legal penalties or 
contractual fines. By controlling and sanctioning their behaviour, clients can deny PSCs such 
opportunities and make problematic behaviour less likely. This section analyses three 
sources of control, as discussed in the PSC literature.  
Legal Controls 
Regulation of PSCs is undoubtedly the most widely discussed source of control.55 While few 
laws were explicitly crafted to regulate the PSI, most authors reject the notion that PSCs 
operate in a legal vacuum.56 Instead, they recognize a variety of international and domestic 
regulations that are applicable to PSCs, but conclude that this regulatory ‘patchwork’ exerts 
insufficient control over PSC behaviour.57 For instance, since many of the laws applicable to 
PSCs were crafted to regulate other actors, i.e. mercenaries or arms manufacturers, they 
often lack regulatory fit: PSCs either fall foul of their definitions or they are easily 
circumvented. 58 Also, current criminal and international law seems ill-suited to prosecute 
corporations:59 PSC employees engaged in misconduct may face long prison sentences, while 
their employers remain beyond the reach of criminal law – a situation few would find 
acceptable.60 The literature discusses numerous further problems, including immunity from 
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local laws61 and the lack of jurisdiction,62 which affirm the literature’s conclusion that 
existing regulation is ineffective.  
Enforcement of Legal Controls  
Yet, the biggest problem may not be the lack of regulation, but its enforcement.63 
Enforcement of international regulation is traditionally weak, as states only reluctantly 
relinquish regulatory authority64 and are lax in meeting their responsibility to enforce 
international law.65 Domestic regulation by territorial states, i.e. where PSCs operate,66 is 
similarly weak, as they often lack the institutional capacity necessary for effective 
regulation.67 Contracting states68 and home states69 may have greater institutional capacity, 
but their effectiveness is hampered by the transnational nature of the PSI.70 Their civilian 
law-enforcement lacks the capability to investigate allegations of misconduct in high-risk 
environments to an acceptable evidentiary standard and PSCs can circumvent their 
regulation by moving offshore.71 To address these shortcomings, the US government 
extended military jurisdiction over PSCs in support of contingency operations,72 but 
constitutional73 and procedural concerns74 limit its effectiveness. Finally, industry 
representatives advocate self-regulation as an effective supplement to formal regulation.75 
However, there are serious concerns about its enforcement, as monitoring compliance is 
entrusted to industry-financed bodies and companies can avoid investigations by 
withdrawing from the regulating industry association.76 Hence, while PSCs may not operate 
in a de jure legal vacuum, it can be argued that, given the lack of regulatory fit and 
enforcement, they operate in a de facto legal vacuum.  
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The Market for Security 
The second source of control is the market for security. To paraphrase John Stuart Mill, it is 
only through competition that (security) privatization becomes beneficial.77 In competitive 
markets, all participants are price-takers not makers, as they lack the market power 
necessary to determine the prices of their goods/services.78 Should a supplier set a higher 
price, he/she will lose customers to a competitor and eventually be forced out of business. 
Indeed, a competitive market arguably punishes problematic behaviour harsher than price 
increases: While a price increase is easily quantifiable and reversible, a reputation for 
problematic behaviour may stay with a supplier for a while. However, not all markets are 
competitive;79 critics like Anne Markusen contend that this applies to the market for 
security.80 Without competition, suppliers can raise prices without having to fear 
repercussions, as customers cannot easily switch to an alternative supplier. Worse still, 
customers are believed to be utterly dependent on PSCs in high-risk environments, since 
there is generally no (public sector) alternative available. Rather than empowering clients to 
control PSCs, the market is therefore seen as providing PSCs with opportunities for 
problematic behaviour.  
The Relationship between PSCs and their Clients 
The third source of control, the contractual relationship, should give clients considerable 
sway over PSC behaviour, as they can define contractual duties and threaten non-payment 
and non-renewal should PSCs misbehave. Moreover, where legal recourse and the market 
are slow, cumbersome and potentially costly, clients can use their day-to-day contact to 
PSCs to influence their behaviour. Yet, the PSC literature portrays the contractual 
relationship in a very different light: Clients can only sanction problematic behaviour if they 
are aware of it and monitoring PSC behaviour in high-risk environments is expensive and 
often impossible.81 In theory, clients could judge a PSC’s performance based on its 
outcomes, but this is similarly problematic: A shirking PSC may benefit from inept insurgent 
attacks, while a diligent PSC may fail due to overwhelming opposition.82 As a result, shirking 
may escape detection. Another cause for concerns is the contract itself, particularly its 
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specificity. Principals limit shirking by specifying the agent’s duties en détail in their 
contracts.83 However, contracts negotiated in environments characterized by high volatility 
and uncertainty are ‘inevitably [...] quite incomplete’.84 As the security situation changes, 
clients cannot simply order PSCs to take action, as they would with the military. Instead, they 
have to amend contractual details through re-negotiations, which is believed to limit clients’ 
ability to control PSC behaviour.85 
PSCs may even use the relationship to evade market-based competition: First, a PSC submits 
a “low-ball” bid, i.e. an offer at a price significantly below the market price, to undercut 
competitors,86 before increasing its initially meagre profit margin through re-negotiations or 
by providing a cheaper, low-quality service.87 Economists refer to this as a “hold-up 
problem”. Whether clients accept such ex post rent-extraction depends on their switching 
costs. Many clients may consider the decrease in security that a sudden change in provider 
entails too great a risk to contemplate changing providers.88 Hence, Eric Fredland argues that 
‘the government [as a customer] is more vulnerable to hold-up than is the company’.89  
Conclusion 
The literature argues that the legal framework in which PSCs operate, the market and their 
contractual relationships are inadequate sources of control. However, even if laws are ill-
fitting and unenforceable, their violation nonetheless bears a cost for PSCs. Some authors 
recognize such reputational costs, but consider them to be inequitable to formal regulation. 
Likewise, the literature’s analysis of competition is unconvincing, especially its limited 
engagement with economic theory. Finally, the literature characterizes both dependency 
and uncertainty in the relationship as being limited to clients, but PSCs are arguably just as 
dependent on their customers as vice versa. Moreover, in the long-term relationships that 
are prevalent in the PSI, information asymmetries may matter little, as clients discover and 
punish problematic behaviour over time.  
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Sections one to three thus identified several weaknesses in the literature’s conceptualization 
of PSC behaviour. Nonetheless, the literature raises serious questions about the motivation 
of PSCs and their opportunities to act on them. The following section discusses whether the 
available evidence supports the literature’s concerns about PSC behaviour. 
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Section Four: Behavioural Manifestations 
The Abu-Ghraib scandal, the Nisour Square shootings, the Aegis trophy video, ArmorGroup’s 
Kabul Embassy parties, the Custer Battles fraud case – given the number of incidents with 
PSC involvement, questioning whether the available evidence supports the literature’s 
concerns about PSCs seems almost fastidious. However, this section argues that support for 
the literature’s view is scant among the evidence of PSC behaviour in Afghanistan and Iraq 
from 2003-2009. 
A Quantitative View on the Evidence 
While some allegations of misconduct have remained or remain just that,90 PSCs have 
undoubtedly been involved in problematic behaviour. Yet, the mere occurrence of 
problematic behaviour is not sufficient proof that PSCs are inherently problematic. As 
Deane-Peter Baker points out, ‘under the extreme stresses of combat, it is unrealistic to 
expect such things will never happen’.91 To substantiate the literature’s concerns, PSCs’ 
record would have to show that they are particularly susceptible to misconduct. 
Unfortunately, reliable figures that would either substantiate or disprove the literature’s 
claims are not available.92 Until they are, the aforementioned scandals constitute merely 
anecdotal evidence.  
However, if PSCs are indeed as focused on their profit interest and as loosely controlled as 
the literature intimates, one may expect a large number of incidents of misconduct being 
reported.93 Critics may contend that PSCs and their employees have little reason to 
incriminate themselves by advertising problematic behaviour. However, the same cannot be 
said for their customers, who are presumably more concerned about not becoming an 
auxiliary to misconduct by covering it up. Indeed, interviews with PSC customers suggest 
that they would immediately report any misconduct to protect themselves from liability.94 
Furthermore, disgruntled former employees, competitors and the considerable media 
interest in PSCs make a significant dark figure of serious incidents unlikely. Even if reliable 
figures on PSC misconduct were available, one would still have to determine whether it is 
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attributable to PSCs’ inherently problematic nature or to their operational environment. 
Here, Keith Hartley rightly cautions against comparing PSCs to an ideal model of the state-
organized military.95 If PSCs are instead compared to e.g., the US military’s record in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, Abu Ghraib,96 Shinwar,97 Haditha98 and other scandals suggest that misconduct 
is unfortunately not an infrequent occurrence when soldiers operate in environments as 
taxing as Iraq and Afghanistan.99  
Moreover, there is ample evidence of PSCs acting in a fashion commensurate with the 
highest professional norms in situations of extreme duress.100 While such instances are 
likewise admittedly only anecdotal evidence, much of said evidence comes from customers, 
who are arguably intimately familiar with and have little reason to mischaracterize the day-
to-day behaviour of PSCs and who often laud their professionalism.101 One particularly 
pertinent example occurred during the 2004 Shia-Uprising in Iraq, when PSCs continued to 
support their clients, while coalition forces refused to act due to security concerns.102 
Moreover, when describing their motivation, PSC personnel themselves frequently invoke 
the very norms and values that the literature ascribes to the military’s professional ethos: 
sense of duty, comradeship, personal integrity, etc.103 The presence of such behaviour 
suggests that conceptualizing PSCs as inherently problematic provides at best an incomplete 
picture. Rather than a source of unequivocal support for the literature’s conceptualization of 
PSC behaviour, a quantitative assessment of the available evidence to date remains at best 
inconclusive.  
A Qualitative View on the Evidence 
In the absence of reliable figures on PSC behaviour, a qualitative assessment of the available 
evidence may provide more support for the prevalent behavioural model. If a clear causal 
link could be established between problematic behaviour and PSCs’ profit motive, this would 
                                                     
95
 Hartley (2004), p. 201. See also Avant (2005), p. 43, Chesterman (2009), p. 7. 
96
 Hersh (2004). 
97
 Gall (2007). 
98
 Knickmeyer (2007). 
99
 Cowen (2007), Amnesty International (2005). 
100
 Baker (2011), p. 51, Cancian (2008), p. 71.  
101
 Hvaal (2007), Stewart (2007), p. 398, Etherington (2005), p. 222, Victoria Wayne in Feinaru (2008), p. 22, 
Shays in CWC (2010). 
102
 Stewart (2007), Etherington (2005), Priest (2004). 
103
 Ashcroft (2006), p. 29, Laguna (2008), Low (2007), p. 54. See also Baker (2010), pp. 48-65.   
29 
 
arguably lend credence to the literature’s concerns. However, several reasons suggest that 
such a causal link is difficult to establish.  
First, the literature has to show that PSCs’ characteristics identified as problematic actually 
cause problematic behaviour. Allegations that PSCs prolong conflicts to create demand for 
their services104 or that they lack the ‘discipline and incorruptibility that is essential for 
[peace-building/-enforcement operations]’105 are devoid of any substance and thus hardly 
constitute proof for PSCs’ problematic nature. Secondly, PSC behaviour cannot be 
considered problematic, if a public-sector security provider, i.e. the military, would act 
similarly under similar circumstances. For example, as PSCs’ primary concern is their client’s 
security, they are frequently accused of being insensitive to the impact of their actions on 
the local population.106 However, the military’s Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) when 
protecting high-value individuals or convoys hardly call for a less robust posture.107 Indeed, 
interviews with PSC representatives suggest that they consider themselves to be more 
respectful of the local population, as they frequently live among them rather than on well-
protected military bases.108 Thirdly, behaviour that is indicative of an inherently problematic 
nature needs to be clearly attributable to the company rather than to individual employees, 
as corporate and individual (financial) interests can diverge considerably.109 A PSC that fails 
to control its employees’ behaviour should not escape blame for their misconduct. However, 
as much as the military bears only limited responsibility for the actions of individual soldiers, 
a PSC that takes reasonable measures to prevent individual misconduct should also be able 
to limit its responsibility. Finally, some allowance should be made for the industry’s growing 
pains, as cases of misconduct were often attributable to volatility in the market for PSC 
services and in the security environment in Iraq and Afghanistan rather than PSCs’ 
problematic nature. After all, the fact that the large-scale use of PSCs is a fairly recent 
phenomenon is often cited to explain the poor state of public-sector oversight and 
                                                     
104
 Jennings (2006), p. 39, Musah/Fayemi (2000), p. 28, Perlo/Sköns (2008), p. 14. 
105
 Münkler (2005), p. 134. 
106
 Fainaru (2008), p. 139, Ricks (2009), p. 269. 
107
 Cancian (2008), p. 71. See also DoD (2006). 
108
 Lynch (2010), Phillips (2010).  
109
 See Chapter 3. 
30 
 
regulation.110 PSCs should not be considered inherently problematic for behaviour that they 
are nowadays addressing with some success.111 
The strongest argument against the prevalent behavioural model, however, may not be the 
relative lack of problematic, but the presence of altruistic behaviour. On numerous 
occasions, PSC personnel performed services beyond their contractual duties, without 
financial compensation and at considerable risk to themselves and their companies’ assets. 
PSCs have responded to requests for help by the CPA, the military and once even rescued 
the Polish ambassador during an ambush in Iraq.112 PSC personnel also disarmed IEDs rather 
than leaving them for the military, which apparently happened so frequently that the DoD 
now forbids it.113 PSCs even set up charities and directly help the civilian population.114 
Again, given the lack of reliable data on PSC behaviour, reported instances of altruism are 
little more than anecdotal evidence. Still, they pose a challenge to the literature’s 
conceptualization of PSC behaviour.  
Conclusion 
While PSCs have indisputably engaged in problematic behaviour in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
their overall record does not support the claim that PSCs are inherently problematic. More 
importantly, the prevalent behavioural model fails to explain why PSCs, in the absence of 
effective regulation, would repeatedly engage in professional, even altruistic behaviour.  
Industry representatives and proponents echo this argument in their criticism of the PSC 
literature: they complain that allegations against PSCs are unsubstantiated and 
exaggerated,115 stress the relatively low number of incidents116 and the acts of heroism 
committed by PSCs117 and suggest that disproportionate attention is paid to ‘atypical, but 
high-profile companies’.118 However, their argument is limited to a critique of the prevalent 
behavioural model, which is supported by anecdotal evidence alone. When confronted with 
incidents of misconduct, PSC representatives stress their own accountability mechanisms, 
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the quality of their employees and their volatile operational environment and blame 
unspecified “cowboys”, i.e. companies with little respect for the law or their customers.119 
Yet, like the critics of PSC use, its proponents fail to provide a convincing alternative 
explanation for PSC behaviour that is supported by the available evidence and that 
addresses the legitimate questions raised by the literature. They fail to explain why - in a de 
facto legal vacuum, without strong institutional support for a professional ethos and with 
weak customer control – PSCs behave in a professional manner that, allegedly, at times 
violates their own profit-interest. Since neither critics nor proponents of PSC use offer such a 
behavioural model, this raises several interesting questions that this thesis sets out to 
address.       
 
Section Five: The Research Question 
The absence of problematic behaviour and the presence of professional, even altruistic 
actions exposes an important gap in the PSC literature: Its conceptualization of PSC 
behaviour fails to fully account for PSCs’ actual performance in Iraq and Afghanistan. Hence, 
either the literature’s conceptualization of PSC motivation is flawed or PSCs are more 
constrained in their opportunities - or both. By answering the questions “Why are UK PSCs 
not more often engaged in problematic behaviour?” and “Why do UK PSCs engage in 
behaviour that seems to contravene their profit interests?” this thesis will develop an 
alternative model of PSC behaviour.  
PSC Motivation – Beyond the Homo Economicus 
At the heart of this alternative behavioural model lies a very different approach to PSC 
motivation. The literature reduces PSC behaviour to a purely economic interaction 
undertaken by what is essentially a homo economicus,120 i.e. a rational, self-interested, 
profit-maximising actor.121 Thus, the prevalent model is vulnerable to a line of criticism 
similar to the one levelled against the homo economicus within economics. As Francis 
Edgeworth stresses, the homo economicus is an ’unsympathetic isolation abstractly assumed 
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in Economics’.122 Critics like Frank Dobbins and Amartya Sen contend that its usefulness is 
restricted to being an abstract modelling assumption aimed at answering very general 
questions.123 Indeed, would people actually behave like this ‘anthropological monster’,124 
they would be ‘social moron[s]’,125 incapable of commitment, moral judgement or 
sympathy’,126 and ‘[n]o society would be viable’.127  
However, the PSC literature describes PSCs as if they actually behaved like a homo 
economicus. This is exemplified by the use of John Donahue’s The Privatization Decision in 
the PSC literature.128 Donahue argues that public (the state-organized military) and private 
agents (PSCs) behave in different ways, due to different methods of compensation.129 He 
goes on to describe a ‘pure’ private agent as resembling a homo economicus,130 but Donahue 
also stresses that his characterization of public and private agents is ‘contingent’ and ‘slightly 
artificial’.131 Neither Singer nor Avant mention such constraints in their respective 
discussions of Donahue132 - let alone the many authors that cite them.  
The above criticism against the homo economicus concept is not concerned about its 
intimation that private actors are self-interested or profit-motivated. Likewise, this thesis 
does not dispute the important role financial interests play in PSC decision-making. Instead, 
it is the assertion that the homo economicus ‘is actuated only by self-interest’133 that alarms 
critics. Likewise, this thesis questions the dominance the profit motive allegedly enjoys in 
PSC decision-making.134 To borrow a metaphor: Understanding PSC behaviour and its 
underlying motivations by solely focusing on their profit-motive is ‘like driving down an 
interstate looking through a soda straw’.135 Profit is important, but it is not everything.    
                                                     
122
 Edgeworth in Sen (1977), p. 326. 
123
 Dobbins (2004), p. 3ff, Sen (1977), p. 322ff. See Becker (1992) for an opposing view. 
124
 Bourdieu (2005), p. 83. 
125
 Sen (1977), p. 336.  
126
 Ibid., pp. 326-336. 
127
 Johansen in Sen (1977), p. 332. For similar concerns about the viability of social institutions, see Cramp 
(1991), p. 59 (family) or Fukuyama (1995), p. 14 (trade).  
128
 Donahue (1989) in Avant (2005), p. 48, Singer (2003), pp. 151-155. 
129
 Donahue (1989), p. 39ff.  
130
 Ibid., pp. 40-42. 
131
 Ibid., p. 39. 
132
 Singer (2003), pp. 151-155, Avant (2005), p. 48.  
133
 Edgeworth in Sen (1977), p. 317.  
134
 Jenings (2006), p. 24, Spear (2006), p. 45. 
135




If PSCs are not solely motivated by their self-interested desire for financial profit, what else 
might motivate them? The following sections will outline an alternative behavioural model 
that this thesis will build on.  
While neo-classical economics stands staunchly by the homo economicus,136 heterodox 
economics, specifically economic sociology, may provide an answer. As its name suggests, 
heterodox economics does not present a single, coherent explanation for economic 
action.137 Its raison d’être and the “glue” holding it together is, according to Tony Lawson, 
their ‘opposition to the mainstream or “neoclassical” orthodoxy’.138 Economic sociology, in 
particular, focuses its criticism on how neo-classical economics atomizes economic action.139 
Contrary to that view, the central tenet of economic sociology is that economic action is 
“embedded” in a social context and influenced by it.140 Indeed, several cases have been 
made for the relevance of the social context for economic action. Pierre Bourdieu and 
Anthony Giddens argue that the degree of isolation assumed by neo-liberal economics is 
impossible.141 Geert Hofstede has shown how economic action differs depending on its 
cultural context,142 while Ernst Fehr and Colin Camerer as well as Herbert Simon and James 
March highlighted the limits of human cognition and the need for guidance from the social 
context.143 What these arguments have in common - and what they share with economic 
sociology – is the belief that explaining economic action by solely looking at its economic 
aspects is insufficient. Instead, economic sociology draws on ‘the sociological perspective’ to 
understand ‘economic phenomena’.144 It argues that economic actors have social roles - 
‘scripts’ in Frank Dobbins’ words.145 These scripts, referred to as conventions at the 
collective level,146 influence economic action through three social mechanisms. 
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Institutions, Networks, Power   
 Institutions, which Dobbins defines as ‘conventions and the meaning they have for 
people’, offer actors prescriptions on how they are expected to behave.147 Such 
institutions can manifest in various forms: They can be informal, based on tradition, 
e.g. a common culture148 and best practices,149 or they can have a more formal, legal 
character, e.g. contract law or economic policy.150 Institutions can be aimed at a 
specific purpose or be the result of ‘history and happenstance’,151 and they may be 
adhered to tacitly or consciously.152 In any case, institutions are created and 
sustained by networks.153 
 Networks teach members conventions and, crucially, enforce their adherence by 
granting/denying membership and the privileges associated with it. However, 
networks need not rely on coercive means, as they can propagate institutions by 
shaping their members’ self-perception and the perception of the world around 
them.154 Like institutions, networks exist in various manifestations: They can be 
formal, tightly organized bodies with codified rules, e.g. professional organizations155 
and trade unions,156 or informal, loosely organized affairs, such as technology 
clusters,157 business groups158 or regular customers.159 How networks teach and 
enforce institutions and what shape these institutions take, in turn, depends on the 
underlying power relations.     
 Power describes the ability of actors to ‘promot[e] practices and public policies that 
are in their interest as being in the common interest’.160 Traditional economics ‘has 
tended to regard economic action as an exchange among equals’,161 and has ignored 
asymmetric power distributions among buyers and sellers. Moreover, power is not 
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limited to coercion, but also encompasses the ability to set norms and values or to 
influence political processes.162 Likewise, it need not be limited to the relationship 
between buyers and sellers or employers and employees, but extends to third parties 
that influence economic action through their normative power.  
Conclusion 
This thesis hypothesises that, through institutions, networks and power relations, the social 
context, in which PSCs operate, influences their economic actions. Specifically, building on 
Granovetter’s Theory of Embeddedness and the scholarship it has produced in economic 
sociology, this thesis argues that PSCs are motivated by financial profit as well as by a desire 
to adhere to social conventions.  
This alternative approach to PSCs’ incentives opens up a new analytical perspective on their 
opportunities to engage in problematic behaviour. First, the presence of considerations 
other than financial profit renders some behavioural options unviable, because the 
associated price of violating social conventions is not offset by financial profit. Secondly, 
non-financial motivations open up new behavioural opportunities that previously, in a purely 
profit-oriented assessment, would have made little sense. Thus, PSCs may pursue what is 
financially a second-best option, because it conforms to dearly held social conventions. This 
differs from the prevalent behavioural model, according to which PSCs would seize any 
opportunity for misconduct as long as prospective profits exceed expected negative financial 
consequences. 
In sum, the proposed alternative behavioural model does not suggest that PSCs cease to be 
rational actors nor that they are no longer interested in financial profit. Instead, it argues 
that their hierarchy of preferences prominently includes non-financial motives. This 
alternative model can therefore explain the presence of professional behaviour and 
misconduct and, thus, seems to better fit the available evidence.  
 
                                                     
162
 Dobbins (2005), p. 27.  
36 
 
Section Six: The Relationship between Profit and Conventions 
Despite its emphasis on the 'embeddedness' of PSC behaviour, this thesis is acutely aware of 
the risk of “oversocializing” PSC decision-making, i.e. of losing sight of the importance of 
economic motives in favour of non-financial concerns. Such an ‘oversocialized’ view would 
distort PSCs’ economic actions in a manner not dissimilar to the ‘undersocialized’ view neo-
classical economics and by extension the prevalent behavioural model relies on.163 This 
section therefore takes a closer look at the relationship between financial and non-financial 
motives in PSC decision-making to determine under what circumstances either one “carries 
the day”. 
When Do PSCs Adhere to Conventions? 
Adherence to conventions does not per se imply appropriate behaviour and neither does the 
pursuit of financial profit invariably result in misconduct. Indeed, adherence to conventions 
may inspire problematic behaviour, e.g. when military values inspire individual contractors 
to engage in offensive military operations. Also, while market exchanges ‘are shaped by, and 
depend on, other social relations’,164 profitability remains the sine qua none of corporate 
life.165 A company that ignores its profits in favour of social conventions will go bankrupt. 
Likewise, a PSC that disregards social conventions will be shunned by its clients and 
eventually fail. Hence, this thesis argues that profitability (unlike profit-maximization)166 is 
generally not only compatible with obeying conventions, but dependent on it.  
One way to illustrate why behaviour that seemingly runs contrary to the profit motive of 
PSCs, i.e. obeying conventions, can be vital for their profitability is to distinguish between 
short-term and long-term profitability. As previously argued, the relationship between PSCs 
and their clients is prone to hold-up problems, as PSCs’ operational environment renders a 
priori specification impossible and an ad hoc change in supplier problematic. A PSC set on 
maximising its short-term profit can exploit this situation, but it can also continue to reliably 
provide its services. The foregone short-term profits – “opportunity costs” in the parlance of 
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economists167 – are then an investment made in the hope that, in the long-term, the PSC’s 
good reputation will attract new business, while maximising its short-term profit is more 
likely to be punished by its clients.  
This thesis will describe various ways in which conventions influence PSC behaviour. The 
discussion above merely serves to illustrate that adhering to conventions in most cases 
benefits PSCs’ profitability.168 The distinction between long- and short-term profits also 
raises another problem that the PSC literature has ignored to date, but that will feature 
prominently in this thesis. According to Armen Alchian, profit-maximising behaviour is 
predicated on ‘complete information’ and ‘certain foresight’.169 PSCs have to know which 
behaviour maximises their financial profit, taking into account the long-term consequences 
of their actions. Given their challenging operational environment and the volatility in the 
market for PSC services, it is questionable if perfect information and certain foresight are a 
reasonable assumption. Instead, PSCs are faced with considerable uncertainty and 
ambiguity. Adherence to conventions thus helps PSCs overcome such information 
constraints. 
When Does Profit Trump All? 
If, indeed, adherence to conventions is frequently a pre-condition for profitability, this raises 
the question as to under what circumstances PSCs disregard social conventions in favour of 
financial profit?  
As previously noted, many instances of problematic behaviour do not necessarily represent 
PSC misconduct, but are instead attributable to individual employees, temporary lapses in 
oversight or to the nature of the service and operational environment. While, at times, the 
potential profit of misconduct may exceed the costs of violating social conventions, 
interviews, suggest that such circumstances are rare, once long-term consequences are 
taken into consideration.170 Indeed, PSC representatives frequently point to the Nisoor 
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Square incident:171 However profitable Blackwater’s aggressive posture may initially have 
been, ultimately, it imperilled the company’s business.172 Within the prevalent behavioural 
model, which abstractly weighs the costs and benefits of various behavioural options, it is 
difficult to explain why a company would employ such aggressive posture despite its evident 
long-term risks. The approach proposed by this thesis stresses the importance of cognition, 
i.e. how PSCs perceive themselves and their environment. Specifically, it uses Herbert 
Simon’s concept of “bounded rationality”, which views an actor’s choice as constrained by 
his/her ‘cognitive limitations’ and the ‘structure of the environment’,173 to argue that a PSC’s 
subjective assessment of its social and economic situation may differ considerably from any 
abstract, objective evaluation. PSCs may therefore flout convention because they are 
unaware of or fail to interpret an applicable convention correctly. Likewise, a company may 
misjudge its position in the market, leading it to violate conventions because it believes its 
clients unable to sanction its behaviour. Hence, it is arguably less the social or economic 
context per se that determines a PSC’s behaviour, but its limited and often biased perception 
of its environment.  
The Limits of the Alternative Behavioural Model 
Finally, it is worth considering the limitations of the proposed behavioural model. First, a PSC 
needs to be in a situation that economically permits the adherence to conventions. A 
company teetering on the brink of bankruptcy in a market characterized by cut-throat 
competition may have to focus on short-term profits to ensure its survival, even if such 
behaviour endangers its long-term profitability. Secondly, PSCs’ market positions cannot be 
such that they are insulated from the consequences of violating conventions. A monopolist 
need not adhere to conventions, because clients cannot sanction it for lack of an alternative. 
Much as the social context influences the economic actions of PSCs, the economic context 
delimits the influence of social conventions. In deciding whether to adhere to or violate 
conventions, abstract measures of competitive pressure are less decisive than a PSC’s 
perception of competition. This is particularly salient, given the high level of uncertainty and 
ambiguity in the PSI.  
                                                     
171
 In September 2007, a Blackwater PSD came under fire in Nisoor Square, Baghdad. During the ensuing 
firefight, 17 civilians were killed (BBC (2008 II)). The incident led to Blackwater’s license to be revoked and a 
FBI investigation later found 14 of the 17 deaths to be unjustified killings (Horton (2007)). 
172
 Cole/Chon (2009), O’Harrow (2009), Sauer/Chuchmach (2009). 
173
 Gigerenzer/Selten (2001), p. 4. See also Simon (1957), p. 196. 
39 
 
This stresses the need to reappraise not only the social context in which PSCs operate, but 
also their economic environment. This thesis will show that the polar opposites of hyper-
competition and monopoly demarcate the limits of the alternative behavioural model and 
help to explain variations in PSC behaviour. What emerges can be described as a bell-curve: 
At the extremes, where there is either no competition or competition is absolute, 
conventions matter little. On the fringes, where competition is either very strong or very 
weak, their effect is likely low. In the midst of the spectrum, however, where the vast 
majority of PSCs arguably operate, market and social pressures combine in PSC decision-
making.   
Conclusion 
Conceptually, the alternative behavioural model provides a more nuanced view of PSC 
decision-making. However, it is not merely an extension of the prevalent behavioural model 
that just adds conventions to its analysis. Instead, it turns the prevalent behavioural model 
on its head: Rather than being solely motivated by profit, PSCs generally behave in 
accordance with prevailing social conventions, i.e. they aim to serve their clients loyally and 
reliably within the norms and values of wider society. It further argues that problematic 
behaviour not only occurs less frequently and for different reasons than previously assumed, 
but also that it is largely avoidable without the use of costly formal regulation, intrusive 
monitoring and severe sanctions. This nuanced view of PSC behaviour, which combines 
social and economic influences and emphasises the importance of cognition, has significant 
implications for this thesis’s scope, methodology and data generation.  
 
Section Seven: Methodology 
In essence, this thesis argues that adherence to conventions at times displaces the profit 
motive in PSCs’ decision-making. The analysis of conventions and of their impact on 
economic action, however, poses a number of methodological challenges. 
How to Study Conventions    
Conventions are often uncodified and implicit, and PSCs may not be conscious of their 
adherence to them nor of their impact. To make them visible, research needs to take into 
account institutions, networks and power relations. The literature’s equation of PSCs with 
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their management ignores conventions that primarily affect or originate with their 
employees and clients. Yet, such conventions may be decisive for PSC decision-making. To 
assess their impact, one therefore has to study context not conventions per se. Moreover, 
PSCs, their employees and clients can simultaneously be part of numerous networks, subject 
to various power relations and affected by multiple conventions. An analysis of conventions 
therefore has to also identify and focus on a specific set of networks and their influence. 
Another reason why such a narrower, more targeted approach seems appropriate is the 
specificity of conventions to the members of a network. Neo-classical economics 
conceptualizes markets as ‘single economic systems’174 and, similarly, the PSC literature 
treats the PSI as a single, global market.175 This approach invariably overemphasises global 
networks, whose loose, heterogeneous membership limits the scope and strength of their 
influence.176 Smaller networks, whose membership is more sharply defined and whose 
influence on PSC behaviour may be stronger, are all but ignored. An analysis of conventions 
should therefore be deep in its understanding, holistic in its approach and narrow in its 
scope. 
However, such a holistic approach poses its own challenges. One limitation with important 
methodological implications is that ‘data on PSCs and their activities are in short supply’.177 
In general, this assertion is debatable,178 but, with respect to conventions and their 
underlying institutions, networks and power relations in the PSI, it certainly applies. Given 
this lack of data and the PSC literature’s limited engagement with the analysis of PSCs’ 
economic actions in their social context, this thesis does not aspire to present an account of 
thoroughly verified causal relationships. Instead, it hopes to provide an initial, tentative 
understanding of how conventions, institutions, networks and power relations influence PSC 
behaviour – a stepping stone that future research can hopefully verify and expand on.  
The exploratory character of this thesis is further evident in how it addresses another 
important limitation, namely the need to identify which of the many conventions, 
institutions, networks and power relations exert the greatest influence on PSC behaviour. 
While the thesis draws on the applicable literature in economic sociology, its analysis in the 
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specific context of the PSI is inspired by Barney Glaser’s and Anselm Strauss’ concept of 
grounded theory, i.e. ‘the systematic discovery of [...] theory from [...] data’.179 It is 
important to note that this thesis’ use of grounded theory is nevertheless limited insofar as it 
does not aspire to generate inherently new theories.180 Instead, one of its original 
contributions lies in the adaptation of economic sociology to studies of the PSI. Within this 
more limited aim, grounded theory is used to understand how conventions, institutions, 
networks and power relations manifest, interact and influence behaviour in the specific 
context of the PSI.  
In particular, a series of initial interviews was used to identify recurring themes in the 
‘meanings participants [i.e. PSCs, their employees and their clients] attach to their 
behaviour’.181 Subsequent interviews reshaped and refined these themes and grouped them 
into three aspects of PSC behaviour,182 which, with one chapter dedicated to each, provide 
the core of this thesis: 
- The Individual PSC (Chapter Three) explores decision-making processes within PSCs, 
the competing interests of PSCs and their employees and the role of professionalism 
in resolving conflicts of interests. 
- The Market of PSC Services (Chapter Four) discusses the PSC literature’s 
understanding of monopolies and analyses the competitive pressure in the PSI and its 
effect on PSC behaviour. 
- The Relationship between PSCs and their Clients (Chapter Five) focuses on how 
(contractual) relations influence PSC behaviour. 
Three themes emerged in the process of identifying those conventions, institutions, 
networks and power relationships that are of relevance for the PSI, namely professionalism, 
competition and (contractual) relations. The importance of these themes was further 
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confirmed by their prominence in the PSC literature, which however judges their influence 
to be too weak to effectively control PSC behaviour.183     
The Available Data on PSCs and Its Problems 
This raises the question as to what kind of data is needed to determine the influence of 
conventions on PSC behaviour. A frequent complaint in the PSC literature concerns the lack 
of empirical data,184 which is blamed on the industry’s insistence on corporate 
confidentiality.185 While such concerns may have initially been valid, given that the 
widespread use of PSCs is a relatively new phenomenon, Freedom of Information releases, 
government reports, academic research and media coverage unearthed a vast amount of 
data in recent years.186 Unfortunately, the available data is unevenly distributed. On some 
topics – the US government’s use of PSCs187 and their legal status188 – data is plentiful. On 
labour relations, competition and client relations, however, little is known to date. This lack 
of data is particularly pronounced when it comes to PSCs’ perceptions, i.e. the very kind of 
data needed to analyse the impact of conventions on their decision-making.   
Filling the Data Gap: The Qualitative Interview 
Corporate confidentiality and physical insecurity make it impossible to obtain additional 
information about PSC behaviour by directly observing it.189 There are, however, other ways 
to ascertain PSCs’ perceptions of their socio-economic environment: Many PSCs file annual 
reports; clients and PSCs publish trade journals, online newsletters and websites and 
individual contractors write biographies, blogs and in forums. Also, secondary sources like 
academic research and media reporting contain useful information.190 Yet, these sources of 
data are each limited in their usefulness by their specific purpose. Annual reports, for 
instance, are aimed at satisfying fiduciary duties, not at giving an honest assessment of a 
PSC’s market situation. Moreover, one simply cannot probe an annual report or challenge an 
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online newsletter to ascertain a deep understanding of PSCs’ attitude to their socio-
economic context.191  
Hence, this thesis draws on forty-nine semi-structured interviews, altogether about 350 
pages, in addition to the aforementioned sources. These interviews allow this thesis to dig 
deeper and to make an original contribution to the PSC literature by exploring issues not 
addressed elsewhere. However, said interviews were also strongly informed by the 
aforementioned sources and often served to complement them by verifying data. This 
partial interdependence makes it hard to quantify the thesis’ reliance on interviews relative 
to other sources. Generally, a balance was sought between interviews and other sources of 
data, but on key issues like the attitudes of PSCs, their clients and employees these 
interviews were the primary source of information. Given the important role interviews play 
in this thesis, the following section will take a closer look at their design and purpose. 
 
Section Eight: Purpose, Design and Use of the Interviews  
According to Herbert and Irene Rubin, ‘[q]ualitative interviewing is a way of finding out what 
others feel and think about their world’, 192 which is exactly what the interviews conducted 
for this thesis tried to achieve with respect to PSCs, their employees and clients. Ideally, 
qualitative interviews are ‘conversational partnerships’193 that allow interviewees to express 
their understanding of their environment194 and interviewers to probe deeper and challenge 
their statements.195 An obvious drawback of qualitative interviewing is their time-
intensiveness.196 This further stresses the need to narrow the focus of this thesis, which this 
chapter will return to at a later point.  
Sample Selection and Viability 
The purpose of interviews is not ‘intrinsic’ but ‘instrumental’,197 i.e. the thesis wants to 
generalize from the specific interview information to the UK PSI as a whole. Hence, 
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interviews need to be, in the aggregate, representative of the PSI. The study of PSCs 
presents two obstacles to producing such a representative sample: 
Information: Unfortunately, there is no authoritative list of UK PSCs providing armed 
perimeter, convoy or personal security in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2003-2008. Moreover, the 
volatile security environment and the apparent ease with which new companies entered the 
PSI render the identification of a viable sample challenging. One way to address this 
challenge is to identify the largest PSCs and ensure their inclusion in the sample.198 Large 
PSCs are not solely important due to their size, but they also exert greater political influence 
and are often emulated by smaller competitors.199 Using lists from the BAPSC, the US 
Embassy in Baghdad and the PSCAI,200 as well as various publications on PSCs201 and 
conversations with industry experts and PSC representatives, this thesis identified ten UK 
companies among these “key players”. Seven of them were successfully interviewed for this 
thesis. The sample was further complemented with interview data from smaller UK PSCs. 
The aforementioned information-related problems were exacerbated with the more 
numerous and less visible, smaller PSCs. Fortunately, two PSC representatives provided 
access to their respective companies’ global lists of PSCs.202 Based on this information, 
sixteen additional UK PSCs were identified, eight of whom agreed to be interviewed for this 
study.  
Finally, while many studies on PSCs include interview data, they are generally limited to 
managerial staff and omit employees and clients.203 In contrast, two aspects informed this 
thesis’ sample selection with respect to PSC clients: First, genuine private sector demand is 
often overlooked in favour of public sector institutions, i.e. DoD, DoS and FCO, and their 
prime contractors, despite the private sector’s often extensive experience as PSC customer. 
Secondly, private sector demand for PSC services is often reduced to extractive industries, 
but initial interviews strongly suggested that the private sector clientele of UK PSC is 
considerably more diverse.204 Hence, this thesis took great care to include interviews with 
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private sector customers from a variety of backgrounds, including banking, insurance, 
development. With respect to PSC employees, this thesis identified three groups that 
needed to be included: managerial staff, including employees with no military background 
and personnel stationed “in-theatre”. While conducting interviews with PSC clients and 
managerial staff was relatively easy, interviewing PSC personnel “in-theatre” confronted 
considerable access problems.   
Access: Molly Dunigan rightly notes that obtaining primary data on PSCs is ‘extremely 
difficult’.205 First, security concerns make fieldwork in PSCs’ areas of operation difficult, 
which complicates interviewing PSC employees “in the field”. When face-to-face interviews 
were impossible, this thesis relied on interviews via telephone and email. Moreover, this 
thesis especially targeted PSC employees that maintained blogs or newsgroups. As these PSC 
employees receive frequent feedback from their peers, interviewing them provides an 
insight into shared sentiments among PSC employees. One interviewee likened his situation 
to that of an information node in a network: ‘My readership is pretty strong and [...] 
definitely keeps me in line and informed. [...] They help me see the bigger picture’.206 By 
accessing these “nodes”, the thesis is able to identify general trends in how PSC employees 
see themselves and their work. Secondly, generating primary data about PSCs is complicated 
by concerns about corporate confidentiality, which cause PSCs, their clients and employees 
to frequently decline requests for interviews. Hence, the response rate to more than 200 
interview requests was less than 5%,207 while the remaining interviews were generated 
through the use of snowballing, i.e. interviewees were invited to suggest future participants 
and to introduce the study to them. One drawback of this technique is the risk of bias.208 By 
selectively recommending participants, interviewees can “shape” the author’s information. 
There are two ways in which this study sought to compensate for said risk: It used multiple 
starting points rather than a single chain of referrals and it relied on triangulation to control 
for bias.   
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Steinar Kvale notes that ‘the number of subjects necessary depends on a study’s purpose’.209 
This study’s purpose is not to predict the behaviour of specific individual PSCs, let alone their 
individual representatives and employees. Instead, its focus lies on the UK PSI as a whole and 
discusses how companies behave in response to the conditions present in said industry. 
Given this thesis’ specific focus and the measures outlined above, the sample presented 
above is viable despite the aforementioned concerns about information and access. Still, 
rather than solely focussing on its viability, i.e. whether the sample is sufficiently 
representative of it to make any claim about the UK PSI as a whole, it is important to 
highlight the sample’s limitations and their possible implications for the intended analysis. 
Two concerns seem to be particularly pertinent, namely the question whether large and 
small PSCs describe the UK PSI exhaustively and the relative weight of PSC representatives 
and employees in the sample.  
First of all, this thesis, by including both large and small UK PSCs, relies on a more 
representative sample than is common in the PSC literature.210 Still, critics may argue that 
the sample excludes even smaller outfits that form ad hoc in response to specific contractual 
demands and exist only temporarily.211 The spectre of such “cowboy” companies is often 
raised by critics and PSI representatives alike, along with the charge that they are largely 
responsible for misconduct in the industry. While the existence of such very small, often 
temporary private security providers is not in doubt,212 there is no data to support the 
significance attributed to them, both in economic terms and in terms of their share of the 
industry’s misconduct. Moreover, their limited impact on the UK PSI is evident in the fact 
that, when discussing issues like competition, inter-industry cooperation and PSC regulation, 
none of the interviewees mentioned such very small, often temporary PSCs as a relevant 
factor. Given their lack of significance in the context of the UK PSI as a whole, it was decided 
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to exclude these very small, often temporary companies from the sample. Therefore, this 
thesis’ analysis may not fully apply to such temporary outfits.213      
As to the relationship between PSC representative and employees in the thesis’ sample, a 
clear-cut distinction between the two is often difficult to make, as mid-management 
positions can be classified both as PSC employees and representatives.214 Also, many 
interviewees have been both employees and representatives in the course of their career in 
the UK PSI and their responses to the interview questions are often a blend of these 
experiences. Still, the emphasis in the sample clearly lies with UK PSC representatives. This is 
largely a function of the thesis’ focus, which lies on the UK PSI and on corporate decision-
making in said industry. While bottom-up dynamics are an important factor in determining 
the actions UK PSCs take,215 individual employees exert less influence on the decisions PSCs 
take as a corporation than their managerial counterparts. This imbalance therefore does not 
negatively affect the viability of the sample. However, given its limited scope, the thesis’ 
analysis is limited to the effect of PSC employees’ influence on corporate decision-making 
processes, which leaves crucial questions about the influence itself – how it forms, how it is 
affected by outside influences, etc. - unanswered. Likewise, future research will have to 
show whether the conclusions this thesis draws with respect to corporate decision-making 
are also applicable to the decision-making processes of individual PSC employees.216       
Challenges I: Trust during the Interview 
Even after accepting an interview request, interviewees remained cautious about the 
information they shared – hardly ideal circumstances for “conversational partnerships”.217 
This cautionary stance was somewhat alleviated by the interview process (see below). 
Moreover, snowballing greatly helped in overcoming this initial trust deficit. PSCs, which had 
previously categorically refused to be interviewed, participated in the study after being 
introduced via snowballing,218 even when the parties did not know each other personally, 
but only by reputation. The use of snowballing, however, required additional care to protect 
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these “gatekeepers”:219 No identifiable part of any previous conversation was shared with 
subsequent interviewees, even when a “gatekeeper” had brokered the interview.  
Challenges II: Data Verification and Triangulation 
Another challenge was how to verify interview data. Faced with the prospect of costly 
regulation, PSCs have an incentive to distort data to present themselves in a favourable light. 
To verify their statements, this thesis relied on data triangulation. According to Alan Bryman, 
the term triangulation is commonly used to describe research that mixes methodologies, 
while ‘data triangulation’ is the less controversial combination of different sources of 
information.220 This thesis triangulated data across interviews by speaking to PSCs, their 
employees and clients and it triangulated data across different types of sources. Corporate 
reports, for example, were very useful in this respect, because legal requirements limit the 
extent to which PSCs can shape the information they contain. This last point highlights that 
triangulation not only verifies data, but increases an analysis’ ‘richness and complexity’221 by 
adding information, e.g. profit figures, that is unlikely to come up in interviews.      
Challenges III: Trust and Freedom vs. Focus 
Any interview has to balance two aims: (1) engendering sufficient trust and giving 
interviewees the freedom to express their views, whilst (2) keeping the conversation 
focused. To foster trust through transparency, participants were presented with the list of 
interview questions ahead of time. They were also made aware that the questions exceeded 
the allotted time and encouraged to choose which issues to focus on, thereby allowing them 
to ‘steer [or, at least, co-pilot] the conversation’.222 To keep the interviews focused, semi-
structured interviews were chosen223 and questions were structured in four categories:   
Background: Interviewees were asked to describe their professional career and how the PSI 
had changed in recent years. This introductory part provided first insights into how 
interviewees view their social and economic context.   
Individual PSCs: This section focused on how interviewees experienced power relations 
between managerial and non-managerial staff. Professionalism would frequently be 
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mentioned and interviewees’ understanding of the concept probed by follow-up 
questions.224 
The Market for PSC Services: Interviewees were asked to describe the market for PSC 
services and its level of competition. Follow-up questions targeted interviewees’ views on 
their clients’ competence and on PSCs’ abilities to develop strategies to compete in PSI.    
The Relationship between PSCs and their clients: These questions focused on client 
relations in the PSI, especially on contract (re-)negotiations. Interviewees were asked to 
describe common problems affecting client relations and their resolution. Follow-up 
questions explored quality control measures, personal networks and their influence on 
contractual relations.    
Challenge IV: Interviewees’ Preferences and Fealty to the Interview Data 
Finally, the use of data generated from qualitative interviews poses two challenges, which 
concern specifically the use of citations in this thesis. First, successfully conducting 
interviews in the PSI requires the establishment of trust relationships - prior to the interview 
to engender participation, during the interview to generate usable data and, crucially, after 
the interview to maintain participants’ consent and for snowballing to be effective.225 While 
interviewees were generally happy to discuss the PSI, often with considerable frankness, 
many expressed a reluctance to be cited directly. Secondly, interviewees would often 
describe the PSI in striking statements, yet add qualifications and thus nuance to this initial 
assessment in the course of the interview. While tempting, given their concise and striking 
nature, merely citing their initial statements would distort the often much more subtle 
arguments the interviewees were putting forward. At the same time, the conversational 
nature of the interview often meant that interviewees would make qualifications to their 
initial statements at later points in the course of the interview. Drawing together the various 
aspects of their arguments would have involved citing lengthy passages from the interviews, 
which would have unnecessarily distracted from the underlying argument. In light of these 
concerns about interviewees’ preferences/research ethics and the integrity of the interview 
data, the decision was taken to limit the use of direct citations from the interviews and, 
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instead, to present the thesis’ analysis and use the footnotes to highlight where it 




Section Nine: Research Ethics 
Nicholas Walliman identifies two aims of ethical research: protecting the honesty and 
professional integrity of the researcher and avoid harm to research participants.226 In the 
case of qualitative interviews in the PSI, one may add a third aim: establishing the trust 
necessary for a successful interview. To meet these aims, this thesis used the ESRC 
Framework for Research Ethics, which emphasises four elements – information, voluntary 
participation, anonymity/confidentiality and appropriate use227 – and expanded them to 
meet the specific needs of this thesis.  
Information: A project description was provided during the initial contact, expanded upon in 
subsequent correspondence and at the beginning of the interview. During said 
correspondence and prior to the interview, participants were encouraged to ask questions 
about the project. The project description contained a detailed outline of the project and the 
interview process, the proposed confidentiality arrangement and the intended use of the 
data. Also, a list containing all interview questions was previously submitted to participants 
and interviewees were asked to provide feedback on the interview process.228 
Voluntary participation: Consent to participate in the study was obtained during the initial 
correspondence and reaffirmations were sought at the beginning of the interview and 
during the transcription process. Interviewees are very much ‘the owner[s] of the data they 
provide’ and, as such, participants were offered to withdraw their consent at any point.229 
The sharing of interview questions ahead of time greatly strengthened interviewees’ ability 
to give informed consent. Moreover, the opportunity to steer the conversation allowed 
interviewees to avoid questions without having to explicitly refuse them.    
Anonymity/confidentiality: Feedback to initial interviews indicated that the use of recording 
devices would not be possible. This led to the development of a transcription process with 
considerable implications for ensuring confidentiality and anonymity. Notes were taken 
during the interview and a non-verbatim transcript was later produced. To avoid omitting or 
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distorting data during transcription,230 a copy of the transcript was submitted to the 
interviewee for review. Such review copies would also include requests for clarification and 
comments about how the statements could be used in this thesis.231 The transcript would 
then be revised accordingly and re-submitted to the interviewee for approval.232 Once a 
copy of the definitive transcript was sent to the interviewee for his/her records, the notes of 
the initial conversation were destroyed.233 During this process, interviewees were 
encouraged to indicate any passages they would like to have struck from the record and to 
determine how their statements should be attributed. Finally, fully anonymised “working-
copies” of the transcripts were created with colour-codes indicating the various levels of 
attribution, while the definitive transcript and the key were securely stored. 
Appropriate use: The purpose of the project and the role of the collected interview data was 
specified during initial contact and reiterated prior to the interview. The funding status of 
this research project was indicated to the interviewees234 and they were informed that their 
consent would not extend to any commercial use of the data.  
Finally, while the interviews did not cover sensitive data, e.g. about operational security, or 
record personal information, special precautions were still taken in designing the interviews 
to protect participants from harm. For instance, the multiple-step consent process and the 
ability to change the record during the transcription process gave interviewees additional 
options to reconsider their consent and confidentiality/anonymity requirements. This was 
especially pertinent for telephone and email interviews, when the interviewee’s mental 
state could not be assessed.  
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Section Ten:  The Scope of the Thesis 
This final section makes the case for a narrow approach to the study of PSC behaviour and 
outlines its choice of focus. Specifically, this thesis focuses on UK PSCs that provided armed 
site, personal or convoy security between 2003 and 2009 in Iraq or Afghanistan.  
The Scope of the Thesis I: The Case for a Narrow Focus 
Even a perfunctory review of the literature shows that security privatization is defined very 
broadly:235 PSCs, i.e. private companies that provide armed personal, convoy and perimeter 
security, are grouped together with PMCs and various defence contractors, they are 
believed to compete in a single, global market and little significance is attached to the 
specific context from which they originate or in which they operate. This prevalent, broad 
approach poses three problems to the study of PSC behaviour: 
First, the literature’s definition is vague on which companies are considered to be part of this 
globally competing industry. It regards PSC behaviour largely as a function of their structural 
characteristics: their for-profit status motivates PSCs to maximise profit, while their private 
ownership enables them to pursue such behaviour. However, PSCs share these structural 
characteristics with a wide variety of companies. Consequently, such unlikely candidates as 
the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Oxford Analytica236 and BW Fuhrpark Service GmbH237 
have been classified as PSCs. It is questionable if the behaviour of companies as vastly 
different from one another as Blackwater and EIU can be discussed in a meaningful manner. 
Moreover, this approach ignores the behavioural implications of characteristics that are 
specific to certain types of companies and to the context in which they operate.238 In 
contrast, this thesis argues that UK PSCs’ specific characteristics exert a more significant 
influence on their behaviour than the fact that they are private, permanent and profit-
making. 
Secondly, the notion that security privatization is a single, coherent phenomenon 
encourages “cross-pollination”: Authors apply evidence from one type of company, e.g. 
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Sandline in Sierra Leone, to contemporary PSCs.239 This approach falsely assumes a historical 
continuity between PSCs and traditional private military actors, which invites inaccurate 
comparisons between PSCs, mercenaries and PMCs. Alison Stange, for example, suggests 
that ‘medieval Europe made extensive use of privateers, yet it was not the most desirable 
set of arrangements for liberty, equality and prosperity’, implying that the use of PSCs has 
comparable consequences.240 ”Cross-pollination” can cause behavioural models to become 
“lopsided”, i.e. to be less applicable to contemporary PSCs than to actors that ceased to be 
relevant long ago.  
Scope of the Thesis II: PSCs 
This thesis’ decision to focus on PSCs is hardly controversial, given their prominent role in 
the contemporary academic debate. Yet, three more reasons justify this focus: First, PSCs are 
operationally important, as they enable mission-critical actors, e.g. NGOs and construction 
companies, to operate in post-conflict environments.241 Secondly, their use of lethal force 
challenges core tenets of international law and traditional concepts of state sovereignty.242 
Finally, PSCs have garnered considerable interest beyond the academic realm, which is 
evident in, among others, movies, TV series, books and internet blogs.  
Scope of the Thesis II: Iraq and Afghanistan 2003-2008 
This thesis further narrows its scope to companies operating in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2003-
2008. The PSCs in Afghanistan and Iraq have been subject to intense scrutiny in recent years. 
This ‘fishbowl effect’ will likely determine how PSCs are used and regulated in the 
foreseeable future.243 Interviews with PSC representatives confirm that the industry also 
perceives Iraq and Afghanistan as a ‘shift in paradigm’.244 Moreover, the volatility in the 
market for PSC services during said period offers a high level of in-case variation245: a largely 
dormant industry in 2003, a “bonanza” in 2004-2005 and a process of consolidation since 
2005.246 Finally, the unprecedented scale of PSC use since 2003 and the corresponding 
media, political and academic interest unearthed a rich set of data. Altogether, this makes 
                                                     
239
 See, for example, Spear (2006).  
240
 Stanger in CWC (2010). 
241
 Marshall (2011). 
242
 Ortiz (2009), p. 4ff, Kinsey (2005), p. 269ff. See also Chapter 6. 
243
 Spearin (2003), p. 27. See also Ortiz (2010), p. 3. 
244
 Worcester (2009). See also Isaacs (2010), Claridge (2010). 
245
 Van Evera (1997), pp. 82-87. 
246
 See Chapter 2. 
55 
 
PSCs in Afghanistan and Iraq from 2003 to 2008 not just a viable, but also an interesting and 
highly relevant case of study. 
Scope of the Thesis III: UK PSCs 
A more controversial choice is the thesis’ focus on UK PSCs.247 Christopher Kinsey, for 
example, claims that ‘it is impossible to write about PMCs without including US PMCs since 
they are at the forefront of the changes to private global security’.248 Indeed, while UK 
companies won large public sector contracts, notably Aegis and Erinys,249 Cockayne et al 
argue that US PSCs ‘easily constitute the largest share of the global market’.250 Moreover, US 
PSCs are even more dominant in the realm of public perception, where Blackwater has 
become synonymous with private security.251  
Yet, there are several reasons why UK PSCs merit closer attention. First, while relatively little 
is known about the UK PSI,252 it is widely recognized as the second largest segment in the 
market for PSC services.253 Moreover, successive UK governments have recognized the 
importance of the UK PSI. As Sir Michael Willcocks remarked in an interview, ‘there are not 
many industries left in which the UK can clearly claim a leadership role’254 and the desire to 
assure the commercial viability of the UK PSI permeates the UK government’s regulatory 
proposals.255 The sustainability afforded by this industry-friendly regulatory approach greatly 
adds to the importance of the UK PSI.  
Secondly, UK PSCs are more integrated into the broader economy than their US 
counterparts. Prior to the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the companies that came 
to dominate the US PSI either did not exist (Triple Canopy, Custer Battles) or they were 
defence contractors focused on public sector contracts (Blackwater, DynCorp).256 While most 
UK PSCs were also only founded in the late 1990s and early 2000s,257 companies like CRG 
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(founded in 1975) and Defence Systems Limited (1981)258 had already established a business 
model focused on private sector clients that many UK companies subsequently emulated.259 
When demand for PSC services exploded in 2003/2004, UK PSCs therefore already had a 
business model in place and a diverse clientele outside the public sector. This makes the UK 
PSI a particularly interesting case-study: If PSCs are as unreliable and disloyal as the 
literature suggests, how did their decades-long use by private sector clients in the absence of 
effective regulation lead to an industry that is generally well-regarded and lauded for its 
professionalism? 
Chapter two will present further arguments for focusing on UK PSCs. Still, the US PSI, and 
especially the US government as a key source of regulation and demand are too important 
to be left out of this study entirely. Thus, this thesis attempts a careful balancing act that 
emphasises its regional focus without ignoring important external influences: In its 
discussion of the decision-making in individual PSCs (Chapter 3), the thesis maintains an 
almost exclusive regional focus on the UK PSI, while its analysis of the PSI’s development 
(Chapter 2) features the US government and US PSI prominently. However, in the latter case, 
great care is taken to highlight how UK PSCs evolved in relation to broader, global trends and 
where they developed differently from their US counterparts. The same applies to the 
relationship between PSCs and their clients (Chapter 5): While their clientele is global, the 
focus of the analysis is on how said clientele affects the UK PSI. Here, it should also be noted 
that although governments all over the world use PSC services, in Iraq and Afghanistan from 
2003-2008, US government demand held an exceptionally dominant role.260 Moreover, US 
government spending has been intensely analysed and debated – so much so that it has 
arguably been more influential when it comes to shaping UK PSCs’ understanding of public 
sector contracting than the UK government’s demand for PSC services. Thus, when this 
thesis discusses public sector contracting, the concept is heavily influenced by the US 
government’s use of PSCs. Still, the focus of the analysis lies on how the public sector 
demand influences UK PSCs. Finally, the discussions of the market for PSC services (Chapter 
4) and the regulation of the PSI (Chapter 6) necessitate a similarly global perspective, whilst 
likewise granting special attention to characteristics specific to the UK PSI.       
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One drawback of this thesis’ narrow focus arguably is a more limited applicability of its 
results. However, this section has shown that UK PSCs providing armed security in Iraq and 
Afghanistan in 2003-2008 constituted an important case that merits attention. Indeed, the 
specificity of its results may prove to be advantageous. Christopher Kinsey argues that, ‘to 
politicians responsible for designing policy, [...] looking at activities as discrete issues makes 
the allocation of resources much easier than when all activities are simply labelled as one’.261 
For UK policymakers, this study may therefore represent invaluable input. Its narrow focus 
also allows this thesis to discuss the UK PSI at greater depth and include such previously 
overlooked aspects as the attitudes of PSCs’ employees and (private sector) clients.  
Finally, the argument this thesis proposes may be applicable beyond the UK PSI. For 
instance, lessons learnt from the UK PSI may be instructive to states like Germany and 
France, whose PSI is likely less focused on public sector demand than the US PSI.262 In its 
conclusion, this thesis will indeed suggest that its core argument, that PSCs’ social and 
economic context mitigates their profit-motive, is unlikely to be restricted to the UK PSI, yet 
it will also highlight that further research is needed to confirm this in greater detail.263  
Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter Two will provide further background on the 
subject of this study by analysing the recent history of security privatization, the 
accompanying academic debate and the development of the UK PSI. It will highlight 
problems with the literature’s broad view and its implicit notion of historical continuity. 
Finally, Chapter Two will review the contribution economics has made to the subject of PSCs.  
Chapters Three through Five each focus on a distinct aspect of PSC behaviour: Chapter 
Three’s analysis of decision-making in individual PSCs challenges the literature’s 
conceptualization of PSCs as unified entities with a single, coherent motivation. Using the 
Behavioural Theory of the Firm, it argues instead that PSC decision-making processes are 
subject to competing interests and that military professionalism plays a key role in 
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overcoming the resulting conflicts of interests. Indeed, it proposes that recourse to military 
professionalism helps PSCs to overcome the uncertainty and ambiguity they face.         
Chapter Four focuses on the market for PSC services. It commences by pointing out flaws in 
the literature’s argument concerning the lack of competition due to monopolistic structures. 
Using Michael Porter’s Five Forces Framework, the chapter provides a more sophisticated 
view of competition in the PSI. It concludes that the market for PSC services is neither 
characterized by excessive nor weak competition. Finally, the chapter identifies differences 
in the intensity of competitive pressure among the five forces, thereby providing starting 
points for customers and policy-makers to enhance competition in the PSI.   
Chapter Five focuses on client relations in the PSI. The chapter starts by critically reviewing 
the literature’s use of the P/A problem to understand PSI client relations, especially its 
emphasis on the antagonism between the contracting parties and the abundance of 
opportunities for the agent to shirk. It goes on to show that this view of the contractual 
relationship is not compatible with the prevalence of long-term contracting and the 
importance of networks in the PSI nor with the close relationships and trust between PSCs 
and their clients. The chapter concludes by comparing private and public sector approaches 
to contracting, finding that the private sector’s focus on relationships rather than contracts 
is remarkably successful in influencing PSC behaviour.  
Chapter Six discusses the implications of this thesis’ analysis on the debate on PSC 
regulation, specifically the PSC literature’s regulatory aims and its assessment of existing 
international, national and self-regulation. It argues that PSC regulation is portrayed as a 
zero-sum game with high-stakes: Any regulatory leniency would be exploited by PSCs, 
resulting in problematic behaviour. Chapter Five concludes that this thesis’ behavioural 
model suggests that the strict regulation, intrusive monitoring and harsh sanctions proposed 




Chapter 2: The PSI - From Its Origins to 
the Bubble and Beyond 
Dig trenches?  
With our men being killed off like flies?  
There is not time to dig trenches. 
 We’ll have to buy them ready made. 
Groucho Marx1 
 
This chapter provides further context to the subject of this study, the UK PSI in Iraq and 
Afghanistan between 2003 and 2009. In particular, it argues two points: First, the PSI is not 
as homogeneous as the literature suggests. Prior to 2003, there were considerable variations 
between the various private military and security providers included in the literature’s 
typologies. Yet, the literature fails to account for these differences in its discussion of PSC 
behaviour. Moreover, the market for PSC services from 2003-2009 was more volatile and, 
hence, less homogeneous than has been acknowledged. Indeed, the chapter identifies two 
distinct periods: The “bubble”, 2003-2004, describes a sharp increase in demand for PSC 
services triggered by the invasion of Iraq, while its aftermath, 2005-2009, describes a decline 
in demand and ensuing market correction. The impact of said volatility on PSC behaviour has 
so far been neglected by the literature. Instead, prevalent perceptions of the contemporary 
PSI are largely shaped by the “bubble”, while changes that have occurred since have yet to 
be fully taken into account. This volatility and its specific effect on PSCs provide further 
justification for this thesis’ choice of a narrow focus. 
Secondly, the data about the market for PSC services is less complete than the literature 
assumes. Reliable figures are only available since 2007 and only for US and UK public sector 
demand. Yet, these data limitations and their implications are largely ignored. Instead, 
authors rely on rather unreliable sources to make up for the lack of data, which distorts the 
literature’s account of the PSI. For instance, while the “bubble” is the period that most 
informs popular perceptions of the PSI in Iraq and Afghanistan, this period is particularly 
strongly affected by the lack of reliable data. Given the poor state of the available data, the 
chapter advocates alternative ways of generating insights into PSCs’ behaviour and their 
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(market) environment. Such data suggest, among other things, that UK PSCs, after initially 
profiting from the “bubble”, were disproportionately affected by the slowing in demand 
since 2005 and it highlights the extent to which UK PSCs rely on private sector demand for 
their services.   
Part one, sections one to three, focuses on security privatization prior to 2003. Section one 
discusses developments at the end of the Cold War, which are widely seen as responsible for 
the emergence of the contemporary phenomenon of security privatization. Section two 
analyses the literature’s efforts to develop a typology. Specifically, it critically reviews Peter 
Singer’s widely used Tip-of-the-Spear framework, which argues that private military firms 
(PMFs) share three structural characteristics: They are privately owned, for-profit and 
permanent. Section three challenges the notion of a homogeneous, global private security 
industry represented by Singer’s typology by discussing the UK PSI’s development.  
Part two, sections four through seven, is devoted to the development of the PSI in Iraq and 
Afghanistan since 2003. Section four discusses the conditions and catalysts responsible for 
the “bubble”. It argues that developments specific to the situation in Iraq rather than those 
associated with the end of the Cold War are primarily responsible for the boom in the PSI in 
2003-2004. Section five discusses the available data on the PSI in Iraq and Afghanistan and 
notes its ofte overlooked flaws. Section six analyses the “bubble” and its aftermath from the 
perspective of PSCs and their clients. It shows that, while the “bubble” was generated by an 
increase in demand for PSC services, changes to demand and supply were responsible for its 
deflation. Using corporate reports and interview data, section seven discusses the 
development of the UK PSI since 2003, specifically how it differs from its US counterpart.     
Part three, sections eight and nine, complement Chapter One’s discussion of the use of 
economic concepts in the PSC literature. Section eight discusses economists’ treatment of 
PSCs. While Economics as a discipline has yet to discover PSCs, individual economists have 
ventured outside of their discipline to contribute to the PSC debate. Section nine argues that 
the literature’s distinction between private and public actors, which largely relies on John 
Donahue’s The Privatization Decision, does not do justice to the economic theory it draws 
on, especially Oliver Williamson’s work on transaction cost economics. The section also 
addresses economists’ and sociologists’ concerns about combining the two disciplines, which 
lies at the heart of this thesis’ approach. 
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PART I: The Private Security Industry Prior to 2003 
Section One: The Origins of the Debate about Security Privatization 
This section argues that the debate about security privatization prior to 2003 centred on two 
developments in the 1990s: the emergence of autonomous private military actors in the 
context of African security and increased outsourcing by the US military. It explores the 
reasons, which the literature presents for both developments, and shows how the 
literature’s approach shapes its attempts at developing a typology.       
Origins I: Executive Outcomes and Sandline International  
The current debate about security privatization started in response to the emergence of 
Executive Outcomes (EO) and Sandline International in the 1990s,2 which has been attributed 
to developments precipitated by the end of the Cold War.3 First, the fall of the “Iron Curtain” 
resulted in a cut in foreign military assistance that destabilized many African countries.4 
Initially, increased peacekeeping seemed to meet this challenge,5 but soon policy-makers’ 
concerns about their constituents’ ‘sensitivity to casualties’ mounted.6 Moreover, the 
reduction in military spending after the Cold War – US defence spending shrank by 21% 
between 1986 and 19947 – had depleted the capacity of many NATO and Warsaw Treaty 
Organization member nations to support their former allies in the developing world, 
particularly in the low-intensity intra-state conflicts characteristic of the post-Cold War 
world.8 Hence, bereft of public sector support and faced with increasing instability, 
governments in Angola, Mozambique and Sierra Leone turned to EO and Sandline for help. 
Secondly, the developed world’s reductions in military budgets inadvertently created an 
affordable supply of private security and military services. The dissolution of the Warsaw 
Treaty Organization and subsequent sales of military stockpiles led,9 according to Robert 
Mandel, to a widespread ‘availability of arms’.10 The resulting flood of cheap firearms 
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aggravated conflicts in the developing world11 and provided EO and Sandline with easy 
access to military equipment.12 More importantly, the reduction in military budgets created 
an ‘oversupply of dislocated military skilled labor’,13 as soldiers were released from military 
duty in droves.14 This oversupply decreased the costs of the skilled labour sought by 
companies like EO and Sandline and, thus, enabled the private provision of military and 
security services.15  
EO and Sandline were neither the first nor the only companies to offer military and security 
services,16 but their actions and the prospect of private UN-peacekeeping dominated the 
early debate about security privatization.17 Given the nature of their service provision and 
the African continent’s recent history,18 for the UN to use EO and Sandline, they had to be 
clearly distinguished from mercenaries19 – an aim that strongly influenced subsequent 
typological debates.    
Origins II: From African Security to Privatization in the US Military 
By 1999, the demise of EO, the Sandline Affair20 and the Arms to Africa Affair21 had dimmed 
the enthusiasm for private peacekeeping. Instead, attention shifted to changes in the US 
military, namely the large scale outsourcing of military services to the private sector.  
Historically, private sector involvement in military matters was nothing new: Both George 
Washington and his British opponents made use of it – as did the US military in every 
subsequent war.22 Initially, however, privatization was a matter of necessity. The US 
government relied on privateering in the 19th century, because it lacked the finances to 
compete with the French or British navy.23 As the US military gained greater capabilities, 
                                                     
11
 Singer (2003), p. 54. 
12
 Kümmel (2004), p. 17. 
13
 Singer (2003), p. 53. 
14
 Kümmel (2004), p. 18, Avant (2006), p. 329. 
15
 Grunberg (2004). 
16
 Kinsey (2006), p. 76. See also Ortiz (2010), p. 37, O’Brien (2000), p. 60).  
17
 Singer (2003), p. 88ff, Kinsey (2006), p. 89. 
18
 See Mockler (1969).  
19
 Berndtsson (2009), p. 3. See also the Chapter 6 Section 1. 
20
 In 1997, the government Papua New Guinea hired Sandline, but international pressure and military-led public 
protests eventually led to the cancellation of the deal and the resignation of Prime Minister Julius Chan (Dinnen 
(1999), p. 279ff). 
21
 In 1998, Sandline imported arms to Sierra Leone in violation of a UN embargo. A subsequent inquiry found 
that the company had informed the FCO of its plans ahead of time (Kinsey (2006), p. 72ff). 
22
 Avant (2006), pp. 327-328, Uttley (2006), pp. 4-10, Ortiz (2010), pp. 26-28. 
23
 Thompson (1996), pp. 25-26. 
63 
 
private sector support became more limited.24 According to Deborah Avant, this changed 
after WWII. In particular, the Vietnam War and the switch to The All-Volunteer Force 
reversed the previous ‘trajectory towards centralization’.25 Now, contractors built and 
supplied military bases,26 maintained weapon systems and trained soldiers in their use27 and 
even assisted in doctrinal development.28 The evolving US government policy position 
illustrates this shift and its limits: The 1966 OMB Circular A-76 encouraged the use of private 
sector support, but limited its scope to services that were neither ‘inherently governmental’ 
nor ‘directly involved in war fighting’.29 While this tenet has not changed,30 it has undergone 
a substantial reappraisal since the 1990s, resulting in a less restrictive understanding of what 
activities are “inherently governmental” and what constitutes “war fighting”.31  
This reappraisal, which ultimately led the US government to become a major source of 
demand for PSC services, is generally attributed to developments at the end of the Cold War. 
First, the aforementioned decrease in the defence budget forced the military to change its 
force structure. To preserve the military’s war fighting capability, support functions were 
either cut or delegated to the private sector.32  Here, contracting was seen as a way to make 
ends meet. Secondly, the post-Cold War world had the US ‘committing troops in a broader 
and less predictable array of conflicts’,33 i.e. asymmetric, low-intensity conflicts in far-away 
regions that were culturally and religiously very different. These conflicts required skills that 
the military did not have and could not develop quickly. Moreover, many of these skills were 
highly sought after in the private sector, making it hard to attract qualified personnel given 
the constraints of the military’s pay-scale.34 Here, contracting offered a quick fix preferable 
to more expensive solutions. Thirdly, ideological factors promoted greater privatization, 
specifically the introduction of neo-liberal concepts under UK Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher and US President Ronald Reagan in the 1970s and 1980s.35 Following the end of the 
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Cold War, the spread of market liberalism into previously bureaucratically organized aspects 
of society greatly accelerated. Here, contracting was presumed to result in increased 
institutional efficiency.36       
The literature cites further drivers for privatization, which were accelerated rather than 
caused by the end of the Cold War. For instance, privatization was seen as a way to quickly 
integrate new technology into the battle-space.37 As The Economist notes, ‘innovation used 
to spill over from military and corporate laboratories to the consumer market, but lately this 
process has gone into reverse’.38 Also, contemporary conflicts are more likely to have a 
significant reconstruction/nation-building component.39 Yet, the military lacks capacities for 
providing the required services and other government institutions tend to be ill-suited for 
operations in high-risk environments.40 Here, contracting made services accessible that 
would otherwise have been unavailable. 
Conclusion 
Against this background, the PSC literature concludes that ‘the US cannot go to war without 
contractors’.41 Yet, while this assessment may be accurate, it misses an important point. 
What the literature describes as a fairly coherent phenomenon encompasses a range of very 
different actors providing a range of different services for different reasons and, by no 
means, solely to the military. Finding a suitable typology that encompasses all actors as well 
as companies like EO and Sandline and that accurately distinguishes them from traditional 
private security and military actors, i.e. mercenaries, presented a considerable challenge to 
the PSC literature, as the next section shows.     
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Section Two: Typologies and Typological Problems  
Typological issues played an important role in the early literature on security privatization.42 
From that discussion, Peter Singer’s tip-of-the-spear typology stands out due to its 
widespread use in the PSC literature.43 This section examines how Singer distinguishes 
between, what he calls, private military firms (PMFs) and mercenaries and between the 
different types of PMFs covered by his typology, before identifying the flaws of this 
approach.  
The Three Ps: Permanent, For-Profit and Private  
In his seminal work Corporate Warriors, Singer identifies three key characteristics that 
distinguish PMFs from mercenary units: First, PMFs are permanent entities, as opposed to 
the temporary alliances that characterise mercenary units.44 This allows them to create 
more elaborate corporate structures and to rely on external finance and long-term client 
relations.45 Secondly, while both are motivated by profit, their profit motives differ 
considerably. While PMFs are focused on ‘business profit’, which benefits companies as a 
whole, Singer regards mercenary units as mainly looking for short-term, individual profit.46 
Finally, as privately-owned corporations, PMFs differ from mercenary units in their 
organisational structure, i.e. they are more akin to contemporary companies, while the 
organizational blueprint of mercenary units resembles that of military units.47 
Singer’s definition has a number of important implications. First, given that they are private, 
profit-making and permanent, a great variety of companies ranging from combat service 
providers (EO and Sandline), military advisors (MPRI) and companies offering logistical 
support (KBR) are portrayed as part of a coherent phenomenon.48 Moreover, Singer ascribes 
behavioural implications to PMFs’ shared structural characteristics. For instance, their 
permanence allegedly causes companies to pay greater attention to the legitimacy of their 
actions, as misconduct may discourage future business deals.49 Mercenary units, which are 
believed to be solely interested in short-term individual profits, have no such compunction. 
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However, by defining PMFs primarily by how they differ from mercenary units, Singer 
arguably misrepresents companies, which are ostensibly quite different from one another, 
as part of a single, coherent phenomenon with shared origins and behavioural 
characteristics.   
Unfortunately, Singer’s term PMF never caught on. Instead, a plethora of alternative terms is 
currently in use.50 Yet, while value-laden designations like ‘[lap]dogs of war’51, ‘[modern-day] 
mercenaries’52 and ‘new Condottieri’53 still permeate the literature, defining PMCs and PSCs 
based on the three Ps of private, profit-making and permanent has become widely accepted. 
For many authors, the main appeal of Singer’s definition presumably lies in its ability to 
combine the various different companies it encompasses in a coherent typology.   
The Tip-of-The-Spear Typology  
The tip-of-the-spear typology differentiates between the various companies included in 
Singer’s definition by focusing on the locus of service provision in the battle-space: private 
companies providing combat services, such as EO, operate closest to the frontline, while 
support companies like KBR operate furthest away from it and private consultant companies, 
e.g. MPRI, fall between the two.54 
The most obvious weakness of the tip-of-the-spear typology is that, when Corporate 
Warriors’ was published in 2003, the market for combat services had already effectively 
ceased to exist: EO had gone out of business in 199955 and Sandline was weeks away from 
closing its doors.56 Meanwhile, the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq brought different 
companies to the fore: Aegis, CRG and Armorgroup rejected the term PMC, which EO and 
Sandline had advocated for themselves.57 These private security companies (PSCs) argued 
that, while their services require their employees to be armed, they provide only defensive, 
protective services as opposed to the offensive, military combat services offered by PMCs.58  
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Figure II-1: Peter Singer’s Tip-of-the-Spear Typology59 
 
 
Some authors simply incorporated PSCs as another distinct category into the tip-of-the-spear 
typology.60 Others argued against distinguishing between PSCs and PMCs, claiming that 
differences between offensive and defensive uses of force are ‘necessarily subjective’,61 
unsustainable at the operational level62 and that companies can change their service 
portfolio with relative ease.63 Deborah Avant hence argues that researchers should focus on 
contracts as their unit of analysis because companies can offer a variety of services,64 while 
others, notably Christopher Kinsey and Carlos Ortiz, proposed alternatives to the tip-of-the-
spear typology. Kinsey’s four-quadrant-model stresses the importance of private sector 
demand by categorizing companies based on whether the object they secure is private or 
public and on the lethality of their service provision.65 Ortiz defines PMCs as ‘legally 
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established international firms offering services that involve the potential to exercise force in 
a systematic way and by military and paramilitary means’ and proposes six categories to 
classify PMCs, namely combat, training, support, security, intelligence and reconstruction.66 
He also highlights the breadth of services provided by PSCs and places them in the context of 
other private military or security actors. 
Addressing Typological Challenges 
In contrast, this thesis distinguishes between PSCs and PMCs. Indeed, while the use of lethal 
force is an integral part of PSCs’ service provision, they are – unlike PMCs – hired and 
remunerated only for the provision of defensive services. Accordingly, their training and 
standard operating procedures (SOPs) are focused on defensive services.67 Suggestions that 
PSCs could easily change from providing defensive to offensive services ignore the fact that 
they lack the necessary equipment. PSCs’ weaponry is generally restricted to side-arms 
(Glocks), small arms (AK47s and M4s) and light machine guns (Minimis, PKMs and SAWs).68 
In contrast, Sandline’s contract with the government of Papua New Guinea suggests that 
PMCs are more heavily armed, including RPG-7s, mortars, automatic grenade launchers and 
Mi-24/Mi—17 helicopters.69 Finally, there is no longer a market for the legitimate provision 
of offensive combat services and its re-emergence is considered to be unlikely.70 Sarah Percy 
attributes the disappearance of PMCs offering combat services to a lack of legitimacy rather 
than to a lack of commercial viability.71 Today’s PSCs would have to operate without the 
‘implicit or informal consent’ governments extended to Sandline during the Arms to Africa 
Affair.72 Changes to the underlying economics also make a resurgence of a market for PMCs 
unlikely. First, the ease with which heavy weaponry, e.g. attack helicopters, can be procured 
has arguably decreased since the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War. 
Moreover, EO’s strategic impact was predicated on its ability to field a coherent fighting 
force, which was made possible by the decommissioning of entire units at the end of 
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Apartheid.73 Nowadays, it is no longer possible to purchase such a coherent fighting force 
“off the shelf”. Instead, PMCs would now have to compete for qualified labour with PSCs, 
which offer more secure, better compensated employment.74 This is not to say that there 
may not exist an illegitimate market for private military services75 or that individual 
contractors employed by PSCs may not cross the line towards using force in an offensive 
manner. However, such exceptional behaviour should not preclude an otherwise valid 
distinction being drawn between PSCs and PMCs.    
In spite of Avant’s suggestion, this thesis also focuses on companies rather than contracts. 
Given this study’s aim of analysing the behaviour of PSCs, it seems prudent to discuss 
decision-making entities rather than the contracts PSCs serve. Moreover, focussing on 
contracts arguably exacerbates the aforementioned information bias, as far less information 
is available about private than about public sector contracts. Finally, contracts consist of 
various different services and identifying what services are contained in a contract is 
complicated, as they are frequently not itemized en détail or mislabelled.76  
Conclusion 
The greatest challenge the tip-of-the-spear typology poses for the study of PSC behaviour is 
its broad approach, which it shares with the typologies proposed by Ortiz and Kinsey. As 
Chapter One has argued, such a broad approach mistakenly views distinctly different 
companies as part of a single, coherent phenomenon based on their supposedly shared 
structural and resulting behavioural characteristics. Such an approach necessarily 
overaccentuates the few aspects that different types of companies have in common – at the 
expense of characteristics that are specific to a subset of companies, yet more important for 
their behaviour.    
The next section illustrates this point by discussing the UK PSI prior to 2003 and contrasting 
it with the prevalent US-centric view of security privatization. It shows how the UK PSI differs 
from its US equivalent and how these differences may lead to different behavioural 
outcomes. 
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Section Three: The UK PSI Prior to 2003 
The discussion above mainly focused on the US government’s experience with security 
privatization before 2003. Despite numerous case studies detailing privatization in other 
countries,77 this US-centrism is largely reflective of the PSC literature as a whole, which 
obscures important developments elsewhere. As Sabrina Schulz and Andy Bearpark note: 
‘There might be similar market evolutions worldwide, but the dynamics differ significantly in 
every country’.78 This section, by looking at the UK PSI, argues that private sector demand is 
one such important, yet underappreciated dynamic.  
The UK PSI and the End of the Cold War 
The UK did not remain unaffected by the end of the Cold War. Indeed, budget constraints 
and the turn to private sector support arguably affected the UK armed forces even more 
strongly.79 Since the 1990s, the UK military has seen an exceptionally high level of 
operational activity and, given its permanent membership in the UN Security Council, the 
special relationship and its colonial past, the need for Britain’s vaunted ability to “punch 
above its weight” will likely remain high.80 Likewise, ideological factors were even stronger in 
the UK, because the Tory governments of Margaret Thatcher and John Major and the New 
Labour governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown were ardent supporters of 
privatization.81 Hence, the end of the Cold War may have influenced UK PSCs differently 
from their US counterparts, but only in degree, not in substance.   
In contrast, the UK PSI’s early development and its continued influence present a more 
substantial divergence. While there are few links connecting early US companies like 
Pinkertons (founded in 1850) and Kroll (1972) to current US PSCs,82 greater continuity 
characterizes the UK PSI. David Stirling’s founding of Watchguard in 1967 is generally 
considered to be the “birth” of the UK PSI83 and two developments during this early phase 
continue to influence the evolution of the UK PSI. First, Watchguard liaised with the FCO, not 
the MoD84 and this pattern, i.e. a (sometimes problematically) close relationship to the FCO 
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and an arm’s length relationship to the MoD, continues to prevail.85 Secondly, except for the 
early days of Watchguard, the UK government never played such a dominant role as a 
customer of UK PSCs as the US government plays vis-à-vis companies like Blackwater, 
DynCorp and Triple Canopy. As Kinsey points out, ‘[b]y 1970, Stirling’s original idea of placing 
Watchguard at the government’s disposal had all but disappeared, overtaken by commercial 
interests’.86 Early on, strong private sector demand therefore provided an attractive 
alternative to public sector demand for the UK PSI. 
Beyond Watchguard: Early PSCs and the Contemporary UK PSI 
This change in client structure in the UK PSI is best illustrated by the second generation of 
PSCs. Companies like Control Risks Group (CRG) and Defence Systems Limited (DSL) 
established two business models that shaped the UK PSI. CRG was founded in 1975 as a 
subsidiary of the insurance broker Hogg-Robinson. Faced with a growing threat of left-wing 
terrorism and a number of high-profile kidnappings,87 the market for kidnap and ransom 
(K&R) insurances grew rapidly in the 1970s.88 CRG offered policyholders risk advice, training 
and, should a kidnapping occur, support during ransom negotiations.89 Over time, as their 
clients’ security needs became more complex, especially after 9/11, CRG broadened its 
service portfolio to include business and political risk analysis, travel and executive 
security.90 While CRG generally served private rather than public sector clients, its K&R 
business also brought it into close contact with the FCO.91 When physical risks became more 
important in the context of diplomatic security, the FCO and DFID turned to CRG for 
support.92  
The second business model is represented by DSL, which became ArmorGroup in 1996 and 
was later taken over by G4S.93 DSL mainly provided British military training to friendly 
governments without direct UK government involvement.94 While providing such training 
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was one of the reasons why Stirling had created Watchguard,95 DSL was different insofar as 
it was primarily a business venture. As a result, DSL soon broadened its clientele to include 
companies like BP and international organizations like the UN.96 It also complemented its 
portfolio of training services by providing security97 and ordnance removal services.98  
While these business models are not mutually exclusive, they are distinct from the business 
model that dominates the US PSI. DSL and CRG diversified their businesses in favour of 
private sector demand, while the first US PSCs were predominantly private military training 
providers serving public sector contracts:99 MPRI trained the Croatian Military during the 
Yugoslav War100 and assisted the DoD in doctrinal development.101 Northrop Grumman, on 
behalf of the US government, provided training to the armed forces of various African 
countries102 and Blackwater provided training to US military and law enforcement 
personnel.103 As a result, US PSCs tend to have a much stronger ‘long-term “brick and 
mortar”’ component,104 tying them closely to the US government, which is both its regulator 
and its near-monopsonic customer.  
Conclusion 
During a 2007 congressional hearing, Congressman Chris Murphy retorted that his 
constituents ‘pay 90% of your salary, pay 90% of the salaries of your employees’ when Erik 
Prince refused to reveal Blackwater’s profit figures.105 It is hard to imagine a UK MP taking a 
similarly arrogating stance. Instead, the UK government is very supportive of its PSI, as it is 
considered a growth industry that enables UK businesses to operate in otherwise 
inaccessible markets.106 Thanks to their diversified business models, UK PSCs have a 
relationship with their government that is characterized by amicable cooperation, not the 
diktat of a near-monopsonic customer.  
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Since its ‘early start’ in the 1970s,107 the UK PSI has earned a reputation of professionalism, 
which many UK PSCs rely on for attracting business.108 UK PSCs also formed alliances, 
especially with the insurance industry, which deepened their integration into the wider 
economy. While the direct economic benefits of such alliances vary and are easily 
overstated,109 PSCs will go to great length to protect them, as their dissolution entails 
significant reputational losses. As a result, many British PSCs had a sophisticated business 
model and an established clientele in place by 2003. The next section analyses the factors 
driving the hike in demand for PSC services in 2003-2004 and how this increase affected the 
trade in PSC services. Section six, in turn, returns to the importance of private sector 
demand in the UK PSI and explores how it affected UK PSCs during the “bubble”.  
 
PART II: The Private Security Industry Since 2003 
Section Four: The “Bubble”: The PSI 2003-2004 
There is widespread agreement that the “bubble”, i.e. the rapid increase in demand for PSC 
services in Iraq in 2003-2004, heralded a new paradigm for the PSI – both for how PSCs 
organized their business110 and for how academics discussed the private provision of security 
services.111 Nevertheless, the literature primarily identifies global factors, such as ideological 
and political changes associated with the end of the Cold War, as the root cause of the 
“bubble”112 and little attention is paid to the effects of developments in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. This section argues that conditions and catalysts especially in Iraq in 2003-2004 played 
a decisive role in shaping the contemporary PSI.  
Conditions 
Prior to the “bubble”, the relationship between the PSI and its public sector clients was not a 
blank canvas. In the US, the legal authorization for the Worldwide Personal Protective 
Services (WPPS) contract, the primary vehicle for DoS purchases of PSC services, had been 
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created in 1986113 and had already been used in Haiti, the Balkans and in Afghanistan.114 In 
comparison, the FCO’s and DFID’s contracting procedures were relatively informal: PSCs 
were only used ‘on a case-by-case basis’ following ministerial consultation, despite 
diplomatic security not being a military function.115 The FCO enjoyed a close, informal 
relationship with a number of UK PSCs and used their services, for example, in Kosovo.116 
Had these contractual vehicles/relations not been in place prior to the Iraq invasion, the 
subsequent increase in demand would have been inconceivable.117  
Another pre-condition for the “bubble” was the poor planning for “Phase IV” operations in 
Iraq.118 Pre-war planning had been characterized by a poor understanding of the state of 
Iraq. The decline of the Iraqi economy in the inter-war years and the resulting social ferment 
were underestimated,119 as were the importance of the Iraqi military and of Baath Party 
members for maintaining security and keeping the civilian infrastructure operational.120 Paul 
Bremer, head of the CPA, memorably complained: ‘Nobody had given me a sense of how 
utterly broken this country was’.121 Planning for “Phase IV” operations was also guided by 
flawed assumptions about post-war developments, as policy-makers assumed a degree of 
malleability of the Iraqi culture, economy and political system that proved unrealistic.122 This 
was in part attributable to the undue influence of Iraqi exiles on the planning process123 and 
to the rivalry between DoD and DoS, which separated regional expertise from the planning 
process.124 The resulting plan underestimated the need for security, and its policies, i.e. De-
Baathification and the disbanding of the Iraqi Army, aggravated an already challenging 
situation.  
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Poor planning for “Phase IV” operations culminated in insufficient resource commitments. 
Against the US military’s advice,125 only about 116,000 troops were used in the invasion126 
and their swift success in ousting President Saddam Hussein was seen as validating the 
DoD’s stance.127 Hence, the civilian leadership found it ‘hard to conceive that it would take 
more forces to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq than […] to conduct the war itself’.128 
So, when Iraq became increasingly insecure after April 2003, the civilian leadership had 
planned for a drawdown of troops – preparations for which continued until October 2003 – 
that would have left only 40,000 troops in the country.129 Moreover, the available troops 
were equipped for combat, not policing130 and preoccupied with the search for WMDs.131 
Thus, insufficient troops were available for maintaining public order in post-invasion Iraq.  
What was abundantly available, though, was money.132 Pre-war planning assumed that Iraqi 
oil production would pay for the reconstruction costs133 and, when the lack of security and 
the dilapidated infrastructure kept oil revenues low, the US government stepped in, pledging 
$24 billion in reconstruction funds.134 Funds from the Oil-for-Food Program ($18.1 billion), 
asset seizures ($2.7 billion), and international donors ($13.6 billion) brought the available 
funds to a staggering $58.4 billion by 30 April 2004.135 That ‘[c]ontractors [were] doing the 
actual work of reconstruction and rehabilitation in Iraq’ was therefore largely attributable to 
a lack of public sector personnel resources and an abundant availability of money.136     
Catalysts 
The first catalyst that caused the “bubble” to inflate were looting incidents in Baghdad in 
April 2003. In addition to causing considerable damage to Iraq’s civilian infrastructure,137 
looting affected Iraqis’ perceptions of the US military and the reconstruction effort.138 While 
the civilian leadership initially dismissed looting as inconsequential – Secretary of Defense 
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Donald Rumsfeld exclaimed ‘[s]tuff happens’ when asked about it139 – the fact that it was 
allowed to go on for weeks, with US troops apparently unwilling to engage in crowd-
control,140 alienated many Iraqis141 and, according to Paul Bremer, ‘established an 
atmosphere of lawlessness’.142 Moreover, looting allowed the budding insurgency to plunder 
Iraqi army weapon dumps, which Coalition Forces (CF) had largely left intact and 
unprotected.143  
A  change in the insurgents’ strategy represented a second catalyst: Initially, the insurgency 
had focused on US military supply-lines.144 As the military consolidated its bases and 
improved convoy security, insurgents shifted their attacks to “soft”, i.e. non-military, targets, 
such as the Jordanian embassy and the ICRC and UK compounds in Baghdad.145 For the first 
time, according to Samantha Power, humanitarians became ‘outright targets of Al Qaeda 
and other violent extremists’ in Iraq,146 causing companies and NGOs to suspend their 
operations and withdraw their staff – often at their governments’ insistence.147  
A third important catalyst consisted of the haphazard institutional development that 
accompanied the reconstruction effort. The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian 
Assistance (ORHA) was created only two months prior to the invasion, a full year after 
planning for the conflict had started,148 and its impact was stymied by DoD/DoS rivalries.149 
Worse, after only three months of operations,150 the ORHA was replaced by the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) under Paul Bremer on 11 May 2003.151 Like ORHA,152 the CPA 
started from scratch, making little use of the experiences of the ORHA or the DoS.153 This 
lack of institutional continuity was aggravated by the replacement of experienced military 
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units, which coincided with the ORHA/CPA handover.154 Finally, the CPA was plagued by, 
what James Dobbins has called, ‘heroic amateurism’, i.e. staff that was ‘dedicated’, but not 
sufficiently qualified for the tasks at hand.155  
This generated a vicious circle: The insurgency increasingly targeted non-military actors 
crucial to the reconstruction effort, which provoked the departure of a growing number of 
IOs, NGOs and companies from Iraq. This, in turn, slowed the reconstruction effort, and the 
resulting lack of basic services further undermined the occupation and fuelled the 
insurgency. Given the lack of troops and the availability of money and of tried and tested 
contracting vehicles/relationships, finding a private sector solution to this rapidly 
deteriorating situation was an almost inevitable conclusion. 
Conclusion 
The explosive growth in demand for PSC services was thus, to a large part, a product of 
developments specific to Iraq in 2003-2004: A lack of adequate troops, a weak institutional 
framework, a well-armed and sophisticated insurgency and a largely private sector-based 
reconstruction effort. Any attempt to explain the expansion of PSC use in Iraq as the result of 
a deliberate ideological shift disregards the poor planning that permeated the reconstruction 
effort and, in the words of SecDef Robert Gates, the ‘willy-nilly’, i.e. ad hoc and uncontrolled, 
way in which security was privatized.156  
The section also supports this thesis’ choice of a narrow approach: While the PSIs in Iraq and 
Afghanistan are closely linked, e.g. manpower or equipment shortages affect both markets, 
there is no similarly immediate connection to the use of PSCs in Kosovo in 1998, let alone to 
EO’s and Sandline’s activities in Angola and Sierra Leone.  
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Section Five: Data on the PSI’s Size and Growth and its Limitations 
As the security situation in Iraq worsened in 2003/2004, demand for private security 
increased dramatically.157 This raises two important questions: How large was this increase 
in demand in 2003-2004, and by how much did the market contract in the following years? 
Unfortunately, a lack of reliable data complicates answering these questions definitively – a 
problem that the literature often obscures.  
Table II-1: Military and Contractor Personnel during US Military Operations 158 
 
First, the literature often does not distinguish between PSCs and other types of private 
service providers, which inflates the number of armed security contractors.159 Also, 
contractor numbers are often presented in relation to the number of soldiers used in a given 
conflict (see table II-1). However, contractor figures prior to the advent of the contemporary 
corporation and concerning local contractors are likely unreliable.160 Even under the best of 
circumstances, such ratios compare apples and oranges, as Phase IV operations, during 
which civilian-led reconstruction plays a significant role, were not an issue during previous 
conflicts, such as the Mexican-American War.  
Iraq 
However, even when limited to PSCs, several problems affect current data analysis. First, 
until the second half of 2007, the US government did not systematically collect data on its 
use of PSCs (see table II-2).161 These data gaps are often obscured by citing figures from 
press reports or industry lobby groups, whose reliability is often questionable.162 For 
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example, a recent RAND study cited 10,000 and 20,000 PSC contractors for Iraq in 2003 and 
2004, which is probably too low an estimate, given that Erinys’ Oil Protection Force alone 
employed 9,000 and 16,000 contractors, respectively.163 Secondly, while efforts to 
systematically collect data and disclosure requirements like the Freedom of Information Act 
have generated reliable data on the US and UK governments’ use of PSCs,164 there is little 
information available on the use of PSCs by other countries or by the private sector.165 
Hence, conclusive evidence that ‘the largest clients in the security market in Iraq are the U.S. 
Departments of Defense and State, and USAID‘ has yet to be presented.166 
Table II-2: RAND Data on the Number of PSC Contractors in Iraq  
Year 2003 2004 2007 2009 
Number of Armed 
Contractors in Iraq 
10,000 20,000 30,000 10,422 
 
Afghanistan 
Concerns about data gaps, biases and reliability are even more pronounced in Afghanistan, 
where the use of PSCs has, to date, been subject to relatively little academic, media and 
policy interest.167 The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan (SIGAR) was only instituted 
in 2005, five years after its counterpart in Iraq.168 Iraq has also been more than twice as 
costly in treasure169 and blood170 and total contractor spending by US agencies between 
2003-2007 in Iraq ($85 billion) dwarfed that in Afghanistan ($10 billion).171 Until December 
2009, the number of PSC contractors employed by the DoD in Iraq exceeded its number in 
Afghanistan (see Figure II-2).172 The resulting focus on the PSI in Iraq,173 however, ignores the 
increasing importance of the PSI in Afghanistan: Indeed, in 2011, the DoD employed more 
PSC contractors in Afghanistan (21,544) than in Iraq (9,554).174 
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Figure II-2: Comparison Afghanistan and Iraq: DoD Use of PSC Contractors 2007-2009175 
 Figure II-3: Percentage of Local Contractors of Total No. of Contractors in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, 2007-2011176 
Moreover, Afghanistan deviates from Iraq in ways that may prove more instructive for the 
future trade in PSC services. For instance, local security providers, which are far less 
accessible for researchers than their US/UK counterparts,177 play a far greater role in 
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Afghanistan than in Iraq (see Figure II-3). A more independent Iraqi government, 
emboldened by the withdrawal of Coalition Forces, may pursue restrictive policies towards 
foreign PSCs similar to those of the Afghan government.178 Iraq is also a far more developed 
country (see table II-3) that can draw on considerable natural resources to fuel its future 
growth. Afghanistan, in turn, ranks 172nd out of 187 countries in the Human Development 
Index (HDI) and may thus be more representative of the challenging environments where 
future interventions may take place.179   






What Is Known 
Given these data limitations, reliable information about the use of PSCs in Iraq and 
Afghanistan from 2003-2009 is far from plentiful. From 2003-2007, the Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) estimates that US government agencies spent between $6-10 billion on PSC 
services in Iraq – out of $85 billion of total spending on contractors and $446 billion of total 
US appropriations.181 A 2008 Special Inspector General for Iraq (SIGIR) report refines these 
figures by suggesting that US government agencies and their contractors had spend $5.9 
billion since 2003,182 but acknowledges that actual spending on security could be 
significantly higher, as data on subcontractors is limited.183  
SIGIR further provides detailed information on the companies that worked for DoD, DoS and 
USAID and what share of the $5.9 billion they received.184 With respect to the number of 
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contractors, the CBO does not provide its own estimations, but relies on GAO figures for 
2005 (25,000 PSC contractors) and PSCAI figures for 2008 (30,000 PSC contractors).185 It 
further states that ‘counts of contractor personnel in Iraq […] are only rough 
approximations’,186 suggesting that figures for 2003-2007 are less than reliable. The CBO 
blames this lack of data on the use of outcome-oriented contracting procedures, which do 
not require contractors to specify the number of employees used on a given contract.187 
Hence, concerns about the reliability of these figures, especially with respect to data for 
2003-2007, seem merited. From the second half of 2007 onwards, data on the DoD’s PSC use 
improve significantly (Figure II-4 and II-5).188 
 
Figure II-4: DoD Use of PSC Contractors in Iraq, 2007-2011 
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Figure II-5: DoD Use of PSC Contractors in Afghanistan, 2007-2011 
 
DoS’ use of PSC services accounted for an additional 3,321 contractors in 2009 in Iraq,189 
rising to 4,250 in 2010190 and was expected to rise to 5,500 by the end of 2011.191 
Furthermore, the DoS reported 2,205 PSCs contractors in Afghanistan for 2009,192 which 
dipped to 1,691 in the first half of 2010.193 USAID reported that it used 3,888 PSC contractors 
in 2009 and 4,538 PSC contractors in the first half of 2010 in Afghanistan.194  
Given these insights, the claim that US government agencies are the largest customers in the 
market for PSC services in Iraq and Afghanistan may well be correct. Still, their aggregate 
demand may fall short of the total demand for PSC services, given that private sector 
demand is more fragmented. Moreover, $1.2 billion of the aforementioned $5.9 billion is 
paid to subcontractors,195 whose indirect relationship to US agencies may differ distinctly 
from the direct control they exert on their prime contractors. 
  
                                                     
189
 CWC (2009), p. 62. In 2006, the DoS employed 3,000 PSC contractors (Cotton et al (2010), p. 14).  
190
 GAO (2010 II), p. 21. 
191
 Schwartz (2008), p. 12. 
192
 GAO (2010 II), p. 21. 
193








Given the problems associated with the available data, it remains difficult to determine the 
exact size and growth of the PSI since 2003. The lack of reliable data is particularly acute for 
the duration of the "bubble" - the period that has arguably had the strongest influence on 
popular perceptions of PSCs. While the data provide only an incomplete picture of the PSI in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, it still allows for a number of tentative conclusions to be drawn. First, 
while PSC representatives frequently emphasise that only a relatively small share of the total 
number of contractors is armed – Dominick Donald suggests 10%196 – the available figures 
suggest that PSC use is a significant and policy-relevant phenomenon in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Secondly, the available data does not conclusively prove a significant dip in the 
demand for PSC services in the post-“bubble” period. Instead, DoD use of PSC services 
increased since 2007 – slightly in Iraq and dramatically in Afghanistan.197 Thirdly, flawed as it 
may be, the data about US government contracting in Iraq, especially since 2007, constitute 
a significant improvement over those available at any other time.198 Finally, incomplete data 
sets arguably pose less of a problem for the purpose of this thesis: To gain a more complete 
understanding of PSC behaviour, perfect information about the overall size and growth of 
the PSI is ‘nice to have’ but not necessary. It is instead more important to understand what 
data PSCs themselves have at their disposal when making business decisions and how they 
interpret it. Indeed, using data derived from interviews and corporate reporting, the 
following section will discuss how PSCs perceived the PSI's developments in Iraq and 
Afghanistan in 2003-2009. 
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Section Six: The “Bubble” and its Aftermath from an Industry 
Perspective 
If the “bubble” burst in 2005,199 why do the available data suggest that DoD use of PSC 
services increased since 2007 in Iraq and Afghanistan?200 While poor data are partly to 
blame for this apparent discrepancy, this section argues that the volatility in the market for 
PSC services, which the “bubble” and its bursting describes, has its roots not in a significant 
overall decrease in demand, but in changes of perceptions of PSC services and in the 
institutional framework orchestrating the Iraqi reconstruction. 
‘Iraq was no Ordinary Market’201 
The “bubble” and its bursting are rarely characterized as supply-side problems. Yet, 
interviews repeatedly indicate that the PSI was a ‘cottage industry’ prior to 2003.202 As such, 
the small number of mid-sized companies that populated the industry conducted their 
recruitment through networks of personal relationships, based on shared years in the British 
military.203 They also catered to a relatively small market and customer relations were 
characterized by a strong personal dimension – again often based on shared military 
experience.204 Vetting and accountability took place informally, was largely intransparent to 
outside observers and varied depending on the company and client.205 When the demand 
for PSC services increased in 2003, these market structures proved woefully inadequate, 
resulting in a temporary shortage in the supply of PSC services.  
This triggered a number of changes with long-term implications for the PSI. First, the 
resulting scarcity of qualified labour provoked a steep increase in wages, led to poaching 
among PSCs206 and, eventually, a change in their recruitment practices, as databases and 
commercial recruitment support replaced the proverbial rolodex of former army-buddies.207 
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PSCs also looked further afield to address their recruitment needs, resulting in the large-
scale use of so-called third-country nationals (TCN) (see figure II-6 and II-7).208  
Figure II-6: Composition of DoD PSC Contractors in Afghanistan, 2007-2011 
 
Figure II-7: Composition of DoD PSC Contractors in Iraq, 2007-2011  
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In the short-term, this internationalization of the PSI’s workforce reduced wages in Iraq,209 
but, in the long-term, it also raised questions about the importance of quality in the PSI, i.e. 
was it ever necessary to pay the premium an established PSC would demand?    
Secondly, the “bubble” changed the nature and modalities of competition between PSCs. 
During the rapidly deteriorating security situation of 2003/2004, a company’s experience, 
capabilities and pricing were arguably secondary to how fast it could put “boots on the 
ground”.210 As a result, contracts of unprecedented size were won by companies that had 
scarcely existed before 2003.211 This flood of new entrants had two long-term consequences: 
On the one hand, many new entrants had yet to develop managerial processes, including 
vetting, oversight and accountability, whilst already operating in a hostile environment.212 
This aura of ineptitude still colours public perceptions of the PSI. On the other hand, these 
entrants’ success raised further questions about the importance of quality in the PSI. If a 
new company can use databases to fulfil a large-scale contract faster and cheaper, what is 
the value-added that justifies the premium charged by an established and, thus, more 
experienced PSC?  
Thirdly, many of the NGOs and private companies working in Iraq had little previous 
experience with operating in high-risk environments.213 Hence, they were often unable to 
determine whether security services were valued fairly in terms of quality and price.214 
During the “bubble”, having some form of security clearly outweighed concerns about cost-
efficiency, service quality and best practices in contracting. This raised another long-term 
question about the PSI: How can an established company, which employs highly-qualified 
contractors, compete against new entrants, if clients fail to recognize and indeed appreciate 
differences in service quality?     
In short, the “bubble” did not only alter the volume of trade in PSC services, it also changed 
the industry’s image. These changes became evident in the aftermath of the “bubble”, when 
clients’ valuations of PSC services deteriorated significantly – along with their willingness to 
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pay for them. Ultimately, their clients’ unwillingness to recognize and pay for differences in 
service quality motivates PSC to switch to producing cheaper, low-quality services. 
‘Government’s Attitude to PSCs Changed Completely’215  
Changes in the institutional framework in Iraq also had important implications for PSCs and 
the market they operated in. While Paul Bremer, as head of the CPA, reported to the 
Secretary of Defense, the CPA’s contracting guidelines covered only 31 pages, while 
comparable US government rules could easily cover 1,923 pages.216 Such truncated 
regulations allowed the CPA to make funds available quickly to companies and NGOs in need 
for security, but they also invited oversight and accountability deficits and allegations of 
waste and fraud.217 Moreover, interviews suggest that these lax contracting standards 
created a tolerance towards high prices among PSC clients: ‘In 2003 and 2004 money was 
basically free [in Iraq]’.218 Clients did not even demur when security accounted for as much 
as 22% of the costs of some reconstruction projects,219 because ultimately the CPA would 
“pick up the tab”. Prices for PSC services in Iraq were high not because clients valued their 
services, but because of limited cost-controls. 
Yet, while ‘[n]ormal commercial or governmental financial constraints no longer applied’ in 
Iraq in 2003-2004,220 interviews suggest that this was merely a temporary phenomenon.221 
Within twelve months of the CPA’s handover of power to the Iraqi government, many of the 
contracts negotiated under its lenient contracting regime either expired or were 
renegotiated,222 which explains why the market for PSC services slowed in 2005. A significant 
share of the CPA’s funds was subsequently transferred to the Iraqi government,223 which 
preferred investing in public or local private security providers. Also, oversight over the 
Coalition’s reconstruction effort was brought more firmly under the US government’s 
purview.224 Nevertheless, various reports suggest that US government contracting in Iraq 
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was initially not a significant improvement.225 For instance, while the WPPS had been in 
place prior to the invasion, it still lacked reliable accountability and oversight procedures and 
the staff necessary to enforce them.226 This criticism illustrates the more rigorous scrutiny 
PSC contracting has been exposed to ever since. Eventually, it led the DoD and DoS to 
implement a series of changes in their respective contracts227 and to sign a memorandum 
standardizing their security contracting practices.228 
Conclusion 
The security situation in Iraq did not improve in 2005.229 While it may be true that ‘three 
years of scandals and violence had dampened the gusto for hiring private security 
contractors’,230 DoD and DoS demand for PSC services remained robust. Rather than a dip in 
demand, corporate reports and interviews suggest that the bursting of the “bubble” in Iraq 
since 2005 has mainly been caused by tighter profit margins.231 The demise of the CPA 
caused the torrent of “free money” to dry up and, as a result, clients expressed their 
changed valuation of the industry’s professionalism and service quality by no longer being 
willing to pay for either. As a result, Iraq and Afghanistan became very challenging market 
environments for PSCs, which the PSC literature has yet to recognize. The next section 
further illustrates this point by discussing the consequences for UK PSCs in particular.      
 
Section Seven: The UK PSI during the “Bubble” and Its Aftermath 
Rather than providing an exhaustive account of how the UK PSI was affected by the “bubble” 
and its bursting, this section focuses on those changes that have shaped UK PSCs’ behaviour. 
The Relative Importance of Private Sector Demand 
One such difference is the relative importance of private sector demand for UK PSCs.232 
Interviews suggest that most UK PSCs generate between 40-60% of their revenue from 
private sector clients.233 Contrary to that, US PSCs like Dyncorp earn up to 96% of their 
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revenue from public sector contracts.234 Moreover, UK PSCs’ business model actually favours 
private sector clients: UK PSCs want to provide a ‘holistic’ service that combines analysis, 
strategy development and implementation, rather than simply putting ‘boots on the 
ground’.235 Public sector clients, however, are more likely to rely on their considerable in-
house expertise for analysis and strategic planning.236 The relative importance of private 
sector clients for UK PSCs is noteworthy, because interviews suggest that the private sector 
is even more sensitive to possible reputational costs.237 As one anonymous interviewee 
noted, a private sector client is ‘more likely to switch provider or abandon his operations in a 
country than to explain the concept of “acceptable losses” to the New York Times’.238  
Changes to the “PSC brand” in Iraq have also been particularly damaging for the UK PSI. UK 
PSCs are more likely than their US counterparts to trade on a reputation for being 
experienced and professional,239 to which the image of the “trigger-happy cowboy” that has 
become synonymous with PSCs in Iraq poses a formidable threat. Moreover, the low-margin 
business that providing security in Iraq and Afghanistan has become since 2005 is less 
attractive to established UK PSCs, due to the larger overhead they have to cover ‘just to keep 
the lights on’.240 Indeed, their relatively more elaborate management processes proved 
disadvantageous in Iraq: Having no reputation worth protecting, many new entrants were 
less concerned about due diligence during contract negotiations. Also, they did not have to 
coordinate their actions in Iraq with management in London,241 which made them more 
nimble when it came to attracting business. In many ways, Custer Battle is an example for 
this: One of its founders noted that they had won their first contract because they were 
‘young and dumb’ and when they lacked the financing to staff and equip said contract, the 
CPA provided it with a loan – in the form of black duffel-bags filled with shrink-wrapped 
stacks of $100 bills.242   
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UK PSCs’ Performance in Iraq and Afghanistan 
These concerns may not have prevented UK companies from competing for business in Iraq - 
red24 being a notable exception.243 However, few UK PSCs were among the main 
beneficiaries of US government spending that contributed to the “bubble” and sustained 
demand as the “bubble” burst in 2005 (see table II-4). It also seems that UK PSCs benefitted 
disproportionately in the early years of the Iraq occupation244 and, with exceptions,245 
suffered disproportionately as the “bubble” burst. Armorgroup, for example, lost its contract 
guarding non-military convoys in 2006,246 forcing it to issue a profit warning and to 
eventually seek a buyer in G4S to prevent bankruptcy.247 CRG’s business in Iraq decreased by 
24% in 2007248 and by 40% in 2008.249 Most UK PSCs seem to have pruned their operations 
in Iraq in response to changes in the business environment. CRG, for example, shifted its 
business away from providing diplomatic security to servicing commercial clients by 2010.250 
As one competitor noted, ‘CRG never really bought into being a PSC’.251 The fact that others 
followed its example – Janusian sold its Iraq operations in 2007252 – suggests that the above 
statement has broader appeal in the UK PSI.  
Table II-4: UK PSCs under Direct Contract or Subcontract with DoD, DoS and USAID253 
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UK PSC Total ($ Millions) 2003-2008 Rank 
Aegis 798.6 2 
Armorgroup 137.6 10 
Erinys 108.1 11 
Global 83.7 13 
Hart 26.2 20 
Olive Group 17.6 21 
CRG 17.2 22 
EI 11.8 26 
Blue Hackle 0.9 40 
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Moreover, while Iraq had filled their “war-chests”, many UK PSCs used these funds, again 
with exceptions,254 to diversify their business away from the market for PSC services in Iraq 
and Afghanistan into areas like travel255 and data security,256 screening services257 and 
systems security.258 Partly, this desire to diversify was rooted in the fact that, by 2006, UK 
PSCs no longer shared their US counterparts’ belief in the sustainability of government 
demand for PSC services.259 It is noteworthy that this diversification yielded very varied 
results: While Olive’s venture into systems security is widely seen as successful, few would 
say the same about CRG’s attempts. Said diversification was also an expression of the 
relationship between the UK government and the UK PSI: Initially, FCO and DFID spending on 
PSC services increased significantly with the invasion of Iraq,260 but ultimately it remained 
meagre compared to similar US government spending (see table II-5).  
 
Table II-5: FCO and DFID Spending on PSC Services 2005-2008261 
 
Moreover, since the financial year 2006/2007, the FCO has replaced Armorgroup, a British 
PSC, with Garda World, a Canadian company,262 i.e. the UK government evidently does not 
feel obliged to “buy British” when it comes to its demand for PSC services. This suggests that 
the relationship between the UK government and UK PSCs is not defined by its commercial 
ties. Instead, the good relationship between the UK government and UK PSI seems to be 
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Country Type of  
Service 





£41,000,000 £21,949,907 £20,252,435 £20,800,843 
Static Security £6,800,000 £6,903,489 £5,266,067 £5,715,764 
Various No data £577,973 £1,422,651 £2,341,829 
Afghanistan Personal/ Mobile/ 
Static Security 
No data £19,536,267 £20,321,543 £20,174,588 
Various No data No data No data £749.075 
93 
 
increasingly based on their political cooperation, which has yielded important successes on 
regulatory matters.263 Indeed, several interviewees compared this relationship favourably to 
the cantankerous one between the US government and its PSI,264 which worsened 
considerably after the 2006 Congressional Elections.265 Moreover, interviews with PSC 
representatives suggest that intra-sector cooperation in regulatory processes at the 
domestic and international level – through the BAPSC and bilaterally – greatly strengthened 
relations between individual UK PSCs.266 
This section has stressed the specificities of the UK PSI, especially when compared to its US 
counterpart. One possible counterpoint to this analysis is that, while UK PSCs are 
traditionally seen to serve British commercial interests abroad,267 the UK as a market has 
become significantly less important. Aegis, otherwise an atypical UK PSCs, exemplifies a 
growing trend in the industry by generating 98% of its business outside of the UK.268 For Hart 
Security, the comparable figure has been 46-85% from 2005-2009,269 and Blue Hackle 
identifies ‘large American corporates’ as its main customers.270 While most UK PSCs did not 
disclose the geographic distribution of their earnings, interviews suggest the diminishing 
importance of the UK as a market to be an industry-wide trend.271 As previously mentioned, 
tax and legal reasons have encouraged many UK PSCs to run parts of their operations 
through tax havens (see table II-5). However, several PSCs are now leaving the UK 
outright,272 citing high taxes, the need for proximity to their clients and, especially, 
exchange-rate volatility as major risks to their business and, thus, causes for their move.273 
This thesis’ conclusion will return to the curious question this trend raises, namely whether – 
unlike in the period under review in this thesis, when the UK PSI arguably still was distinctly 
British and perceived as such274  – the UK PSI will continue to maintain these characteristics 
or whether it is likely to become part of a homogeneous global industry.  
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Table II-6: Country of Incorporation of UK PSCs  
Company Country of Incorporation Company Country of 
Incorporation 
Drum Cussac275 Jersey Olive Group276 British Virgin Islands 
Hart Security277 Cyprus Erinys278 British Virgin Islands 
Global279  Luxemburg Aegis280 British Virgin Islands* 
Armorgroup/G4S281 Jersey* CRG282 Jersey* 
Blue Hackle283 England & Wales red24284 England & Wales 
* Denotes significant subsidiary established for tax/HR reasons      
Conclusion 
This section has shown that the UK PSI’s distinct character, e.g. its dependence on the 
private sector and its resulting sensitivity to reputational risks, shaped its development in 
and its attitude to Iraq and Afghanistan. As one UK PSC representative described it: ‘A lot of 
companies were “hot and cold” about Iraq’,285 acknowledging both the new business 
opportunities and its primarily reputational risks for a fairly well-established industry. As a 
result, the “bubble” was not an unequivocal blessing for most UK PSCs: While they 
benefitted significantly from the increase in demand for their services, few companies were 
able to sustain their initial success and some even had to undo previous investments.286     
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PART III: Economics and Security Privatization 
Section Eight: PSCs in the Literature on Economics  
The literature review in Chapter One focused on the use of economic concepts in the PSC 
literature, yet it did not discuss how economists themselves view PSCs. This section 
addresses this omission. According to John Fredland, ’[e]conomists have largely neglected 
the PMC phenomenon’.287 Moreover, the few economists that have joined the academic 
discussion on PSCs have done so by contributing to the debate in the fields of International 
Relations/Political Science, rather than within their own discipline.288 Correspondence with 
those economists that have published on PSCs/PMCs suggests that this lack of interest is 
primarily attributable to a lack of accessible empirical data on PSCs.289 Indeed, very few PSCs 
are stock-market listed290 and, thus, only subject to limited disclosure requirements as part 
of their fiduciary duties. This problem was epitomized by Eric Prince’s refusal to disclose 
Blackwater’s profit figures during a Congressional hearing.291 As this chapter’s frequent use 
of UK PSCs’ corporate reports has shown, this problem does not apply to British PSCs to the 
same extent due to different accounting standards.292 Moreover, lobbying groups that could 
function as data aggregators have yet to satisfactorily fulfil this function.293  
Economics in the Literature on PSCs 
While the “dismal science” has largely remained silent on PSCs, some economists have 
ventured outside of their discipline to criticize the use of PSCs. Joseph Stiglitz and Linda 
Bilmes, for example, base their claim that ‘[i]t does not make sense to privatize the military’ 
on cost comparisons between PSCs and the military.294 However, the comparison they draw 
is so misleading – they compare the billing-rate for contractors (including all costs) with the 
pay received by a US Army sergeant (excluding all costs)295 – that the CBO singled it out for 
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criticism.296 Unfortunately, this example appears to be representative of a broader problem 
associated with the use of economic concepts in the PSC literature.  
As outlined in Chapter One, economic concepts play an important role in the PSC literature, 
either to make a case for or against the use of PSCs in reference to their cost-efficiency or to 
account for their motivations.297 While this thesis focuses on the latter discussion, the cost-
efficiency debate nicely illustrates some of the problems affecting the use of economic 
concepts in the PSC literature. For instance, some criticism of the PSI seems to be driven by a 
general scepticism about contemporary capitalism as much as by a genuine concern about 
the use of PSCs. Sheehy et al, for instance, claim that ‘the corporate form is dedicated to 
outsourcing social costs and privatizing profits’.298 More often, economic concepts are 
selectively employed to support rather tendentious statements. Stieglitz and Bilmes’ 
comparison falls into that category, as do attempts to exclude the costs of training and R&R 
for soldiers by comparing the deployment rather than the lifetime costs of soldiers and 
PSCs.299 Similarly misconceived from an economist’s perspective is Isenberg’s argument that, 
since PSCs employ ex-soldiers that were trained using public funds, said costs ought to be 
included in the costs of privatizing security.300 Indeed, such expenses would be considered as 
sunk costs and thus not included.301 
Conclusion  
This section illustrates two important considerations for the broader debate about PSCs. 
First, the use of economic concepts will not provide a definitive answer to whether security 
ought to be privatized. As Brauer stresses, 'economics can inform the PMC debate but not 
decide it’.302 The cost-efficiency of PSC use is a product of its situational and contextual 
specifics, i.e. what type of PSCs is used, for what purpose and how the relationship is 
managed. Moreover, cost efficiency is a relative measure that varies depending on how and 
what PSCs are compared against. Whether PSCs are cost-efficient is thus likely to differ on a 
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case-by-case basis.303 Secondly, as the example of deployment vs. lifetime costs has shown, 
great care needs to be taken in the selection and application of economic concepts to assure 
that the resulting analysis is not distorted. This is particularly salient in the use of economic 
concepts to characterize the motivation of PSCs, which lies at the heart of this thesis. 
 
Section Nine: Privatization and New Institutionalism  
While the previous section discussed the PSC literature’s use of economic concepts in 
general, this section takes a closer look at a concept that is central to the literature’s 
understanding of PSC behaviour: By featuring prominently both in Deborah Avant’s The 
Market for Force and Peter Singer’s Corporate Warriors, John Donahue’s The Privatization 
Decision has shaped the PSC literature’s view of private and public agents.304 This section 
briefly explores to what extent Donahue’s distinction between private and public agents is 
supported by the sub-field within economics that he draws on and for which he, to a certain 
extent, is a conduit: New Institutional Economics.  
Despite his various caveats,305 Donahue depicts The Privatization Decision ultimately as a 
binary choice between public and private agents that differ significantly from one another.306 
Indeed, inherent differences between public and private actors seem to be central to much 
of the privatization debate in general.307 Donahue’s argument draws on, New Institutional 
Economics (NIE), namely the work of Oliver Williamson,308 which has also found its way into 
the PSC debate.309 Williamson focuses on transaction cost economics (TCE), i.e. the costs 
incurred by transacting through different organizational forms.310 Drawing on Ronald Coase’s 
seminal essay The Nature of the Firm,311 Williamson does not dispute the efficiency of 
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markets, but contends that under certain conditions of uncertainty, if assets are highly 
specific, transactions are conducted infrequently and there is a high need for probity, 
transacting through the market may be relatively expensive compared to transacting 
through hierarchical forms of organization.312 Public bureaucracies represent such a 
hierarchical form of organization,313 but they are hardly the only form. Indeed, when 
Williamson and Coase compare hierarchies and markets, the hierarchical organizational form 
they have in mind is the firm - not the public bureaucracy. Bruce Benson echoes this point by 
highlighting that privatization can take various forms: At the one extreme, ownership and 
control over an activity is completely abandoned, at the other extreme a more benign 
outsourcing of an activity is conceivable, where control and responsibility are retained.314 
Moreover, Williamson allows for hybrid forms of ‘quasi-privatization’ and even identifies 
conducive regulation.315 This suggests that Williamson views public and private agents not as 
a binary choice between two polar opposites, as it is arguably presented in The Privatization 
Decision and, by extension, in the PSC literature. Instead, private and public provision can 
take a variety of forms, which are more or less hierarchical/market-based.  
Furthermore, Williamson ‘sovereign transactions’ are per se to be provided by a public 
sector bureaucracy, but he  sets out a set of conditions under which ‘politics is different’, i.e. 
when the costs of using the market for ‘sovereign transactions’ becomes prohibitively high: 
uncertainty, asset specificity, infrequency and probity.316 Moreover, he stresses that 
‘[b]ecause all feasible modes of organization are flawed, the strengths and weaknesses of 
each candidate mode need to be assessed comparatively’.317 It is not sufficient to show that 
market-based transactions are costly, but other organizational forms have to yield more 
efficient outcomes.318 This point is given further importance by the possibility of hybrid 
forms, which may be superior to both “purely” hierarchical and market-based organizational 
forms.      
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Unfortunately, the PSC literature has yet to fully explore Williamson’s arguments. An even 
more salient point is highlighted by Benson’s critique of Avant’s The Market for Force. 
Benson chides Avant’s choice of economic theory, which he describes as ‘drawing most 
heavily from Oliver Williamson’s writings’, as too narrow.319 While Benson’s criticism is not 
unjustified, compared to the wider PSC literature, Avant’s work is exceptional for its 
extensive engagement with economic concepts. Most authors seem to outright ignore 
economic theory, even when it comes to understanding key economic concepts like 
competition,320 volatility,321 contracts322 and sunk costs. 323 
Finding an Audience 
Another two of Benson’s criticisms show that the aforementioned disconnect between 
economic theory and the PSC literature has important implications for this thesis’ choice of 
focus. Benson criticizes that Avant does ‘not actually build a model’, at least not in the 
formal, economic sense, as well as her ‘simultaneous application of sociological and 
economic models’.324 As Benson would likely pose similar criticisms against this thesis’ 
approach,325 they need to be briefly assessed.  
Essentially, neither criticism applies to this thesis, since its intended audience is not that of 
economics, but the debate about PSCs, which is dominated by political scientists, IR scholars, 
lawyers and PSC representatives. Given its choice of audience, this thesis has to assure that 
its use of economic theory remains accessible to non-economists. Indeed, in interviews, PSC 
representatives frequently criticized that most of the research into PSCs is ‘useless’ to the 
industry.326 This precludes the use of a formal model, especially given the ‘mathematising 
inclination’ of traditional economics.327 Moreover, it is questionable whether the social 
embeddedness of economic action can at all be quantified and thus be appropriately 
expressed in a formal model. Tellingly, the sub-fields of economic theory borrowed from 
most heavily in this thesis generally make little use of formal models, either because they 
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have yet to find a meaningful way of doing so328 or because they reject formal modelling as a 
question of principle.329  
Conclusion 
Benson’s reproach against an inter-disciplinary approach seems to be similarly misguided. 
Instead, informed by the core tenets of economic sociology, this thesis holds that an inter-
disciplinary approach can unlock original and relevant insights for understanding PSC 
behaviour. Combining the new (economics) with the familiar (sociology) should make the 
approach taken by this thesis even more palpable for the PSC literature. It is worth noting, 
however, that the practice of combining economics and sociology has its critics among 
sociologists as well.330 One concern, which this thesis and economic sociology more 
generally seeks to overcome, is that the result of an inter-disciplinary approach could not be 
a dialogue between the two disciplines, but a displacement of sociology by economics in the 
analysis of human behaviour.331 Indeed, chiming with economic sociologists, this thesis 
recognizes both the risk of ‘over- and under-socializing’ any analysis.332 This thesis’ approach, 




In addition to discussing the relationship between economics and the PSC literature, this 
chapter has added substance to the analytical scheme outlined in Chapter One. Its review of 
the development of the PSI prior to 2003 and of the associated literature identified 
weaknesses in the prevalent literature’s definition and resulting typology. Since these 
weaknesses are ultimately owed to a broad definition of private military and security 
providers, this chapter also provided further support for the narrow focus employed by this 
thesis. Turning to the use of PSC services in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2003-2009, the 
chapter emphasised the importance of conditions and catalysts specific to Iraq for the 
emergence of the “bubble”, suggesting that they may have been more decisive than changes 
associated with the end of the Cold War. It further identified institutional changes and 
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evolving perceptions of PSCs and their services as the main reason for the bursting of the 
“bubble” since 2005. Moreover, the chapter established the UK PSI as a distinct group within 
the PSI during the period under review.  
Chapter Three sets out the actual analysis of UK PSC behaviour. According to Sarah Percy, 
‘[t]here are very few industries that operate in a fashion analogous to PSCs’.333 While Percy’s 
statement may have merit from the point of view of a regulator, the following chapters will 
argue that, from a business perspective, the UK PSI shares many aspects with companies in 
other industries – specifically with regards to labour relations, market dynamics and 
customer relations. By taking a closer look at individual PSCs, Chapter Three will provide an 
insight into their decision-making processes and their underlying motivations. 
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Chapter 3: Decision-Making Processes 
in Individual UK PSCs  
A man who fights for coin is loyal only to his purse. 
    G.G. Martin, The Game of Thrones1 
 
While customers and regulators may influence PSC behaviour, the decision of how to act 
ultimately lies with PSCs and their employees. Hence, this analysis of UK PSC behaviour 
focuses on the individual PSC, the smallest aggregate in the PSI, and its decision-making 
process.  
As previous chapters have shown, assumptions about PSCs’ motivation play an important 
role in the literature’s discussion of their behaviour. To date, the literature’s assumptions are 
not based on an in-depth analysis of a PSC’s internal decision-making process, its 
participants and their underlying motivations. Indeed, the literature on security privatization 
has largely looked at, rather than into, PSCs and their structural characteristics: In this 
understanding, PSCs are for-profit companies and, therefore, presumed to be primarily 
motivated my financial profit. 
This chapter largely rejects the prevalent “structure is destiny” argument and, instead, uses 
the behavioural theory of the firm and the concept of professionalism to open the “black 
box” of PSC decision-making. While UK PSCs are first and foremost businesses, the sort of 
deterministic pursuit of financial profit the literature envisions is rarely evident in their 
motivations. Individually, motivations in the PSI are more complex and, influenced by 
professional norms and values, gravitate strongly towards non-financial aims. This has 
implications for PSC decision-making processes, as PSCs lack the management processes to 
force and the incentive structures to persuade their employees to align their interests with 
the aim of maximizing corporate profit. Moreover, it is questionable if PSCs actually know 
which behaviour is actually profit maximizing in the long-term. Instead, faced with 
uncertainty and ambiguity, PSCs frequently rely on professional norms and values to inform 
their decision-making to assure the long-term sustainability of their business.  
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Part one: Section one revisits the prevalent conceptualization of PSC motivation, specifically 
its evolution from a need to differentiate PMCs and PSCs from mercenaries. It criticizes the 
literature’s lack of nuance and evidentiary support. Section two focuses on PSC employees’ 
financial incentive structures and shows that they participate neither directly nor indirectly 
in corporate profit. Section three outlines how PSC employees’ economic interests clash with 
the aim of maximising corporate profit. Finally, section four argues that PSCs’ ability to force 
their employees to align their interests with the aim of maximising corporate profit is rather 
limited. Part one concludes by pointing out that the conflicting aims of PSCs and their 
employees, if unresolved, may result in conflict of great potential costs for both parties - 
thus creating a strong incentive to compromise. It further suggests that professionalism not 
only provides the catalyst for such cooperation, but also informs the resulting compromises.   
Part two: Section five shows how the literature’s view on PSC professionalism diverges from 
the industry’s self-perception. In particular, the argument that PSCs lack the institutional 
pre-requisites to develop a strong professionalism merits closer attention. Section six sets 
the PSC literature’s critique of professionalism in the broader context of the study of 
professions. It argues that said critique ignores the varied and dynamic nature of 
professionalism and is too focused on the structural characteristics of professionalism. 
Sections seven and eight discuss the extent to which the UK PSI presents the functional, 
structural, monopolist and cultural characteristics associated with professionalism and argue 
that professionalism in the PSI should be seen as an extension of military professionalism. 
Drawing on the works of Abbott and Burk, section nine discusses differences in their 
respective understandings of professionalism, before using the notion of professionalism as 
competition for jurisdiction to shed light on the relationship between professionalism in the 
UK PSI and military professionalism. Section ten concludes this chapter’s analysis by 
suggesting a new conceptualization of PSCs’ and their employees’ motivations by proposing 
that PSCs are primarily motivated by their corporate survival. This explains why PSCs are 




Part I: In Search of the Corporate Interest 
Section One: The Prevalent View on PSC Motivation 
Given how central the literature’s assertions about PSCs’ motivation are to its objections 
against their use, it is surprising how little efforts have been made to study the latter. Survey 
data are scarce – so much so that Volker Franke and Marc von Boemcken noted in their 2011 
survey that ‘[t]o date, we know very little about the people who sign on with [PSCs]’.2 Since 
the motives of those working for PSCs are not homogenous, this thesis will use the terms 
“PSC representatives” and “PSC employees” to distinguish, respectively, between individuals 
in managerial roles and those that are merely employed by PSCs. These terms denote poles 
on a spectrum rather than clear-cut categories, which becomes evident when they are 
applied to mid-management positions: On the one hand, mid-management sports many 
characteristics of PSC employees: They receive orders rather than issue them, they are 
strongly involved with operational matters and they sport a relatively high turnover. On the 
other hand, they occupy positions of authority, they are often involved in strategic 
management decisions, especially in smaller PSCs, and a larger share of their pay is tied to 
the company’s performance. Still, the distinction between “representatives” and 
“employees” provides useful insights into divergent motivations within UK PSCs. Frank and 
von Boemcken’s observation about the lack of information concerning PSC representatives’ 
and employees’ motives is hardly attributable to a lack of data. Many PSC representatives 
are happy, even eager, to talk to researchers.3 Gaining unvetted access to PSC employees, 
particularly “on the ground”, is admittedly more difficult – physically, due to their insecure 
operational environment and because they are often contractually prohibited from giving 
interviews.4 However, PSC employees have published biographical accounts,5 blogs,6 
internet fora7 and even a podcast series, the Combat Operator Radio,8 to share information 
and publish their perspectives on industry matters. Moreover, once they are granted 
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anonymity, many PSC employees agree to being interviewed despite their contractual 
obligations.  
The Origins of the Literature’s Views on PSC Motivation 
That little is known about the motivations of PSC representatives and employees is largely 
attributable to how the literature defines private military and security providers in contrast 
to mercenaries. Singer argues that, unlike mercenaries, PSCs are motivated by ‘business 
profit rather than individual profit’, which he attributes to the permanence of their 
corporate structure.9 He further suggests that ‘[t]he key is that it is not the person that 
matters, but the structure that they are within’. Singer’s definition, focusing on corporate 
motivation, came to be widely accepted and led the PSC literature to pay little attention to 
PSCs’ organizational structure and to their employees’ motivations.  
Singer further stipulated that, as for-profit entities, PSCs are ‘driven neither by goodwill nor 
honor, but rather by profit’10 – an assertion widely echoed in the PSC literature.11 However, 
while Singer emphasised the permanence of their corporate entity as a restraining influence 
on PSC behaviour,12 authors more recently stress their “naked” profit interest. Petersohn, 
for example, claims that a PSC’s ‘decision-making process is always based on a cost-benefit 
analysis’,13 while Perlo-Freeman and Sköns believe that PSCs have a ‘vested interest in the 
perpetuation of such conflicts’.14 Authors are notably more cautious when it comes to 
describing individual motivation. For example, Spearin, like many others, stresses the greater 
earning potential of SOF personnel in the private sector and their prevalence in the PSI,15 but 
he does not explicitly claim that their decision to join a PSC and their subsequent actions in 
the industry are solely motivated by financial profit. Still, most seem to agree with 
Petersohn, who argues that, since their pay is higher than what they ‘would earn performing 
the same service for their own respective militaries, the PSCs can be assumed to be fighting 
for money.‘16 Indeed, some authors even consider PSCs’ allegedly exclusive focus on profit to 
be a boon. Since PSCs are not interested in anything but financial profit, they are believed to 
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be politically neutral, without ‘a particular ideology or interest’.17 This argument poignantly 
illustrates the limitations of the prevalent view on motivation in the PSI: PSC representatives 
and employees presumably do not cease to subscribe to an ideology or (political) interests 
upon joining a PSC, yet the literature’s conceptualization lacks the nuance to capture 
anything but their interest in financial profit.  
Weaknesses in the Literature’s Characterization of PSC Motivation 
Another weakness is the lack of conclusive evidence provided in support for this structural 
approach. Instead, Machiavelli’s warnings against employing condottieri are frequently cited 
in the PSC literature,18 despite numerous concerns about its historical veracity.19 The lack of 
other corroborating evidence suggests that claims about PSC motivation are mainly 
buttressed by historical stereotypes about mercenaries. This lack of evidentiary support is 
partly due to the fact that the literature has so far paid little attention to the motivation of 
PSC employees and representatives. If at all, the topic featured in the discussion about 
soldiers leaving the military for the PSI. Indeed, said discussion neatly illustrates how the 
debate about motivation in the PSI has remained largely theoretical: While Spearin and 
Krahmann identify higher wages as responsible for soldiers leaving the military to join the 
PSI,20 Pattison admits that there are no data to substantiate such a claim,21 only to claim that 
‘it would be odd if the high wages on offer were not a key motivating factor’.22 Kinsey, 
however, suggests that high op-tempo and bad housing in the military are to blame,23 but 
likewise fails to present any supporting data. 
Conclusion 
While not questioning that PSCs are ultimately profit-driven entities,24 this thesis challenges 
the absolutism, with which the literature attributes all PSC behaviour to being motivated by 
financial interests. The literature’s claims belie PSCs’ limited organizational power and their 
volatile operational environment and thus underestimate the influence PSC employees can 
exert on corporate decision-making processes. It is, therefore, not just the lack of nuance in 
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the literature’s characterization of PSC motivation nor its failure to provide supporting 
evidence to which this thesis objects: The literature also fails to account for how PSCs 
overcome their structural limitations and the divergent interests of their workforce to create 
the alleged single, coherent corporate interest in financial profit. 
 
Section Two: Incentive Structures in the PSI 
This section takes a closer look at labour relations in the PSI by focusing on its economic 
underpinnings. This is not to suggest that financial interests are more important than non-
financial interests nor that the two are fully substitutable. Indeed, much of this chapter 
argues that an excessive focus on financial interests provides at best an incomplete and thus 
distorted understanding of motivation in the PSI. However, financial interests are 
nonetheless important. Understanding them provides a good starting point for exploring the 
more complex issue of what motivates PSCs and their employees. 
Economics and the Behavioural Theory of the Firm 
Generally, economics is believed to have limited applicability to the study of motivations. 
According to Brauer, motivations ‘constitute a “black box”’ for traditional economists,25 who 
instead focus on incentives.26 Hence, Donahue’s characterization of public and private 
agents does not centre on the civic-mindedness of civil servants nor the greediness of 
private sector agents, but on their different means of compensation.27 Similarly, while the 
PSC literature focuses on compensation in the PSI by reducing PSCs’ motivation to their 
alleged interest in corporate profit, Blyton and Turnbull argue that ‘within organizations a 
common interest [e.g. in corporate profit] cannot be assumed, willed, or “managed” into 
existence’.28 A similar observation that emphasises the divergent interests within a company 
lies at the heart of the Behavioural Theory of the Firm.29 Contrary to standard 
microeconomic theory,30 it stresses that companies are ‘large, complex organizations’, 
whose actions are not ‘completely determined’ by the market.31 Like Blyton and Turnbull, its 
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proponents Cyert and March argue that the resulting “room” afforded by the market is not 
just for management to use in its pursuit of maximum corporate profit: ‘[W]e cannot assume 
that a rational manager can treat the organization as a simple instrument in his dealings with 
the external world’.32 Rather than a ‘unified entity’ with a ‘single objective’,33 the 
Behavioural Theory of the Firm portrays firms as ‘coalitions of participants’ with divergent 
interests.34 While PSCs as abstract corporate entities may be interested in corporate profit, 
the PSC literature fails to account for why their employees should share this interest.  
Direct and Indirect Participation in Corporate Profits  
An obvious reason for employees to align their interest would be their profit participation. 
However, significant direct participation, either through equity or profit-participation 
programs, is uncommon among UK PSCs. Those annual reports that identify individual 
shareholders show considerable overlap between the ownership and management.35 This 
overlap is, however, limited to the upper echelons of senior management and therefore 
includes only a small fraction of the overall workforce of UK PSCs.36 Employee share 
programs that extend corporate ownership to a wider share of the workforce are rare37 and, 
while interviews suggest that bonuses are more common, they also indicate that, aside from 
senior management, they do not constitute a substantial part of PSC employees’ 
compensation.38 Crucially, interviewees noted that employee share programs and bonuses 
primarily benefit a PSC’s permanent workforce, rather than the often considerably larger 
group of temporary employees.39 One interviewee even suggested that, while some PSCs 
would pay year-end and contract renewal bonuses to their temporary staff, the signing 
bonus and wage increase one could earn by switching companies would often be higher.40 
As a result, the majority of UK PSC employees, much like their counterparts in the state-
organized military, are compensated by fixed-wage contracts and thus do not directly 
participate in corporate profit.  
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Indirect profit participation, i.e. the risk of job loss should a company go bankrupt, is also 
unlikely to be significant. The perceived risk of bankruptcy is likely to be low, as few 
companies have failed in recent years and because employees tend to overestimate their 
employers’ financial health. Often financial troubles also result in a take-over rather than in 
the PSC’s dissolution and thus have little consequence for employees. While data are scarce, 
G4S’s acquisition of Armorgroup may be instructive: Part of the value of a company often lies 
in its contracts.41 To prevent disruptions to the provision of security services, clients are 
likely to support a take-over aimed at rescuing an ailing PSC. Finally, should a company go 
bankrupt, the consequences for its employees are unlikely to be significant in the long-term. 
Skills are highly transferable within the PSI and temporary employment is rife, which greatly 
facilitates switching jobs.42 Indeed, the consequences of a bankruptcy for an individual 
employee may be similar to those of losing a contract: In an effort to quickly staff their newly 
acquired contracts, companies often retain employees from the PSC that missed out.43  
Conclusion 
Therefore, due to little direct or indirect profit participation, most UK PSC employees have 
little reason to align their interests with the aim of maximizing corporate profits. This raises a 
broader question, which the following two sections address: How does a PSC, as “coalition of 
participants”, create a single, coherent interest in maximizing corporate profit, as envisaged 
by the literature? 
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Section Three: Interests in Individual PSCs  
This section argues that UK PSC employees in Iraq and Afghanistan do not tend to share the 
aim of maximizing corporate profit. Indeed, the level of compensation is an obvious source 
of friction in employee relations. However, several factors specific to the PSI in Iraq and 
Afghanistan from 2003-2009 rendered compensation questions particularly contentious.  
Market Volatility and Wage Expectations: One such factor is the volatility in the market for 
PSC services and the time lag with which wage expectations adjust. Biographical accounts 
and interviews suggest that UK PSC employees in Iraq and Afghanistan felt that 
managements were increasing corporate profits at their expense, especially when wages 
started to fall in 2005.44 This perception was reinforced by PSI’s media portrayal. Following 
the 2005 killing of four Blackwater employees in Fallujah, media attention increased 
significantly and emphasised the industry’s boom since 2003 and the high wages contractors 
could earn.45 Meanwhile, however, the market for PSC services had already slowed 
considerably. Hence, wage expectations remained high in 2005-2006, but UK PSCs were no 
longer willing nor able to meet them, provoking significant frictions with their employees.46 
A telling example for just how cantankerous labour relations became occurred in 2006: CRG 
was only able to renew its contract with the FCO at considerably lower rates.47 When it tried 
to reduce employee compensation accordingly, staff threatened mass resignation and 
strikes.48 
Monetary and Non-Monetary Benefits: The PSI’s employment structure also rendered 
compensation questions contentious. Compensation consists of an employee’s monetary 
benefits, i.e. a wage and bonuses, and non-monetary benefits, e.g. free flights home, 
insurance cover and personal security equipment. Interviews suggest that due to differences 
in personal preferences PSC employees focused primarily on their wages:49 Indeed, divorced 
PSC employees would value free flights less and, instead, prefer higher wages.50 Yet, 
contentious employee relations also played a role: Afraid that employers would cut corners, 
some PSC employees suggested that they preferred to purchase their own insurance and 
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personal security equipment.51 Additionally, there is evidence that some PSCs failed to 
deliver promised non-monetary benefits, especially personal security equipment.52 It 
remains unclear whether this was due to corporate greed or their ineptitude in dealing with 
administrative challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet, the fact that PSC employees would 
attribute these actions to corporate greed illustrates the poor state of PSI labour relations.    
Job Security and Career Advancement: Job security and the prospect of career 
advancement may lessen employees’ focus on their wages and promote greater goal 
alignment. However, most PSC employees work on short-term contracts with little job 
security. Indeed, when some PSCs tried to force their employers into annual salary contracts, 
many resisted because added job security in their eyes did to compensate for the envisaged 
wage reduction.53 This is partly attributable to the perceived ease with which PSC employees 
can be fired. Low captures a prevalent sentiment by stating that ‘the firm could sack me for 
having my eyes too close together’.54 Given that PSC employees are often hired through off-
shore subsidiaries, their rights are indeed largely unenforceable.55 PSC employees also 
attach little value to job security, because the job hunt in the PSI does not represent a 
significant threat. While collective action remains rare, PSCs employees will “vote with their 
feet” if better compensation is offered elsewhere.56  
Wage Transparency and Changes in the PSI Workforce: The Behavioural Theory of the Firm 
suggests that, if wage transparency is high, employees are more likely to be dissatisfied and 
seek out new employment.57 While such information is usually scarce and compensation 
packages are difficult to compare,58 wage transparency has been very high in the PSI in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, as PSC employees use newsgroups and internet forums to compare 
their compensation packages. Moreover, interviews with PSC employees suggest that, once 
in country, their compensation packages were ‘all we ever talked about’.59 PSC employees 
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also insist that this willingness to share information about compensation packages was 
primarily motivated by a desire for fair compensation.60  
Interview data and biographical accounts by PSC employees further indicate a broader 
concern about the PSI, particularly the lowering of standards and the internationalization of 
its workforce.61 This highlights two important points that feature prominently in this thesis: 
First, PSC employees’ concerns about wider PSI developments suggest a degree of 
“ownership” that seems to be at odds with the temporary commitment that PSCs ascribe to 
their employees. Secondly, highly qualified employees argue that the internationalization of 
the PSI’s workforce increases their own risk exposure and that therefore their compensation 
should increase.62 This suggests that they regard their compensation to be fairly determined 
only when taking into account factors other than supply and demand.  
Different Attitudes to the Employee Relationship 
Interestingly, interviews seem to suggest that PSCs are far less critical about their employees 
than vice versa. While PSC representatives reject accusations of profiteering at their 
employees’ expense, they admit to equipment shortages but regard the CPA and local 
authorities as largely responsible.63 In reference to TCNs and local staff, they argue that 
highly-qualified expat staff are much better suited to the management of security rather 
than to its immediate provision. Moreover, PSC employees’ concerns about the quality of 
TCNs and local staff are said to be exaggerated.64 Generally, wage cuts are attributable to 
clients pushing down prices for PSC services rather than PSCs’ attempt to increase profit 
margins.65 Although accepting that the use of temporary labour is not conducive to strong 
loyalties, PSC representatives maintain that more permanent solutions would be 
prohibitively expensive.66 Moreover, they regard most of their employees as only working in 
the PSI for a few years ‘until their [military] pension kicks in’.67 Therefore, efforts to promote 
greater corporate loyalty are seen to be uneconomical. 
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The contentious relationship between PSCs and their employees seems to be largely 
attributable to conflicting attitudes to the nature of their relationship. PSCs seem to 
emphasise the commercial nature of employee relations, stressing that wages are subject to 
market volatility and ultimately limited by clients’ willingness to pay for PSC services.68 In 
contrast, PSC employees regard their work not as a commodity, whose price is subject to the 
laws of supply and demand and the fickle, often uninformed client opinion, but as a good 
that has inherent value thanks to their experience, professionalism and risk exposure.69 As 
one CEO of a UK PSC noted: ‘I am trying to tell them [PSC employees] not to look at the 
product. They are not here to create the perfect product. Focus instead on the client’s 
need.’70   
Conclusion 
Section five will return to the notion of “ownership” and PSC employees’ self-perception. 
This section has demonstrated the degree to which PSC and employee interests diverge 
significantly. Together with fundamentally different attitudes to employee relations in the 
PSI, this renders compromise more difficult and may provoke escalations in labour relations. 
 
Section Four: Limited Corporate Control and the Costs of Conflict 
If PSC employees are not per se disposed to and lack the incentives to align their interests 
with the aim of maximizing corporate profit, to what extent can PSCs pressure their 
employees to “fall in line”? This section argues that PSCs’ ability to enforce corporate goals is 
severely limited by the labour market and the weakness of their corporate structure.  
The Labour Market in the PSI 
Many of the aspects of the PSI’s labour market that make it inimical to strong corporate 
control have already been discussed: The combination of temporary employment and high 
demand renders job loss less threatening. Also, the perceived lack of job security leads 
employees to invest little into their current positions. Indeed, several contractors have 
eventually created their own companies or freelanced,71 suggesting that corporate control 
by threat of dismissal is not very effective. Nor is such control without costs for PSCs: 
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Dismissing employees entails costs for sourcing replacements and may result in conflict, as 
discussed below.     
While the PSI’s labour market does not encourage strong corporate control, PSCs may 
actively punish their employees. PSC employees are particularly concerned about being 
“blackballed”, i.e. the spreading of unfavourable information by a disgruntled former 
employer, which could diminish chances of future employment.72 Judging the likelihood of 
such punishment in purely economic terms is problematic, as individuals are likely to 
blackball a former employee even if this is irrational because the costs of punishment exceed 
the original damages.73 However, in the absence of a central database, which could 
disseminate employee information among PSCs the industry lacks the means for exacting 
effective punishment. Some PSC representatives supposedly just ‘pick up the phone’ to 
discuss a prospective employee with his/her former employer.74 Yet, the large number of 
contractors PSCs employ, the high turnover and time pressure suggest that such a laborious 
procedure is impracticable for all but key management appointments. Moreover, it appears 
unlikely that all PSCs keep detailed records of their employees after termination of 
employment nor that they would be willing to share such information, especially if the 
company may be held liable for employee misconduct.75  
Still, PSCs’ ability to pressure their employees is arguably not inconsequential. Widespread 
concerns about “blackballing” suggest that the ease with which an employer can sanction 
behaviour and employees’ perception thereof can differ considerably. Moreover, despite the 
high demand and flexibility in the PSI’s labour market, employees still face costs when 
switching jobs, e.g. the loss of wages during and the costs of the job search.76 Some 
employees may therefore opt for goal alignment, rather than bear the risk of job loss and 
possible punishment. Overall, however, the PSI’s labour market in Iraq and Afghanistan in 
2003-2009 afforded employees a relatively comfortable position that made it unlikely that 
exerting pressure on employees was an effective means for resolving goal ambiguity.           
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The Structure of UK PSCs  
PSCs’ ability to exert pressure on their employees is predicated on organizational control: 
PSCs thus need to be able to communicate their goals to their employees, observe their 
behaviour closely enough to identify problems and effectively address them. This section will 
argue that, however, PSCs’ corporate structures do not provide the necessary organizational 
control. Unfortunately, Kinsey’s 2005 article Examining the Organizational Structure of UK 
Private Security Companies remains the only in-depth analysis of PSCs’ organizational 
structures – confirming once more the notion that the PSC literature to date looks at rather 
than into PSCs to understand their behaviour.  
Kinsey identifies two types of structures in the PSI. First, the ‘loosely coupled organic 
network’ (LCON) relies on a Central Management Team (CMT) to oversee its quotidian 
operations and strategic management (see figure III-2). LCONs are characterized by (1) little 
differentiation and specialization, (2) a flat hierarchy and (3) a single chain of command (see 
figure III-1).77 According to Kinsey, thanks to concentrated authority in the CMT, LCONs are 
better able to quickly react to changes in the operational environment. Other benefits 
include their relatively low cost and the ease with which companies can adopt an LCON 
structure.78 However, the LCON is limited in its ability to accommodate specialization79 and 
struggles when it comes to managing numerous complex operations, as their CMTs either 
become bottlenecks or, if expanded, lose their organizational coherence.   
Figure III-1 Authority Structures within LCONs
80
           Figure III-2 Organizational Chart of a LCON
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As companies grow and diversify, Kinsey argues, PSCs opt for the second type of 
organizational structure: the ‘divisionalised company’ (DC).82 Here, corporate processes are 
separated into different divisions along geographic and/or functional lines (see table III-4).83 
DCs, unlike LCONs, also separate companies’ strategic management from their day-to-day 
operations.84 To accommodate its complex corporate structure, DCs rely on a more complex 
hierarchy (see table III-3). Kinsey argues that the DC is better able to meet the complex 
challenges of today when some believe that ‘the day of the generalist [...] are [sic] long 
gone’.85 Kinsey acknowledges the DC’s longer chain of command and its relative lack of 
flexibility, but concludes that thanks to the benefits of modern telecommunications its 
‘hierarchical structure does not appear to place companies at a disadvantage from those 
PSCs structured around an [LCON]’.86  
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Kinsey’s study has weathered the changes that have occurred since its publication in 2005 
remarkably well, and LCONs and DCs remain important concepts for understanding the 
contemporary UK PSI. However, two aspects require critical review due to their particular 
relevance for assessing PSCs’ organizational control. First, Kinsey excludes ‘informal 
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processes’ from his analysis.89 While a focus on formal organizational structures is not per se 
objectionable, Kinsey does not apply it consistently. Specifically, he argues that the members 
of CMTs often served together in the military90 and that project teams are often ‘structured 
along more military lines’, enhancing their organizational coherence.91 The importance of 
such informal organizational factors indicates a deficit in the formal organizational structure 
of PSCs: Employees rely on informal processes because formal organizational guidance is not 
always readily available.  
Interviews with PSC representatives confirm this: Management processes and SOPs were still 
evolving, in response to the rapid growth PSCs had undergone during the “bubble”,92 the 
unexpectedly volatile situation in Iraq and the evolving views on what constitutes 
appropriate behaviour for private security providers.93 Drivers of change that originated “in-
theatre” are particularly interesting, as their direction seemingly runs contrary to Kinsey’s 
expectations. Changes to the RoE, contractual terms or security situation often were not 
dealt with in a “top-down” manner, i.e. management develops and disseminates SOPs and 
management processes in response to them, but in a “bottom-up” manner, i.e. acute 
problems were addressed “on the ground” and the resulting practices were later adopted 
throughout the company.94 In interviews, PSC representatives were eager to stress that 
management retained ultimate approval, especially if a procedure was adopted company-
wide.95 However, such ex post approval is hardly the immediate control that Kinsey’s analysis 
suggests.  
Secondly, Kinsey’s assessment of the effectiveness of formal organizational structures and, 
especially, of the benefits of modern telecommunications seems overly optimistic.96 This 
may be a consequence of the data he relies on for his study: the questionnaires and 
interviews used are limited to PSCs’ senior management,97 who are likely to have a more 
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optimistic assessment of the control afforded by formal organizational structures.98  
Employees in mid-management and working-level positions stationed “in-theatre”, who are 
subject to such controls, are omitted. In interviews, they provide a significantly more 
negative assessment of formal organizational structures99 suggesting that, while the number 
and scope of management processes has increased, this has not significantly improved 
corporate control.100 Indeed, PSC employees seem to experience these processes as a 
nuisance and often regard these measures as a cover for management if something should 
go awry.101 Said interviews also suggest that information is heavily “filtered” before being 
passed up the chain of command,102 which suggests that senior management overestimates 
the benefits of standardized management processes and modern telecommunications for 
organizational control. Finally, it is questionable whether more information alone necessarily 
increases corporate control, as many PSCs still dedicate few resources to oversight and 
accountability.103    
Conclusion 
It is therefore questionable whether UK PSCs possess the necessary level of organizational 
control to enforce goal alignment by employees. Moreover, such actions are hardly 
compatible with the need for delegation of PSC decision-making down the chain of 
command. Kinsey attributes this need to ‘the technical nature of the work and its 
location’,104 but the lack of formal organizational guidance is arguably an even more salient 
factor. In any case, PSCs can hardly afford to threaten their employees at the same time as 
they confer substantial decision-making authority upon them. Kinsey implicitly 
acknowledges these limits by noting the prevalence of flat hierarchies in the PSI105 - a 
sentiment that was echoed in the interviews with PSCs and their employees conducted for 
this thesis.106 
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Conclusion Part I: The Costs of Conflict 
Focussing on their respective economic interests, part one has shown that PSCs’ interests 
diverge significantly from those of their employees – a divergence, which neither incentive 
structures nor the use of corporate pressure can fully reconcile. This implies a potential for 
friction within PSCs understood as “coalitions of participants”, which poses a problem for 
PSCs and their employees alike: When employee relations deteriorate, the damage for both 
parties is potentially considerable.  
A breakdown in a PSC’s service provision due to poor labour relations would negatively 
affect the client’s security and provoke a significant negative reputational impact on the 
PSC’s business. Labour conflict can be costly for PSCs even if an escalation to a strike or mass 
resignations can be avoided. Highly qualified PSC employees often have significant client 
exposure, which they can use to the detriment of their employer. Indeed, DynCorp allegedly 
lost its contract for providing security for Afghan President Hamid Karzai after complaints by 
its employees.107  
Yet, conflictive labour relations are also expensive for PSC employees. Most PSC employees 
have not accrued a full pension through their military service and their career earnings prior 
to entering the PSI usually did not allow them to build up a substantial financial “cushion”.108 
They are therefore dependent on their income not only to sustain themselves and their 
families, but also to address their pension shortfall. Furthermore, the skills that are sought 
after in the PSI, e.g. extensive combat experience in SOF units, have few applications in the 
civilian world.109 Highly-qualified employees therefore have little hope to command a 
comparable salary outside the PSI.   
Since the costs of labour conflict are high for PSCs and their employees, incentives to 
compromise are strong. Yet, acknowledging the possibility of a shared corporate interest to 
emerge thanks to said incentives by no means amounts to whole-hearted support for the 
PSC literature’s absolutist notion of a single, coherent corporate interest. Instead, the 
divergent interests of PSCs and their employees offer customers and regulators a point of 
departure to influence PSC behaviour, e.g. by playing off PSCs against their employees and 
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vice versa. Indeed, this chapter’s and the thesis’ overall conclusion will return to this point 
and analyse how these divergent interests can be utilized to influence PSC behaviour as well 
as the likely limits of such an approach.110     
 
 
Part II: Professionalism in the PSI 
While their economic underpinnings indicate a high propensity for conflict, to date, labour 
relations in the PSI have rarely escalated to that level. Interviews confirm this: While PSC 
employees describe the relationship to their employer at best as ‘business-like’111 and 
‘professional’112 and at worst as ‘extremely offensive’113 or careless,114 they rejected strikes 
and mass resignations as ‘unprofessional’.115 The prevalent sentiment seems to be that one 
may switch companies, but only after serving out one’s contract in a professional manner – 
even if employers and clients lack a similar level of professionalism.116 Part two of this 
chapter will argue that it is thanks to the social context that conflicts have largely been 
averted. Specifically, the sense of professionalism expressed above plays an important role 
in fostering cooperation in the PSI.    
Section Five: Conflicting Views about Professionalism in the PSI 
Professionalism has so far received relatively little attention in the PSC literature.117 If at all, 
it features in discussions about how security privatization threatens professionalism in the 
state-organized military118 or about the problems associated with a lack of professionalism in 
the private provision of armed security.119 Professionalism in the PSI has yet to be 
thoroughly analysed, presumably, because PSCs are generally assumed to be exclusively 
motivated by financial interests, leaving little room for other concerns.120 
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PSC Employees’ Self-Perception  
The available data on motivation in the PSI, however, fail to support the literature’s 
assumptions. Franke/von Boemcken showed that only 25% of respondents considered the 
relatively higher wages in the PSI an important factor in their motivation, while non-financial 
motives like helping others (64.6%), making a difference (38.0%) and serving their country 
(31.3%) were each more important.121 Moreover, 96% of respondents considered their work 
as security contractors as a calling.122 Paul Higate’s analysis of UK PSC employees’ memoirs 
likewise identified ‘nationality and professionalism’ as important recurring themes.123  
Caution seems appropriate when drawing conclusions from the aforementioned studies for 
this thesis. Franke/von Boemcken’s survey is based on US rather than UK contractors, with a 
background in law enforcement, not the military,124 while Higate’s analysis draws on a 
sample of only five memoirs of UK PSC contractors,125 which suffer from genre-specific 
constraints, such as self-censorship, editorial influence and self-aggrandisement.126 Still, key 
aspects of the aforementioned studies are confirmed by interviews and journalistic 
accounts: Contractors frequently expressed their distaste at being associated with financial 
motives and stress their commitment to professionalism.127 Critics, however, may contend 
that PSCs have a vested interest to (over-)emphasise their professionalism to ‘provide a 
counter-narrative to [...] the archetypal mercenary figure’.128 Professions are also ‘singled 
out for public prestige and official privilege in the marketplace’,129 making it desirable for 
PSCs to attach that label to themselves. Indeed, when asked how they advertise their 
services, PSC representatives identified their professionalism as their main selling point.130  
This schism between the literature’s prevalent view on professionalism and PSC employees’ 
self-perception raises two questions: (1) why do views on professionalism in the PSI diverge 
so dramatically and (2) are PSCs’ claims about their professionalism merited?     
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Problems with the PSC Literature’s View of Professionalism 
Three arguments can be found for why the literature rejects the notion of professionalism in 
the PSI, two of which are due to its reliance on Huntingtonian notions of military 
professionalism.  
First, influenced by Samuel Huntington’s seminal work The Soldier and the State, the 
literature focuses on the submission of the military to its civilian leadership as the keystone 
to professionalism.131 Prima facie, the commodification of armed security through PSCs 
violates this principle, as individual contractors also owe loyalty to their employer.132 Worse 
still, PSCs may work for a client other than their home-state, causing PSCs to ‘fall outside of 
the military profession’.133 This critique overlooks that neither all members of the US nor the 
UK military serve their home-state. In 2007, 30,000 non-citizens served on active duty in the 
US military and a further 11,000 in the reserves,134 while 6.7% of new recruits to the British 
Army came from Commonwealth countries – a figure due to increase to 10% by 2020.135 
Moreover, while state-organized militaries may require the absolute and exclusive control 
envisioned by Huntington, the same requirement seems excessive with respect to PSCs. PSCs 
operate conjunctly with other security actors in Iraq and Afghanistan in comparison to whom 
their strategic impact is relatively low136 and, unlike the US military, a PSC whose loyalty has 
come under question can easily be substituted.   
Secondly, Huntington argues that the military professional is not primarily motivated by 
economic incentives, but by ‘a technical love for his craft and the sense of social 
obligation’.137 Critics apply this argument to the PSI by claiming that the financial interests of 
PSCs and their employees displace more altruistic values, resulting in a more aggressive 
stance and, ultimately, an excessive use of force.138 Unfortunately, the literature does not 
elaborate on why a more aggressive stance would be financially beneficial. Indeed, the 
literature’s assertions appear questionable, given that an aggressive stance would require 
more expensive equipment, such as armoured vehicles, and make its loss more likely. 
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Moreover, it is questionable if soldiers in the state-organized military are as indifferent to 
financial incentives as the above criticism implies. Recent empirical data by Woodruff, Kelty 
and Segal shows not only that financial interests play an important role in soldiers’ 
motivation, but also that a certain level of financial motivation seems to be compatible with 
military professionalism.139 PSCs and their employees are therefore held to a motivational 
standard that even the state-organized military struggles to fulfil.   
Finally, a more substantial critique is expressed by Franke, Schaub and von Boemcken (FSvB). 
They argue that professionalism is strong in the military, because its members are 
‘indoctrinated’ through ‘common experiences in training, education, and practice’ and 
because it has a strong ‘command structure that controls entry into the profession [and] 
establishes polices and standards’.140 PSCs not only lack these institutional prerequisites for 
a strong ‘professional, corporate identity’,141 but the ‘highly fragmented nature of the 
industry’, 142 the ‘diversity of firms, clients, and the eligible labor pool’,143 and the ‘short-
cycle deployment rotations’144 prevents its development in the PSI. This critique challenges 
earlier claims about the central role of professionalism in PSI labour relations – so much so 
that the next section will discuss it in greater detail.  
 
Section Six: Defining Professionalism  
FSvB essentially argue that there is a set of characteristics that distinguishes professions 
from other occupations, which is absent in the PSI. Their approach to professionalism in the 
PSI differs distinctly from the rest of the PSC literature insofar as it draws explicitly on the 
broader study of professions. Unfortunately, FSvB make little use of the insights said 
literature has to offer,145 as even a cursory foray – this thesis will focus on works by Andrew 
Abbott and Eliot Freidson – reveals weaknesses in their argument. In their defence, one 
ought to note that the two works in which FSvB develop their critique are, first and 
foremost, empirical surveys and that their discussion of professionalism is merely a tentative 
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attempt to make sense of the resulting data. The following discussion will flesh out FSvB’s 
critique and set it in the broader context of the literature on professions.    
The Varied and Dynamic Nature of Professionalism 
FSvB identify specific characteristics in the military’s organizational structure that they 
determine to be constitutive for its professionalism and note their absence in the PSI as 
evidence for its lack of professionalism.146 This approach presupposes the existence of a 
definitive set of specific institutional characteristics whose presence unequivocally 
determines whether an occupation is a profession. Most scholars of professionalism would 
likely reject this notion. Instead, Freidson suggests conceptualizing professionalism as a 
‘logic’, distinct from market-based and bureaucratic control, that, crucially with respect to 
FSvB’s argument, can manifest itself in various forms.147 Abbott makes a similar point when 
he notes the ‘empirical diversity’ of professions148 and criticises a ‘test-by-example’ 
approach.149  
Why the notion of a definitive set of specific institutional characteristics is so problematic 
becomes apparent once it is applied to other professions. FSvB argue that PSC employees 
lack the military’s ‘enforced conformity in all aspects of life [...] over an extended period of 
time’.150 This criterion not only finds the PSI to be wanting, but would also disqualify some of 
the ‘original “status professions”’, notably law, medicine and university education.151 The 
notion of a definitive set of specific characteristics also poses a problem with respect to the 
historical experience of professions. Rather than static and immutable, Abbott specifically 
stresses the dynamic nature of professions.152 Defining professionalism as a definitive set of 
specific institutional characteristics is too narrow a corset to accommodate historical 
changes experienced as professions adapted to new social and political realities. This is 
echoed by Burk in his seminal article Expertise, Jurisdiction, and Legitimacy of the Military 
Profession.153   
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A Broader, More Nuanced Approach to Professionalism 
Instead, professions and professionalization are defined in more abstract terms to account 
for their varied and dynamic nature. Freidson, for example, argues that ‘[p]rofessionalism 
may be said to exist when an organized occupation gains the power to determine who is 
qualified to perform a defined set of tasks, to prevent all others from performing that work, 
and to control the criteria by which to evaluate performance’,154 while Abbott defines 
professions even more abstractly as ‘exclusive occupational groups applying somewhat 
abstract knowledge to particular cases’.155 Moreover, professions and occupations are not 
divided by a clear-cut boundary, but are ideal types that mark polar opposites on a 
continuum.156 This suggests that the question whether the PSI is a profession may be too 
narrow and yield distorted results, especially if compared against an idealized notion of 
military professionalism. A more fruitful approach may be to ask to what degree the PSI can 
be a profession. Finally, Freidson and Abbott stress an important point that FSvB’s critique 
omits: Occupations become professions neither just because of their “training”, “education”, 
“practice” or “command structure”, i.e. their structural characteristics, nor because of their 
functional characterists, which Huntingtonian notions of military professionalism emphasise 
in the military’s unique ability in the ‘management of violence’.157 Instead, professionalism is 
socially constructed and, as a result, cultural and monopolistic characteristics of 
professionalism, i.e. a profession’s members seeing themselves as such and being accepted 
by society, are at least as important.158 Indeed, influenced by Abbott’s definition of 
professionalism, which emphasises professional knowledge and jurisdiction,159 Burk argues 
that ‘expertise, jurisdiction and legitimacy’ are the defining characteristics of military 
professionalism.160  
Despite the critical tenor of the paragraphs above, this sojourn into the literature on 
professionalism is not meant to imply that FSvB’s critique is without merit. Instead, the 
benefits of the proposed approach are most starkly evident in the support it lends to FSvB’s 
otherwise somewhat quixotic conclusions. While they maintain that the PSI lacks the 
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institutional pre-requisites to form a strong professional identity, they also note that 
‘[c]ivilian contractors have many of the traits of military professionals’161 and that their 
survey data indicates ‘a desire for the development and recognition of a professional 
identity in the security industry’.162 FSvB conclude that PSC employees should be ‘considered 
to be members of a semi-profession’, whose ‘continued professionalization is possible and 
should be encouraged’.163 Unfortunately, FSvB remain vague on how their conclusion is 
compatible with their own concerns about PSI professionalism, let alone with the PSC 
literature’s prevalent scepticism. Their more nuanced view of professionalism, however, 
allows for the existence of semi-professions and explains how the PSI could attain said status 
by emphasising its structural as well as functional, cultural and monopolist characteristics.  
The following discussion of professionalism in the PSI will proceed in steps, successively 
drawing on different aspects of the concept. Sections seven and eight will discuss whether 
the PSI sports the characteristics associated with professionalism, which FSvB dispute. It will 
use, what Abbott describes as, a ‘synthetic professionalization concept’, i.e. a concept that 
combines structural, functional, monopolist and cultural approaches to professionalism.164 
However, by emphasising “jurisdiction” and “legitimacy” respectively, Abbott and Burk go 
beyond this “synthetic” model and also emphasise professionalism’s socially constructed 
nature. Sections seven and eight discuss the steps PSCs take to gain recognition for their 
claim to professionalism. Section nine explores the interactive character of professionalism 
at the heart of Burk’s and Abbott’s conceptualization and highlights differences between 
their respective approaches and the consequences for the emerging understanding of 
professionalism in the PSI. 
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Section Seven: A Genuine Private Security Professionalism? I 
FSvB insist that the PSI is distinct from military professionalism, as ‘[i]ncorporating 
contractors into the military profession would dilute its corporate identity’.165 Leaving aside 
whether this concern is justified, section seven and eight will argue that, a genuine PSI 
professionalism is at best still evolving. A stronger claim can be made regarding 
professionalism in the PSI as an extension of military professionalism, which, as such, exerts 
considerable influence on PSC behaviour.       
Structural Characteristics of Professionalism in the PSI 
There are various ways to define the structural characteristics of professionalism. Freidson, 
for example, argues that the logic of professionalism has structural implications for, among 
others, its knowledge, specialization, labour market, training.166 Using this approach to 
identifying professions would likely produce inconclusive results, as any occupation would 
exhibit some and none all of the numerous structural aspects of professionalism. Instead, 
this section asks whether the PSI has developed institutions that would support its claim to 
professionalism.167 Indeed, the industry created professional associations,168 developed 
ethics codes169 and, in the UK, some PSC training courses are certified by the SIA.170 The PSI 
also engaged in national and international efforts to create licensing legislation171 and 
assisted in the development of university-based professional education.172 Hence, an 
absence of “training”, “education”, “practice” and a “common command structure” cannot 
be categorically attested.  
It is further unclear why the structural characteristics FSvB identify should bar the PSI from 
attaining the status of a profession. FSvB rightly note a ‘multitude of firms’ and a 
‘heterogeneous labour pool’ in the PSI,173 but there are hardly fewer law firms in the legal 
profession or a less diverse labour pool in journalism. Likewise, while Freidson argues that 
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‘jobs whose very existence may be fleeting [...] can develop no coherent identity’,174 the 
prevalence of temporary employment need not prevent the PSI from professionalizing. After 
all, the professional identity of doctors, lawyers and journalists does not rely on the specific 
hospital, law-firm or newspaper they work for but on operating within their respective 
profession.175 While contractors enter the PSI as a second career, most still spend significant 
time in it: The respondents to Franke/von Boemcken’s survey, for example, spent on average 
4.7 years in the PSI.176 Categorically denying the possibility that the PSI could form a 
professional identity thus seems somewhat arbitrary, given that the average career in the US 
military lasts less than ten years.177 Closer inspection, admittedly, reveals weaknesses in the 
structures of PSI professionalism. Crucially, the enforcement of its ethic codes, their 
operationalization by PSCs and the consequences of violations remain largely unclear.178 Yet, 
as Alexander Carr-Saunders notes, the attempt to form professional structures is more 
important than its success,179 and UK PSCs are clearly trying to professionalise.  
FSvB are, however, not interested in “training”, “education” and “practice” per se, but in 
their contribution to allowing the military to form a strong professional identity.180 Abbott 
and Burk likewise stress the importance of professional education in establishing an 
expertise/professional knowledge.181 Professional education in the PSI is too limited in its 
duration and participation to constitute a formative period as envisioned by FSvB, and the 
PSI lacks the lengthy apprenticeships that professions without a dedicated educational 
pathway to membership use, such as journalism. It is in fulfilling this function, therefore, that 
genuine PSI professionalism falls short. However, the UK PSI is also suffused with the 
structures of military professionalism and, when it comes to their formative period, 
interviewees highlight their shared time in military education and training and their 
operational experience.182 Military training and operational experience also regulate entry 
into the PSI, as job adverts generally specify a minimum rank and period of operational 
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experience as conditions for application.183 Crucially, the structures of military 
professionalism are not limited to PSC employees’ previous career. Processes learnt in the 
military are ubiquitous in the quotidian work of PSCs. Their employees frequently rely on 
their military training to understand and develop ad hoc solutions to problems,184 which 
often become formalized. Hence, one PSC employee stated: ‘Our SOPs are carried over from 
the military […] directly out of the manual’.185  
Functional Characteristics of Professionalism in the PSI  
Functionalists argue that professions form in response to the need to govern an ‘otherwise 
asymmetric expert-client relationship’.186 Huntington proposes such a functional rationale 
for military professionalism: Democratic societies need the security an effective military 
provides and, to be effective, those tasked with the “management of violence” require 
autonomy.187 This ‘functional imperative’ chafes against the ‘societal imperative’ of the 
primacy of the civilian leadership and the norms and values of liberal democracies.188 To 
contain the risk the military poses to society while preserving its effectiveness, it needs to be 
separate from, but under the absolute and exclusive control of the civilian leadership.189 
Earlier, this chapter argued that Huntington’s theory is a poor fit for the PSI: While PSCs also 
present an “asymmetric expert-client relationship”, their limited strategic impact and their 
clients’ ability to replace them at will reduces the risk they pose to society. This argument 
has so far relied on structural reasons, i.e. the limited capabilities of PSCs,190 but there are 
also functional reasons supporting this argument: The need for control is a consequence of 
the specific function the military provides. If PSCs provide an altogether different function, 
this should lessen the need for control.    
Functional Imperative 
In interviews, PSC representatives stressed their unwillingness and inability to provide 
military functions, i.e. offensive combat services.191 This is not just a matter of capability 
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constraints: Michael Hutchinson of Erinys emphasised that its Oil Protection Force of 16,000 
guards could not have functioned without CF support.192 Instead, PSC representatives argue 
that there is no viable business model for the private provision of military functions.193 The 
PSI “works” as a business, because it caters to a large and diverse group of private and public 
sector customers, while a legitimate purveyor of military functions would be limited to a 
small group of public sector clients. There would also be little demand for offensive combat 
services outside the infrequently occurring expeditionary operations, and their provision 
requires more expensive training and equipment. This combination of high costs, few 
customers and volatile demand causes the business risk of the private provision of military 
functions to be prohibitively high. Indeed, Sandline’s and EO’s corporate histories arguably 
support this assessment. Both companies emerged when military equipment and man-
power was relatively inexpensive. The security environment at the end of the Cold War also 
generated demand for private military services and, more importantly, an expectation for 
said demand to become sustainable. As these hopes failed to materialize and competition 
from PSCs increased their man-power costs, EO and then Sandline went out of business.     
Societal Imperative 
Providing a different function than the military, however, does not absolve PSCs entirely 
from an expectation of societal control. Indeed, FSvB combine this need for social control 
with the vocational nature of military service in the term legitimacy,194 which also features 
prominently in Burk’s definition of military professionalism.195 While the function of PSCs 
may differ from the military’s “management of violence”, their quotidian work relies on the 
use of force and thus requires a level of legitimacy comparable to the state-organized 
military. While this chapter will discuss en détail whether the term legitimacy is as usefully 
applied to PSCs as to military professionalism,196 interviews and memoirs strongly suggest 
that PSCs are eager to embrace this expectation of social control.197 Critics may reject such 
claims as lip-service. Indeed, there is a dearth of formal processes through which UK PSCs 
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could coordinate their activities with, for example, the FCO.198 While several interviewees 
pointed to informal lines of communication,199 experiences with such arrangements during 
the Arms to Africa Affair are hardly encouraging: Local contacts lacked the necessary 
authority to approve Sandlines’ activities, information flow to the FCO was slow and the 
process was prone to misunderstandings.200 However, the lack of formal coordination and 
the deficits of informal coordination should not be mistaken for a lack of responsibility. 
Instead, PSCs stress that they would welcome more formal coordination mechanisms201 and 
interviews tell of several instances when PSCs lent support to military and CPA personnel202 
or declined business after consulting with the FCO.203 Combined with the monopolist and 
cultural characteristics of professionalism, which will be discussed in the next section, this 
behaviour, the distinction PSCs draw between their function and that of the military and 
their acceptance of a broader societal responsibility are indicative of PSI professionalism.  
Conclusion 
The PSI’s willingness to adopt a broader societal responsibility and the structural 
developments within the industry indicate a desire to professionalize. Yet, its lack of a 
formative period and of processes through which PSCs could coordinate suggest that a 
strong, genuine PSI professionalism has yet to develop. When PSI professionalism is viewed 
as a continuation of military professionalism, however, the military training and operational 
experience many PSC employees share accounts for their formative period and explain their 
strong sense of responsibility.     
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Section Eight: A Genuine Private Security Professionalism? II 
Having discussed the structural and functional characteristics of PSI professionalism, this 
section focuses on its monopolist and cultural aspects, specifically on the steps PSCs take to 
gain recognition for their professionalism.   
Monopolist Characteristics of Professionalism in the PSI 
While structuralists, functionalists and the literature on military professionalism focus on the 
beneficial nature of professionalism,204 monopolist approaches take a less sanguine view. 
Johnson, for example, argues that professions aim to maintain their dominance in client 
relations,205 while Freidson notes their desire for autonomy206 and Berlant points to the 
establishment of an economic monopoly.207 Applied to the PSI, this means that PSCs’ success 
in establishing a monopoly and autonomy depends on whether they can convince society 
that their claim is merited.208    
Monopoly: Professions establish a monopoly by ‘construct[ing] tasks into [...] “professional 
problems”’ and by regulating who may legitimately work on these problems.209 To 
demarcate their professional expertise, UK companies early on rejected the then-prevalent 
term PMC in favour of PSC to distinguish themselves not just from EO and Sandline, but also 
from US companies like Blackwater.210 Indeed, when authors started to describe US 
companies as PSCs, some UK companies re-christened themselves as risk consultancies.211 
According to Caplow, such name changes are characteristic for emerging professions trying 
to ‘lose their past, [and] assert their monopoly’.212 To substantiate their claim, UK PSCs 
established a distinct ‘professional practice’, a specific system of ‘diagnosis, treatment, and 
inference’.213 Unlike their US counterparts, UK PSCs emphasise the analytical aspects of their 
services provision, which they attribute to their better qualified staff: ‘It is the thick ones 
among my staff that just have a PhD. The smart ones can list you their languages like other 
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people can list the letters in the alphabet’.214 Thus, UK PSCs promise to better understand 
their security environment (diagnosis), which allows them to use a ‘more sophisticated’, 
low-profile approach (treatment).215 Moreover, UK PSCs claim that their approach allows for 
greater flexibility: If necessary, UK PSCs adopt an overt, more robust stance, but, most of the 
time, their covert low-profile approach minimizes their clients’ risk-exposure by reducing the 
likelihood of a confrontation (inference).216 The following testimonial is testament to the UK 
PSI’s success in establishing this “British Way” of providing security: ‘They [UK PSCs] learned 
how to keep a low profile. Now these other guys: Triple Canopy, Blackwater, etc.? They don’t 
change their tactics‘.217   
Efforts to restrict entry into the profession, however, have been largely unsuccessful. 
‘”Aggressive self-regulation”’ through the BAPSC has yet to attract meaningful government 
support and its charter’s promise to commit its members ‘to transparency, implying that 
they have to disclose their corporate structures and their relations with their offshore bases, 
partners, and sub-contractors’ remains unfulfilled.218 Moreover, the FCO’s decision to award 
its Iraq contract to Garda World, a Canadian PSC, suggests that the UK PSI’s monopoly is 
porous even in its domestic market.   
Autonomy: According to Freidson, ‘self-control is essential’ for professionalism.219 To claim 
such autonomy, the UK PSI has to show that its regulating authority, i.e. the BAPSC, can 
exert effective professional control over its members. Freidson argues that effective 
professional control relies on four conditions, which, applied to the PSI, are (1) PSC 
behaviour has to be observable, (2) PSCs have to depend on the BAPSCs approval, there has 
to be (3) a willingness to exercise supervision and (4) an effective way to influence PSC 
behaviour.220 The BAPSC acknowledges that ‘any investigation [...] will be difficult to 
perform’ in Iraq or Afghanistan221 and, while the BAPSC could ‘suspend or withdraw 
membership rights’,222 it is unclear what, if any, effect this would have. Moreover, it seems 
unlikely that UK PSCs would be willing to exercise effective self-regulation: While noting 
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several instances of problematic behaviour in interviews, no UK PSC representative was 
willing to go “on the record” criticising his/her peers. Indeed, the PSC literature largely 
echoes these arguments in its scepticism of the merits of self-regulation.223 
However, the UK government remains committed to self-regulation in the apparent belief 
that UK PSCs will abide by it.224 Freidson seems to makes a similar point about the medical 
profession: It also violates the conditions for effective professional control, yet while this 
‘social structure permits certain kinds of behaviour [...] that behavior does not occur’.225 
Freidson, therefore, suggests that medical professionals are restrained from engaging in 
problematic behaviour by the medical profession’s norms and informal organization.226 
Applied to the PSI, this would suggest that PSCs and their employees could abstain from 
misconduct even if effective formal regulation is absent.  
Cultural Characteristics of Professionalism in the PSI 
Cultural characteristics generally describe the effect broader social and cultural trends have 
on professions, which the next section will touch upon.227 However, if Freidson is right that a 
profession’s norms and informal organization affect its behaviour, the inner-workings of UK 
PSCs merit closer attention. Here, this thesis agrees with FSvB’s assessment insofar as it is 
unlikely that genuine PSI professionalism provides sufficiently strong norms and informal 
organization to significantly affect PSC behaviour.228 Instead, the following discussion looks 
to the continued influence of military professionalism in the PSI to provide the norms and 
informal organization that shapes PSC behaviour.    
While Higate notes ‘a good deal of continuity between military and PMSC culture’,229 such 
claims are seemingly incompatible with the internationalization of the PSI’s workforce and 
UK PSCs’ emphasis on non-military skills. To resolve this apparent paradox, it is important to 
consider how UK PSCs are organized. Their businesses are generally divided into three parts: 
“Operations“ provide security services, while “Analysis“ produces information services and 
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“Support Services“ includes legal, HR, sales, etc.230 Within “Operations”, ‘contractors of 
similar background tend to cluster together’231 - often along regimental lines, as highly-
qualified employees enter the industry and switch jobs based on personal recommendations 
by former colleagues.232 Moreover, individual UK PSCs have developed a reputation for 
preferably recruiting from specific regiments, which function as a signalling device in the 
labour market, especially in the newsgroups/internet-forums contractors rely on for 
information.233 “Operations” are thus often dominated by a small group of former soldiers 
that served together in their previous military career.234  
Several reasons cause these small – several interviewees suggested the term “tribal”235 – 
groups to exert significant influence within their respective companies. First, its members 
occupy key standard-setting positions within PSCs, e.g. “Compliance Officer” and “Head of 
Crisis Management” and, secondly, there is little turnover among its managerial staff.236 This 
allows for the development of close relations between “Operations” and senior 
management, which interviewees suggest allows UK PSCs to develop stronger oversight and 
accountability structures.237 Within “Operations”, corporate authority is underpinned by 
residual military authority: PSC employees in corporate positions of authority generally hold 
a higher military rank and often had a previous command relationship with those they are 
tasked to supervise.238 This high level of cultural coherence within “Operations” is 
maintained, despite the increasing internationalization of the PSI’s workforce, by UK PSCs’ 
pattern of recruitment. UK PSCs recruit their TCNs and local staff along existing military lines. 
This allowed e.g., Erinys to manage the vast number of employees in its Oil Protection 
Force.239 Moreover, UK PSCs preferably employ former soldiers from Commonwealth 
countries, especially South Africa, Fiji, Australia and New Zealand,240 whose military 
training/culture is similar to the British army culture that dominates UK PSCs.    
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Finally, “Operations” often have a disproportionate influence on the overall corporate 
culture of UK PSCs. Recent years have seen many UK PSCs diversify and, in interviews, PSC 
representatives would frequently underscore how many senior management positions were 
now held by employees without a military background.241 Still, interviews suggest that 
“Operations” are disproportionally important for revenue, profits and clients’ perception of 
UK PSCs.242 Moreover, PSC representatives, employees and clients without a military 
background overwhelmingly associate UK PSCs’ corporate culture with the military and 
identify “Operations” as responsible for shaping said culture.243 Interestingly, “civilian” 
employees do not view the prevalence of military culture in UK PSCs as negative: ‘Ultimately, 
we are responsible for a lot of people in harm’s way. It is good to know that our company 
cares about something else besides the bottom-line’.244   
Conclusion 
This section presented an ambivalent picture of professionalism in the PSI. The UK PSI has 
neither a solid monopoly over even parts of the legitimate provision of private security 
services, nor a strong claim to autonomy. Still, the UK PSI has been remarkably successful in 
gaining recognition for its “British Way” of providing security and has successfully resisted 
outside regulation. Indeed, its success in claiming a professional monopoly and autonomy 
has arguably been tied to the continuing influence of military professionalism: Clients 
acknowledge the “British Way” of providing security, because the PSC employees ‘were 
former SAS guys’245 and its proponents argue that UK PSCs can self-regulate because they 
‘are all led by ex-servicemen’ with an ‘understanding of the military ethos’.246 The section 
further showed military professionalism to have a strong influence on PSC behaviour and 
self-organization. The discussion showed how military professionalism is ingrained in the 
corporate culture of UK PSCs, how corporate and residual military authority structures are 
intertwined and how military professionalism extends even to civilian employees of UK PSCs. 
It is thus fair to conclude that UK PSCs have used the continued influence of military 
professionalism to gain recognition for its professionalism.  
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The discussion about the monopolist characteristics of professionalism raises an important 
question, namely whether greater professionalism is necessarily always beneficial. This 
question will be revisited in the final chapter, when this thesis discusses if and how 
professionalism in the PSI should be encouraged. The next section will discuss Abbott’s and 
Burk’s conceptualizations of professionalism and their emphasis on its socially constructed 
nature.   
 
Section Nine: The Socially Constructed Nature of Professionalism  
Sections seven and eight touched on the socially constructed nature of professionalism as 
exemplified by PSCs’ social imperative and their professional autonomy and monopoly. FSvB 
also make reference to this when discussing the notion of legitimacy with respect to 
professionalism in the PSI.247 More importantly, its socially constructed nature lies at the 
heart of both Burk’s and Abbott’s understanding of professionalism. While this chapter has, 
so far, characterized professionalization as a one-way street by focussing on the actions PSCs 
take to gain recognition, the subsequent section engages with Abbott’s and Burk’s 
interactive approach to professionalization. Even though Burk draws heavily on Abbott’s 
work, this section also shows that their respective conceptualizations of professionalism are 
ultimately incompatible and that Abbott’s notion of jurisdiction and its emphasis on 
competition provide important insights for the study of PSCs, especially vis-à-vis the 
relationship between professionalism in the PSI and military professionalism.           
Legitimacy, Competition, Culture: Divergent perspectives by Burk and Abbott 
According to Burk, legitimacy – in addition to expertise and jurisdiction, which correspond to 
Abbott’s notions of professional knowledge and jurisdiction – constitutes one of the 
‘prescriptive factors that [...] mark an occupation as a profession‘.248 By arguing for a 
‘relatively ”high status”’ as a defining feature of professions,249 he also criticizes Abbott for 
not according legitimacy a similarly important role. 250 Abbot’s point of departure is the 
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synthetic professionalization concept (see sections seven and eight), which best describes 
the implicit model FSvB rely on in their criticism of PSI professionalism. He argues that, while 
the concept of synthetic professionalization ‘has some important successes to its credit’, it 
also presents a number of empirical and conceptual shortcomings.251 In its stead, Abbott 
proposes an alternative approach that defines professions by the tasks they perform and the 
necessary knowledge to perform such tasks. Rather than in isolation, Abbott regards 
professions as existing in the context of a ‘system of professions’, within which they 
compete for jurisdiction.252 Thus, in his view, a profession is not defined by its structural, 
functional, monopolist and cultural characteristics, but by their professional knowledge and 
jurisdiction. A profession merely adopts structural, functional, monopolist and cultural 
characteristics to claim jurisdiction over tasks. They are therefore tools rather than defining 
characteristics. 
The defining role jurisdiction thus plays in Abbott’s understanding of professionalism 
suggests flaws in Burk’s criticism. Contrary to Burk’s assertion, Abbott does not claim that 
‘an occupation’s struggle for professional standing rests entirely on [...] abstract 
knowledge’.253 Instead, Abbott states that ‘[i]n claiming jurisdiction, a profession asks society 
to recognize its cognitive structure’.254 In other words, knowledge alone matters little within 
the system of professions if others do not acknowledge it. Abbott’s approach to 
professionalism differs from that of Burk in two additional ways: 
Legitimacy 
Burk rightly notes that Abbott uses the term legitimacy with respect to professionalism255 
and, indeed, one could argue that Burk’s understanding of legitimacy describes something 
akin to the “societal recognition” envisioned in Abbott’s jurisdiction. However, Abbott’s 
understanding of legitimacy differs from Burk’s insofar as it allows ‘for different types and 
levels of jurisdiction’.256 In addition to public opinion, which perhaps best resembles Burk’s 
notion of legitimacy, jurisdictional claims can be made in the legal system or in the 
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workplace, according to Abbott.257 Indeed, since perceptions of professions only change 
slowly, jurisdictional claims can even persist on “residual” recognition ‘long after the realities 
they imply have disappeared’.258 For example, clients continue to praise UK PSCs, because 
they are staffed by ‘former SAS guys’,259 while interviews suggest that former SOF personnel 
are and probably have always been a minority among PSC employees.260 His notion of 
“different types and levels of jurisdiction” also leads Abbott, unlike Burk, to opt against 
considering a “high status” to be a defining characteristic of professionalism. This is not to 
suggest that a profession, in the long run, can sustain itself without legitimacy. However, 
Abbott’s approach emphasises the fluid character of professional jurisdictions and their 
underlying ‘cultural values’ as well as the slow pace of change, which allows ‘well-endowed 
professions [...] [to] put off the day of wrath’.261 Moreover, Burk’s notion of a high-status 
implies popular appeal,262 which is incompatible with Abbott’s emphasis on legitimation 
through the workplace and, especially, the legal system as alternative sources of support for 
jurisdictional claims.    
Still, the concept of legitimacy may have some merits in the specific context of military 
professionalism as it is applied to state-organized militaries. For instance, through the 
incorporation of Huntingtonian ideas into military doctrine and practices, the need for 
legitimacy has become an integral part of the military’s professional knowledge. Moreover, 
the function the military provides and the means it employs constitute such high stakes that 
the high standard of societal recognition implied by the term legitimacy may be justified.263 
Yet, the same cannot be said for the PSI, as neither the means the industry employs nor its 
function – while undoubtedly important – amount to similarly significant stakes as those in 
the state-organized military. Moreover, by identifying legitimacy as a defining characteristic, 
Burk’s professionalism is too narrow to capture aspects of professionalism in the UK PSI: 
While the PSI does not, to date, occupy a “high status” - public opinion tends to view its 
activities negatively - UK PSCs have gained some recognition for their professional 
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jurisdiction in the workplace, e.g. by establishing the “British Way” of providing security, and 
in the legal system, e.g. by gaining support for self-regulation and resisting other forms of 
regulation.  
Competition 
Burk also differs from Abbott in his conceptualization of professionalism with respect to 
competition. While both authors acknowledge competition for jurisdiction as an important 
aspect of professionalism, Abbott identifies competition for professional jurisdiction as the 
very essence of professionalism.264 Thus, he shifts attention away from the relationship 
between professions and society, which arguably dominates Burk’s discussion.265 Instead, 
Abbott focuses on the relationship between different professions and on the mechanics of 
competition.266 Abbott’s focus on this inter-professional relationship is particularly useful for 
understanding professionalism in the PSI – not least because it provides an analytical tool for 
addressing FSvB’s aforementioned concern that PSCs could eventually “dilute” military 
professionalism.       
Following Abbott’s account, one precondition for competition between the PSI and the 
military for jurisdiction would be the development of a distinct professional knowledge. As 
previously noted, PSCs and their employees are increasingly developing a sense of 
“ownership” of their industry.267 This “ownership” manifests itself in debates within the 
PSI,268 which suggest that the idea that private security provision requires more than military 
skills increasingly gains traction in the UK PSI.269 Indeed, PSCs seem eager to develop and 
formalize a professional knowledge distinct from that of the military: Several PSCs have 
reached out to universities and participated in academic research into the private provision 
of security – independent from the military.270 UK PSCs are thus clearly eager to develop 
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their own professional knowledge and to use it to claim jurisdiction over at least some 
aspects of the provision of security in high-risk environments. 
Likewise, there is evidence that the military also contests this jurisdiction. According to Burk, 
the military successively expanded its role from ‘the management of violence between 
armies at war’ at the end of WWII, via the management of defence during the Cold War and 
the management of peace in its aftermath.271 Thus, while Burk rightly notes that the 
military’s core function continues to be the “management of violence between armies at 
war”, the military clearly also claims jurisdiction over the provision of security in post-conflict 
environments. Indeed, the extent to which the military perceives itself to be in competition 
with the PSI is evident in the overwhelmingly negative assessments of the PSI on the part of 
soldiers.272  
Dual Membership and Semi-Professionalism 
Interviews with PSC employees, however, suggest a more complex picture than outright 
competition between the military and the PSI. When asked to compare their current work to 
their previous military career, PSC employees took great care to distinguish between the 
two.273 Several interviewees further claimed that their companies are unable to provide 
military services or to even provide their own services in an environment like Iraq during the 
“bubble” without the simultaneous presence of the military.274 Drawing a clear distinction 
between the PSI and the military seems to be motivated by PSC employees’ desire to protect 
the latter. Indeed, several interviewees were opposed to PSC employees receiving greater 
recognition for their service, arguing that this may diminish the recognition soldiers receive 
for theirs.275 One PSC representative noted: ‘You have to keep in mind that most of us are 
veterans with sometimes decades of military service to our name. While we do this [private 
security provision] now, most of us still care deeply what’s going on in the military.’276 This 
suggests that PSC employees are (or at least regard themselves as) members of two 
professions: They are members of the PSI and, as veterans, they are still part of the military 
profession.  
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This dual membership sits uneasily with Abbott’s notion of competing professions, yet it 
provides a more satisfying account of PSC employees’ motivation than the PSC literature to 
date, which seemingly suggests that an individual can spend years in the military, only to 
drop all allegiance to it as soon as she/he joins a PSC. A possible way to conceptualize the 
relationship between PSC employees and the military may lie in Amitai Etzioni’s notion of 
semi-professions. Etzioni argues that semi-professions thrive for recognition277 and, on the 
margins, clash over issues of professional knowledge and jurisdiction with their “parent” 
profession.278 Still, their relationship to their “parent profession” is often relatively stable 
and semi-professions thrive for acceptance alongside rather than at the expense of their 
parent profession.279 Indeed, even a symbiotic relationship between a semi-profession and 
its “parent profession” is possible: Nursing, for example, has greatly profited from the 
professionalization of medicine in the last century – all the while the two competed with one 
another for jurisdiction in the workplace.280           
 
Conclusion Part II:  
Sections seven and eight suggested that professionalism in the UK PSI is largely an extension 
of military professionalism, which plays an important role in the quotidian activities of UK 
PSCs. Within the organizational remit of PSCs, military professionalism functions as an 
“organizational lubricant”, i.e. it helps UK PSCs to develop a coherent corporate culture, on 
which UK PSCs rely for coordination when they delegate authority to staff “in the field”. With 
respect to PSCs’ environment, military professionalism also fulfils an important signalling 
function, i.e. UK PSCs emphasise their employees’ professionalism when they advertise their 
services and the merits of self-regulation. Section nine discusses Abbott’s notion of 
professionalism as jurisdiction and Etzioni’s concept of semi-professions to delineate the 
relationship between professionalism in the PSI and military professionalism. While the 
chapter argued that the competition for jurisdiction between PSCs and their clients has not 
been particularly intense to date, it raises the question whether, as FSvB have suggested, it 
would be problematic, should competition intensify in the future.   
                                                     
277
 Etzioni (1969), p. vi. 
278
 Ibid., p. xvi. 
279
 Ibid., p. Xvi. See also Abbott (1988), pp. 66-67. 
280
 Abbott (1988), p. 67. 
144 
 
Would Greater Jurisdictional Competition Be a Problem? 
First of all, to Abbott, jurisdictional competition is a fact of professional life281 and thus 
cannot be averted by declaring PSCs to be a different profession – as FSvB seem to 
suggest.282 While “professional death” due to loss of jurisdiction is theoretically possible,283 
there is little evidence that the emergence of the PSI might cause military professionalism to 
suffer this fate, nor does it seem likely that the PSI will be fully integrated into the military 
profession, although some legislative initiatives in the USA advocate greater integration.284 
Indeed, arguments could be made that PSCs are strengthening military professionalism: The 
military no longer offers the prospect of a life-long career to all or even a majority of its 
members, and studies of UK veterans indicate that soldiers with combat experience struggle 
most to re-integrate into civilian life.285 The financial disincentives this increasing gap in their 
lifetime earnings produces, therefore, should propel soldiers to avoid combat, which 
Huntington considers to be at the heart of military professionalism.286 PSCs, however, offer a 
job market, which values the very skills combat-experienced soldiers gain during their 
military career and thus make it more attractive again for recruits to choose a combat 
intensive role in the military – a possibility, which the PSC literature’s frequent criticism of 
the “revolving door”287 and the migration of soldiers to the PSI yet has to consider.288     
Secondly, the extent to which jurisdictional competition is problematic arguably depends on 
what aspect of the military profession is at stake. Not all tasks the military currently 
performs are central to its professional identity and Burk suggests that “pruning” some of 
the expansion the military has undergone recently by ‘contracting out part of the military’s 
jurisdiction’ could ‘strengthen military professionalism’ by allowing it to refocus on core 
aspects of its professional identity.289 While the previous section highlighted the military’s 
claim to professional jurisdiction over the provision of security in a high-risk environment, 
providing personal protection to commercial actors, NGOs and even government institutions 
can hardly be considered a core function of the military. At the same time, UK PSCs have 
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stressed that they view their work as different from that of the military and their actions to 
date largely confirm this claim: UK PSCs have limited their weaponry in line with their 
defensive service provision and, more importantly, when US PSCs were expressing their 
interest to provide the kinetic element in a possible UN peacekeeping mission,290 UK PSCs 
overwhelmingly rejected this idea.291 Instead, what PSCs thrive for seems to be a symbiotic 
relationship to the military. In said relationship, the military retains exclusive jurisdiction 
over offensive combat services, while there is some competition for jurisdiction over 
defensive services. As in medicine, the military would likely dominate the development of 
the applicable professional knowledge, but, like nursing studies, PSCs could carve out a niche 
by developing an expertise for adapting defensive services for the protection of, for 
example, private sector clients. 
Instead of constituting a problem, this conclusion has shown that competition for 
jurisdiction between the military and the UK PSI can actually benefit both parties. Indeed, a 
well-functioning symbiosis between the two professions would assist the military in its 
overall mission, i.e. to sufficiently secure a post-conflict environment for reconstruction to 
commence, while allowing it to shed a function it is institutionally neither equipped nor 
trained to fulfil. As one Bureau of Diplomatic Security official noted: ‘Whoever thought that 
the US Marine Corps would be best suited to provide diplomatic security had either never 
met a marine or a diplomat.’292 Aside from strengthening military professionalism in the PSI, 
fostering such a symbiosis between government institutions, especially the MoD, FCO and 
DFID, and the UK PSI is an important way in which governments can exert influence on PSC 
behaviour in addition to regulating the industry.  This chapter’s conclusion and, more 
importantly, the thesis’ conclusion will return to this issue in detail to discuss how 
professionalism can specifically be used to influence PSC behaviour.293   
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Section Ten: Conceptualizing the Motivation of PSCs and PSC 
Employees  
Part I focused on the divergent economic interests of PSCs and their employees. It concluded 
that the costs of conflict between PSCs and their employees are high for either party and 
thus create a strong incentive to compromise. Part II argued that military professionalism 
plays an important role in the UK PSI. Its importance raises the question whether prevalent 
conceptualizations of PSC behaviour sufficiently account for the role of professionalism.      
PSC Employee Motivation: The Limited/Unlimited Conundrum 
The prevalent view of PSC motivation faces a conundrum that has so far received surprisingly 
little attention: The number of contractor fatalities suggests that PSCs in Iraq have been 
exposed to a level of risk at least comparable to that of the military.294 Yet, reports of PSC 
employees refusing to perform their duties remain rare295 and several media reports and 
accounts by customers highlight the courage with which PSC employees performed in 
situations of extreme danger.296 Why would individual contractors, driven primarily by the 
limited aim of financial profit, choose to fulfil a ‘contract of unlimited liability’?297 
There are several possible explanations why employees may decide to join PSCs and perform 
their duties, even if this means risking their lives. For example, interviews and biographical 
accounts suggest that contractors have a greater tolerance for risk, causing them to find the 
danger of death or serious injury in the PSI acceptable.298 Interviews suggest that PSC 
employees underestimate their risk exposure,299 as data on contractor fatalities was not 
available until recently and remains incomplete.300 Strategic altruism also motivates PSC 
employees’ risk tolerance: Several interviewees stated that, in the case of death or serious 
injury, their insurance at least secured their family’s financial well-being.301 Once a 
contractor has joined a PSC, concerns about his/her security often become secondary to the 
well-being of his/her colleagues or clients.302 PSC employees also report that, when under 
attack, the decision to act courageously is often instinctive, repeating routine behaviour that 
                                                     
294
 Miller (2010). 
295
 Geddes (2006), p. 225, Shepherd (2008), p. 336, Marshall (2010).  
296
 Marshall (2011), Stewart (2007), p. 398, Etherington (2005), p. 222. 
297
 John Hackett in Baker (2011), p. 25.  
298
 Higate (2011), p. 329, Franke/von Boemcken (2011), pp. 736-737. Contractors often join PSCs because they 
‘missed the action’ (Craig Maxim in Pelton (2006), p. 72, see also Ashcroft (2006), p. 7). 
299
 Higgins (2011). 
300
 Miller (2010).  
301
 Edwards (2011), Lynch (2010). 
302
 Ashcroft (206), p. 7, Geddes (2006), p. 203, Loe (2010), Low (2007), p. 29.  
147 
 
they trained for and executed regularly throughout their military career.303 Finally, a 
commitment to professionalism304 and ideology may motivate contractors to disregard 
concerns for their own security.305 Notably, none of these explanations can be 
accommodated by the literature’s conceptualization of PSC motivation and the importance it 
attributes to financial interests. 
Instead, PSC employees are seemingly motivated by a variety of factors, among whom a 
single, dominant one cannot be easily identified. Moreover, interviews suggest that, while 
they perceive the PSI as being very different from the military, many contractors describe 
their work as a continuation of their military life.306 Low, for example, describes his decision 
to work for a PSC as ‘I would soldier on [...] [i]t was what I’d done for 17 years’.307 In addition 
to their SOPs and their language, which closely resemble elements from their prior military 
life,308 PSC employees are surrounded by people similarly steeped in military culture: In 
addition to their fellow contractors, PSC employees often engage with military personnel 
during their work309 and socialize with them in their free-time.310 Finally, as previously 
mentioned, recruitment to the PSI often takes place through a network of former military 
contacts. Given how strongly they are embedded in military culture, PSC employees are 
unlikely to sacrifice the non-financial interests that attracted them to the military life in the 
first place for marginally better pay. At the same time, financial factors are undeniably 
important to PSC employees – so much so that they are willing to switch jobs within the 
industry in pursuit of higher remuneration.311 A possible solution to this apparent paradox is 
that PSC employees separate the relationship to their work from that to their employer: 
While they view the former largely in non-financial terms, they emphasise the commercial 
nature with respect to the latter. One PSC employee stated that ‘[m]uch of what we do now 
[as PSC employees] is very similar to what we used to do as soldiers, but we are no longer 
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working for queen and country, but for a private company’.312 This explains why PSC 
employees are willing to “pay the ultimate price” for their colleagues and clients and “soldier 
on” in the face of danger, yet talk about little else but money among one another and are 
willing to switch companies for a higher wage. 
What Motivates PSCs?  
The PSC literature and most traditional economists treat a company ‘as if it were, in effect, a 
single person’313 with rational profit maximization as its motivation. However, the central 
role that non-financial factors play in the motivation of a company’s employees suggests 
that this view does not adequately describe the motivation of PSCs as a whole.  
First, the behavioural theory of the firm argues that companies are “coalitions of 
participants” with competing interests. To generate organizational coherence, “participants” 
have to find compromises, which deviate from the choices a rational, profit-maximizing 
company would make. Hence, Cyert and March argue that ‘[p]rofit maximization [...] is 
either only one among many goals of business firms or not a goal at all’.314 Secondly, the 
managerial theory of the firm stipulates that managers, who control but do not own their 
respective companies, ‘pursue objectives other than profit maximisation’, including their 
‘salary, status, power and prestige, and security’.315 As a result, they may neglect long-term 
investments in favour of short-term performance, as their performance is often measured in 
quarterly earnings.316 Indeed, biographical accounts frequently mentioned friction between 
regional/country-managers and senior management, as the former insist on costly security 
upgrades and refuse assignments that entail unnecessary risks.317  Finally, ‘the search for the 
corporate soul’318 suggests that corporations have aims other than increasing shareholder 
value, as they are not isolated from society, but have a vested interest in its well-being. In 
interviews, PSCs frequently acknowledge their corporate social responsibility (CSR) and point 
to their regulatory efforts319 and their support for charities320 as evidence for their wider 
societal engagement.     
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If PSCs are characterized as being solely interested in financial profit, these behavioural, 
managerial and CSR influences are neglected. However, it is not sufficient to merely 
acknowledge the presence of these factors in the motivation of PSCs. What is instead 
needed is a way to conceptualize the relationship of financial and non-financial factors in the 
behaviour of PSCs. One possible way is proposed by Fligstein: 
In the neo-classical theory of the firm, the motives and actions of managers and 
entrepreneurs presume that firms must maximize profits. [...] I claim that the central 
goal of managers in the past hundred years has been to make sure their firms 
survived.321   
Accommodating their employees’ financial and non-financial interests, i.e. to impose 
‘beneficial constraints’ on their corporate behaviour to have it conform with the norms and 
values of military professionalism,322 makes more sense for a manager if he/she is focused 
on a PSC’s long-term survival rather than maximising its financial profit. Moreover, corporate 
survival as a motivation for PSCs also explains why, at times, friction escalates to outright 
conflict between PSCs and their employees: When a PSC’s profitability and, hence, long-term 
survival is threatened, management may feel that it lacks the room necessary for costly 
compromises with their employees.  
Professionalism and Uncertainty 
The chapter has so far focused on goal ambiguity in PSCs and the role of professionalism in 
overcoming it. However, Fligstein’s focus on corporate survival suggests an even broader 
role for professionalism in PSC decision-making. Fligstein tries to understand how managers 
use the discretion afforded to them by the market. Unlike traditional economics, which sees 
managers as an instrument in maximising shareholder value, and managerialism, which 
emphasises their self-interest,323 he highlights the effect of uncertainty: ‘Actors in 
organizations exist in murky worlds where the consequence of any given action is 
unclear’.324 Two reasons suggest that this emphasis on the unintended consequences of 
managerial actions is particularly applicable to the PSI.  
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First, the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have brought about changes that, in sum, mark a 
paradigm change for the PSI. Examples include the widespread use of PSCs by public sector 
institutions, the resulting increase in demand for their services, the internationalisation of 
the PSI’s workforce and the exposure of PSCs to an unprecedented level of physical 
insecurity. In response, PSCs professionalized their corporate processes, developed more 
elaborate management processes and acquired the equipment and skills needed to service 
large public sector contracts. These changes are, however, still ongoing, as PSCs face the 
challenge of making their businesses sustainable in the aftermath of the “bubble” – a 
situation that exposes them to a significant level of uncertainty.325 Secondly, the PSI is now 
subject to seemingly persistent attention by the international media, the wider public and its 
political representatives. While most experts agree that private security will play an 
important role in expeditionary operations for the foreseeable future,326 PSCs’ popular 
image has deteriorated from being largely unknown to ignominy. This adds further 
uncertainty, as PSCs need to consider the economic merits of their decisions and their 
consequences for public reputation.  
Chapter five will elaborate further on the uncertainty resulting from how actions are 
interpreted when discussing PSCs’ customer relations. However, given the changes the PSI is 
currently undergoing, recourse to military professionalism helps managers chart a course for 
their companies through this corporate terra nova. By ostensibly relying on military 
professionalism to inform their actions, PSCs can draw on the legitimacy of what some 
interviewees called the “gold standard” in providing security to make up for their own 
legitimacy deficit.327 Military professionalism, therefore, provides an important means for 
reducing uncertainty. 
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This chapter’s discussion of the PSI’s labour relations and the role of professionalism has 
important implications for any interaction with PSCs, be it as a client or as a regulator. While 
client relations will be discussed en détail in Chapter Five, some of these implications seem 
to be apparent already. First of all, a top-down approach to controlling PSC behaviour, for 
example through untargeted financial sanctions at the corporate level, is likely to produce 
suboptimal results. As this chapter has shown, PSCs lack the level of control over their 
employees such an approach would require to be effective. Instead, measures that treat 
PSCs as a “coalition of participants” and provides incentives to all its members may prove 
more effective. While the PSC literature has so far devoted little attention to what PSC 
employees could possibly want, interviews suggest that assistance with insurance matters 
could provide a useful yet inexpensive “carrot” to encourage desired behaviour. Secondly, 
the prevalence of military professionalism in the PSI may provide an avenue to influence PSC 
behaviour that may end up being more effective than more overt regulatory means. Several 
PSC employees suggested that they regretted the poor opinion their former military 
colleagues have of their profession, which one describes as ‘mixture of suspicion and 
disdain’.328 Encouraging greater mutual respect, e.g. by instituting limited joint training 
sessions, a reciprocal exchange on personal security provision and a system of honours 
recognizing exceptional service by PSC employees, may foster military professionalism in the 
PSI and, thus, positively influence PSC behaviour. Finally, formal and informal lines of 
communication between UK PSCs  and the FCO, UK armed forces and DFID should be 
improved. One example of how this could be accomplished is the FCO’s decision to host the 
Security in Complex Environments Group’s (SCEG) inaugural conference.329 Similar events 
could greatly foster mutual respect and thus improve coordination, even in the absence of 
formal mechanisms.  
In addition to these amicable means of control, the contentious nature of labour relations in 
the PSI offers further opportunities to control PSC behaviour. Establishing lines of 
communication to PSC employees independent of their management and encouraging them 
to “whistle-blow” would likely increase transparency. Likewise, PSCs should be encouraged 
to report any misconduct by individual employees. The BAPSC’s suggestion to install an 
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independent ombudsman is one possibly solution.330 However, the BASPC’s ombudsman 
model lacks incentives for greater transparency, which could be provided by granting 
exemption from punishment to individual employees and by capping liability or granting 
anonymity to PSCs. This thesis’ concluding chapter will return to these implications and the 
resulting policy advice. It will also discuss how formal and informal mechanisms of 
controlling PSC behaviour are best to be balanced. The next chapter, however, will take a 
look at the broader economic context in which PSC behaviour is embedded, i.e. the market 
for PSC service.  
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Chapter 4: The Market for Security1  
The previous chapter focused on the smallest aggregate in which economic activity takes 
place in the UK PSI, the individual UK PSC. It showed that the behaviour of UK PSCs cannot 
be accurately explained if their motivation is reduced to a single, coherent interest in 
corporate profit. Instead, UK PSCs are “coalitions of participants’ with different, often 
competing interests. To the extent that there is a corporate interest, it is based on a 
compromise between these participants, which is facilitated and informed by a shared sense 
of professionalism. However, explaining UK PSC behaviour based on motivations alone is 
comparable to drawing conclusions about a painting by studying a single pigment on its 
canvas. Corporate behaviour is influenced – traditional microeconomics would say 
determined – by the contextual structures, i.e. its external ‘constraints’.2 Therefore, Chapter 
Four will analyse how UK PSC behaviour is affected by the market for private security 
services. 
Competition and the Regulative Influence of Markets 
Economists believe that markets influence the behaviour of their participants by 
determining prices, thereby disseminating information and providing incentives to engage in 
or abstain from certain behaviour.3 However, a market’s influence on its participants’ 
behaviour is conditional on its competitiveness. In competitive markets, all companies are 
price-takers not makers, as market power is too dispersed for any one actor to determine 
the market price.4 Companies could neither raise their prices above the market price nor risk 
violating accepted standards, as customers would take their business elsewhere and leave 
the company in question unable to attract new business in the future. 
The PSC literature does not challenge the beneficial properties of competitive markets per 
se, but it disputes the competitiveness of the PSI’s.5 Authors point to the relatively small 
number of companies that initially plied their trade in Iraq and Afghanistan and the increase 
in prices for PSC services during the “bubble” as evidence for monopolistic structures in the 
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PSI.6 Hence, the market for private security services is believed to fail as a source of 
regulative influence on PSC behaviour.  
Even though many authors emphasise the importance of competition in the PSI,7 little effort 
has gone into providing an in-depth analysis of the subject. The literature's disregard for 
insights from economics and/or management studies on competition is particularly 
unfortunate and yet symptomatic of its limited attention to economic aspects of PSC 
behaviour.8 This chapter argues that competition in the market for PSC services is neither 
too weak – granting UK PSCs “carte blanche” in their behavioural choices – nor too strong – 
forcing UK PSCs to maximise their profits to survive. The first section discusses the 
literature’s approach to competition and its shortcomings. Section two considers different 
ways of measuring competition, provides a brief critique of Porter’s “Five Forces” framework 
(FFF), which will be employed to discuss competitive pressures in the PSI. The section also 
highlights differences in how private and public sector clients procure PSC services. Sections 
three through seven apply Porter's “five forces” – (1) rivalry among existing competitors, the 
threat of (2) new entrants and (3) substitutes and the power of (4) customers and (5) 
suppliers – to illustrate the competitive pressure in the PSI. Finally, the chapter concludes by 
discussing how competition can be improved in the UK PSI. 
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Section One: The Literature’s View of Competition in the PSI 
There are several reasons for concern about the literature’s assessment of competition in 
the PSI. For one, its accuracy hinges on the market environment in Afghanistan and Iraq in 
2003-2006 being exemplary for the PSI – an assumption that a growing number of experts 
are sceptical about. Rather than structural problems, they suggest that situational 
difficulties, e.g. poor pre-war planning9 and insufficient institutional experience with security 
contracting,10 are responsible for the temporary increase in demand for PSC services during 
the “bubble”.11 Moreover, markets for PSC services elsewhere seem to be affected by 
different dynamics than the PSI in Iraq and Afghanistan. Rita Abrahamson’s and Michael 
Williams’ studies of private security markets in Kenya, Nigeria and Sierra Leone neither 
indicate significant levels of volatility nor disparities between supply and demand similar to 
those in Iraq and Afghanistan.12 This stresses the need for an approach that focuses on the 
structural determinants of competition, rather than primarily on situational factors. 
Monopoly 
The validity of the literature’s concerns further depends on the accuracy of its assessment of 
PSC competition in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2003-2005, especially the claim that the PSI is 
monopolistic. This would imply that the PSI as a market is dysfunctional, i.e., without 
regulatory intervention, the price mechanism, which is supposed to regulate PSC behaviour, 
would not work.13 Unfortunately, the PSC literature’s use of this economic concept is vague: 
Is the PSI a pure monopoly or does it suffer from monopolistic competition? Economists 
define the former as a situation in which a single supplier, protected by market barriers, is 
not a price-taker, i.e. the monopolist can determine the price for its goods/services.14 
However, Avant lists more than 130 site/personnel security companies15 - a figure that 
clearly violates the single supplier requirement of a pure monopoly. Indeed, even the less 
restrictive legal definition of a monopoly – a supplier enjoying a market share in excess of 
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25%16 - seems inapplicable to the PSI. Interviews with PSC representatives confirm that, 
while there are differences in PSCs’ respective market-shares, no single company dominates 
the industry.17 The concept of a pure monopoly is therefore inapplicable to the PSI. 
Monopolistic Competition 
Monopolistic competition differs from a pure monopoly insofar as it describes a market in 
which many suppliers compete, whose products are similar, but not perfect substitutes and 
who are not protected by significant market-barriers.18 Unlike perfect competition, 
monopolistic competition would, in the short-term, allow a company to raise its prices 
without losing its customers, as long as the price hike does not exceed the costs of using an 
imperfect substitute.19 In the long-term, however, higher prices would attract new market 
entrants, forcing the company to reduce prices or face a loss in customers. Therefore, a 
company’s ability to raise prices without losing its customers depends on its ability to deter 
competitors, i.e. its market power. Frank and Bernanke identify five sources of market 
power: (1) ‘Exclusive Control over Important Inputs’, (2) ‘Patents and Copyrights’, (3) 
‘Government Licenses or Franchises’, (4) ‘Economies of Scale’ and (5) ‘Network 
Economies’.20 Closer examination, however, shows that none of these factors has a 
significant presence in the PSI.  
Whereas their reliance on technology often grants defence companies exclusive control over 
important inputs and the protection afforded by patents and copyrights,21 the quotidian 
work of PSCs is neither technology-intensive nor dependent on specific raw materials. 
Likewise, while PSCs generally require licenses to operate in a given country, these licenses 
do not offer PSCs the exclusive market access implicit in Frank and Bernanke’s government 
licenses and franchises.22 There is also no evidence of economies of scale, i.e. diminishing 
unit costs as the total number of units increases, in the PSI.23 Indeed, the notion that PSCs 
are little more than ‘a retired military guy sitting in a spare-bedroom with a fax machine and 
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a Rolodex'’24 is clearly at odds with the large up-front investments usually associated with 
economies of scale.25 Finally, while networks influence how PSCs compete, their influence is 
not comparable to the network economies sustaining the dominance of Microsoft Windows 
in the market for PC operating systems.26 The lack of clearly identifiable sources of market 
power suggests that the literature’s concerns about monopolistic structures in the PSI are 
largely unfounded. However, the discussion above exemplifies how a closer engagement 
with economic concepts could benefit the literature’s understanding of PSC behaviour.  
Excess Demand 
This raises the question whether excess demand alone can be indicative of a lack of 
competition. Temporary asymmetries between supply and demand are to be expected, as 
market participants cannot react to price signals instantly.27 Such “time lags” can cause 
considerable price distortions, especially if demand increases significantly and unexpectedly, 
as it was the case during “the bubble”. While much has been written to account for the 
increase in demand for PSC services,28 the state of the PSI prior to the “bubble” has largely 
been overlooked as a cause for the subsequent excess in demand.  
While the UK PSI emerged in the 1970s, for much of its history it has been a “cottage 
industry” catering to a relatively small group of customers.29 The attacks of September 11th, 
2001 changed this insofar as they significantly increased the demand for PSC services. CRG’s 
business in Europe and North America, for example, increased by 35% in 2001-2003.30 
However, interviews suggest that this post-9/11 boom steered the PSI towards different 
activities than those subsequently required in Iraq and Afghanistan. Companies were 
primarily concerned about business continuity, which required the purchase of consultancy 
and information products rather than large numbers of armed security contractors.31 
Expansion into developing countries had become increasingly important, but the markets in 
question were relatively secure, which created little demand for armed security.32 Even 
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companies operating in high-risk environments had become increasingly reluctant to rely on 
armed security for their protection,33 due to concerns about corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) and corporate liability.34 Finally, while UK PSCs were already used for diplomatic 
security, for example, during the conflict in Kosovo, the resulting demand was negligible in 
comparison with Afghanistan and Iraq.35 Therefore, while the market for security services 
expanded in the decade prior to the “bubble”, its “kinetic end”, i.e. the provision of armed 
security services, did not grow significantly.  
The resulting mismatch between supply and demand for armed security services suggests 
that the PSI suffered from temporary “growing pains” rather than inherent structural 
problems.36 This assessment is supported by the industry’s development in response to “the 
bubble”. The success of relatively new companies, such as Triple Canopy, Aegis and 
Blackwater, in winning contracts against established competitors provides evidence against 
a structural lack of competition.37 Moreover, the drop in prices for PSC services from 2005 
onwards indicates increasing competition in the PSI. One measure for this depreciation in 
prices is the change in the compensation of PSC employees. Prior to the “bubble” highly 
qualified contractors could expect to earn $400-$500 per day, before wages rose to $1,200 
per day during 2004.38 Since 2005, wages decreased again to $400-700 per day.39 As a result, 
Avant argues that ‘[i]n Iraq, the [private security] industry has demonstrated its deepening 
competitive […] nature.40 
Indeed, the PSI’s development – a partially dormant industry prior to 2001, a drastic increase 
in demand from 2003-2005 and the rebalancing of supply and demand since then – suggests 
that the PSI is maturing, which should provide further opportunities for improving 
competition in the market for PSC services. As it stands, the literature has highlighted a lack 
of competition, but it has remained vague on how to enhance it. To identify possible policies 
and assess their market-wide impact, an in-depth analysis of competition in the PSI is 
needed.  
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Section Two: Introducing Michael Porter’s Five Forces Framework 
How to Measure Competition in the PSI? 
Several methods seek to quantify competitive pressure. The most widely used measure, the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index (HHI), compares the size of companies, denominated in their 
number of sales, to the industry they compete in.41 Competing measures are the Lerner 
Index and the Boone Indicator, which use companies’ profit margins and the relationship of 
profit-elasticity to marginal costs, respectively, to determine competition in the underlying 
market.42 Unfortunately, all three measures are unsuitable for this thesis’ purpose: the 
analysis of UK PSC behaviour. For one, they require data that are not readily available for the 
PSI. PSCs are unwilling to share information about their profit- and cost-structure;43 market 
share and the overall size of the industry are unknown.44 Moreover, all three measures 
exclusively look at past performance and tangible factors to analyse competition. However, 
its influence on PSCs’ decision-making depends primarily on how companies assess their 
competitive environment and its future development and in forming such an assessment 
intangibles can be important. Indeed, in a market as volatile as the PSI, perceptions of future 
developments arguably have a greater impact than past performance. Finally, all three 
measures are limited to quantifying the intensity of competition, but cannot explain why 
competitive pressure is high or low in a given market. 
Instead, this thesis will use Porter’s Five Forces Framework (FFF). Its central idea is that 
competition in any industry can be described as the product of five forces, namely (1) the 
rivalry among competitors, (2) the threat of new entrants and (3) substitute products and (4) 
the power of suppliers and (5) buyers. The FFF is particularly suited to the analysis of the PSI, 
because it requires relatively little data to reach meaningful conclusions45 and because, 
through the threat of new entrants and substitutes, it incorporates perceptions about 
intangibles and future developments.46 Finally, by disaggregating competitive pressure into 
                                                     
41
 The DoJ uses the HHI in anti-trust cases (DoJ (1997), §1.51). 
42
 Aghion et al (2005), p. 704ff, Boone (2008). 
43
 Erik Prince in Milbank (2007). Due to corporate disclosure requirements in the UK, the situation vis-à-vis the 
UK PSI is somewhat less problematic. 
44
 The Peace Operations Institute attempted to measure the size of the industry, but the meagre response rate of 
13.6% and 6.1% make its information unreliable (Messner/Gracielli (2006) and Messner/Gracielli (2007)).  
45
 Porter (1980), p. xxiii. 
46
 Burke et al (1988), p. 63.  
160 
 
five components, the FFF provides insights into why the competitive pressure in an industry 
is high or low.  
A Brief Critique of Porter’s FFF 
It is hard to overestimate the impact Porter’s work had on the analysis of competition and 
corporate strategy since its publication in 1980 – among academics and practitioners alike.47 
Its continued relevance is attributable to the balance the FFF strikes between complexity and 
applicability, i.e. it is neither too specific to be limited to a single industry nor too complex to 
be useless to practitioners with little previous knowledge of economics.48 This makes the FFF 
particularly suitable for this thesis, as its intended audience largely consists of non-
economists. Given the FFF’s prominent position in this thesis, a brief review of the criticism 
against Porter’s work seems merited.49  
Some of the criticism aimed specifically at the FFF is not of concern due to this thesis’ 
specific design and object of analysis. For instance, some critics are concerned about the 
arbitrary boundaries of Porter’s unit of analysis, the “industry”.50 However, Chapters One 
and Two have shown that alternative demarcations, such as the broader approach prevalent 
in the PSC literature, are even more problematic.51 Criticism targeting the FFF’s implicit 
cultural bias and, thus, limited suitability for the study of developing economies also does 
not apply to this thesis’ focus, the UK PSI. Finally, the FFF’s has been criticized for being 
insufficiently attentive to cooperation,52 resource constraints,53 non-economic factors54 and 
the role of innovation.55 These limitations of the FFF are somewhat compensated by 
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Chapters Three and Five, which put greater emphasis on resource constraints, non-economic 
factors and cooperation.56  
Finally, economists criticize Porter’s methodology and his failure to acknowledge the 
intellectual origins of his work.57 Porter addresses this criticism by pointing out that 
economics largely ignores the implications of competition on the quotidian behaviour of 
corporations.58 If competition can be described as a spectrum, traditional economics focuses 
on its polar opposites, perfect competition and monopolies/oligopolies, but has little to say 
about the room in-between, where most economic activity takes place.59 While Porter’s 
failure to acknowledge the work of others may be objectionable, the FFF nonetheless 
succeeds in providing practitioners with a tool for assessing the competitive pressure in their 
industry – one that, incidentally, is widely used by PSC representatives.60   
How PSC Services Are Bought and Sold  
UK PSC representatives suggest that there is a significant difference in how PSC services are 
marketed and sold to private and public sector clients.61 Yet, the PSC literature does not 
draw such a distinction. Indeed, its discussion is arguably dominated by large public sector 
contracts like the Worldwide Personal Protective Services contract (WPPS), which is owed to 
the fact that private sector demand is more fragmented. Yet, while most UK PSCs in Iraq and 
Afghanistan may ultimately be public sector-funded, these funds often reach them through 
private sector companies.62 In 2003-2007, prime contractors paid $3-6 billion to PSCs, while 
DoS, DoD and USAID combined paid about $5 billion.63 The former figure excludes 
subcontractors and genuine private sector demand, which, interviews suggest, has steadily 
increased in recent years in Iraq.64 Given its share of the overall demand for PSC services and 
the important role it plays in the UK PSI, taking a closer look at private sector demand is 
certainly justified.  
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Drawing a distinction between private and public sector clients is important, because they 
differ in how they procure PSC services. Private sector customers emphasise the importance 
of personal relationships: corporate security managers in need of security will turn to 
companies they already have an often personal relationship with or that have been 
personally recommended to them by trusted sources.65 The resulting contractual 
relationship is often enduring, as private sector customers will rather renew a contract than 
search for a new supplier.66 Insofar as private sector customers push for lower prices, this 
often occurs within existing contractual relationships rather than by retendering their 
contract.67 Indeed, it is testament to the personal nature of the relationship that a change in 
corporate security manager frequently causes a change in private security provider68 and 
that clients sometimes follow a PSC employee when he/she switches to a new company.69 In 
contrast, public sector customers rely on more formalized contracting procedures. Contracts 
are often awarded following a public tender and an evaluation process that uses anonymised 
bids, which limits the influence of personal relationships.70 Moreover, procurement rules 
restrict contract renewals and, instead, force public sector clients to return to the market.71 
This public-private dichotomy does not apply perfectly. At times, political objectives and 
operational needs trump public sector procurement regulations: When the security situation 
in Iraq deteriorated, contractual provisions were tailored to fit specific, pre-selected 
companies72 or procurement regulations were ignored altogether.73 Additionally, the CPA 
allowed reconstruction funds to be spent without having to obey US government 
procurement rules.74 At the same time, Richard Phillips of Edinburgh International argues 
that the need to be perceived as transparent and fair increasingly forces private sector 
clients to standardize and anonymize their procurement procedures.75 Still, the dichotomy 
describes the underlying structures of public and private sector contracting as it is perceived 
by PSC decision-makers. While individual contracts may be strongly influenced by situational 
                                                     
65
 Jeremy Stompa Orwin in Spear’s Wealth Management Survey (2008 VII). 
66




 Priestley (2009).   
69
 Thompson (2008). 
70
 Isaac (2010), Phillips (2010).  
71
 Reed (2010).  
72
 Pelton (2006), p. 277. 
73
 Miller (2007), p. 177. 
74
 Newman/Hammond (2006), Miller (2007), p. 188.  
75
 Phillips (2010).  
163 
 
constraints, these structures shape the expectations of market participants and, thereby, 
strongly influence PSC competition. 
 
Section Three: Porter’s Five Forces I: Rivalry 
Rivalry describes the competitive pressure that companies in a market exert on one another 
and it is, therefore, closest to the literature’s conceptualization of competition. However, 
Porter advocates a broader understanding of rivalry that encompasses a range of actions 
companies may take, namely ‘price competition, advertising battles, product introductions, 
and increased customer services’,76 and structural factors that increase rivalry.    
Actions Indicating Rivalry 
Even within this wider range of actions and allowing for differences between private and 
public sector demand, PSCs seemingly take few actions indicative of intense rivalry. With 
respect to private sector demand, PSCs are essentially competing to ‘get in the same room 
with the client’,77 i.e. to establish a relationship with a client’s corporate security manager. 
There is little conventional advertising78 and, given that customers can often only describe 
the function a product fulfils not its specific name, it seems that product branding has little 
impact in the PSI.79 Additional customer services are an important factor, but interviews 
suggest that they are used to increase revenue from existing contractual relationships, 
rather than to attract new clients80 - a practice many clients find irksome.81 Finally, price 
competition is limited, because security, as a product, does not lend itself to low-cost 
strategies. Clients engage PSCs in part as ‘reassurance’ to reduce their reputational and 
liability risk in case of an incident.82 Choosing a PSC with a low-cost strategy could cause the 
client in question to appear “cheap” on security, increasing their exposure to reputational 
and liability risks.83  
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With respect to public sector demand, PSCs compete for publicly tendered contracts in an 
anonymised procurement process. Thus, advertisements, product branding and additional 
customer services have little impact on competition for public sector demand. Lobbying is 
believed to be prevalent in the PSI,84 but it is a poor indicator for intense rivalry. Aegis’ hiring 
of the former British High-Commissioner Paul Boateng85 and Blackwater’s hiring of Burson-
Marsteller after the Nisoor Square incident86 suggest that PSCs may use lobbying primarily to 
influence regulatory efforts and address legal challenges rather than to gain a competitive 
advantage in the tender process. Finally, PSC representatives consider public sector demand 
to be increasingly price sensitive and complain about the public sector’s focus on pricing 
rather than a company’s reputation and ability.87  
However, there are several reasons why the industry’s claims about the intensity of public 
sector price sensitivity and resulting intense price competition is questionable. For one, the 
evidence from Iraq and Afghanistan suggests that cost-efficiency was often a secondary 
concern to force protection and mission success.88 The US government, for example, 
expected to award reconstruction contracts in Iraq at a rate of twenty-five contracts in the 
first two months, rather than the usual ninety days per contract, making effective cost-
control virtually impossible.89 Secondly, unlike companies, states cannot as easily “cut their 
losses” and abandon operations if the cost of security increases. This and the lack of public 
sector alternatives to protect government institutions in Iraq and Afghanistan greatly 
impeded cost-efficient contracting for PSC services.90 Finally, the alleged public sector price 
sensitivity has yet to change how PSCs conduct their business. With the exception of 
Blackwater, which advertises its use of fixed-price contracts,91 most PSCs, especially in the 
UK, rely on their experience and service quality, rather than pricing to attract customers.92 
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Indeed, most PSCs consider Blackwater’s pricing strategy to be unsuccessful,93 indicating 
that the public sector is not sufficiently price sensitive for such a strategy to succeed.94 
Hence, PSCs take few actions that indicate intense rivalry. Indeed, in interviews, PSC 
representatives were reluctant to criticize their competitors. This amicability is attributable 
to the personal relationships that pervade especially the UK PSI95 and the high level of 
cooperation required. Prime contractors often rely on other PSCs as subcontractors to 
service large public sector contracts96 and small PSCs occasionally pass on contracts to larger 
competitors and vice versa.97 As a result, the actions PSCs take are at best a weak source of 
rivalry and, thus, competition.  
Structural Factors 
However, rivalry is not limited to the actions PSCs take, but, according to Porter, can also be 
a result of structural factors – five of which can be found in the PSI.98 First, ‘numerous and 
equally balanced competitors’ can exacerbate rivalry in an industry, as no company is 
dominant enough to impose discipline in the market.99 While company size clearly varies in 
the PSI, newly created companies have won contracts against much larger, established PSCs, 
e.g. when Aegis won the ROC contract against Dyncorp.100 Moreover, small companies 
poached employees from established PSCs for the very contracts they won against them.101 
This suggests that size does not translate into the ability to control competitors in the PSI.  
Secondly, ‘slow market growth’ increases rivalry, as companies have to compete for their 
rivals’ clients to grow their business.102 While the recent decline in public sector demand is 
widely recognized,103 the financial crisis precipitated a similar, largely overlooked decrease in 
private sector demand,104 especially in industries that had previously been important PSC 
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customers, namely banking, insurance and oil companies.105 Interviews suggest that, as a 
result, clients’ security budgets and appetite for investments in high-risk environments 
shrank,106 causing profit margins to decline across the PSI. To “keep the lights on”, i.e. to at 
least cover their fixed costs, PSCs have to sell their services in greater volumes, which 
precipitates greater rivalry in the PSI.107   
Thirdly, a ‘lack of differentiation or switching costs’ promotes rivalry by making it less costly 
for clients to switch providers. While diversification into areas like forensics, data security 
and information services has made PSCs less dependent on the provision of armed security, 
they have generally remained ‘Jacks of all Trades’,108 unwilling to carve out a distinct niche 
for themselves. This lack of specialization is partly attributable to their clients’ expectation 
that PSCs are “one-stop solutions” for their security needs.109 Moreover, the prevalence of 
subcontractors in the PSI also stymies specialization, because they allow PSCs to maintain a 
broad service portfolio at relatively low costs: Subcontractors, unlike in-house assets, require 
no upfront investments and they eliminate the risk of capacity underutilization.110 
Since PSCs services are not significantly differentiated, it is easy for customers to switch from 
one provider to another. Likewise, clients do not face significant switching costs, at least not 
in financial terms, because sunk costs and long-term contracts are uncommon in the PSI.111 
While the next chapter will discuss the impact of personal relationships on the decision to 
switch providers, the prevailing attitude among corporate security managers towards 
switching costs seems to be ‘[i]f you are unhappy with something, you can switch [to 
another PSC]. There is really no reason not to’.112  
Finally, ‘diverse competitors’ and ‘high-strategic stakes’ exacerbate rivalry, as they 
disconnect PSCs from the need to turn a profit.113 With respect to diverse competitors, 
Blackwater’s critics argue that the “deep pockets” and political convictions of its owner, Eric 
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Price, allow it to compete for contracts at a loss.114 Recently, a similar concern has been 
voiced following the entrance of large conglomerates into the UK PSI, especially after G4S’ 
purchase of ArmorGroup.115 While these concerns about the competitive practices of 
Blackwater and G4S have yet to be substantiated, their mere existence puts pressure on 
PSCs to fortify their market position, which likely intensifies their rivalry.  
As to high strategic stakes, success in an industry may have value to a company beyond its 
economic performance. This is clearly the case for PSCs with respect to the provision of 
armed security, as it gives them credibility and initiates a relationship to the client that can 
then be used to sell further services.116 Its strategic importance further is evident in the 
inability of some PSCs – CRG is a frequently cited example117 – to abandon the provision of 
armed security when restructuring their service portfolio, despite its reputational risks and 
decreasing profit margin.118  
Conclusion 
While the behaviour of PSCs does not indicate intense rivalry, the aforementioned structural 
factors do. The fact that PSC behaviour has not fully adapted to these structural conditions 
raises two questions: What factors have caused PSCs not to develop intense rivalry and what 
are the industry’s prospects to withstand this structural “pull” towards greater rivalry? While 
the second question will be addressed in the concluding chapter of this thesis, a partial 
answer to the first question lies in the overall argument this thesis proposes: The social 
context, in which PSCs are embedded, curbs their desire for financial profit, specifically the 
relationships within PSCs, among PSCs and between PSCs and their clients. However, the 
extent to which contextual factors can exert influence on PSC behaviour is also a function of 
market conditions in the PSI. This alludes to Chapter One’s bell-curve model of competition 
in the market for PSC services, which Chapter Three expanded on by placing corporate 
survival, not profit-maximisation at the heart of PSCs’ motivation. The bell-curve model 
suggested that at the extremes, where there is absolute competition or none at all, social 
context matters little. On the fringes, where competition is either very strong or very weak, 
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its effect is low. In the middle, however, PSCs are neither unrestricted in their behavioural 
choices nor forced to pursue opportunistic behaviour just to survive. This section’s analysis 
of rivalry places competition in the UK PSI squarely in the middle of the bell-curve. However, 
competition is not limited to rivalry alone, but a function of five forces. The following 
sections will discuss whether the remaining forces confirm that competition in the PSI is 
neither too strong nor too weak to make the influence of the social context immaterial – 
starting with the threat of new entrants. 
 
Section Four: Porter’s Five Forces II: New Entrants  
While rivalry describes the current level of competition in an industry, the threat of new 
entrants focuses on an industry’s future competitive pressure. If a market becomes more 
lucrative, it attracts new competitors, whose market-entry puts pressure on existing 
companies.119 Thus, even an industry that is populated by few companies can be subject to 
high competitive pressure, as the threat of new entrants keeps them in check. However, if 
significant barriers to entry exist, new entrants are deterred, leaving established competitors 
to be free to behave as they please. Hence, the ease of market entry is an important factor 
in determining an industry’s competitive pressure.120 This section argues that the threat of 
new entrants is high in the PSI.     
Barriers to Entry 
Some of the barriers to entry Porter identifies are not applicable to the PSI. For instance, 
technological advantages or proprietary rights play no significant role in the provision of 
armed security121 and neither government subsidies nor licenses pose a significant 
impediment to market-entry.122 Likewise, interviews suggest that the provision of armed 
security requires no raw materials except manpower, which PSC representatives seem to be 
right in pointing out that it is abundantly available.123 Still, three barriers to entry are worthy 
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of closer consideration, namely economies of scale, product differentiation and favourable 
access.124      
Economies of scale: Economies of scale constitute a barrier to entry, because new entrants 
either have to enter the market on par with existing competitors, which requires costly up-
front investments, or they compete at a disadvantage.125 However, their presence in the PSI 
is questionable.126 Increased volume may reduce the costs of credit and of equipment 
purchases, but “diminishing returns on scale” outweigh these benefits.127 Interviews 
specifically named the greater need for managerial oversight and weaker personal 
relationships as a possible downside to an increased production of security services.128 
Porter proposes that ‘joint costs’ and ‘intangible assets’, which can be shared across several 
products at no additional costs, constitute a further source of economies of scale.129 One 
such intangible asset may be the information PSCs gather to assess the security situation in a 
country, which they can re-sell as information products.130 However, transforming an in-
house analysis into an information product incurs costs, as the information needs to be 
processed for external consumption.131 Moreover, “recycling” information risks cannibalizing 
the more lucrative trade in security consulting services.132 Sharing the joint costs of divisions 
like HR, legal and sales across different products may also offer economies of scale, but they 
are likely to be limited in the PSI, as the resulting synergies are limited by the different 
requirements of each product.133 The benefits PSC derive from joint costs and intangible 
assets are therefore not significant enough to amount to economies of scale.  
Product differentiation: As previously mentioned, PSCs have not succeeded in differentiating 
their products sufficiently to attract significant customer loyalty.134 In interviews, few clients 
could name the specific product they purchase.135 Interviews suggest that this is partly owed 
to PSCs not advertising their services as specific products, but, instead, focus on their ability 
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to meet their clients’ problems.136 Still, personal relationships seem to have produced such 
strong customer loyalties in private sector clients137 that the investments needed to 
overcome them arguably constitute a barrier to entry.138 Meanwhile, customer loyalties 
have little effect on public sector demand. A case in point is CRG, to whom the FCO 
maintained a close relationship at the beginning of the Iraq War,139 before cost-efficiency 
considerations caused it to switch providers.140 Indeed, the companies associated with 
successfully entering the PSI in recent years – Aegis, Triple Canopy and Blackwater – all 
primarily cater to public sector clients.141 Furthermore, the PSI does not lend itself to the 
sort of investments commonly associated with overcoming customer loyalty, i.e. in R&D, 
plants, advertisement and equipment.142 Rather than a handicap for new entrants anxious to 
overcome customer loyalty to established companies, the lack of investment opportunities 
allows new entrants to maintain a low overhead and to undercut the prices offered by their 
more established competitors.143 Finally, customer loyalty is primarily centred on people 
rather than companies or brands.144 New entrants can therefore poach employees from 
existing PSCs, who, in turn, can often take loyal customers with them to their new 
venture.145 Likewise, a change of personnel in the client’s security management can end 
even well-established relationships,146 which suggests that established competitors have a 
hard time defending their customer base. Therefore, while customer loyalty cannot be 
entirely dismissed as a barrier to entry, its effect is limited and seemingly surmountable. 
Access to distribution channels: Exclusive access to a distribution channel by an established 
company can make it hard for subsequent entrants to compete in a market. With respect to 
public sector demand, preferred vendor status, e.g. through the US GSA schedule,147 and 
long-term “indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity” contracts, e.g. the WPPS, constitute two 
                                                     
136
 Philliphs (2010), Beese (2011), Claridge (2010). 
137
 Ashwell (2008), Priestley (2009), Marshall (2011). 
138
 Porter (1998), p. 9. 
139
 Worcester (2005).  
140
 Phillips (2010). 
141
 Spicer (2009), Falconer/Schulman (2008), Bergner (2005). 
142
 Spence (1979), p. 6. See Section 7. 
143
 Clissitt (2010), Phillips (2010). 
144
 A notable exception is Hiscox, which uses its exclusive access to CRG’s services for advertisement purposes 
(Hiscox (2010), Ashwell (2008). 
145
 Thompson (2008).  
146
 Priestley (2009), Cook (2006), Kroha (2009).  
147




possible “bottle-necks”.148 However, with Aegis and Triple Canopy, two relatively new 
companies got onto the GSA schedule and won the Matrix and the WPPS contracts 
respectively, which suggests that access to these distribution channels has not obstructed 
market entry in the past. Yet, interviews suggest that increases in the complexity and costs 
of competing for large government contracts, in case of the WPPS allegedly reaching $3-10 
million, make access to these distribution channels increasingly difficult.149 With respect to 
private sector demand, the cooperation between established PSCs and insurance companies 
could constitute a barrier for new entrants.150 Such cooperation offers a relatively steady 
revenue stream, as insurance companies encourage their clients to use their partner in the 
PSI by reducing their clients’ premium.151 Moreover, through this cooperation, PSCs are 
exposed to prospective clients152 and they derive reputational benefits from the 
endorsement implicit in such cooperation.153  
However, it is questionable whether the advantages derived from such access will be large 
enough to constitute significant barriers to entry. New entrants that are precluded from 
winning large government contracts may still work on these contracts as subcontractors or 
provide security to companies under government contract and thus have access to a 
significant share of the market for PSC services in Iraq and Afghanistan.154 With respect to 
private sector demand, the effect of inter-industry cooperation is easily overstated. 
Interviews suggest that, for a variety of reasons, clients use a PSC other than the one they 
are familiar with through their insurer: Clients are either concerned about a possible conflict 
of interest,155 they consider the PSC provided by the insurer as a ‘back-up’ option,156 their 
security manager already has a personal relationship to another PSC157 or because insurance 
cover and security services are purchased by different divisions within the client company.158 
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Therefore, while access to distribution channels provides established PSCs with some 
advantages, it certainly does not amount to a prohibitive barrier to entry.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, barriers to entry have been relatively low in the PSI. Indeed, new entrants 
were largely responsible for the shrinkage in profit margins for armed security services, in 
response to which established UK PSCs started to move away from ‘just putting “boots on 
the ground”.159 Instead, they promulgate a ‘more analytical approach to security’, which 
combines the armed security with consultancy and information services160 and which new 
entrants cannot easily copy. Similarly, the industry’s efforts to self-regulate are partly 
motivated by the influence such regulation would afford over new entrants to the PSI.161  
While barriers to entry have been low in the past, this may change. Efforts to erect such 
barriers, e.g. introducing costly regulation, and the stagnating growth in the PSI make it 
harder for companies to enter the PSI. An even more salient factor is the increasing 
complexity and costs involved in competing for government contracts. Unfortunately, those 
calling for greater accountability of PSCs have yet to fully recognize the trade-off between 
the complexity of public sector contracting and the competitive pressure in the PSI. More 
complex selection and oversight procedures, for all their benefits, shrink the pool of 
applicants and, thereby, decrease the competitive pressure in the PSI.  
Ultimately, this may cause the PSI to split into a two-tier system: A small group of large PSCs 
corners the market for government contracts, while a much larger group of companies is 
limited to competing for smaller private sector contracts. A 2009 SIGIR audit report suggests 
that this may have already happened: Of the estimated 5.9 billion spent on PSC services by 
the DoD, DoS and USAID in Iraq from 2003-2008, 3.2 billion were earned by just four out of 
93 PSCs.162 Moreover, large public sector-focused PSCs may use their profits from public 
sector contracts to push into the market for private sector clients.163 This could eventually 
force smaller PSCs out of the market and further degrade the competitive pressure.  
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At least for the moment, however, the threat of new entrants seems to be high enough to 
suggest that the resulting competitive pressure in the PSI is neither to high nor too low to 
obviate the influence of the social context on PSC behaviour. This section’s analysis also 
suggests that the behaviour of customers, e.g. the complexity of government contracting, 
influences the behaviour of individual PSCs. Interestingly, this point is even more salient with 
respect to the third of the five forces, the threat of substitutes. 
 
Section Five: Porter’s Five Forces III: Substitutes  
Companies do not only experience intra-industry competition, but their market power is also 
limited by competition from other industries: Faced with rising prices, customers may switch 
to a substitute product.164 The oft-cited example of butter and margarine is somewhat 
misleading,165 as correctly identifying a substitute product can often be very difficult.166 
Customers may accept significant switching costs and inferior products if the difference in 
price between the product and its substitute is substantial enough. Applied to the PSI, this 
means that substitutes may encompass not just other security providers, but also the use of 
alternative strategies for addressing security problems.    
This section will argue that the threat of substitutes affects public and private sector demand 
differently. With respect to the former, the threat of substitutes has been low, but there is 
considerable potential for establishing an effective public sector substitute. With respect to 
private sector demand, substitutes have been available, but their use is increasingly 
problematic.      
Public Sector Substitutes  
Public sector clients are more limited in their choice of substitutes for PSC services than their 
private sector counterparts. For instance, a state cannot easily abandon its presence in a 
country due to concerns about the price of PSC services, as this would damage its diplomatic 
relations. Likewise, legal reasons and political costs make it inadvisable to send diplomats 
into a conflict zone without any protection. Hence, the most frequently advocated substitute 
is public sector security provision, i.e. the use of military, police and diplomatic security 
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assets instead of PSC.167 Yet, there are considerable concerns about the feasibility of 
replacing PSC with public sector providers in Iraq and Afghanistan.168 A GAO study, for 
example, found that replacing PSCs would entail higher costs and require assets that are not 
currently available.169 Leaving aside the respective merits of both arguments for the 
moment, they fail to recognize that, to be a credible substitute, public sector security 
provision need not be able to replace PSCs entirely. While a limited public sector substitute 
could do little against concerted misbehaviour by multiple companies, the ability to 
temporarily replace individual companies with a public sector security provider would likely 
provide PSCs with a sufficiently strong incentive not to shirk.  
Alas, despite its considerable potential benefits, such a credible public sector substitute has 
yet to be established. One problem has been that troop levels in Iraq were too low to assure 
even a basic level of security in Baghdad,170 let alone take over the guarding of strategic 
infrastructure.171 Furthermore, the 2004 attacks on the CPA in Najaf and Kut made it clear 
that neither the Iraqi security forces nor parts of the multinational contingent of the 
Coalition are reliable security providers.172 Another problem has been the lack of political 
pressure for establishing a private sector substitute. While the GAO repeatedly highlighted 
the lack of planning involved in the public sector’s use of PSCs, its recommendations focused 
more on oversight and accountability and less on contingency planning.173 While plans are in 
place at an institutional level to address interruptions to the delivery of PSC services,174 the 
DoS’ recent inability to execute its decision to replace ArmorGroup as its security provider 
for the US Embassy in Kabul suggests that these plans hardly constitute a public sector 
substitute.175   
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Private Sector Substitutes 
A public sector substitute would be unavailable to most private sector clients. Instead, they 
can employ strategies inaccessible to the public sector as substitutes for PSC services. First, 
private sector clients can purchase security services from the local military or police or pay 
off the parties that pose a risk to the client’s operations.176 The Nigerian government, for 
example, allows companies to purchase armed security services from the Nigerian police,177 
while, in Afghanistan, several companies have admitted to bribing the Taliban.178 Secondly, 
clients can internalize the risk of operating in an insecure environment, e.g. by sending their 
employees in harm’s way without purchasing adequate protection. Interviews suggest that 
this occurs more frequently than companies care to admit, especially in states that lack a 
well-established PSI and in industries without a history of operating in high-risk 
environments.179 Indeed, many states inadvertently encourage this behaviour by socializing 
the costs of operating in high-risk environments. German companies, for example, can rely 
on the government to negotiate and pay for the release of its kidnapped employees.180 
Alternatively, clients can internalize risks by using in-house security as a substitute for PSC 
services or they can opt to buy insurance cover instead of PSC services. Finally, private sector 
clients can decide to cease operating in a country. Indeed, several companies and NGOs 
opted not to fulfil their contracts in Iraq when the security situation deteriorated.181 
While private sector clients may have a wider range of substitutes available to them, their 
use is increasingly problematic. By purchasing armed security from the local police or 
military or by paying off insurgents and warlords, companies can be held liable for the crimes 
these security providers commit. Indeed, Shell and Coca-Cola both had to defend themselves 
in US courts for actions undertaken by security providers in Nigeria and Colombia, 
respectively.182 By paying insurgents and warlords, companies may also provoke the ire of 
the local government and its allies.183 Internalizing the risks of operating in high-risk 
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environments without adequate security is similarly problematic, because legal changes, 
especially the UK Corporate Manslaughter Act and the US Sarbanes and Oxley Act, have 
made it easier to hold companies liable for violating their duty of care vis-à-vis their 
employees.184 Likewise, companies using in-house security can no longer shift liability to a 
PSC. Interviews have shown this to be a major reason for hiring PSCs – so much so that 
clients’ desire to ‘saddle them [PSCs] with all the risk’ is a contentious issue in contract 
negotiations.185 Moreover, developing in-house assets with the necessary local knowledge is 
expensive, especially if clients maintain small presences in numerous countries.186 Finally, 
PSCs’ exposure to a large variety of clients, security management strategies and conflict 
regions gives them an edge when it comes to innovation and developing best practices.187  
Relying on the public sector has also become decidedly less attractive, as states are 
increasingly eager to have corporations reimburse the costs of freeing a kidnapped 
employee.188 Even substituting PSC services for insurance has its limits, as standard 
insurance policies often exclude conflict zones.189 Indeed, many clients buy PSCs services to 
bring down their otherwise prohibitively expensive insurance rates.190 More importantly, no 
legal defences, public sector substitutes nor insurance cover can mitigate the reputational 
risk involved in sending employees into a conflict zone without the necessary support. 
Therefore, private sector clients may be able to reduce their reliance on PSC services via 
internalization, but substituting them entirely would entail unacceptable costs and risks. 
Finally, the costs involved in ceasing to operate in a country are significant. Investments, e.g. 
in infrastructure, research and licenses, are largely irredeemable, as are the costs directly 
associated with terminating an operation, i.e. moving personnel, selling off equipment and 
dissolving contracts. Terminating an operation also often entails a loss in revenue, as 
companies cannot shift their assets seamlessly to another, equally lucrative use. Finally, 
leaving a country means losing preferred access to markets, raw materials and the good-will 
of customers, suppliers and local authorities. It is inevitably an admission of defeat that may 
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entail substantial reputational costs. Leaving a country is, therefore, a measure of last resort 
not a substitute for PSC services. 
Conclusion  
So far, there is no obvious substitute available to replace PSC services entirely. Still, private 
sector clients can limit their use of PSC services through insurance, in-house security 
solutions and by internalizing risk, insofar as they are willing to bear the resulting costs and 
risks. Likewise, public sector clients can use public sector security forces to temporarily 
reduce their reliance on PSCs. As this section has shown, even a limited substitute can have a 
significant impact on PSCs. Thus, while the competitive pressure of substitutes is not 
overwhelming, it is noticeable in the PSI.    
Moreover, private and public sector clients could relatively easily increase the threat of 
substitutes. Developing a viable public sector substitute and increasing private sector clients’ 
in-house security capacity would be an obvious, yet expensive remedy. Instead, a better 
usage of existing capacities, e.g. through improved contingency planning, may be more 
feasible. An important role in this may fall to reforming private and public sector 
procurement procedures. If clients concentrate on a single PSC as a “one-stop-solution” for 
their security needs, a limited substitute cannot hope to replace it even temporarily. 
Likewise, the industry’s efforts to provide more complex, integrated security products that 
combine analysis, consultancy and provision of PSC services undermine the effectiveness of 
a limited substitute. If a client’s security needs are instead split up into several smaller 
contracts that are held by different PSCs, a limited substitute has a greater chance to replace 
problematic companies. Also, for a limited substitute to be effective, security providers need 
to maintain a close relationship to the wider PSI to quickly find a permanent replacement, 
once a public sector substitute had to be employed. 
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Section Six: Porter’s Five Forces IV: The Bargaining Power Of Buyers 
Proponents of security privatization often argue that PSCs are best controlled through their 
‘purse-strings’.191 Porter identifies seven factors that determine how much bargaining power 
customers have at their disposal. Three of these will not be discussed in greater detail: 
Unfortunately, the buyers of PSC services are too varied and their products too diverse to 
generalize about whether PSC services constitute a significant share of buyers’ costs, if 
buyers earn low profits and if PSC services are unimportant for the buyers’ own products.192 
Likewise, the possibility of backward integration and standardized/undifferentiated products 
need not be discussed again,193 as Section Five has already established the possibility of 
expanding public sector security forces and in-house security solutions, while Sections Three 
and Four showed that customers perceive PSC services as undifferentiated. This leaves two 
factors for closer examination: buyer concentration and the availability of information.  
Buyer concentration 
Where few, large buyers are confronted with numerous, small sellers, buyers can pressure 
sellers to lower their prices.194 Crucially, this power derives not from the size of the buyer’s 
demand, but from the asymmetric concentration of demand and supply. While demand for 
PSC services in Iraq and Afghanistan is largely publicly funded, public sector funds are not 
administered in a concentrated form, as government institutions purchase security 
individually.195 Still, public sector contracts are large by industry standards and should give 
public sector clients considerable leverage over PSCs: In 2006, the FCO paid £41 million to 
CRG for mobile security services, which had a turnover of just £125.9 million.196  
In contrast, data about the dispersion of private sector demand is scarce, as PSC clients are 
generally reluctant and under no legal obligation to provide such information. Indeed, only 
one interviewee, Rafael Schenz of Deutsche Bank, provided any figures at all.197 Still, 
interviews strongly suggest that private sector demand is fairly fragmented. However, the 
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close personal relationships private sector clients form with PSCs creates an implicit promise 
for future business, which gives them market leverage, which exceeds their contracts’ face-
value. Moreover, some private sector clients engage in “seller selection”, intentionally 
choosing a contractual partner for whom their business constitutes a significant share of 
their earnings.198 Indeed, “seller selection” is partly responsible for the successful 
management walk-outs that led to the creation of companies like Blue Hackle and Risk 
Advisory Group/Janusian.199 Eventually, such seller selection can bring about “extreme 
boutique companies”, i.e. small PSCs that cater primarily to a single client.200 Such 
companies’ experience of the market differs considerably from that of a diversified 
established PSC, as they face near monopsonic buyer concentration, even though their 
contracts may not be large by industry standards.  
Overall, demand for PSCs services is fairly concentrated. However, the extent to which buyer 
concentration translates into market power depends on its application, which the next 
chapter will discuss by taking an in-depth look at how buyer power is applied in the 
quotidian relationship between PSCs and their clients.  
The Availability of Information 
Another factor that can impede the application of buyer power is the availability of 
information. According to Porter, detailed information about overall demand, market prices 
and the costs of inputs gives customers greater leverage over sellers.201 Applied to the PSI, 
this means that well-informed clients can identify fairly priced products and reputable PSCs, 
pressure existing providers to match lower prices elsewhere and fend off egregious demands 
for price increases during re-negotiations. Moreover, well-informed customers can avoid 
low-ball bids and thereby reduce the risk of frictional re-negotiations, low-quality products 
and a breakdown in service provision.202 
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However, the PSI presents several challenges when it comes to obtaining such information. 
For example, there is no centralized market place for PSC services that allows customers to 
compare prices. Interviews suggest that this is partly owed to the fact that PSC services are 
often tailor-made security solutions rather than off-the-shelf products.203 Also, while deficits 
in public sector contract oversight are well documented,204 relatively little is known about 
private sector contract management. Interviews, however, suggest that most private sector 
clients lack the resources, experience and the extensive market research.205 
While the PSI may be a difficult information environment, buyers are taking actions to 
mitigate its challenges. By putting contracts up for public tender, the public sector 
procurement process creates a temporary market place, in which the information provided 
by PSCs as part of their bids establishes a market price. Private sector clients have created 
formal and informal networks, such as the Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Sicherheit der Wirtschaft 
(ASW) in Germany, aimed at sharing information.206 Finally, experience with private security 
contracting can cause information unavailability to become less of a concern: If a client does 
not know the going rate for a service, the price he/she paid in the past may be a good 
indicator.  
Also, PSCs and their clients need not have conflicting interests when it comes to the 
availability of information. A PSC offering a product superior in quality or price, has a vested 
interest to inform potential customers about said product and the shortcomings of 
competitors. Also, its contested legitimacy arguably creates a need for the PSI to provide 
information to buyers and the wider public. Indeed, PSCs make substantial efforts to inform 
customers about their services and about corporate security and business continuity in 
general: they respond to media requests,207 publish news-letters, detailed case-studies and 
blogs208 and speak at conferences,209 etc.  
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With the exception of the temporary market place created by public sector contracting 
procedures, these measures do not adequately resolve the PSI’s information challenges. 
Information volunteered by PSCs is biased and therefore of limited value to their clients.210 
Information sharing is restricted by the fact that clients will not volunteer information that 
embarrasses them or exposes them to liability.211 Likewise, relying on experience rather than 
up-to-date information is problematic, as it can cause clients to miss changes in the industry 
or security environment. Finally, it is important to note that the availability of information 
does not assure its proper use. Flaws in contract management, e.g. insufficient staff, short 
rotations, a lack of institutional memory and problematic guidelines, can limit its usefulness. 
Hence, the availability of information cannot be definitively determined without analysing 
the relationship between PSCs and their clients, which Chapter Seven will discuss en détail. 
Conclusion  
Despite these concerns, especially public sector PSC clients hold significant bargaining 
power. The relatively strong concentration of public sector demand, the relatively weak 
concentration of supply for PSC services, the possibility of backward integration and the 
undifferentiated products PSCs provide give PSC clients considerable power. With respect to 
its public sector demand, the competitive pressure in the PSI is therefore neither too high 
nor too low to obviate the influence of the social context on PSC behaviour. 
Unfortunately, changes in the PSI threaten to decrease the power of public sector 
customers. As previously mentioned, increasingly complex procurement procedures 
threaten to isolate government contracts from the PSI’s full competitive pressure. Also, 
some PSCs have started to use vertical integration to gain a competitive advantage. Mergers 
and acquisitions, such as G4S’s take-over of ArmorGroup, Aegis’ acquisition of Rubicon and 
Triple Canopy’s purchase of Edinburgh International, threaten to concentrate the supply for 
PSC services. The supply of PSC services is further consolidated by companies that abandon 
the pursuit of public sector contracts to focus instead on private sector clients212 – a 
behaviour Porter refers to as ‘buyer selection’.213 Hence, while its formal, anonymised 
procurement process may empower public sector clients in the short term, the size and 
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complexity of the contract and the costs involved in competing for them increasingly 
diminish the bargaining power of buyers.    
With respect to the buyer power of private sector clients, the resulting competitive pressure 
is likewise neither excessive nor too limited to influence PSC behaviour, yet it differs from 
the public sector. The lack of even a temporary centralized marketplace makes it harder for 
customers to compare prices, which causes price competition to be less intense. At the same 
time, PSCs have fewer incentives for supply-side concentration, which arguably makes the 
bargaining power of private sector clients more sustainable. An even more important factor 
in reducing supply-side competition and thereby making private sector buyer power 
sustainable is the prevalence of relational contracting between PSCs and their private sector 
clients. While a competitor can match a PSC’s price and service quality, the personal 
relationship and the trust it produces cannot be easily reproduced. Hence, it seems that by 
desisting from using formal, anonymised contracting procedures, private sector buyer power 
and thus competition is less intense, but more sustainable compared to the public sector. 
This conclusion reinforces a recurring theme: behavioural patterns – here the prevalence of 
relational contracting among private sector clients – influence how structural factors affect 
the behaviour of individual PSCs. However, by arguing that less intense competition may be 
beneficial for customers, this section also suggests, seemingly contrary to the PSC literature, 
that increased competition in the PSI is not necessarily beneficial and may even have 
negative implications – an idea that has been echoed in Chapter One’s bell curve model and 
that will be revisited in the concluding section of this chapter. First, however, the discussion 
of Porter’s FFF addresses the bargaining power of suppliers. 
 
 
   
 




Section Seven: Porter’s Five Forces V: Bargaining Power Of Suppliers 
Porter argues that suppliers ‘can exert bargaining power [..] in an industry by threatening to 
raise prices or reduce [...] quality’.214 However, it is unclear which supplies are sufficiently 
important to the production of armed security to accrue significant bargaining power. While 
most PSCs have limited access to credit,215 the provision of armed security is not capital-
intensive,216 as weaponry and equipment are generally plentifully available, relatively cheap 
and, in the latter case, often purchased by PSC employees themselves.217 A possible 
exception are armoured vehicles, which are expensive, impossible to insure and difficult to 
import.218 However, such vehicles are often provided or paid up-front by clients.219 
Alternatively, UK PSCs often use “soft-skinned” vehicles to blend in with the local 
population.220 Thus, the only sufficiently important input for the production of armed 
security is manpower.      
Organized Labour 
Porter argues that whether labour is in a position to exert bargaining power at an industry-
wide level depends primarily on its ‘degree of organization’.221 Fortunately, from a PSC 
perspective, contractors are generally not unionized222 and evidence for spontaneous 
organization is scarce. Indeed, there has only been one reported case of a threat of 
coordinated mass resignations: CRG faced an ‘employee revolt’ when it cut wages and 
benefits in Iraq in 2006.223 Work stoppages have occurred more frequently, but they are 
often attributable to conflicts between PSCs and their clients rather than their employees.224  
A major obstacle to organized labour in the PSI lies in the heterogeneity of its workforce. A 
by-product of the internationalization of the PSI’s workforce has been its increasing cultural 
and linguistic diversity.225 Reviews of DoS contracts found contractors to lack English 
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language proficiency, suggesting that PSC employees no longer have a common language.226 
Also, conflicting interests have emerged in the PSI’s workforce: Threatened by its 
depreciative effect on wages, highly qualified expatriates have criticised the use of less-
qualified TCN and local staff.227 Hence, the prospects of organized labour representing all 
PSC employees are slim.  
Even within the different labour segments, the emergence of well-organized labour 
structures among highly qualified PSC employees appears to be an unlikely prospect. The 
prevalence of short-term contracts and the transferability of skills make it more likely that 
contractors will “vote with their feet” rather than chance a conflict with their employer, 
especially given their concerns about blackballing228 and their relatively short work life in the 
PSI: Contractors enter the industry in their mid-30s and tend to leave it in their early 50s, 
while injury-related early retirement is not uncommon.229 Finally, the prior military life 
shared by many contractors does not offer a ready template for unionization230 and 
elements of military culture in the PSI, the “can do” attitude and the sense of duty seem to 
be incompatible with strong labour organisation. Thus, organized labour does not seem to 
be a significant source of bargaining power for highly qualified contractors. 
For TCNs and local staff, a more ambivalent picture presents itself. Unionization has not 
played a significant role in either Iraq or Afghanistan, since PSCs are in a strong position vis-
à-vis TCNs and local staff. TCNs and local staff are abundantly available, easily replaceable 
and, although TCN and local staff, at $700-$1,000 a month, earn considerably less than 
US/UK contractors, jobs in the PSI are highly sought after, as they are better compensated 
than almost all available alternatives.231 Still, there is precedent for unionization among 
TCNs/local staff: Local staff at the US Embassy in Kampala successfully pressured 
Armorgroup/G4S to allow them to form a union.232 Indeed, some aspects of the PSI in Iraq 
and Afghanistan would be conducive to organized labour, especially with respect to local 
staff. For example, to keep sourcing costs low and to assure cohesion, PSCs often recruit 
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along cultural, military or tribal lines.233 The resulting “common ground” could provide a 
stepping stone for contractors to organize themselves. Also, local staff may be able to rely 
on existing legislation to facilitate unionization. In Uganda, contractors were able to 
overcome G4S’s opposition by arguing that preventing them from forming a union would 
violate the terms of their contract.234 Contractors may also find supporters of unionization in 
local governments eager to exert control over PSCs. Finally, the future prospects of 
unionization depend on the state of the economy in Iraq and Afghanistan: A prospering 
economy offers ample opportunities to earn a living outside the PSI, thus possibly forcing 
PSCs eager to attract qualified employees to accept unionization. 
Scarce Varieties of Labour 
An alternative source of bargaining power is the scarcity of labour. Alas, the supply of 
manpower seems to be robust, especially following the internationalization of the PSI.235 
Nonetheless, Porter argues that a limited ‘supply of scarce varieties of labour’ can grant a 
specific group of employees significant bargaining power, even in an otherwise robust labour 
market.236 Said bargaining power is derived from three factors: the scarcity of the variety of 
labour, its inelastic supply and its importance for the production process.237  
Tier-one operators from the UK and US meet the criteria of a scarce variety of labour, as the 
pool from which PSCs recruit them – retirees from elite Special Operations Force (SOF) units 
– is limited. Their scarcity is exacerbated by the fact that only states can expand the supply 
of tier-one operators, but find it difficult due to the scarcity of qualified applicants and the 
high training costs.238 Indeed, the supply of tier-one operators is likely to remain tight, as 
states have significantly increased their efforts to retain SOF personnel.239 Still, tier-one 
operators are valuable assets for PSCs. They are used to operating under conditions of 
hardship and physical insecurity and, unlike most ordinary soldiers, they are often trained in 
personal security provision during the course of their military career.240 Moreover, Spearin 
argues that SOF personnel offer PSCs significant promotional benefits when competing for 
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clients.241 In addition to possessing security clearance, which is required by some 
contracts,242 tier-one operators offer clients an easily discernable indicator of otherwise 
hard-to-measure service quality.243 Thus, the training and elite status of SOF personnel can 
function as a regulatory surrogate, alleviating clients’ concerns about the use of PSCs.244  
Interviews, however, suggest that highly-qualified PSC employees believe their bargaining 
power has eroded in recent years.245 Indeed, some companies forced highly qualified 
contractors to accept cuts in their pay and benefits246 and replaced them with less-qualified 
TCN/local staff, especially on convoy and static security contracts.247 In addition to reducing 
the relative demand for tier-one contractors, PSCs increasingly used long-term contracts 
with lower annual salaries instead of short-term contracts with high day-rates.248 Such long-
term contracts reduce labour mobility and, hence, bargaining power of highly qualified PSC 
employees. PSC representatives blame these developments primarily on clients exerting 
greater cost-pressure.249 Initially, the impact of these cost-saving measures on the demand 
for highly qualified contractors has been cushioned by the high overall demand for PSC 
services, which explains why some PSC employees still claim to make ‘up to $250,000’ per 
year in a market that has seen an overall wage decline.250 However, interviews suggest that 
contractors are currently offered significantly lower wages.251 Should said cost-pressure 
continue to rise and make it increasingly unprofitable for PSCs to offer high-quality security 
services – a scenario PSC representatives frequently augur252 - the bargaining power of tier-
one operators would see a further drastic decline.  
However, such prophecies of doom postulating an unabated rise in cost-pressure seem 
premature. While another “bubble”, i.e. a rapid and significant increase in demand for PSC 
services, is unlikely in the short and mid-term, an overall increase in demand would in 
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principle improve the bargaining power of highly qualified contractors, given the inelasticity 
of its supply. Moreover, the aforementioned pessimistic predictions underestimate the 
possibility of a resurgent interest in service quality. Such interest may result from concerns 
about exposure to reputational risk and liability, pressure from insurance companies and 
regulatory action in the form of industry-wide standards. Also, violent incidents or language 
and cultural problems with TCN/local security providers may motivate clients to reappraise 
the value of tier-one operators.253  
Finally, PSCs are keen to avoid a “race to the bottom”, in which increasing price-pressure 
would force them to favour lower prices over service quality. PSCs’ efforts to foster 
competition focused on service quality has important implications for the relationship 
between PSCs and their highly-qualified contractors. Ordinarily, the two would be 
diametrically opposed, as an increase in bargaining power would benefit contractors at the 
expense of their employer and vice versa.254 Avoiding a “race to the bottom”, however, 
could benefit both PSCs and their highly-qualified employees. Since tier-one employees are 
an easy means to signal service quality, their bargaining power would increase in a market 
that values quality over price. Moreover, the use of tier-one operatives may support PSCs’ 
claims concerning the quality of their services and thus justify higher prices. Hence, barring 
another “bubble”, PSCs’ efforts to avoid a “race to the bottom” may be the best opportunity 
for highly-qualified contractors to improve their ailing bargaining power. Indeed, interviews 
with UK PSC representatives suggest that this is the main reason for the UK PSI’s ardent 
support for the BAPSC and its push for PSC regulation.255  
Conclusion 
Currently, the bargaining power of suppliers in the PSI seems to be a relatively weak source 
of competitive pressure. This section has argued that unionization among TCN/local staff and 
changes in customers’ demand for highly qualified contractors may provoke change in the 
future. However, it also highlighted various reasons for why strong organized labour is an 
unlikely prospect in the PSI and stressed that greater price pressure on the part of PSC 
clients may further diminish contractors’ bargaining power. It is therefore difficult to gauge 
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the future strength of suppliers’ bargaining power, as it is largely determined by market 
developments in general and customer choice in particular.  
This observation matches conclusions reached in the previous sections: The extent to which 
structural factors, i.e. the overall demand for PSC services, the abundant availability of 
TCN/local staff, the scarcity of highly qualified contractors and the inelasticity of their supply, 
translate into competitive pressure is to a large extent determined by behavioural patterns, 
specifically by how customers procure PSC services. Combined with the bargaining power of 
buyers, it is increasingly evident that customers hold considerable power in the PSI. This 
challenges prevalent notions in the PSC literature that suggest that the market for PSC 
services offers clients little leverage to hold PSCs accountable. It also raises questions as to 
how customers apply their power in their relationship to PSCs.       
The present section also touched upon another important issue: To avoid a ”race to the 
bottom” and to establish quality-based competition, the PSI has to undergo significant 
changes. With respect to the bargaining power of suppliers, this means that PSCs have to 
build long-term relationships to their employees, invest more in training and limit the use of 
subcontractors to improve service quality and to develop a recognizable speciality. However, 
PSCs will not make the investments associated with these changes, if customers do not 
restrain the price-pressure they exert on PSCs in favour of a greater focus on service quality.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has clearly shown the prevalent conceptualization of competition in the PSI to 
be inadequate. In contrast to the PSC literature, this study argued that the competitive 
pressure in the market for PSC services is relatively high. The competitive pressure in this 
global market for PSC services is, of course, not the sole determinant of UK PSC behaviour. 
Labour and client relations as well as local variations in the legal environment in the UK also 
exert considerable influence on UK PSC decision-making. Still, interviews with UK PSC 
representatives confirm not only this chapter’s overall assessment of the competitive 
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pressure in the market for PSC services, but also the significant extent to which UK PSC 
behaviour is influenced by it.256 
Specifically, this chapter has shown that, while the actions UK PSCs take indicate cooperation 
rather than rivalry, structurally, the global market for armed security services encourages 
significant rivalry. More importantly, the barriers to entry in the PSI are low and the threat of 
substitutes is high. Finally, while the bargaining power of suppliers is limited, the bargaining 
power of customers is extensive and could easily be increased. Indeed, throughout this 
chapter, the way in which customers procure PSC services was shown to be a strong 
determinant of competitive pressure in the PSI.     
This chapter’s analysis of the competitive pressure in the PSI mainly relied on interviews with 
UK PSC representatives and their clients. This focus on primary data offers a deep 
understanding of how UK PSCs perceive their competitive environment rather than just an 
abstract measure of competition per se. The conclusions drawn from this interview data-
focused analysis are supported by Chapter Two’s account of the UK PSI from 2003-2009, 
which made intensive use of secondary sources, such as corporate and media reports and 
expert analysis.257 Together and in contrast to the prevalent literature, these two chapters 
make a strong case for the presence of substantial and increasing competitive pressure in 
the market for PSC services and its effect on UK PSC behaviour.   
According to Burke et al, however, competition is not a goal in and of itself, but merely a 
means to an end, namely to discipline market participants.258 This raises two questions: (1) 
Are clients using their considerable power to influence PSC behaviour effectively, and (2) 
what can and should be done to improve competition in the PSI? Chapter Five will address 
the first question in its discussion of PSI client relations. Although the second question will 
be discussed en détail in the final chapter of this thesis, some initial conclusions about how 
competition in the PSI can be enhanced are highlighted here:  
One important conclusion that the thesis in general and this chapter in particular advocates 
is the notion that increasing competitive pressure is not tantamount to improving 
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competition. Instead, excessive competitive pressure can force PSCs to engage in 
opportunistic behaviour that is not only contrary to their clients’ interests, but also harms 
their long-term prospects as market participants. In terms of tangible measures, the way in 
which clients procure PSC services has emerged as one way for enhancing competition in the 
PSI. For instance, rather than few, large public sector contracts held by a small number of 
companies, a greater number of smaller contracts would sustain a greater number of 
companies in the PSI. This would provide an additional incentive for new entrants and would 
prevent the emergence of a market within a market, which limits competition. Also, the 
establishment of a credible public sector substitute would put additional pressure on the PSI 
as a whole. In addition to being employed as a temporary replacement for problematic PSCs, 
it could also compete against PSCs for government contracts, thereby providing a ceiling for 
price-increases.259 A further course of action would be to standardize PSC services, e.g. by 
coordinating DoS and FCO procurement procedures. If successful, such standardization could 
lead to the introduction of industry-wide quality standards. Finally, support for organized 
labour would provide a source of competitive pressure and an additional layer of oversight 
by addressing problems affecting employee welfare that could otherwise diminish service 
quality. 
These changes in procurement practices are all the more important, because, as the last 
chapter of this thesis will show, developments in the PSI, to date, bode ill for the emergence 
of a stable industry with reliable providers of high-quality PSC services. Indeed, this chapter 
highlighted market developments – such as the slowing growth of the industry, the 
emergence of complex products and a growing concentration on the supply side – that have 
troublesome implications for clients. At the same time, the chapter highlighted the 
considerable power the market for PSC services imbues clients with and suggested ways in 
which it can be exploited to better influence PSC behaviour. Chapter Five will focus on how 
said power is applied in the relationship between PSCs and their clients. 
                                                     
259




CHAPTER 5: THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN PSCs AND THEIR 
CUSTOMERS 
Chapters Three and Four looked at the smallest and the largest aggregate, respectively, in 
which economic activity takes place in the UK PSI. While the former stressed the diversity of 
interests and the role of professionalism within UK PSCs, the latter noted the significant 
competitive pressure in the market for PSC services. Having thus considered PSC’s 
motivation (CH3) and opportunity (CH4) separately, Chapter Five analyses the relationship 
between PSCs and their clients to determine how clients use the considerable power the 
market for private security services imbues them with to shape that relationship. 
The Relationship between PSCs and their Clients 
The notion that clients have the power to shape their relationship to PSCs may strike those 
familiar with the PSC literature as odd. Peter Singer, for example, is concerned that, once 
PSCs have obtained a contract, they can use the threat to suspend their service provision 
force their clients to renegotiate their contract and, thereby, increase their profit.1 David 
Isenberg notes that, for a competitive market to have any effect, ‘contracts must be subject 
to transparent bidding procedures, competing offers must be systematically compared and 
the performance of suppliers on the contract terms has to be closely monitored, and, if 
necessary, sanctioned’ and that none of these characteristics are met in the PSI.2 Allison 
Stanger states that ‘[w]hen contracts are awarded on the basis of old relationships, the 
promised cost savings tend to evaporate’.3 Finally, Alyson Bailes and Caroline Holmqvist 
suggest that ‘[i]n the absence of specific laws and rules tailored to the security and human 
rights impact of their operations, parliaments stand in the same relationship to them [PSCs] 
as they do to commercial enterprises in general - which is rarely if ever one of direct 
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oversight and case-by-case enquiry’.4 Each of these authors discusses seemingly different 
issues. Singer is concerned about clients becoming dependent on PSCs, while Isenberg 
focuses on contracting procedures used to govern their relationship. Stanger draws 
attention to the detrimental effect personal relationships can have on economic action. 
Finally, Bailes and Holmqvist question whether market relationships can be used to address 
‘regulatory and normative issues’.5 What unites these critics, however, is that they identify 
the relationship between PSCs and their clients rather than the market per se as 
problematic. 
This chapter argues that the literature’s concerns about the relationship between PSCs and 
their clients are largely attributable to its specific use of the principal-agent (P/A) problem to 
understand client relations in the PSI. Contrary to the PSC literature, which characterizes the 
relationship between PSCs and their clients as antagonistic and offering abundant 
opportunities for shirking, this chapter argues that client relations at least in the UK PSI are 
characterized by closeness and trust. It also shows that UK PSCs are far more constrained in 
their actions than the PSC literature suggests – both as a result of their immediate 
relationship to their client and because of the networks that connect the two parties. 
Therefore, rather than a source of problems, this chapter argues that the relationship 
between PSCs and their clients offers various means for the client to PSC behaviour, many of 
which are superior to formal regulation, intrusive monitoring and severe sanctions, which 
the PSC literature seemingly favours. To argue its case, this chapter will highlight the 
important role “embeddedness”, “mutual dependency” and “relational contracting” play in 
PSI client relations. 
Outline 
Section one outlines the core tenets of the PSC literature’s understanding of the P/A 
problem, especially those assumptions that are not inherent to the concept, on which it 
relies in its application of the P/A problem to client relations in the PSI. Section two through 
five argue that the PSC literature’s specific use of the P/A problem is a poor fit for the UK PSI. 
They show that its emphasis on antagonistic client relations and on an abundance of 
opportunities to shirk is incompatible with the prevalence of long-term relationships 
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(Section two), the influence of networks (Section three), the distribution of power (Section 
four) and the role of uncertainty in PSI client relations. Thus, while the P/A problem can per 
se be usefully applied to the relationship between PSCs and their clients, the literature’s 
failure to adapt the concept to the realities of PSI yields a distorted picture of that  
relationship. Section six uses the insights gained in the preceding sections to discuss 
differences in private and public sector management of PSI client relations and to assess 
their respective success. Finally, the chapter will conclude by showing how the alternative 
view on PSC client relations this chapter has outlined helps to explain phenomena in the UK 
PSI that the PSCs literature arguably struggles to account for.    
 
Section One: The P/A Problem in the PSI Literature 
Chapter One already noted that the P/A problem constitutes an important theoretical 
underpinning of the literature’s conceptualization of PSC behaviour in general and of the 
relationship between PSCs and their clients in particular.6 This section revisits the literature’s 
use of the P/A problem and shows that it relies on two assumptions, which are not inherent 
to the P/A problem, namely (1) the antagonistic relationship between PSC and their clients, 
and (2) the abundance of opportunities for PSCs to shirk their duties due to hidden action, 
hidden information and their clients’ inability to sanction PSC behaviour. This chapter 
concludes that the PSC literature’s understanding of the P/A problem is mainly informed by 
its use in the public policy debate, rather than by a thorough engagement with the empirical 
evidence or with the appropriate economics literature.  
Antagonistic Stance and Zero-sum Game 
Chapter One defined the P/A problem as a situation where two actors are joined in a 
hierarchical relationship: The principal hires an agent to fulfil tasks on his/her behalf in 
exchange for compensation. The PSC literature characterizes PSCs (agent) and their clients 
(principal) as ‘two self-interested parties‘, which occupy antagonistic positions within their 
contractual relationship.7 The mere possibility that principals’ and agents’ interests may 
overlap is not explicitly dismissed by the PSC literature. Ulrich Petersohn, for instance, 
seemingly allows for some overlap when he states that ‘the interests of the principal and the 
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agent never match completely’.8 However, his subsequent argument exemplifies the PSC 
literature’s stance on the possibility of overlapping interests in PSI client relations: The PSC is 
‘a profit-driven entity [whose] decision-making process is always based on a cost-benefit 
analysis [and who] will always seek to maximize their profit at the client’s expense’.9 Thus, 
from the PSC literature’s point of view, the interests of PSCs and their clients do not only not 
overlap, PSCs are also believed to use any opportunity to exploit their customer relations - 
even at their clients’ expense. Given that the PSC literature also discounts motives other 
than financial profit, which would bar PSCs from engaging in opportunistic behaviour at the 
expense of their clients, it seems to suggest that PSCs primarily benefit at their clients’ 
expense. While the PSC literature does not make this suggestion explicitly, scholars such as 
Singer claim that PSCs would ‘be tempted by any leeway to increase profits at their client’s 
expense’.10 It is also indicative that the PSC literature does not consider ways in which PSCs 
and their clients could benefit from their relationship other than at each other’s expense.  
Hidden Action and Hidden Information 
Furthermore, the relationship between PSCs and their clients is believed to abound with 
hidden information and hidden action, which allows PSCs to shirk without having to fear 
significant consequences from their principals.11 Hidden information describes a situation in 
which agents enjoy an information advantage over their principal that can be used to 
increase profit.12 PSCs are, for example, better informed about the security environment 
they operate in and the qualifications of their employees. By exaggerating the threat 
exposure of their clients and the quality of their employees respectively, PSCs can convince 
their clients to consume more of their services or pay more for them.13 In turn, hidden action 
describes a situation in which the principal cannot observe agents’ actions, offering agents 
the opportunity to engage in behaviour that increases their profit at their principal’s 
expense.14 PSC may also be dishonest to their clients about their use of staff and equipment 
or they may employ a more or less aggressive stance than agreed upon.15 The prevalent 
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notion that PSCs could prolong conflicts to create demand for their services is likewise 
predicated on hidden action.16  
Chapter One further outlined the literature’s assertion that PSCs are able to shirk their 
duties, because their clients lack effective means to sanction their behaviour. Unlike the 
state-organized military, their principals allegedly cannot force PSCs to ‘stay in the theatre 
and perform a duty‘.17 Most authors focus exclusively on the principal’s lack of (military or 
regulatory) authority over PSCs. However, a lack of authority alone does not sufficiently 
describe the advantage PSCs allegedly enjoy over their principals. After all, as Peter Feaver 
has shown with respect to civil-military relations, the civilian leadership’s authority does not 
guarantee that soldiers necessarily pursue its goals.18 Instead, agents – and this applies to 
PSCs and soldiers alike - can shirk in more subtle ways than by blatantly refusing an order. 
PSCs, for example, can provide their clients with an exaggerated assessment of their security 
environment to induce them to purchase more PSC services.  
Clients’ inability to force PSCs to do their bidding is further exaggerated by the extent to 
which clients allegedly have become dependent on PSC services. Agency theory implicitly 
assumes that, principals can switch to another agent should they become aware of their 
agent’s shirking. While switching agents is not a costless endeavour, switching costs are 
generally not assumed to be prohibitively high. In contrast, the PSC literature regards clients 
as unable to easily switch to another service provider mid-contract, as even a short 
disruption to the provision of security services may have devastating consequences.19 As a 
result, PSCs allegedly could threaten to withhold their services and thus extract further 
profit, for example through renegotiations, knowing that their clients’ dependence on their 
services leaves them no option but to acquiesce to their demands.20  
The Origins of the PSC Literature’s Understanding of the P/A Problem 
Why does the PSC literature conceptualize client relations in the PSI in this manner? After all, 
this conceptualisation is not derived from a significant engagement with the available 
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empirical evidence. While interviews with PSCs feature in the PSC literature,21 client 
interviews are rare and are largely focused on the public sector’s use of PSC services.22 
Private sector clients are largely ignored, which is particularly unfortunate, because this 
thesis’ interviews suggest that some of them have made use of the PSI’s services for 
decades.23  
Likewise, the literature’s conceptualization of client relations in the PSI is not based on an in-
depth engagement with the extensive economic literature on agency theory, although PSCs 
are primarily portrayed as economic actors. While many authors either explicitly or implicitly 
use agency theory in their analysis, they either note the applicable economic literature only 
in passing24 or not at all.25 Even works whose analysis strongly relies on an application of 
agency theory to the PSI make little use of the extensive economic literature on the 
subject.26     
Instead, the PSC literature’s use of the P/A problem seems to be largely informed by non-
economic applications of agency theory. Peter Feaver’s Armed Servants27 and, especially, 
John Donahue’s The Privatization Decision,28 contributions to debates in civil-military 
relations and public policy, respectively, play an important role in the PSC literature.29 While 
the use of non-economic applications of the P/A problem is not per se objectionable, it 
shapes the PSC literature’s views on client relations. The public policy debate, in particular, 
tends to portray the P/A problem as a “make or buy” decision, i.e. a binary choice between 
two very different alternatives: A private ‘profit-seeker’, who ‘in exchange for a price, agrees 
to deliver a product’ or a public ‘civil servant’, who ‘in exchange for a wage, agrees to accept 
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instructions’.30 In essence, public and private agents are viewed as different instruments, and 
the public policy debate aims to determine for which tasks and under which circumstances 
the use of either tool is most appropriate. 
This, of course, is a simplistic characterization of what is a multi-faceted debate on 
privatization in the public policy literature. It is debateable how much said literature itself is 
to be blamed for the PSC literature’s understanding of the P/A problem. On the one hand, 
Donahue himself puts great emphasis on the abstract nature of his comparison between 
private and public agents, while the subsequent use of his discussion in the PSC literature 
shows no such compunction.31 On the other hand, he maintains the artificially stark contrast 
between private and public actors at the expense of the various hybrid forms of 
public/private actors that are characteristic of privatization. Indeed, Feigenbaum et al 
suggest that a similar model of two ‘distinct, bounded, and mutually exclusive’ spheres is 
prevalent in the privatization debate, but note that ‘[i]n reality, though, the relationship 
between public and private is much more complex than this’.32 In any case, the PSC 
literature’s focus on the public policy debate and its “make-or-buy” approach shapes the PSC 
literature’s understanding of the P/A problem: Not only does it assume a stark contrast 
between private and public actors, an antagonistic relationship between principals and 
agents and (an abundance of) opportunities to shirk, it also makes little effort to discuss goal 
alignment and monitoring beyond the possibility of regulation based on strict, formal laws, 
intrusive monitoring and severe sanctions. As Chapter Six shows, this is by no means the only 
way to address P/A problems.    
Conclusion 
This section argued that the PSC literature’s use of the P/A problem relies on two specific 
assumptions, namely the antagonistic relationship between PSCs and their clients and an 
abundance of opportunities for the former to shirk. The section further suggested that the 
PSC literature’s analysis of client relations in the PSI in general and of the P/A problem in 
particular is informed by non-economic uses of the concept, specifically by the public policy 
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debate. Due to this focus on PSI client relations as a “make or buy” decision, i.e. the decision 
to purchase a service in the market or to rely on a public bureaucracy to produce it, the PSC 
literature puts little emphasis on monitoring and incentive design beyond considering formal 
regulation, intrusive monitoring and severe sanctions.33 The next section discusses whether 
the said assumptions are applicable to the UK PSI.  
 
Part I: The Applicability of the P/A Problem to the PSI 
While this thesis considers the P/A problem to be, in principle, a very useful way of analyzing 
customer relations in the UK PSI, it rejects the literature’s specific application of the problem 
and its underlying assumptions, namely the antagonistic interests of PSCs and their clients 
and an abundance of opportunities for shirking. The following sections discuss four reasons 
why these assumptions are ill-applicable to the UK PSI, namely (1) the prevalence of long-
term relationships in the PSI, (2) the role of networks in the UK PSI and (3) the relative power 
of PSCs and their clients and (4) the role of uncertainty in PSI client relations. The sections 
further discuss alternative approaches to the P/A problem that draw more heavily on the 
applicable literature in economics and economic sociology.  
Section Two: Long-term Relationships in the PSI 
When authors discuss PSCs’ shirking, they usually focus on the consequences of such 
behaviour for clients and on clients’ inability to prevent PSCs from shirking: Should a PSC 
walk away from its contract, which clients allegedly can do little about, the government 
institutions or the civilian contractors the PSC serves would be exposed to physical 
insecurity, which could, in turn, disrupt the clients’ often mission-essential service 
provision.34 In contrast, little effort has so far been made to explore the consequences 
shirking would have for PSCs.  
The Prevalence of Long-term Contractual Relationships in the PSI   
One, commonly overlooked, factor that suggests that shirking could have considerable 
consequences for the PSC in question is the prevalence of long-term contractual 
relationships in the PSI. Interviews suggest that long-term contracting is particularly salient 
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in the UK PSI, as private sector clients tend to renew contracts with their current provider 
rather than turn to the market to find a new one.35 Indeed, several interviewees stated that 
their companies regularly do not even obtain competing bids for price-comparison 
purposes.36 One interviewee claimed that, the last time his company tendered their 
contract, it was ‘largely to keep them [i.e. the current contractual partner] on their toes’.37 
Moreover, if clients do decide to change provider, they often turn to a select group of PSCs 
with whom they already have a pre-existing relationship rather than to the wider market.38 
The importance of long-term relationships is exemplified by the fact that, even in recent 
years when the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq expanded the pool of PSC clients, approx. 
80% of UK PSCs’ business is conducted with returning clients.39 Indeed, one UK PSC 
representative suggested that most companies are less concerned about ‘selling products’ 
than about ‘building relationships’.40   
Public sector procurement notably does not allow for similarly close client relations: 
Contracts are publicly tendered; bids are often anonymised. Moreover, the procurement of 
PSC services is often separate from its end-users. While PSCs protect diplomatic personnel, 
DoS contracts are often managed and evaluated by DoS personnel or contracting officers,41 
who are not necessarily stationed “in theatre”.42 As a result, close relationships may develop 
between PSCs and the end-users of their services, but these relationships have little bearing 
on the contracting process.43 Still, the WPPS contract, for example, is awarded for five years, 
which creates a relatively long contractual relationship as well.44  Moreover, interviews with 
UK PSC representatives suggest that bidding for public sector contracts, due to its 
complexities and costs, requires the participating PSCs to specialize.45 Since such 
specialization is not economical for a one-off bid, UK PSCs that pursue large government 
contracts, both by US, UK and other government clients, often aim to become a public sector 
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supplier in the long-term. Thus, the relationship between UK PSCs and their public sector 
clients at home and abroad likewise tends to constitute a long-term relationship.    
The Consequences of Long-term Contractual Relations on PSCs and their Clients 
The prevalence of long-term contracting in the PSI is relevant for its client relations, as it 
allows clients greater control over PSC behaviour. So far, the PSC literature has 
conceptualized the relationship between PSCs and their clients as a one-off encounter. 
Insofar as time is considered to constitute a factor in PSI client relations, it is believed to 
favour PSCs: Using a low-ball offer,46 PSCs are allegedly able to avoid market-based 
competition for PSC services, only to increase their profits through re-negotiations once 
their clients become dependent on their service provision. In contrast, long-term contractual 
relations offer clients the means and opportunity to “punish” PSC misbehaviour. 
PSC clients may be unaware of or unable to punish PSC misconduct when it actually occurs, 
but long-term contractual relations allow them to exert punishment ex post. This is 
particularly important, because, while PSCs enjoy a general information advantage over their 
clients,47 clients can often discover misconduct only after the fact, e.g. through their own 
investigations, through media reports or through disgruntled former PSC employees. Once 
misconduct is discovered, long-term contracting offers clients the opportunity to punish 
PSCs by e.g. withholding payment for their services. Long-term contractual relations allow 
clients to punish even after the initial contract has ended, as clients can declare PSCs 
ineligible for any future contracts.  
However, the most effective means for clients to influence PSC behaviour is likely to be the 
relationship itself and the value it holds for PSCs. Indeed, two reasons suggest said value to 
be high: First, interviews suggest that contract renewal processes are less complicated and 
their outcome more certain than the arduous and uncertain bidding processes PSCs 
otherwise have to undergo.48 Secondly, client relations have an important signalling function 
in the market for PSC services. PSCs benefit from their association with legitimate 
businesses, such as insurance companies, while the premature dissolution of a contract can 
                                                     
46
 See Chapter 1 Section 3. 
47
 Kathleen Eisenhardt argues that this information advantage decreases over the course of a long-term 
relationship, as principals become increasingly familiar with their agents and thus better at determining whether 
or not they are shirking (Eisenhardt (1989), p. 62).  
48
 Edwards (2011), Thompson (2008), Willis-Fleming (2008). 
201 
 
do significant reputational damage. This reputational damage would likely not be limited to 
PSCs’ core business, but may extend to their ability to attract outside financing.  
Alternative Approaches to the P/A Problem in Long-Term Contracting 
Therefore, the literature’s conceptualization of the P/A problem and the prevalence of long-
term contracting in the PSI seem to be at odds. Prima facie, even economists’ use of the P/A 
problem seemingly differs little from the PSC literature’s approach. Economists generally 
characterize principals and agents as rational actors with conflicting interests in a 
relationship that is fraught with hidden action and information.49 However, there are a 
number of subtle differences – one of which is relevant to the prevalence of long-term 
contracting in the PSI. 
In his seminal study The Evolution of Cooperation, Robert Axelrod notes that in a one-off 
exchange or in an exchange with a known end, selfish strategies are likely to dominate. This 
roughly corresponds with the PSC literature’s approach to the P/A problem. However, 
Axelrod further argues that ‘[t]his reasoning does not apply if the players will interact an 
infinite number of times’.50 Indeed, ‘[w]hat makes it possible for cooperation to emerge is 
the fact that the players might meet again’.51 Whether agents shirk or cooperate therefore 
does not depend on their profit interest, but on whether they expect future interaction. If 
this is the case, Axelrod suggests that ‘cooperation [...] can develop even between 
antagonists’.52 The long-term contractual relations that characterize the PSI are clearly more 
akin to this form of interactions without a known end. Indeed, even the caveats Axelrod 
identifies as potentially limiting cooperation, namely the possibility that relations may end 
and that future profits are less certain,53 seem less problematic in the context of the PSI. 
With respect to private sector clients, the close, often personal relationship provides 
continuity and, thus, the promise of future business even when a contract ends and a new 
one is not to follow immediately. With respect to public sector clients, the level of 
specialization and financial commitment necessary for PSCs to successfully compete for large 
public sector contracts provides a strong disincentive to treating the end of a contract as an 
endgame-like situation. As a result, long-term contracts become essentially ‘self-enforcing’, 
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because the short-term pay-offs of shirking pale in significance compared to the promise of 
future business.54   
Applied to the PSI, Axelrod’s claims therefore suggest that, due to the prevalence of long-
term contractual relations, PSI client relations are characterized by cooperation, rather than 
antagonism and an abundance of opportunities for shirking.55 Axelrod’s characterization of 
agency relations is particularly useful for understanding PSC behaviour, because it does not 
violate the rationality assumption that is at the heart of the PSC literature’s 
conceptualization of PSC behaviour and at the heart of traditional economics.56 Moreover, 
Axelrod’s line of argument shifts attention away from the contract to its underlying 
relationship by suggesting that expectations of future business discourage shirking not just 
as long as PSCs are connected to clients by an actual contract. Thus, he provides a rationale 
for PSCs making relationship-specific investments, e.g. by foregoing the short-term profits 
shirking may offer, even in the absence of a contract.    
Conclusion 
David Campbell rightly notes that the relationship between parties ex ante and ex post the 
signing of a contract can be very different.57 However, this section has shown that this only 
partially applies to long-term contracting in the PSI, as this background condition gives 
clients considerable opportunities and means for punishing PSC misconduct. Moreover, 
section two also suggested that client relations in the PSI may hold value for PSCs aside from 
the revenue they extract from their clients: PSCs derive reputational benefits from being 
associated with their clients. Finally, the section used Axelrod’s work to show why 
cooperation rather than shirking may be the most rational form of behaviour for PSCs. Given 
this analysis, it is thus surprising that, to date, the PSC literature has not yet recognized the 
importance of long-term contractual relations.  
One possible explanation lies in the literature’s doubts about the permanence of PSCs as 
corporate entities. A widely held belief suggests that PSCs could easily evade most domestic 
regulation by simply moving to a more lenient jurisdiction.58 The ease with which PSCs can 
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allegedly move to different jurisdictions also implies that client relations are assumed to be 
easily rebuilt or replaced after relocation. This describes the PSI akin to a commodities 
market, where anonymous parties interact in one-off trades, like ships in the fog, never to 
see one another again. Contrasting this image, the next section shows that customer 
relations in the UK PSI have often grown over decades, based on a web of often personal 
relationships and, as a result, are steeped in trust, mutual respect and, at times, even 
affection. Regulatory evasion, as envisioned by the PSC literature, would therefore arguably 
involve winding up the PSC in question, re-incorporating it in the new jurisdiction – and thus 
severing many of these key relationships, which are essential for its corporate survival. 
 
Section Three: Networks in the PSI 
The PSC literature’s view of client relations in the PSI is chiefly focused on the contractual 
relationship between PSCs and their clients – and primarily on those with the public sector. 
The previous section suggested that this conceptualisation may be too narrow given that 
PSCs tend to abstain from shirking even if not or no longer constrained by a contract, as long 
as future business with the client concerned remains a possibility. The PSC literature thus 
overestimates the importance of contracts and, as this section shows, underestimates the 
importance of the web of relationships in which contracts in the PSI are embedded. 
The PSC Literature’s View on Contracting 
According to Thomas Bruneau,  
‘[t]he nature of the contract [...] is central to the contracting process’.59 The 
‘[e]ffectiveness [of a PSC] is only as good as the contract and the organizational 
processes used to plan, award, and administer the contract. Therefore, it is the 
overall contract management process, not the contractor per se, that must be 
reviewed, analysed, and reformed’.60  
This focus on the actual written contract, which builds on extensive planning that identifies 
and codifies requirements and measures of contractor performance, describes a popular 
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view on contracting not only in the PSC literature,61 but also among US government 
agencies.62 This  approach emphasises the importance of formal, generic, even anonymous 
contracting processes that position contractual parties at arm’s length from one another: As 
previously noted, public sector clients are often forced to publicly tender rather than renew 
contracts and PSCs competing for public sector contracts are often asked to take their 
company’s name off their bids.63 From this point of view, security contracting in Iraq and 
Afghanistan is seen as problematic, because it had been allowed to ‘grow willy-nilly’,64 
without proper ‘strategic’ and ‘tactical’ planning,65 based on “handshake deals” with 
insufficient documentation66 and with little concern for how PSCs would integrate into the 
broader military effort.67  
This view is strongly influenced by contracting practices in the procurement of weapons 
system68 and makes little allowance for the volatile security environment PSC services 
operate in and the necessary flexibility to quickly respond to environmental changes. For 
instance, in a submission to the Committee on Government Reform, Representative Henry 
Waxman admonished the increasing use of ‘non-competitive’ and ‘abuse-prone’ contracting 
tools in the Iraqi reconstruction.69 This criticism assumes that sufficient time and information 
were available at the time to properly tender contracts, to define contractual requirements 
and to measure contractor performance. However, given, how rapidly and unexpectedly the 
security environment deteriorated in Iraq in 2003-2004 and considering the speed with 
which the US government intended to implement its reconstruction efforts, this assumption 
is at best questionable.70  
While the PSC literature’s focus on written contracts and on the application of contracting 
standards as derived from weapons system procurement is open to criticism,71 concerns 
about the level of uncertainty that is inevitably involved in PSC contracting seem merited.  
Some authors are taking the fact that ‘[c]ontracts cannot be drawn up to well cover such 
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unforeseen contingencies [as are likely to arise in a conflict environment]’72 to argue that 
security contracting ought to be limited as a matter of principle.73 They are particularly 
concerned about clients’ inability to ex ante specify their particular security needs due to the 
volatile security environment. In this view, PSC service contracts are thus necessarily 
incomplete,74 prompting fears that PSCs could exploit the renegotiations necessary to fill the 
gaps in these incomplete contracts at their clients’ expense.75 The argument that uncertainty 
complicates the effective use of private agents is supported by some economists, notably by 
Williamson’s article Public and Private Bureaucracies.76 Here, Williamson echoes a widely-
held view in transaction cost economics, which argues that the transaction costs of 
contracting through the market are likely to be relatively high if uncertainty and asset 
specificity are high and if transactions occur infrequently.77 Asset specificity, i.e. whether 
assets can be transferred to an alternative use without loss in productive value, seems to be 
low in the PSI, as accountability and oversight capabilities as well as equipment, vehicles and 
installations can easily be transferred to a new supplier. Likewise, while the market for PSC 
services has been volatile since 2003, demand from public and private sector clients is 
sufficiently sustainable for contractual relations not to be considered infrequent. However, 
uncertainty is undoubtedly high. This, at first sight seems to support the literature’s concerns 
about client relations in the PSI.   
The Limits of Contracting in Business Relations 
Yet, the prevalence of uncertainty and of incomplete contracts need not imply that agency 
relations in the PSI are necessarily problematic. Instead, economics considers uncertainty 
and incomplete contracts to be ubiquitous in contemporary commercial relations.78 Indeed, 
several trends emerging in the second half of the twentieth century heightened the level of 
integration and rationalization of global commerce and consequently increased 
uncertainty.79 For instance, companies increasingly shifted to just-in-time production to 
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reduce inventory and carry costs80 and outsourced production processes to benefit from 
outside expertise and reduce capital costs.81 This simultaneous increase in market-based 
transactions and uncertainty apparently did not lead to prohibitively high transaction costs.  
Legal scholars, notably Stewart Macaulay, recognize that this new challenging environment 
and the complex planning involved in companies’ business exchanges nowadays is not 
reflected in their contracts.82 Instead, empirical data Macaulay gathered for his seminal 
study Non-Contractual Relations in Business suggest that well-functioning exchanges are 
often based on overlapping, inconsistent and, at times, contradictory legal arrangements.83 
Moreover, adjustments to the exchange, e.g. an increase in personnel, were, at best, 
incompletely incorporated in contracts.84 Practitioners were often either unaware of existing 
legal arrangements or they ignored them, especially obligations like cancellation duties and 
automatic contractual punishments that could lead to the deterioration of the business 
relationship.85 Macaulay’s data further suggest that, insofar as conflicts occurred, partners to 
the exchange generally resolved these amicably and without reference to the original 
contract. Even a breach of contract rarely resulted in a lawsuit.86 Macaulay claims that, 
rather than contract law, ‘[b]usinessmen often prefer to rely on “a man’s word” [...], a 
handshake, or “common honesty and decency”– even when the transaction involves 
exposure to serious risks.’87 Overall, his work portrays agency relations in a very different 
light than the PSC literature: Rather than characterized by an antagonistic relationship in 
which agents primarily benefit at their principal’s expense, the parties to an exchange are 
seemingly focused on cooperating with one another. Indeed, one participant in Macaulay’s 
study captured a prevalent opinion: ‘”You can settle any dispute if you keep the lawyers and 
accountants out of it”’.88   
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Macaulay’s observations and the challenge they pose to the PSC literature’s approach to 
agency relations raise two questions in particular: First, what allows contractual parties to 
abandon contract law and instead deal in “good faith” with one another? One source of 
“good faith” lies in long-term contractual relationships, as addressed in the previous section. 
In short, successful interactions over time produce trust and a common understanding that 
help avert misunderstandings and make it easier to resolve problems encountered.89 
Moreover, similar to Granovetter, Macaulay argues that contracts do not describe atomised 
economic actions, but that they are ‘floating on a sea of custom’,90 and therefore are based 
on networks of personal, social and business relationships.91 Similarly, David Campbell 
argues that social factors, at times considered irrational from a narrow economic point of 
view, lead agents to comply with contracts.92   
What leads contractual parties to adhere to these customs, even if contradictory to short-
term profits, is the role of reputation within these networks. The importance of reputational 
factors also highlights that economic and non-economic factors often cannot be clearly 
distinguished: A buyer is more likely to enter into a contractual relationship with a company 
that has a good standing rather than one that is shunned by clients and competitors. 
Moreover, Macaulay notes that, within an industry, ‘[e]ach has something to give to the 
other’,93 and being excluded from, for example, information that is freely shared among the 
members of a network can constitute a competitive disadvantage. 
Relational Contracting in the UK PSI 
The second question Macaulay’s work raises is to what extent such “relational contracting” 
is applicable to the UK PSI. Given the differences in how public and private agents procure 
PSC services,94 the influence of networks is likely to be higher with respect to private sector 
clients. However, while public sector clients as a whole tend to favour formal contracting 
based on an arm’s length relationship,95 interviews suggests that DFID and especially the 
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FCO maintain very close, informal relations to UK PSCs.96 UK PSCs also employ many former 
politicians, civil servants and generals in key advisory positions, which further fosters close 
relations to UK government institutions.97 Moreover, several interviews suggest that the UK 
PSI greatly benefits from the far less tangible, yet important social ties that connect the 
upper echelons of politics, the civil service and the military in the UK.98 While the influence 
of such ties, formed during university, military service and even at public schools, is hard to 
quantify and is easily overstated or mischaracterized,99 they are nonetheless important in 
the UK, not least because of geographical proximity: Policy-makers, civil servants, private 
sector clients and PSC representatives in the UK are largely concentrated in London.  
This web of social and personal relationships is particularly prominent among UK PSCs, their 
private sector clients and the insurance companies that frequently connect the two. 
Interviews suggest that corporate security managers tend to be recruited from the same 
labour pool as PSC representatives, i.e. there is often a relationship connecting them before 
they engage in client relations with one another.100 Moreover, clients and insurance 
companies frequently poach PSC employees.101 Interestingly, PSCs tend to encourage rather 
than oppose this practice in the belief that their respective client relationship is thus 
strengthened.102  
Indeed, networks exert considerable influence in part because they are central to the 
business strategy of UK PSCs. In interviews, UK PSC representatives stressed that they 
primarily view their business not through their products, but through the relationships to 
their clients.103 Finally, the extent to which client relations in the UK PSI rely on good faith is 
evident in the contracting practice, particularly with respect to private sector clients. PSCs 
often provide services in response to situational needs based on little more than a verbal 
agreement with the client’s local representative, trusting that the client will later ensure 
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reimbursement.104 Sometimes, PSCs provide such services even without a pre-existing 
contractual relationship to the client in question: EI, for instance, provides a stand-by service 
for security and assisted living in Afghanistan to attract new clients.105 Interviews with PSC 
clients further suggest that they occasionally receive consulting services from PSCs, for 
example during the proposal stage of a project, which are often not reimbursed.106 These 
interviews also emphasise that the need for good faith extends to both parties in PSI client 
relations: One client expressed a seemingly widespread understanding among private sector 
clients thus:  
‘[T]here is a fine line between ringing up people, if you end up not using them. You 
do not want to become a nuisance. That’s why, when I have money to spend, I make 
sure it goes to people that have been helpful to me in the past’.107     
Conclusion 
According to Kathleen Eisenhardt, agency theory describes the relationship between 
principal and agent ‘using the metaphor of a contract’.108 Thus, while contracts are 
undoubtedly an important part of agency relations, the discussion above showed that, in the 
UK PSI they are not reducible to them. Indeed, the underlying relationship is often far more 
relevant for the quotidian interactions between PSCs and their clients than the actual 
written contract. Thus, the notion that contracts in the PSI ‘create specifically negotiated, 
and usually short-term and informal, relationships‘109 is simply misleading. Returning to 
Macaulay’s metaphor, a more accurate description would be that contracts float on top of a 
web of long-term social, personal and business relationships that connect PSCs and their 
clients. Although informal, the influence of these networks is by no means inconsequential. 
This role of networks in the PSI and the extent to which they connect PSCs and their clients 
has not been given sufficient consideration by the current PSC literature.    
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Section Four: Power in PSI Client Relationships 
The previous section noted that the distribution of power influences the PSC-client 
relationship. This is particularly prescient as the relative power of PSCs and clients often 
differs considerably ex ante and ex post of the signing of the contract, as incomplete 
contracts offer agents opportunities to shirk.110 In essence, Peter Singer’s aforementioned 
concern about clients’ dependency on PSCs follows a similar logic as PSCs are empowered to 
force their clients into more beneficial arrangements regardless of prior contractual 
agreements.111 This section argues that the PSC literature misrepresents the distribution of 
power in PSI client relations. In contrast to the PSC literature’s depiction, this constellation 
arguably clearly favours clients over UK PSCs, in particular, once the role of uncertainty is 
taken into account. In its conclusion, the section discusses how asymmetric power relations 
can affect the presence of good faith in PSI client relations. 
Power in the PSI  
Power describes the ability of one party to impose its will on another through, for example, 
the use of force, legal sanctions and market mechanisms. With respect to the use of force, 
concerns about UK PSCs coercing their clients seem exaggerated. Unlike mercenaries and 
PMCs, the military power of UK PSCs is limited and pales in comparison to public sector 
forces, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq.112 While private sector clients do not have 
comparable military assets under their immediate control, they can expect public sector 
forces to come to their assistance in the very unlikely case that a UK PSC would threaten 
them with violence.  
Legal means for exerting power likewise favour clients. Given that the court of jurisdiction 
for PSC contracts is generally the US or the UK, clients can sue their contractual partners 
should they breach their contract and, taking into account legal fees and punitive damages, 
the client-initiated financial punishment on PSCs could thus be substantial. Interviews with 
UK PSCs representatives suggest that legal sanctions are particularly powerful, because, 
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unlike most UK PSCs, clients tend to have pockets deep enough to pursue a potentially 
protracted legal battle.113  
Finally, not only is the bargaining power of buyers in the PSI is relatively high,114 their lack of 
deep pockets also makes PSCs vulnerable to market power, as high labour costs and the lack 
of access to credit cause even brief suspensions of payment by their clients to have 
considerable deterrent power.115 Moreover, clients often choose to contract with smaller 
PSCs, as their demand constitutes a larger share of said PSCs’ total revenues, which makes it 
easier for them to impose their will on the PSC in question.116   
Power can also take on an indirect quality, e.g. a party can set norms and standards to 
conform with its interests. Public sector clients thus derive significant power from their 
double function as clients and regulators, as UK PSCs are well aware in their interactions 
with the FCO that it is not “just another customer”.117 Moreover, clients derive indirect 
power from the contested legitimacy of the UK PSI: UK PSCs are eager to involve civil society 
actors in the development of industry-wide standards.118 One representative of a civil 
society organization suggested that ‘[i]t’s amazing what you can shame PSCs into doing’.119  
Agency relations, however, are not just affected by the relative power of the parties, but 
also by their respective ability to accept and accommodate risk.120 A risk-averse agent would 
abstain from shirking even if it is unlikely that it would be detected and punished by the 
principal. Several reasons suggest that UK PSCs are fairly risk-adverse: For instance, they lack 
easy access to cheap credit or substantial financial reserves that would allow them to survive 
the occasional set-back that a more risk-prone approach would be likely to provoke. Also, UK 
PSCs rely heavily on their reputation to attract customers, as the quality and price of PSC 
services are not easily comparable.121 Since “repairing” one’s reputation is not easily 
achieved, PSCs generally also describe themselves as risk-averse.122 This characterization is 
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supported by the fact that the distribution of risk, in the form of liability, is frequently a 
major sticking point in negotiations between PSCs and their clients.123 A limited appetite for 
risk, however, diminishes whatever power PSCs possess in principle, as it makes them less 
likely to accept the potential costs associated with shirking.  
Concerns about UK PSCs’ power advantages therefore seem exaggerated. This assessment is 
further supported by a closer analysis of the literature’s suggestions for why PSCs allegedly 
possess such power over their clients. Essentially, the literature argues that clients give in to 
PSCs’ demands because the costs of punishing them are deemed too high. However, while 
the revenue generated through contractual fines and legal proceedings generally does not 
cover legal and switching costs,124 punishments - Macaulay makes this point with respect to 
legal sanctions - may also be employed to satisfy an irrational desire to ‘“get even”’.125 
Moreover, punishments are by no means limited to legal sanctions. Pratt and Zeckhauser 
note that ‘[i]n virtually every industry there is a gossip circle that tells who is honorable, 
tough, sleazy, and so on’,126 and interviews suggest that UK PSC clients are sufficiently 
connected to allow clients to inflict reputational damage on offending PSCs.127 Moreover, 
while the financial pain that can be inflicted through legal sanctions is limited, exerting 
reputational punishments through networks is not similarly restricted by proportionality. 
Moreover, clients do not require incontrovertible evidence to terminate their business 
relations with a PSC or to inflict reputational damage on it – a suspicion of shirking is 
enough.128 Finally, the use of punishments has an important signalling function for clients, 
indicating to current and future contractual partners that the company in question will not 
tolerate shirking. Thus, while the direct net-effect of punishments may be negative, its 
indirect benefits may sway clients to make greater use of punishments.  
Conclusion 
The relative power distribution among UK PSCs and their clients that underlies their 
relationship therefore seems to favour clients. Indeed, interviews with UK PSC 
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representatives and employees tend to underscore this assessment, especially the way in 
which they characterize their clients’ influence on their behaviour. For instance, PSCs often 
highlight that their client generally have ‘deeper pockets’,129 they stress the extent to which 
clients ‘keep them on their toes’130 and demand for them to be ‘whiter than white’ in how 
they operate.131 The power of PSCs vis-à-vis their clients is further undermined by 
uncertainty in the PSI, which the following section will discuss in greater detail. 
 
Section Five: Uncertainty and Mutual Dependency in the PSI 
Uncertainty describes a situation in which the outcome of an action is not known in advance, 
forcing actors to take decisions with limited information.132 The literature’s engagement 
with the role of uncertainty is very uneven. While some authors discuss uncertainty’s effect 
on clients and their inability to specify their contractual needs during negotiations,133 such 
notions of an ‘”unlevel playing field”’134 fail to note how PSCs are equally affected by 
uncertainty. Nor does the literature offer an account of how both parties eventually 
incorporate uncertainty into their strategic interactions. 
One source of uncertainty for UK PSCs is that they cannot be assured that their shirking will 
not eventually be discovered and punished by their clients.135 Another source of uncertainty 
is the security environment PSCs operate in. Not only is their ability to predict and prevent 
insurgent attacks very limited or even inexistent, PSCs also have significant risk exposure in 
terms of their personnel, equipment and, crucially, their reputation. As Thomas Hammes 
notes: ‘If Blackwater loses a principal like Bremer, they are out of business.’136 Finally, PSCs 
face considerable uncertainty in their market environment, i.e. volatility in the demand for 
their services and in their labour costs. Moreover, the paradigmatic change the PSI has 
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undergone since 2003 makes it difficult for PSCs to use past experience to inform their 
strategic management.137  
Interviews further indicate that, unlike operational uncertainty, UK PSCs are poorly equipped 
for dealing with market-based uncertainty.138 As Phillips notes, ‘the UK PSI has some of the 
most dedicated people providing security in a challenging environment. That does not mean 
that they are good business men‘.139 This inability to deal with market-based uncertainty is in 
part owed to the prevalent organizational structures in the PSI, in which senior management 
is often occupied with operational matters rather than dedicated to focusing on strategic 
management.140 Interviews also suggest that there is also a general lack of business acumen 
among UK PSCs,141 for which the cultural dominance of the “Operations” department is 
partly to blame, as its members often occupy key management positions.142 As a result, 
Phillips claims that UK PSCs tend to ‘gravitate towards providing an excellent service in terms 
of the technical expertise that goes into the product, but they have little idea about pricing it 
correctly’.143 Other interviewees point to UK PSCs’ inability to understand their clients’ 
business model144 and the often haphazard way in which UK PSCs have diversified their 
business as evidence for their poor strategic management.145  
Exposure to uncertainty thus increases the risk that UK PSCs misjudge their risk exposure, 
which, in turn, makes them more vulnerable to market volatility and more susceptible to 
cliental punishment and influence. Also with a view to overcoming this uncertainty, PSCs 
often seek to establish close, often personal relationships to their clients, as their customers’ 
signals help PSCs to chart a sustainable course for their business.146 Indeed, several UK PSC 
representatives stated that they would informally consult their clients before making 
investment decisions.147 This need for proximity is incompatible with PSCs’ alleged 
inclination to shirk at any given opportunity. Moreover, the extent to which PSCs rely on 
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such relationships suggests that the dependency Singer and others are concerned about 
does not seem to be one-sided, but mutual148 - a notion that the PSC literature has yet to 
consider in its use of the P/A problem.  
Strategic Interaction under Conditions of Uncertainty 
Dearkin and Michie argue that such close relationships between contractual partners – like 
Macaulay they use the term “relational contracting” – produce trust,149 which helps the PSI 
and its clients to overcome an important problem at the intersection of power and 
uncertainty. Clients can incorporate the risk of ‘strategic behaviour’, i.e. the possibility that 
agents take advantage of incomplete contracts,150 into their decision-making. They can, for 
instance, attempt to deter shirking by advertising their intention to punish it 
disproportionally. Under conditions of uncertainty, however, how can clients distinguish 
shirking from other causes of problems?  
As noted earlier, the very insecurity that motivates clients to use PSCs also makes monitoring 
PSC activities and thus identifying instances of shirking largely impossible. Outcome-based 
assessments of PSC performance are likewise problematic, because a shirking PSC may 
benefit from inept insurgent attacks, while a diligent PSC may fail due to overwhelming 
opposition.151 Moreover, a principal has to distinguish between shirking and situations in 
which problematic behaviour occurs not because, but despite the best efforts of the agent. 
Effective punishment is thus quite difficult in the PSI. This constitutes a problem for PSCs and 
their clients alike: “false punishment” costs PSCs a loss in revenue and reputation, while 
clients bear the costs of switching providers. Moreover, the problem has broader 
implications: If a high propensity for shirking is considered not to be limited to individual 
PSCs, clients may seek out alternatives to PSC service provision and leave the PSI altogether. 
Alternatively, should clients increase the rate of punishment, which would inevitably 
increase the rate of “false punishments”, they risk creating a “market for lemons”. In short, 
they risk that all but those PSCs, which shirk so much that their misconduct pays for the 
increased costs of punishment, exit the market.152  
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The PSC literature views the principal’s inability to assess an agent’s performance as 
problematic. However, contrary to the literature’s perspective, this uncertainty is arguably 
an even greater problem for PSCs as agents: While their clients can make do without PSCs by 
using a substitute, PSCs’ corporate survival depends on such contractual relationships. Thus, 
rather than conceptualizing contractual relationships from the principal’s perspective, 
scholars focusing on relational contracting view agency relations as a coordination problem 
affecting both parties,153 and thus underscore the role of mutual dependency as highlighted 
in the previous section. Indeed, applying relational contracting to the PSI arguably turns the 
P/A problem on its head: Given that ‘the definition of any situation [in an agency 
relationship] is open to interpretation’154 and that the distribution of power within PSI client 
relations favours clients, PSCs need to find a way to overcome their customer’s potential 
concerns about their performance. 
According to Dearkin and Michie, contractual parties build close relationships to one another 
to overcome such coordination problems even when uncertainty is high and monitoring 
impossible on the basis of the trust such relationships produce.155 They identify two types of 
trust, which are both prevalent in the UK PSI: ‘[S]elf-interested trust’ is based on an agent’s 
hope for future business and is arguably prevalent in the long-term relationship between 
PSCs and their public sector clients, while ‘socially-oriented trust’ is based on shared norms 
and culture among contracting parties, which nicely captures the close, often personal long-
term relationships between UK PSCs and their private sector clients.156 While this 
understanding of “relational contracting” therefore neatly bridges section two’s focus on 
self-interest with section three’s focus on the societal context, it adds an important third 
dimension to the debate: Deakin and Michie understand trust less as something that simply 
emerges from contractual relations than as something that is actively generated both at the 
inter-personal and at the institutional level.157 Others further highlight that generating trust 
in contractual relations is not limited to its immediate parties, but that the legal and social 
environment and the market structure in which contractual relations take place play a 
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crucial role.158 After all, a minimum level of trust is a prerequisite for parties to “take the 
plunge” and enter into contractual relations in the first place.  
Conclusion 
Sections six will further explore the concept of “relational contracting” by reviewing how 
public and private sector clients organize their relations to UK PSCs. Overall, this section’s 
discussion raised considerable doubts about the PSC literature’s use of the P/A problem as a 
means for understanding client relations in the PSI. Indeed, as shown, clients have 
considerable power and instruments at their disposal to punish shirking PSCs. More 
importantly, the prevalence of uncertainty and the resulting mutual need for close 
relationships and trust is incompatible with the notion of antagonism between PSCs and 
their clients.  
 
Conclusion Part I: Alternative Approaches to the P/A Problem 
Sections two through five pointed to various inconsistencies between the PSC literature’s 
emphasis on antagonism and an abundance of opportunities for shirking in PSI client 
relationships on the one hand, and the importance of long-term contracting, networks, 
power relations and uncertainty in the PSI on the other hand. Moreover, each section 
suggested alternative approaches to agency relations in the PSI, relying particularly on the 
economic/economic sociology literature: Axelrod’s work on cooperation in long-term 
relationships suggested that it is in PSCs’ self-interest to abstain from shirking. In turn, 
Macaulay’s work on the role of non-contractual relations in business highlighted the extent 
to which shirking would have repercussions in the networks in which PSCs are embedded 
and the work by Dearkin, Michie and others on relational contracting suggested that shirking 
could undermine the mutual trust that is vital for PSCs and their clients alike in the face of 
uncertainty.    
Part I, supported by this thesis’ analysis up to this point, thus suggests that the PSC 
literature’s conceptualisation of the P/A problem is problematic when applied to  the UK PSI: 
The suggestion that PSCs will use any opportunity to shirk presupposes that PSC behaviour is 
animated by a single, coherent profit-motive – a notion that Chapter Three rejected. 
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Moreover, given the variety of sources and the overall intensity of competitive pressure in 
the market for PSC services, as described by Chapter Four, PSI client relations can no longer 
be conceived to offer substantial opportunities for shirking, as implied by the PSC literature.  
The Use of the P/A Model in Economics  
This conclusion complements the previous sections’ analysis by elaborating on how 
economists’ and economic sociologists’ perspective on the P/A problem differs from that of 
the PSC literature. First, agency relations are not problematic as a matter of principle. 
Indeed, Arrow argues that economists merely tend to focus on those situations that are 
particularly problematic, i.e. ‘when the information available to the two participants is 
unequal’.159  
Secondly, economists believe that asymmetric information and thus P/A problems are 
ubiquitous in economic life.160 Indeed, the concept has even been applied to the economic 
aspects of relationships that are usually not conceptualized as economic relations, e.g. the 
“marriage market”.161 This has two important implications for how economics approaches 
the P/A problem. With respect to the public policy debate outlined above, they tend to 
reject ‘the idea of the public agency as a benign, technical entity’ and, instead, argue that 
civil servants are agents as well, whose interests need not align any closer with those of their 
principal than the interests of private “profit seekers”.162 Moreover, given how ubiquitous 
agency relations are in economic life, economists expend considerable effort on how to 
mitigate P/A problems, e.g. through monitoring and the design of reward structures.163 
Admittedly, mitigation is not entirely absent from the PSC literature, but it is largely reduced 
to discussions about regulation and the reduction of public sector reliance on PSCs, while 
market-based solutions tend to receive less consideration.   
Thirdly, economists are criticized for characterizing agency as a problem, rather than ‘a 
solution, a neat kind of social plumbing’.164 The aforementioned statement by Arrow, 
however, suggests that this critique is somewhat misguided, as problematic agency relations 
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dominate the economic literature because it is what economists choose to focus on, because 
they believe agency relations to be per se problematic. Instead, economists generally value 
agency relations, because they make specialization possible, which, in turn, allows for 
comparative advantages to be utilized.165 Indeed, the aforementioned criticism arguably 
applies much better to the PSC literature’s conceptualization of PSI client relations. The 
benefits of security privatization receive at best scant attention or are outright rejected: 
Jennings voices a popular critique by stating that ‘[t]he efficiency argument is perhaps the 
easiest for [...] sceptics to rebut’, because ‘[t]he distortions of the private military market 
neutralise or disprove many of the assumptions underlying the economic efficiency 
argument [for the use of PSCs]’.166 It is, however, questionable whether the PSC literature’s 
limited engagement with the economics of the PSI can sufficiently support such a claim. 
Sections six discusses how public and private sector clients organize their respective 
relationships to the PSI. They will show that the public sector’s engagement with PSCs has 
largely been consistent with the PSC literature’s sceptical view on the PSI and its focus on 
formal, arm’s length contracting. Private sector contracting, however, has largely followed a 
different path that is more in line with the idea of “relational contracting”.   
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Part II: Assessing Private and Public Sector Contract Management 
Section Six: Public and Private Sector Approaches to Contracting 
The comments by Stanger and Isenberg at the outset of this chapter indicate a growing 
concern not solely about the regulation of PSCs, which will be discussed in detail in the next 
chapter, but also about the management of their contractual relations. Notably, the PSC 
literature’s analysis, however, focuses primarily on public sector contracting, while the 
private sector’s approach to managing its client relations has to date received little 
attention. This section, in turn, addresses two aspects of the public sector’s contract 
management, (a) its arm’s length approach to contracting and (b) its effect on the evaluation 
of contractor performance and on the resolution of conflicts in the context of the 
contractual relationship. Against this background, this section argues that private sector 
contracting procedures are better suited to fostering trust between contracting parties than 
those used by the public sector. 
Arm’s Length Contracting 
Chapter Four argued that public sector clients tend to favour contractual relationships at 
arm’s length.167 This applies in particular to US government contracting, which the following 
discussion will focus on, as it constitutes, directly or indirectly, a significant share of UK PSCs’ 
public sector revenue in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003.168 More importantly, interviews 
with UK PSCs strongly suggest that US government contracting practices shape the way in 
which PSCs perceive public sector contracting: Asked to describe how public and private 
sector clients differed from one another, most interviewees referred to US government 
practices to describe the former.169 Finally, the well-documented experience of the US 
government with PSCs in Iraq and Afghanistan also provides an important reference point 
for any future UK government engagement with the industry.170 
Manifestations of this arm’s length relationship include the use of anonymised bidding 
processes and of public tendering rather than contract renewal. Another pertinent example 
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is the system of contracting officers (COs) and contracting officer representatives (CORs) that 
governs US government contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. COs, who award, renegotiate 
and, ultimately, oversee DoD contracts, are overwhelmingly civilians stationed out-of-
theatre,171 while CORs, their in-theatre representatives, often lack the necessary expertise 
and authority. Their position is plagued by high turnover and low prestige.172 This system has 
rightly attracted considerable criticism,173 albeit arguably for the wrong reasons: While the 
focus has so far been on the undoubtedly important oversight and accountability deficits it 
generates, practitioners stress how this structure complicates contractual relations in-
theatre.174 Indeed, the separation – psychological rather than geographical – this system 
introduces between contractual parties seems to be welcomed by some critics, as it 
allegedly provides greater oversight and accountability.175  
Private sector clients, on the other hand, prefer a different, much closer relationship to PSCs. 
While title and exact area of authority vary from company to company, corporate security 
managers (CSMs) are generally the main point of contact between PSCs and their private 
sector clients. Since they are primarily responsible for awarding and renewing contracts and 
for monitoring contractor performance, their role is roughly comparable to that COs in the 
public sector. Interviews suggest, however, that the  role is interpreted very differently in 
the private sector. For instance, networks often play an important role in initiating 
relationships between CSMs and PSCs, as initial contact is often established based on 
personal recommendations.176 In the UK, such professional networks often rest on a shared 
cultural foundation,177 i.e. CSMs often also have a military background and thus “know” one 
another as well as the PSC representatives they are being introduced to.178 Thus, early on, 
there is a personal aspect to the relationship that is not present in public sector contracting. 
Subsequently, both parties often make relationship-specific investment to strengthen such 
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relationships: Several CSMs stated that they would regularly call counterparts at PSCs, even 
when they did not have an on-going contract with them, ‘just to keep tabs on them’,179 while 
PSCs often provide consulting services to CSMs in the proposal stages of projects free of 
charge.180 Given that PSCs are included early in projects, some CSMs even seem to consider 
PSC representatives “allies”, whose expertise helps them secure funds and influence within 
their respective organizations.181  
While such close relations between CSMs and PSC representatives pose challenges of their 
own,182 they are more likely to generate trust between the contractual partners than are 
those arm’s length relationships preferred by public sector clients. This is particularly salient 
when it comes to evaluating contractor performance and resolving problems affecting PSI 
client relations.      
Evaluating Contractor Performance and Resolving Problems 
Another important difference in how public and private sector clients approach their 
contractual relations lies in the ways by which their  performance is assessed and how 
problems are resolved, especially when it comes to the autonomy COs and CSMs are 
afforded by their respective contracting practices.  
In the public sector, COs wield considerable power vis-à-vis their contractual partners, but 
they enjoy relatively little freedom in its application. As noted earlier, government 
contracting is subject to extensive regulation and, although the procedures themselves are 
often adapted from other purposes and ill-suited for PSC service contracting,183 COs are 
expected to stringently apply these regulations.184 Moreover, in cases of irregularities or 
conflict between the contractual partners, COs are often required, by law or contracting 
procedure, to initiate investigations, which are often conducted by third parties with little 
prior knowledge of the contractual relationship. Finally, public sector contracting seems to 
be primarily focused on procedural deficits. Interviews with PSCs suggested, for example, 
that public sector clients would frequently request further information on an issue not 
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because it allowed them to better understand a given situation, but in order to ‘tick a box‘, 
i.e. to fulfil a reporting requirement.185 This notion that public sector contracting puts 
greater emphasis on procedural fealty than on its outcome and impact seems to be 
supported by a 2009 SIGIR audit report. Said report lauded US government contracts for 
having been awarded competitively,186 while the high level of concentration in US 
government contracting for PSC services – just four PSCs received nearly half of all US 
government spending under review – was not noted as a cause for concern.187  
In the private sector, on the other hand, CSMs enjoy far greater freedom and autonomy in 
their dealings with PSCs. Interviews suggest that such  freedom is in part owed to the fact 
that there are fewer rules and guidelines encumbering their actions. Insofar as private sector 
clients have regulations in place governing their use of PSCs, said rules are often written and 
reviewed by the CSMs.188 Moreover, CSMs have considerable leeway when it comes to 
evaluating contractor performance and resolving problems, which is particularly relevant in 
the context of this section: While the lack of contract management resources in the public 
sector is widely criticized,189 it is important to note that private sector clients have far fewer 
contract management resources at their disposal. Indeed, the majority of CSMs interviewed 
for this thesis stated that their companies did not have a systematic process in place to 
evaluate PSC service quality or to monitor prices and quality in the market for PSC 
services.190 However, while their contracts tend to be more incomplete as a result, conflicts 
between PSCs and their private sector clients seem to be rare and generally easily resolved.  
Interviews with PSC representatives, employees and CSMs suggest a variety of explanations 
for this phenomenon, which, in turn, provide interesting insights into how PSI client relations 
are affected by public and private sector approaches to contracting, respectively. PSC 
representatives suggested that their greater competence makes it easier to deal with private 
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sector clients.191 Here, competence does not denote a technical qualification, as private 
sector clients are often at least as unqualified as their public sector counterparts: Especially 
smaller companies and NGOs often lack a designated CSM and, instead, rely on their HR 
department.192 Instead, due to the ‘ungodly churn‘, i.e. the high turn-over among CORs,193 
the main point of contact for PSCs is largely ignorant about the contractual arrangement, 
which is made worse by the complexity of the contracts in question.194 However, there is 
significantly greater continuity in private sector contract management: While CORs switch 
every four to six month, CSMs stay in their position for years. Moreover, contractual 
arrangements in the private sector are less complex and their lines of authority clearer, 
which makes it easier for PSCs to interact with them.195 Moreover, CSMs are not primarily 
focused on keeping contractual partners accountable, but on identifying and addressing 
their company’s security needs. As a result, CSMs are often able to resolve conflicts without 
involving third parties that are unfamiliar with the contractual relationship,196 and their 
contract evaluation and conflict resolution is very much outcome-oriented and intend on 
continuing the contractual relationship, as the costs of retendering the contract has to be 
covered by the CSMs’ limited budget. Here, it is also crucial that CSMs are free to choose 
whether to renew contracts or to turn to the market to find a new provider, as it provides 
further incentives for PSCs to cooperate.  
Conclusion 
Private sector clients can therefore, to an extent, make up for their lack of contract 
management resources by using a closer relationship to their contractual partners. This is 
not to suggest that close relationships to PSCs are a panacea for organizing PSI client 
relations. Indeed, it is important to note the limitations of this approach, its potential lack of 
accountability and its vulnerability to regulatory capture, which received little attention in 
the above section. Another important limitation is the scalability of close personal 
relationships. A principal may be able to maintain the close relationships necessary to 
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manage a small contract, but Erinys’ OPF contract, for example, which employed up to 
16,000 people at a time, is a different issue altogether. However, clients usually opt for close 
relationships to their PSCs, because they cannot afford more elaborate contracting 
procedures. Both approaches thus have their respective merits. A more fruitful question 
would therefore be how to combine them in a useful manner. 
If private sector contracting practices suffer from a lack of accountability and a vulnerability 
to regulatory capture, this – of course – invites questions about the drawbacks of public 
sector contracting practices as well. While their resource-intensiveness has already been 
noted, another limitation became apparent from PSCs’ attitudes to public sector contracting: 
Not only did most interviewees refer to its practices with derision: “unprofessional”, 
“legalistic” and “not suitable” were frequently mentioned attributes. It was also apparent 
that public sector practices produced compliance rather than cooperation from its 
contractual partners. For example, one PSC employee would argue that he was so busy filling 
out contractually mandated reports that important information that were not covered by 
the reports would fall by the wayside.197  
Indeed, this observation highlights a broader troubling trend in public sector contract 
management. Public sector contracting procedures in Iraq and Afghanistan have improved 
immeasurably since 2003. First, independent oversight was established through SIGIR, CBO, 
GAO and CRS reporting198 and the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (OGR) 
and the Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC).199 Government contracting for PSC 
services was consolidated in the DoD and DoS,200 reporting standards were tightened201 and 
the control of PSCs in Iraq put under the purview of the DoD.202 Moreover, the DoD and DoS 
charged military commanders with investigating PSCs,203 forced PSCs to install cameras and 
recording devices in their vehicles and embedded Bureau of Diplomatic Security (BDS) 
personnel in PSDs.204 However, over the course of these improvements, PSCs were asked to 
comply with more and more reporting and vetting requirements with little regard for the 
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overall regulatory burden.205 It is not only questionable whether these measures justify their 
costs, as the adding of compliance requirements has been an important contributor to the 
increasing costs of competing for government contracts.206 The observation discussed above 
also questions whether more accountability and transparency requirements necessarily 
succeed in generating greater accountability and transparency – and less misbehaviour on 
the part of PSCs. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter highlighted deficiencies in the PSC literature’s approach to PSI client relations, 
specifically in its specific application of the P/A problem. It showed how long-term 
contractual relations change the incentives UK PSCs face, how client relations are emdedded 
in social relations, how power is distributed in their disfavour in the relationship to their 
clients and how uncertainty causes the dependency of PSCs and their clients to be mutual. 
This chapter’s rejection of the PSC literature’s specific use of the P/A problem does not 
mean,  that the concept cannot be usefully applied to the UK PSI. However, the relational 
contracting environment UK PSCs find themselves in, especially vis-à-vis the private sector, 
causes their interests to overlap with those of their clients and, therefore, their relationship 
to be less antagonistic. Moreover, that environment is also less rich in opportunities to shirk, 
as it makes it more likely that such shirking will be detected and punished by their clients. 
Thus, by introducing power, the influence of networks and uncertainty into consideration, 
this chapter provides an alternative, arguably more sophisticated view on agency relations in 
the UK PSI.      
Cost-Plus/IDIQ Contracts  
This alternative view on the P/A problem is best illustrated by showing how it is better able 
to explain phenomena in the UK PSI. For instance, cost-plus and Indefinite-
Delivery/Indefinite-Quantity (IDIQ) contracts have attracted considerable criticism for 
allegedly making it difficult for customer to control costs.207 According to the PSCs 
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literature’s use of the P/A model, PSCs should favour this form of contracting, as it provides 
them with abundant opportunities to shirk. Yet, interviews with UK PSC representatives 
suggest that cost-plus/IDIQ contracts are, at best, considered a mixed blessing.208 This lack of 
enthusiasm becomes understandable upon considering the relationship such contracts 
present and the extent to which they expose PSCs to uncertainty. According to Christian 
Miller, ‘the rationale [for cost-plus/IDIQ contracts] is that such constructs remove financial 
risks that might otherwise discourage qualified companies from bidding’.209 These contracts, 
indeed, significantly reduce some uncertainty: A PSCs can sign a long-term cost-plus contract 
even if labour costs in the PSI are very volatile. However, cost-plus/IDIQ contracts offer no 
certainty with respect to how much business and thus revenue the PSC in question would 
receive even in the short-/medium-term. Indeed, while, in December 2007, DoD had 
contracts with 32 companies, employing 10,000 contractors, just three month later, this had 
shrunk to 18 companies with 7,000 employees.210 Applying Dearkin’s/Michie’s two sources 
of trust to the relationship cost-plus/IDIQ contracts create, this suggests that the PSC in 
question has little reason to develop “self-interested trust”, given how strongly public sector 
demand fluctuates. However, said PSC also has few reasons to develop “socially-oriented 
trust”, given the arm’s length approach to contracting that is prevalent in the public sector. 
Thus, a situation arises, in which high uncertainty meets low trust, which explains the limited 
enthusiasm for cost-plus/IDIQ contracts. Worse still, PSCs bound by such contracts have to 
maintain some capacity to be able to compete for and fill the task orders cost-plus/IDIQ 
contracts may or may not produce and, as a result, have to bear considerable up-front costs. 
This could easily lead PSCs to overextend themselves financially, especially given their 
limited resources, which, in turn, explains why such contracts are prone to abuse.   
What is the Value of Contracting in the PSI? 
The emphasis this chapter put on the relational nature of contracting in the PSI and the role 
of trust/good faith in its client relations raises the question why PSCs and their clients are 
still keen on the use of formal contracting. Indeed, interviews with PSC representatives 
suggest that contractual negotiations, even for contract renewal with a private sector client, 
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require considerable effort from both parties and are often contentious.211 However, in the 
light of this chapter’s discussion, three reasons provide a continued rational for formal 
contracting.  
First, as Luhmann argues, ‘contracts provide a possibility, not a necessity for sanctions.212 
Thus, formal contracts provide a form of insurance for PSCs and their clients alike, which, in 
the context of their relationship, may even foster trust. The possibility of punishment such 
contracts provide not only lessens the rationale for shirking, the fact that a PSC agrees to 
enter into such a formal contract signals its intention to deal in good-faith. Secondly, formal 
contracts provide its parties with a means of communication.213 For instance, clients can use 
them to express their expectations and intention to punish shirking vis-à-vis their PSCs to 
avoid misunderstandings. Moreover, it also allows the individuals that negotiated the 
contract to communicate their mutual understanding of their relationship to the members of 
their respective organizations. Finally, contract negotiations also provide a legitimate 
opportunity for its parties to address genuine conflicts of interest, such as how much PSC 
services should cost. Contract negotiations are thus a kind of safety valve, which prevents 
that contentious issues need to be addressed again and again in the everyday interaction 
between PSCs and their clients. As one PSC employee described it: ‘[F]ortunately, they 
[contract negotiations] take only play once a year’.214  
Crucially, this approach to formal contracting, which sees it essentially as supporting, not 
replacing a trust-based relationship, casts a new light on an issue that the PSC literature 
otherwise struggles to account for: According to Kateri Carmola, ‘even though contracts are 
made within an almost hyperlegal setting, legal remedies are rarely used; instead, the 
relationship is merely broken off‘.215 If formal contracting primarily serves to support a trust-
based relationship, pursuing legal remedies after the breakdown of said relationship would 
be akin to locking the stable door after the horse has bolted.   
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Finally, the last section suggested that the way in which clients organize their contractual 
relationship influences the behaviour of PSCs. Specifically, it suggested that, if they are in an 
arm’s length relationship, PSCs tend to comply with its formal contractual requirements, 
rather than cooperate with the contractual partner in question. PSCs can thus be said to 
“respond” to their clients attempts to control their behaviour and, crucially, not necessarily 
in the intended fashion. This raises interesting, so far unanswered questions for the 
important debate on how best to regulate PSCs. The next chapter and this thesis’ conclusion 
will engage with said debate by showing how the PSC literature’s view on regulation is 
shaped by the prevalent flawed model o PSC behaviour, before proposing an alternative 
approach to PSC regulation based on the alternative conceptualization of PSC behaviour that 




Chapter 6: Behavioural Modelling and 
Its Implications for PSC Regulation  
Applying the Proposed Behavioural Model 
According to Julien LeGrand, any sort of market intervention, including policy-making on 
PSC, relies on a behavioural model.1 However, for policy-makers, understanding PSC 
behaviour is not an aim in and of itself. Instead, their interest in behavioural modelling is 
defined by the demands of the policy-making process. By implication, the need to take 
legislative action constrains policy-makers’ ability to devote time and resources to reach a 
better understanding of its potential consequences, especially when the need for 
government intervention is perceived to be urgent.  
This is arguably particularly salient with respect to the debate on PSC regulation in the UK.2 
The UK is one of the largest markets for PSC services and UK companies have played crucial, 
yet controversial roles in Afghanistan and Iraq.3 Indeed, support for PSC regulation is 
widespread among NGOs and civil society groups,4 defence experts5 and politicians.6 
Contrary to Sheehy et al’s claim that PSCs ‘argue that the lack of regulation governing their 
conduct is not a concern’,7 UK PSCs strongly support regulation,8 so much so that Sarah 
Percy suggests ‘PSCs are more enthusiastic about developing regulation […] than state 
governments’.9  
The Proposed Behavioural model and the Policy-Making Process 
One of the drawbacks of the proposed behavioural model, which will be discussed further in 
this thesis’ conclusion, is that it is more limited and less definitive in its results and that 
greater caution is required in its application, when compared to the behavioural model that 
                                                     
1
 LeGrand (1997), p. 150. 
2
 Cockayne et al (2008), p. 2, Isenberg (2004), p. 45. 
3
 Cockayne et al (2009), p. 17. 
4
 War on Want (2006) , Lilly (2002) 
5
 Hastings (2006), Walzer (2008).  
6
 Reid (2009), Willcocks (2008).  
7
 Sheehy et al (2009), p. 9.  
8
 Claridge (2006), Spicer (2006), Beese (2004), BAPSC (no date).  
9
 Percy (2006), p. 9 
231 
 
is prevalent in the PSC literature’s. Its use of Granovetter’s theory of embeddedness causes 
the proposed behavioural model to include PSCs’ economic actions and their social context, 
i.e. it opts for greater complexity over parsimony to generate more accurate explanations 
and predictions of PSC behaviour. In the policy-making realm, this trade-off may, however, 
may have problematic implications. Given the aforementioned strong pressures for 
legislative action, policy-makers may opt for the prevalent behavioural model with its less 
accurate, yet more decisive predictions. This chapter will caution against such a course of 
action, arguing that the prevalent model’s flawed assumptions about PSC behaviour would 
produce regulation that is ineffective and inefficient.  
Outline 
Part one of this chapter explores the evolution of the debate about PSC regulation and the 
reasons it identifies for adopting regulation.  Section one explores the impact of perceptions 
of traditional private military actors have on the regulatory debate. It shows how the 
literature overemphasises continuity between PSCs and traditional military actors based on 
alleged similarities in their behaviour. This notion of continuity establishes existing laws 
aimed at prohibiting mercenary activity as reference points for the debate on PSC regulation 
and, thus, extends existing biases to PSCs. Section two discusses the need for regulation, 
which the PSC literature emphasises over its potential limitations and costs. Indeed, the 
benefits of PSC use are generally treated perfunctorily, as are practical and moral 
considerations that may limit PSC regulation. Likewise, regulatory alternatives and the 
industry’s concerns are largely dismissed as ineffective and biased respectively. Sections 
three to six discuss three reasons for regulation that the PSC literature has coalesced 
around: control, accountability, transparency and the growth of the PSI. Part one concludes 
by arguing that the PSC literature portrays regulation as a zero-sum game with high stakes: 
Unless PSCs are tightly controlled through strict formal regulation, intrusive monitoring and 
severe sanctions, their self-interested profit-motive supposedly leads them to exploit any 
opportunity to engage in problematic behaviour - with possibly dramatic consequences. The 
conclusion also suggests that this zero-sum approach rests on specific assumptions about 
PSC behaviour, i.e. the prevalent behavioural model, and that a different conceptualization 
of PSC behaviour would suggest a far less drastic regulatory intervention. 
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Part two discusses the PSC literature’s assessment of the regulatory status quo and the 
lessons to be drawn from it. Sections seven to nine each evaluate the PSC literature’s view 
on existing international, domestic and informal regulation respectively and their prospects 
of addressing the identified need for regulation. The literature is not only largely dismissive 
of the effectiveness of the regulatory status quo, it also identifies structural problems with 
all existing types of regulation, which cause them to fall short of the identified regulatory 
need. Throughout part two, this thesis explores the question to what extent the prevalent 
behavioural model influences the literature’s assessment of the regulatory status quo in 
general and, in particular, of the effectiveness of informal regulatory means. Section ten 
concludes this chapter by discussing the literature’s preferred regulatory solution, the 
regulatory matrix. It argues that, in its advocacy, the literature neglects compliance costs and 
their impact on the market for PSC services. While the conclusion affirms a need for 
regulation, it also contends that the literature’s proposals, based on the prevalent 
behavioural model, risks creating regulation that is both ineffective and inefficient. An 
alternative regulatory proposal based on the proposed behavioural model will be outlined in 
the final chapter of this thesis.  
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Part I: The Development of the Regulatory Debate and the Need for 
Regulation  
Section One: The History of the Debate on PSC Regulation  
When the debate on PM/SCs emerged in the latter half of the 1990s, the then-prevalent 
views on private military actors were decidedly negative. While states had historically relied 
extensively on mercenaries, mercantile companies and privateers,10 their use had largely 
ceased in the 19th century, as social, political and technological changes increasingly 
undermined the need and justification for using private military actors.11 Even when they 
were widely used, private military actors enjoyed a poor reputation for their brutality and 
lack of loyalty.12 As states became less reliant on private military actors, independent private 
military actors, namely corsairs and pirates, came to define the image of private military 
actors.13 By the middle of the 20th century, the process of nationalizing the means of 
violence, which had started with the Westphalian Peace of 1648, reached its apex with the 
enshrinement of the monopoly of legitimate violence as a sine qua non of state sovereignty 
in the UN charter.14 Private military actors truly seemed to be a thing of the past.  
Yet, in the 1960s and 1970s, mercenaries briefly reappeared in the context of post-colonial 
struggles, particularly in Africa.15 While mercenaries have since disappeared as a decisive 
factor in contemporary conflict,16 they continue to influence how contemporary private 
military actors are perceived: The international community identified mercenaries as a 
threat to peoples’ right to self-determination and codified its opposition to their use in 
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international and national legislation.17 These historical attitudes towards private military 
actors constitute an important influence on the contemporary regulatory debate. They 
establish a persistent antagonism, a ‘seemingly instinctive reluctance’ towards PSCs.18 
However, the persistence of comparisons between PSCs and traditional private military 
actors, especially mercenaries, is surprising, given how widely acknowledged the differences 
between the two types of actors are.19 Since the onset of the regulatory debate, authors 
have rejected suggestions that PSC activities constitute a ‘form of mercenary activity’20 as 
‘post-colonial myopia’.21. 
Notions of Historical Continuity and Their Implications for PSC Regulation  
The reason why PSCs are so frequently associated with mercenaries seemingly lies in how 
the literature conceptualizes their behaviour. PSCs are distinguished from traditional private 
military actors primarily based on their permanent corporate structure.22 Yet, when 
describing PSCs, many authors seem to question precisely this permanent corporate 
structure. For example, PSCs are alleged to be able to easily re-locate to a more lenient 
jurisdiction in the face of strict domestic regulation23 and their reliance on subcontracting is 
seen as evidence of a ‘very weak corporate structure’.24 Concerns about PSCs’ corporate 
structures are even more pronounced when their behavioural implications are discussed. 
Their permanent corporate structures arguably leads PSCs to pursue corporate rather than 
‘individual profit or adventure’,25 suggesting PSCs would forego lucrative opportunities if 
they impede long-term profitability.26 Yet, one looks in vain for descriptions of such restraint 
in the PSC literature’s discussions of PSC behaviour. Instead, fraud, price gauging and IHL 
violations are believed to occur frequently27 – behaviour, which is incompatible with a PSC’s 
long-term well-being. Likewise, it is hard to reconcile accusations that PSCs perpetuate 
conflicts to create business opportunities with their interest in long-term profitability, as 
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such behaviour would alienate existing clients.28 Overall, there seems to be little trust in 
PSCs to act decidedly different from mercenary units when presented with an opportunity 
for short-term profit, as there are ‘clear lines of continuity between [mercenaries, PMCs and 
PSCs]’, one of which is the ‘exchange [of] force for financial reward’.29  
This notion of continuity between PSCs and mercenaries has a number of problematic 
implications for the debate on regulation. First, it establishes the aforementioned 
prohibitions of mercenary activity as a precedent for PSC regulation.30 This is, however, 
hardly a suitable template for a contemporary regulatory debate that favours controlling, 
rather than abolishing PSCs.31 The notion of continuity also causes historical attitudes 
towards private military actors to “spill over” to PSCs.32 It is questionable if PSCs, who work 
primarily in support of governments, would have been as readily identified as threats to 
state sovereignty and the monopoly of violence, had they not been associated with 
mercenaries. 
Secondly, by blurring the differences between PSCs and mercenaries, the view on the 
contemporary PSI is obscured.33 Discontinuities that distinguish PSCs from mercenaries and 
PMCs include the types of customers they serve, i.e. democratic states and blue-chip 
companies rather than rebel movements, and their product portfolio, i.e. defensive security 
services rather than combat operations. Likewise, comparisons between PSCs and 
mercenaries obscure similarities between PSCs and “normal” corporations. Unlike 
mercenary units, whose organisational structure is similar to small military units, PSCs 
maintain organizational profiles similar to multinational companies, including legal, PR and 
HR departments.34 Indeed, the contention that ‘[t]here are very few industries that operate 
in a fashion analogous to PSCs’ may be increasingly inaccurate.35 As markets in developing 
countries grow in importance, multinational companies increasingly operate under 
conditions similar to the PSI, i.e. they conduct their business primarily abroad and, due to 
the ineffectiveness of local legal systems, they are only effectively regulated by their home 
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states. These similarities between PSCs and “normal“ corporations are significant, because 
measures to hold the latter accountable can extended to control PSCs and to force greater 
transparency on them. For instance, PSCs are subject to voluntary and mandatory auditing 
requirements and they have fiduciary duties towards their shareholders.36 So far, despite 
frequent complaints about the lack of transparency and accountability in the PSI, the PSC 
literature has made surprisingly little use of the available corporate data on UK PSCs.37 This 
thesis, in turn, sought to exploit this source of information on PSCs. 
Conclusion 
The debate about PSCs and their regulation thus did not start from a “clean slate”. Instead, 
their association with traditional private military actors, which is largely founded on the 
prevalent behaviour model, “taints” the PSC literature’s perceptions of the need to regulate. 
 
Section Two: The Need for Regulation 
Discussing the need for regulation fulfils three important functions for the broader debate 
on PSC regulation. First, regulation constitutes nearly always - and certainly in the case of 
PSC regulation - a significant state intervention into economic processes, which potentially 
hampers economic efficiency and restricts property rights and the freedom of contract. For 
such interventions to be justified, a need for regulation has to be clearly established. 
Secondly, discussions about the need for regulation provide a selective and restrictive 
function. Not every problem merits regulatory intervention or can be solved by it. By 
weighing its limits and costs, reasons for regulation are distinguished from problems that 
cannot or need not be regulated. Thirdly, discussions about the need for regulation identify 
benchmarks against which regulatory proposals can be evaluated.  
Justifying vs. Restricting the Need for Regulation 
So far the literature on PSC regulation has arguably gravitated towards making the ‘The Case 
for Regulation’ rather than critically reflecting on its limits and costs.38 While earlier works 
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did not explicitly address the subject,39 some recent publications have addressed the costs 
and difficulties involved in regulating PSCs.40 This focus is partly attributable to the PSC 
literature’s broad approach to PM/SCs. Support for regulation is easily established by 
highlighting circumstances in which one of the many different companies the literature 
defines as PM/SCs could act in a problematic fashion. Assessing the effectiveness and costs 
of regulation across all these different types of companies, however, is considerably more 
challenging. Given that the regulatory debate is an important source of information for the 
policy-making process, the resulting imbalance is far from inconsequential: presented with a 
strong need for regulation and little information about its costs and limitations, policy-
makers are likely to opt for regulation that would otherwise be deemed excessive. 
Identifying Regulatory Aims 
The aforementioned imbalance also affects the discussion’s ability to clearly define 
regulatory aims and thereby guide the development of PSC regulation. According to Simon 
Chesterman and Chia Lehnhardt, contributions to the regulatory debate have largely been 
‘descriptive accounts’ of PSC misconduct or ‘normative arguments’ against their use,41 which 
establish the literature’s dissatisfaction with the status quo, but fail to define an acceptable 
regulatory end-state and how it could be reached. Indeed, beyond a vague consensus 
affirming the need for regulation and the impossibility/undesirability of banning PSCs, the 
literature offers few specific regulatory aims.  
These deficits are partly attributable to the ongoing evolution of the debate: Vague 
regulatory aims necessarily precede more concrete ones and greater effort is spent on 
assessing the costs and limits of regulation as the matter to be regulated is gradually better 
understood. Yet, given its inaccurate conceptualization of PSCs’ behaviour and the socio-
economic context in which it takes place, the literature’s reliance on the prevalent 
behavioural model may prove to be a stumbling-block, rather than a stepping-stone in that 
process.  
                                                     
39
 See, for example, Singer (2003).      
40
 Percy (2006), p. 63-64, Cockayne et al (2008). 
41
 Interestingly, they attribute this partly to the conflation of PSCs with mercenaries (Chesterman/Lehnhardt 




It is thus unlikely that the compliance costs of regulatory proposals, let alone their market-
wide impact, will be accurately assessed. The following sections will review the specific 
reasons for why regulation is urgently needed so as to show how the literature’s thinking on 
regulation is influenced by the prevalent behavioural model. Specifically, they focus on the 
PSC literature’s four main reasons for regulation, namely control, accountability, 
transparency and future growth of the PSI.  
 
Section Three: Reasons for Regulation I: Control   
According to Deborah Avant, the effect of PSCs on the control of force is not one, but three-
dimensional.42 It encompasses functional control, i.e. how PSCs affect military effectiveness, 
political control, i.e. who decides on the use of force, and social control, i.e. whether the 
use of force by PSCs is compatible with domestic and international norms and values.43  
Outsourcing military functions is believed to diminish the functional control of force by 
limiting the military’s ability to operate autonomously.44 In addition to the military’s growing 
reliance on private contractors, authors are concerned that PSCs, unlike regular soldiers, 
cannot be required to provide their services in a time of crisis.45 Moreover, critics fear that 
the decision to outsource may be motivated by reasons other than operational 
effectiveness, which could suffer as a result.46 Finally, the compatibility of PSCs with COIN 
operations is disputed, as PSCs supposedly undermine the unity of command and strategic 
coherence in the battle-space.47 The literature paints a similarly bleak picture of PSCs’ effect 
on the political control of force. In a debate that largely focuses on the US political system, 
critics suggest that the use of PSCs undermines the checks and balances that hold the 
different branches of government accountable, e.g. by circumventing the need for legislative 
consent to troop deployments.48 Moreover, the use of PSCs is believed to obscure the costs 
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of war, because contractor casualties are not accurately reported.49 Hence, the use of PSCs is 
believed to ‘enhance the likelihood of a resort to force’.50 PSCs are also criticised for giving 
actors, which are not democratically legitimized, control over the use of force. PSCs 
themselves influence decisions about the use of force through their work as government 
consultants,51 and multinational companies gain an unprecedented impact on conflicts 
through their use of PSCs,52 which allegedly brings ‘violence, money, and suffering in [...] 
more direct contact than ever in history’.53 Therefore, the use of PSCs is believed to weaken 
political control and compromise ‘the confidence of the citizenry in the democratic practices 
and institutions of the nation’.54 Finally, PSCs’ effect on the social control of force is believed 
to be similarly problematic. Broader access to security services is believed to empower 
actors that are less committed to the norms, values and stability of the international 
system,55 and the use of PSCs gives governments ‘plausible deniability’, i.e. they can 
allegedly more easily disown illegal and illegitimate activities.56  
Criticising the Trinity of Control 
Many of the PSC literature’s concerns about the control of force are not specific to the use of 
PSCs but symptoms of broader changes in the political and security environment. Examples 
include the prevalence of non-state actors and strategic incoherence in the battle-space57 or 
the rising pressures on the military’s professional norms and values.58 It is questionable 
whether PSCs are a cause or a symptom of these changes. Similarly, it is doubtful if PSC 
regulation alone can meaningfully address these concerns. It is also debatable whether 
regulation should address the redistribution of power in the political system and the 
liberalized access to security services by protecting the status quo or by advancing its 
reform? Surely, the mere fact that the use of PSCs brings about change cannot constitute a 
justification for restrictive regulation. Moreover, the literature fails to explain how PSCs 
would benefit from undermining states’ control of force or the effectiveness of the state-
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organized military, given that public sector contracts constitute a significant share of their 
demand59 and that PSCs cannot operate in high risk environments without the support of 
the military.60 Indeed, Christopher Coker suggests that ‘[PSCs] have never sought to 
challenge states’.61 
Moreover, while the US government has used PSCs in support of covert CIA operations,62 
claims that PSCs facilitate illegal and illegitimate behaviour seem exaggerated, as states 
hardly depend on private sector resources for “plausible deniability”. Finally, the regulatory 
debate fails to give adequate consideration to the benefits of PSC use, especially with 
respect to private sector clients.63 To name but two: PSCs provide crucial capabilities that 
would otherwise be unavailable or prohibitively expensive. Interviews suggest that, even for 
large multinational companies, it is not economical to develop sophisticated in-house 
security capacities to deal with threats like kidnapping and terrorism.64 Also, PSCs allow IOs, 
NGOs and private contractors to operate in the face of significant physical insecurity, which, 
in turn, allows mission-critical civilian reconstruction efforts, such as the provision of clean 
water and electricity, to commence much earlier in post-conflict environments. 65  
Conclusion 
Had these considerations been taken into account, a more balanced view of the impact of 
PSCs on the control of force would likely have emerged. While this would scarcely obviate 
the need for regulation, it lessens the need to restrict PSC activity, making less drastic forms 
of regulatory intervention palatable.  
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Section Four: Reasons for Regulation II: Accountability 
Criticism against PSCs is generally not focused on their behaviour - after all, the prevalent 
behavioural model expects them to be unreliable and disloyal - but on the impunity with 
which such behaviour can be  pursued.66 Critics highlight this alleged lack of accountability 
by comparing PSCs to state-organized militaries, suggesting that they should be held 
accountable to ‘the same standard as regular soldiers’.67 Given that PSCs, as corporate 
entities, cannot be incarcerated, some even propose a corporate accountability standard 
akin to command responsibility,68 which would extend criminal liability to those holding 
managerial responsibility. While such a drastic extension of accountability is impracticable, 
as it, for instance, would question the crucial principle of limited liability in contemporary 
business,69 it illustrates the literature’s high expectations for PSC accountability.  
Any notion that effective PSC regulation, especially if it is meant to satisfy such high 
expectations, can be established “at a brushstroke” fails to appreciate the complexities 
involved.70 For instance, competing interests need to be reconciled, often across different 
regulatory cultures.71 Regulation also must be flexible enough to, in the short-term, respond 
to the operational environment and the type of task being performed and, in the long-term, 
accommodate the constantly evolving market for private security services.72 It also has to be 
able to distinguish between fraud and unintentional oversight, often a result of challenging 
operational environments and complex contracting regulations. Finally, the regulatory 
burden for the industry has to be kept at a minimum. This means limiting the costs of 
regulation and its disruptions to the work of PSCs. Codified, formal regulation akin to that 
holding state-organized militaries accountable is likely to be costly and inflexible. Such 
regulation may force smaller PSCs out of business, increasing the market power of the 
remaining PSCs and thus making them harder to control.73 Also, higher prices could render 
PSC services unaffordable to many consumers, particularly NGOs, which cannot pass on 
costs to their customers. Therefore, replicating the military’s accountability structure in the 
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private sector is complicated, costly and likely ill-suited for the PSI. Moreover, the discussion 
above emphasises that stricter regulation may hurt, rather than help the desired regulatory 
outcome.  
Moreover, using the state-organized military as the standard of accountability for the PSI 
narrowly focuses the regulatory debate on formal regulation as a means to attain it. Instead, 
relying on informal means that are unique to the private sector may produce a better 
regulatory outcome. Aside from the aforementioned fiduciary duties, companies depend on 
licenses and charters to operate, requirements for which can be expanded to include 
accountability measures.74 Also, PSCs are subject to tort law, contract law and insurance 
regulations,75 not to mention sector-specific regulations that apply to PSCs due to their 
contractual relationship to their clients.76 Regulators can also exert pressure on their private 
sector clients to increase PSC accountability77 and governments could directly control PSCs 
through the ownership of “golden shares” or through changes to the composition of their 
boards.78 So far, such informal accountability measures have been rejected as insufficient, 
because their sanctions are restricted to financial punishments. However, unlike state-
organized militaries, the institutional survival of PSCs is dependent on their profitability,79 
which gives financial sanctions so far unrecognized punitive power, especially as most UK 
PSCs have limited financial means and access to credit.80  
Conclusion 
Thus, viewing PSCs less through a military and more through a corporate “lens” opens up a 
wealth of regulatory options hitherto unrecognized by the literature. Moreover, such 
informal regulation is seemingly much better adapted to governing the PSI, as it is 
unencumbered by the regulatory costs and unintended consequences of formal regulation 
and because it makes greater use of the unique regulatory features of the private sector.    
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Section Five: Reasons for Regulation III: Transparency  
The lack of transparency, particularly the industry’s reluctance to share information, is 
believed to be a serious obstacle to PSC control and accountability and, hence, a reason for 
regulation.81 However, little effort has been made to determine why the industry insists on 
corporate confidentiality and whether this insistence is at all justified. While PSCs often cite 
commercial and operational reasons,82 client preferences may actually be primarily 
responsible for PSCs’ reluctance to share information. Interviews suggest that many private 
sector customers do not want to be publicly associated with PSCs to protect their reputation 
and fend off liability.83 Indeed, one PSC client stated: ‘I don’t mind telling you who we work 
with, but if one of the companies [we work with] had given you our name, we would be 
concerned’.84 Therefore, the lack of transparency, even if perpetuated by PSCs, is not 
necessarily of their own volition.85 Hitherto, the literature primarily focuses on PSCs as 
regulatory targets, not on their commercial context. Unilaterally forcing greater 
transparency on PSCs may adversely affect their business, while providing little regulatory 
impact, as customers that value corporate confidentiality would likely switch to PSCs outside 
the regulatory jurisdiction.    
While commercial and operational reasons may justify some limits on transparency, 
attempts by PSCs to cover up misconduct are clearly unacceptable.86 However, it is again 
questionable if such behaviour is best addressed by unilaterally imposing greater 
transparency on the industry, as this could ultimately aggravate existing tendencies towards 
concealment. PSCs consider their defensive information strategy to be a response to a 
biased media-environment, as criticism frequently distorts the difference between individual 
transgressions and corporate wrongdoing, causing PSCs to be criticized for the actions of 
individual employees.87 Moreover, PSCs believe their efforts and limited ability to prevent 
and punish employee misconduct are insufficiently recognized: ‘We can't flog him. We can't 
incarcerate him’.88 While regulators can do little to create a more PSC-friendly media 
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environment, they can employ policies that reduce the costs of cooperation for PSCs, i.e. 
confidentiality clauses and leniency agreements. Such policies would make PSCs’ actions 
more transparent for regulatory purposes without exposing PSCs to the negative publicity 
they and their customers are concerned about. 
So far, such concerns have not featured prominently in the regulatory debate due to the 
literature’s scepticism (and sometimes outright resentment) towards equal industry 
participation in the development of regulation: ‘After all, policy-makers do not turn to 
tobacco companies for advice on health issues’.89 This highlights a broader conflict between 
the PSC literature’s and the industry’s regulatory aims. PSCs complain that, rather than 
unregulated, they are inundated by a wealth of often conflicting laws and regulations.90 
Interviews with PSC representatives suggest that the industry is primarily interested in 
making PSC regulation less complex and costly, easier to comply with and more meaningful 
in its guidelines.91 In contrast, the PSC literature seemingly puts greater emphasis on 
regulatory comprehensiveness than on reducing its complexity and costs.92 Echoing its bias 
to focus on PMCs, the PSC literature’s guiding principle seems to be that, in a critical area 
like the use of force , normative rather than economic concerns should be the determining, 
possibly even the only factor driving the regulatory debate.93 Indeed, some authors even 
advocate that the industry’s financially motivated concerns need to be excluded from the 
regulatory process, as, otherwise, it ‘is unlikely to achieve more than the lowest common 
denominator in terms of ethical standards’.94     
The above discussion challenges this antagonistic, arms-length approach to PSCs regulation. 
First, its underlying assumption that PSCs have little interest in effective regulation fails to 
appreciate how the industry would benefit from clearer standards. Regulatory clarity would 
make it easier for the industry to attract outside financing, as ‘investors prefer a stable, 
certain regulatory environment’95 and it would give PSCs legal certainty, making it easier to 
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address allegations of improper conduct and to quantify liability risks in the case of legal 
proceedings. Furthermore, effective regulation would provide a yardstick for assessing PSCs’ 
performance, which would enhance quality- rather than price-driven competition. Secondly, 
unless the aim is to ban PSC services altogether, regulatory effectiveness depends on the 
industry’s cooperation.96 Such cooperation is unlikely if PSCs’ concerns are not sufficiently 
taken into account, i.e. if it entails an unreasonable regulatory burden and no provisions to 
compensate for it.97 Rather than complying with it, PSCs may either try to circumvent such 
regulation or leave the market for security services,98 which would decrease competition, 
making it harder to control the remaining market participants.  
Conclusion 
While greater transparency is undeniably important, finding the best means by which to 
achieve it is a more complicated issue. In particular, this section has shown that it is not 
sufficient to focus solely on PSCs when it comes to assessing the relative merit of different 
measures to increase transparency. Instead, the context in which PSCs operate, especially 
their clients, also has to be considered. Taking this into account, this section has shown that 
the antagonistic approach to PSC regulation that many authors advocate may harm, rather 
than help transparency. A similar argument can be made for control and accountability. 
 
Section Six: Reasons for Regulation IV: Growth of the Industry 
The literature presents three reasons for why regulation is necessary for shaping the future 
growth of the PSI. First, drawing on Weber’s definition of statehood, critics claim that 
broadening access to security services threatens the modern state’s successful claim on the 
monopoly of the legitimate means of violence - a constitutive norm in international relations 
and law - and that restrictive regulation is required to reassert the pivotal role of states in 
the international system.99 Secondly, unregulated growth in the PSI is believed to aggravate 
problems with military effectiveness. An increased use of PSCs could cannibalize the armed 
forces to the point of unsustainability, as the PSI’s more competitive wages lure soldiers into 
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the private sector.100  Finally, some authors draw on economics to argue that the PSI suffers 
from market failure that needs to be corrected by regulatory intervention. For example,  
Chesterman and Lehnhardt claim that the PSI ’falls short of being a fully developed market’ 
due to its lack of competition,101 while Cockayne et al suggest that the social costs of using 
PSCs are externalized102 and Sarah Percy argues that a lack of information disadvantages PSC 
customers and thus causes market failure.103 While control, accountability and transparency 
constitute valid reasons for regulation, closer scrutiny of the arguments for regulation to 
control the future growth of the PSI expose considerable flaws.  
State Sovereignty and the Monopoly on Violence 
Calls to ‘safeguard [...] the state monopoly on the use of force’104 vastly oversimplify its 
theoretical foundation. Elke Krahmann points out, Weber’s definition of the state is 
descriptive not proscriptive,105 while Lynch and Walsh challenge the implied superiority of 
the state monopoly on violence by juxtaposing an ideologically neutral private force and a 
state ‘with dubious moral and legal foundations’.106 Deborah Avant contends that the 
monopoly of force does not accurately describe the historical reality prior to the emergence 
of the PSI and argues that PSCs need not challenge the state monopoly of force.107 Finally, 
Kevin O’Brien suggests that ‘idealized notions of the international security system’ obstruct 
the regulatory debate.108 Especially Avant’s and O’Brien’s criticisms indicate a change in the 
attitudes towards the state - a process Walker and Whyte have referred to as “rescaling” the 
state.109 Given that this process is ongoing and that governments may face very different 
operational requirements, market environments and public attitudes towards security 
privatization in the future, it seems unwise to create regulation that definitively demarcates 
the boundaries of privatization at this point in time. 
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Military Effectiveness  
As to the charge that PSCs “cannibalize” the armed forces, retention was ‘at historical lows’ 
at the height of the PSI boom, but so was recruitment, which suggests a general 
undesirability of the military profession rather than competition from PSCs was 
responsible.110 Moreover, once non-cash and deferred benefits are included, authors 
suggest that there is little disparity between wages in the military and the PSI.111 Such 
comparisons are somewhat flawed, as they calculate in-kind compensation and deferred 
benefits at full value, which assumes the absence of inflation and a perfect match between 
soldiers’ preferences and the non-monetary compensation they receive. However, 
employment in the PSI exposes most soldiers to greater physical risks112 and lower job 
security due to the prevalence of short-term contracts.113 Moreover, PSCs offer considerably 
less social prestige and little support, especially on family or insurance matters.114 Once 
these benefits are factored in, the appeal of leaving for the PSI seems to be rather limited for 
most active duty personnel.  
The same cannot be said for specialists, particularly SOF personnel. While exact statistics on 
the number of SOF personnel leaving for the private sector are unavailable,115 the DoD’s and 
MoD’s decisions to offer substantial retention bonuses and pay-increases are testament to 
the PSI’s attractiveness to SOF personnel.116 Several reasons make SOF personnel 
particularly attractive to the PSI: Aside from their proven ability to operate in hostile 
environments, their elite status causes them to function as a ‘regulatory surrogate’, giving 
them significant ‘promotional value’.117 Given this continued attractiveness, which translates 
into monthly wages of up to $33,000,118 Christopher Spearin believes SOF should not be 
treated as ‘individuals requiring incentives', but rather as a strategic resource’.119      
However, there is a moral argument to be made against regulation that prevents soldiers 
from leaving for the PSI. Until recently, establishing the true value of SOF personnel’s work 
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was impossible, as the states’ monopoly of force had prevented the emergence of a 
legitimate market for their services.120 While military pay is considered fair – a recent DoD 
study found it exceeds 75% of civilian occupations adjusted for age and education121 - such 
comparisons undervalue the unique skills of soldiers and the hardships of military life, which 
translate poorly into the private sector and to which SOF personnel have an above-average 
exposure. If wages in the PSI show that the work of SOF personnel is undervalued, this 
should be addressed by reforming the military’s pay system, not by depriving soldiers of 
their freedom of occupational choice.122 This is particularly true as military service is rarely 
synonymous with a life-long career and because combat veterans struggle most when it 
comes to reintegrating into the civilian workforce.123    
Market Failure 
Finally, the literature’s suggestion that regulation is needed to prevent market failure in the 
PSI is questionable. Chapter Four showed that the supposed “lack” of competition in the PSI 
does not constitute a market failure.124 Likewise, Chapter Five pointed out that information 
asymmetries favouring PSCs are temporary, allowing customers to punish previously 
undiscovered PSC misconduct at a later stage in their contractual relations.125 Moreover, the 
industry’s increasing professionalism and improvements in public sector contracting suggest 
that the aforementioned problems are temporary growing-pains rather than structural 
problems necessitating regulatory intervention.126  
Externalities are a slightly different matter, because they affect third parties, specifically the 
local population, which sustain costs as a result of PSC contracts without being party to 
them.127 Ordinarily, such externalities can be internalised by their victims through the legal 
system,128 but PSCs are often granted immunity from local prosecution. Creating regulation 
to internalize these externalities by limiting PSCs’ immunity, however, risks exposing 
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contractors to arbitrary justice.129 This highlights a broader problem with regulation aimed at 
correcting market failure: Arguments in its favour assume that regulatory intervention 
increases market efficiency – a notion that classical economists dispute. They, instead, 
suggest that free markets are generally efficient and that only ‘exceptional circumstances 
[...] warranted intervention’.130 Research by, among many others, Stiglitz and Greenwald, 
however, has shown that free markets are rarely efficient.131 Nevertheless, the fact that free 
markets fall short of the theoretical market optimum does not imply that regulatory 
interventions necessarily increase efficiency.132 Regulatory intervention often has 
unintended consequences, which can outweigh its intended benefits and result in a net 
welfare loss. Hence, many economists maintain that, while free markets may not reach 
optimum efficiency, they remain more efficient than other means of allocating goods and 
services.133 For regulation to successfully correct market failure, its net welfare effect ought 
to be positive. Given its limited understanding of the economic aspects of PSC behaviour, it 
seems unlikely that the current PSC literature’s regulatory proposals would meet this 
criterion.  
Another issue that needs to be considered with respect to state sovereignty, military 
effectiveness and market failure alike, is the problem of moral hazard on the part of those 
advocating greater regulation. Even if a need for regulation to correct market failure or to 
preserve the primacy of the state in the international system can be identified, it is by no 
means certain that policy-makers will not pursue their own interest when regulating the 
PSI.134 Likewise, the military’s concerns about PSC use and operational effectiveness may be 
partly motivated by self-interested concerns about diminishing opportunities for promotion 
in and the societal relevance of a “slimmer” state-organized military.  
Conclusion 
The discussion about the growth of the industry as a reason for regulation suggests that the 
PSC literature is more concerned with making the case for regulation than to fully take into 
account its implications and costs. Moreover, the PSC literature’s neglect of moral hazard in 
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government regulation suggests that it has fallen victim to a “Nirvana fallacy”: it compares 
an existing, imperfect arrangement, i.e. the market for private security services, to an 
abstract, ideal regulatory state, i.e. perfect government regulation.135 
 
Conclusion Part I: Regulation as a Zero-Sum Game with High Stakes 
Two themes emerge from the above analysis. First, the literature considers the stakes to be 
high when it comes to PSC regulation, despite the fact that, according to Eugenio Cusumano, 
‘the paupacity of reliable data and quantitative studies [makes] a systematic assessment of 
PMSCs’ compliance with the existing ius in bello [and] their impact on local population[s] […] 
impossible’.136 The literature’s concerns are therefore less fuelled by actual PSC behaviour 
than by the importance of the values - military effectiveness, democracy, state sovereignty - 
that PSC use allegedly threatens. Some authors even consider PSCs to be ‘inherently 
antidemocratic’137 and capable of ‘destroy[ing] democracy’,138 i.e. PSCs possess not just the 
will, but also the ability to threaten the aforementioned values. This assertion stands in stark 
contrast to the limited power contemporary PSCs have at their disposal - financially, 
militarily or otherwise. Contrary to some authors’ claims,139 interviews suggest that UK PSCs 
have only limited access to capital and thus a limited ability to increase their capabilities.140 
Militarily, the power of PSCs is also severely limited and pales in comparison with most 
nation states.141 Finally, the literature seems to have little faith in the resilience of state 
institutions when faced with the potential challenges posed by PSCs.  
Hence, there seems to be a discrepancy between the PSC literature’s perception and the 
actual negative impact of PSC use, which even the desire to err on the side of caution cannot 
fully explain. Here the second theme comes into play, which centres on the literature’s view 
on PSC behaviour. The literature’s leitmotiv for understanding PSC behaviour is their self-
interested desire for financial profit, which essentially makes PSC regulation a zero-sum 
game: Unless every aspect of their behaviour is tightly controlled, PSCs will exploit any 
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loophole the regulatory framework provides to engage in problematic behaviour. This zero-
sum approach explains the disregard for the industry’s voice in the regulatory debate and 
the PSC literature’s insensitivity to the costs and limitations of PSC regulation. In such a zero-
sum game, even significant regulatory costs or deadweight losses are deemed acceptable, 
given the likelihood and costs of regulatory failure. Moreover, the zero-sum approach 
influences the preferred outcome of the regulatory debate: Regulatory options, which rely 
on cooperation and mutual good-will, are deemed to be ineffective, while restrictive 
regulation, intrusive monitoring and stiff sanctions are supported as a means for controlling 
PSCs, despite their considerable costs.  
This section criticised this approach to PSC regulation on three points: (1) It stressed the 
need for a more balanced assessment of the impact of PSC use on the control of force, (2) it 
challenged the literature’s standard of PSC accountability and the effectiveness of the 
proposed means to attain it, and (3) it rejected the literature’s arguments for regulating the 
future development of the PSI and criticised its implicit faith in the effectiveness of 
government regulation. In conclusion, it bears repeating that this thesis does not dispute the 
need for regulation. Indeed, this section noted several points where greater control, 
accountability and transparency are urgently needed in the PSI. Instead, this thesis criticises 
the literature’s approach to regulation, arguing that a more differentiated view of PSC 
behaviour would allow for less drastic regulatory intervention, while providing more 
effective control, accountability and transparency.  
The following section continues the critical appraisal of the literature’s view on PSC 
behaviour and its regulation by reviewing its assessment of the regulatory status quo. It 
shows that the zero-sum approach provides the yardstick against which the literature 





Part II: The Regulatory Status of PSCs  
While most authors reject the claim that PSCs operate in a ‘legal vacuum’,142 existing 
international, domestic and self-regulation are seen as exerting insufficient control over 
PSCs.  
Section Seven: International Regulation 
A common point of departure in the discussion about international law and PSCs are the 
OAU and UN Conventions against the use of mercenaries.143 Both conventions are essentially 
blanket bans that are ‘solely concerned with outlawing mercenary activities’.144 These 
conventions were drafted in response to mercenary activities in Africa in the 1960-1970s. 
Authors consider the conventions’ definitions of mercenaries to be inapplicable to PSCs.145 
Another frequently discussed issue is the status of contractors on the battlefield.146 Again, 
the drafting of the relevant norms significantly predates the emergence of the PSI. Article 47 
of Protocol I to the Geneva Convention seeks to abolish mercenaries by denying them ‘the 
right to be a combatant or a prisoner of war’.147 Yet, the PSC literature considers its 
definition of mercenaries to be likewise inapplicable to PSCs.148 Thus, despite significant 
academic interest in the status of PSCs under international law,149 existing norms seems to 
have little regulatory impact on the quotidian behaviour of PSCs.150 Moreover, despite its 
many misgivings about the PSI, the PSC literature is opposed to international laws banning 
PSCs. Such a blanket ban is widely considered to be ‘counterproductive’,151 as it would lack 
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political support,152 violate states’ rights for self-defence,153 be unenforceable154 and forsake 
the benefits of using PSCs.155  
Still, considerable effort has gone into discussing the potential advantages international 
regulation could bring to the regulation of PSCs. For example, some argue that 
internationalizing PSC regulation would give developing countries greater influence over the 
regulatory debate and enhance their limited monitoring and enforcement capacity.156 It is 
also said to possibly counter the threat of domestic regulatory capture by taking 
enforcement out of the hands of national governments,157 and that its global reach would 
limit PSCs’ ability to evade regulation.158 Regardless of its considerable hypothetical 
potential, until recently the chances for effective international regulation to emerge were 
considered slim.159 Influenced by lobbying,160 an erroneous faith in the cost-effectiveness of 
security privatization161 and the desire not to limit their own use of PSCs,162 policy-makers 
were believed to lack the necessary political will for its creation.163 Still, authors maintain 
that international regulation is ‘unquestionably necessary’164 and an ‘inevitable part of the 
solution to regulating PSCs’.165 Indeed, the emerging debate on “state responsibility”, i.e. the 
legal and moral responsibility of states for the actions of PSCs, seems to target this perceived 
lack of regulatory will.166 
The Montreux Document 
In September 2008, seventeen countries signed the Montreux Document,167 which both 
exemplifies and qualifies the literature’s assessment. The document acknowledges states’ 
responsibilities in their use of private security providers and substantiates these 
responsibilities through 70 recommendations for best practices. On the one hand, it shows 
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that international agreement on PSCs can indeed be obtained. Through their signature, the 
signatory countries, which include the main consumers of private security services, accepted 
their responsibility under international law to regulate the PSI and thus created an 
expectation that future regulation will be internationally coordinated. On the other hand, it 
is too early to accurately assess the Montreux Document’s long-term impact, as many of its 
signatories have yet to take tangible steps to honour their regulatory commitments. The 
Montreux Document also does not carry the legal weight of an international treaty,168 and 
its content has already been criticized for being non-binding169 and for the vagueness of its 
“due diligence” provisions.170 Moreover, the negotiating process highlighted the 
participating nations’ conflicting legal traditions and political interests.171 Future efforts to 
create more definitive and binding PSC regulation may aggravate these conflicts, making 
their success questionable at best.      
Finally, the biggest hurdle for any piece of international regulation is its enforcement172 - an 
aspect that even the Montreux Document left largely unaddressed. To assure effective 
enforcement, many authors would prefer PSC regulation to be administered through an 
international regulatory body with an independent capacity to monitor and sanction 
misconduct.173 However, few fully independent, international regulatory institutions exist 
and the costs involved in their creation are hardly encouraging.174 More importantly, states 
are often reluctant to concede jurisdiction to an international institution, because said 
institutions are often neither directly democratically legitimized nor accountable to domestic 
law. Hence, there is little to suggest that a sufficiently strong, shared regulatory interest 
exists to overcome this reluctance. 
Conclusion 
Thus, despite the recent success in creating the Montreux Document, the prospects for 
effective international regulation are considered to be limited. Fred Schreier and Marina 
Caparini echo a widely held belief by suggesting that a lack of political will is the ‘biggest 
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obstacle to [effective international] regulation’.175 However, this argument underestimates 
the substantial challenges international PSC regulation faces in such critical areas as burden-
sharing, jurisdiction and enforcement. Again, this creates a “Nirvana fallacy”: the literature’s 
overly-optimistic assessment of its prospects creates the illusion that international PSC 
regulation with its many benefits is attainable. As a result, the PSC literature’s perception is 
distorted. Especially regulatory alternatives, which are more restricted in their reach but 
easier to implement than international regulation, are undervalued.  
 
Section Eight: Domestic Regulation  
Given the transnational nature of its business, a UK PSI could easily fall under the jurisdiction 
of half a dozen states or regional bodies while serving a single contract. The ensuing 
complexity is further increased by the wealth of laws applicable to PSCs. Arguably, it is this 
panoply of domestic laws that lends credence to the assertion that PSCs do not operate in a 
“legal vacuum”. Still, the PSC literature argues that this regulatory ‘web’ is insufficiently 
tight.176  
A Review of Select Domestic Regulations Applicable to PSCs 
For instance, laws prohibiting the recruitment of citizens by foreign powers, e.g. the 1870 UK 
Foreign Enlistment Act (FEA), are products of bygone eras and incompatible with 
contemporary interpretations of individual liberties.177 Moreover, their poor enforcement 
history – not a single conviction has been reached based on the FEA – led Simon Mackenzie 
to conclude that the FEA is ‘a complete failure as a legal tool’.178  
Similarly, the US International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) exemplifies why, despite the 
promise many authors see in licensing as a regulatory tool,179 the laws governing the arms 
trade are ill-suited to governing the PSI.180 First, ITAR’s trigger for congressional 
accountability is too high at $50 million and too easily evaded by splitting large contracts 
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into smaller ones.181 Secondly, ITAR’s oversight stops with the granting of export licenses 
and fails to provide the continuous monitoring necessary to control PSCs.182 Finally, ITAR has 
been criticised for being inconsistent and lacking transparency in its licensing process amid 
suggestions that it is ‘more concerned with US foreign policy than with provisions within 
international law’.183  
Likewise, South Africa’s Foreign Military Assistance Act (FMAA), the most substantial piece of 
regulation that is specifically aimed at PSCs to date, is hardly considered a promising 
template for future regulation. Like ITAR, its authorization process is unpredictable and not 
transparent.184 Also, while the Act’s reach extends in theory beyond South Africa, it lacks 
institutional capacity for transnational monitoring and enforcement.185 Moreover, FMAA’s 
regulatory approach restricts and criminalizes PSCs’ activities rather than controlling 
them.186 Finally, it is testament to its regulatory ineffectiveness that hundreds of South 
Africans continue to work for PSCs in Iraq in violation of the FMAA.187  
Rather than creating regulation specifically aimed at PSCs, the US government expanded 
domestic jurisdiction to private contractors “in theatre” through the Military Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction Act (MEJA). Yet, despite ongoing efforts to expand and clarify MEJA,188 the Act’s 
regulatory effectiveness is doubtful. For instance, it is questionable if MEJA’s reach extends 
beyond contractors working in support of DoD missions.189 Moreover, the discussion about 
MEJA highlights a general problem affecting domestic PSC regulation: Enforcement agencies 
are ill-suited to operate in an active conflict zone190 and plans to create dedicated FBI 
“Theatre Investigative Unit” have yet to produce tangible results.191 Invariably, the lack of 
effective enforcement units affects the evidentiary standard of investigations,192 which 
makes successful prosecutions an unlikely prospect.193  
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Partly to address this enforcement problem,194 efforts have been made to subject PSCs to 
military law by expanding the US Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).195 This would 
integrate PSCs into the military chain of command and allow the JAG Corps to monitor and 
sanction PSCs, motivating Peter Singer to call the expansion of the UCMJ the ‘single biggest 
legal development’ for the PSI.196 However, the applicability of the UCMJ to PSCs remains 
unclear: While some fear PSC employees could be penalized for violating the military’s 
grooming standard or watching pornography,197 others contend that the UCMJ may only be 
applicable to PSCs under direct contract with the DoD198 and that the constitutionality of 
applying military law to civilians without a declaration of war is questionable.199   
This brief review of selected domestic laws suggests that, rather than a web of 
complementary regulations with a shared regulatory aim, domestic regulation remains an 
eclectic mix of laws, most of which predate the emergence of contemporary PSCs and are ill-
suited to regulate them.  
Extraterritoriality 
The literature’s concerns about domestic regulation primarily focus on the problem of 
extraterritoriality.200 Since territorial states are generally considered too weak to effectively 
monitor and sanction PSC behaviour,201 home states and contracting states are believed to 
be ‘ultimately responsible’ for the regulation of PSCs.202 Even assuming that home and 
contracting states accept their responsibility to regulate PSCs,203 their ability to do so 
remains constrained by legal and logistical challenges. On the legal side, the extraterritorial 
reach of domestic laws is generally limited to crimes committed by or against the 
prosecuting country’s citizens.204 On the logistical side, the challenges involving in gathering 
evidence and questioning witnesses to a sufficient evidentiary standard are considerable, 
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while the resources most states have at their disposal to tackle them are limited.205 Even if 
home/contracting states were able to effectively regulate PSCs beyond their borders, their 
legal traditions, available resources, commitment to PSC regulation and thus regulatory 
approach would likely differ considerably. Finally, the effectiveness of any domestic 
regulation is limited by PSCs’ ability to evade stringent regulation by moving to a more 
lenient jurisdiction.206 
These concerns about extraterritoriality rely on two assumptions that this thesis has shown 
to be questionable. First, regulatory evasion assumes that relocating a PSC is relatively 
“cheap”. Chapter Five, however, highlighted the importance of close customer relationships, 
which would likely suffer if a PSC engaged in regulatory evasion. Indeed, a company’s ability 
to relocate is likely limited by its customers’ preferences. Hence, states could marshal their 
considerable demand power to dissuade PSCs from regulatory evasion. Secondly, the 
literature rightly notes that regulatory compliance entails costs, but wrongly concludes that 
PSCs necessarily want to evade such costs. Voluntary compliance is an important signalling 
device to attract employees and customers, especially if PSCs hope to compete on quality 
rather than price. Therefore, regulatory evasion could hurt PSCs’ competitiveness, the costs 
of which may well exceed compliance costs.  
The role of compliance in competitiveness highlights a broader issue with the literature’s 
view on regulation. While weak enforcement undoubtedly hurts regulatory effectiveness, 
regulation can exert influence on PSC behaviour even if there is little enforcement. For 
instance, a PSC committing an illegal action risks being prosecuted for it at a later stage. This 
increases the uncertainty faced by PSCs, which, in turn, complicates their strategic 
management and makes it harder to attract outside financing. Moreover, choosing to break 
a law sends an unmistakable message to clients, especially in markets like the PSI, where 
service quality and prices are difficult to compare and, hence, market participant 
exponentially rely on trust.207  
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Still, Caroline Holmqvist maintains that domestic regulation ‘is undoubtedly the most 
effective and most easily enforced’ type of regulation.208 Indeed, an increasing number of 
authors regards international and domestic regulation not as competing, but as 
complementary regulatory options, whose combination in a regulatory ‘matrix’ may be the 
best solution to controlling the PSI.209 Before further exploring this regulatory matrix, the 
next section discusses a third potential addition to the regulatory matrix: informal 
regulation.   
 
Section Nine: Informal Regulation 
Interest in informal regulation among PSC representatives, academics and policy-makers has 
noticeably increased in recent years. In part, this is attributable to the fickle interest of 
policy-makers in and the resulting persistent lack of progress on enacting formal PSC 
regulation.210 Changes in the market for security – interviews particularly noted the trend 
away from PMCs211 – have also lessened the need for prohibitive regulation and thus drawn 
attention to the potential contribution informal regulation can make to the control of PSC 
behaviour.212  
Voluntary Agreements / Collective Self-Regulation 
Compared to formal regulation, collective self-regulation, exemplified by the IPOA’s Code of 
Conduct and the BAPSC’s Charter,213 offers significant advantages: like most forms of 
informal regulation, collective self-regulation can be created and reformed with relative 
ease.214 Since it is created by PSCs for PSCs, it is also widely supported within the PSI.215 Such 
support can take a variety of forms, including peer pressure,216 intra-industry information-
sharing217 and access to expert knowledge from industry insiders.218 Finally, self-regulation 
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shifts the regulatory burden, reducing government’s share of the political and financial costs 
associated with regulating PSCs.219  
Critics, however, highlight the conflict of interest inherent in collective self-regulation. 
Publicizing incidents of misconduct involves high reputational costs for the affected PSCs and 
the PSI as a whole.220 Self-regulating associations, like IPOA and the BAPSC, are industry-
financed and their aim is to promote the PSI’s interests, providing them with ample 
incentives for leniency. Thus, self-regulatory schemes either lack explicit enforcement 
mechanisms,221 or their enforcement mechanisms are hampered by the vagueness of their 
underlying provisions,222 a lack of independent and transparent monitoring223 and the 
absence of effective sanctions.224 Moreover, collective self-regulation is voluntary, which 
means that PSCs can leave a regulating industry association if they want to avoid 
investigations - with seemingly little consequences for their business. 225  
A similar critique targeting weak enforcement and their non-binding character is brought 
forward against voluntary agreements,226 such as the Voluntary Principles on Security and 
Human Rights (VP)227 and the Montreux Document.228 The VP’s flaws are somewhat 
representative for a number of similar voluntary agreements: they exclude key 
stakeholders,229 and they lack specific compliance criteria and effective monitoring.230 As a 
result, the VP’s regulatory impact on the PSI is limited.231 Furthermore, instead of the top-
down approach characteristic of formal regulation or the bottom-up approach of industry 
self-regulation, voluntary agreements bring together various stakeholders to develop 
regulation on an equal footing. Affording parties with vastly different regulatory aims equal 
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say in the development of regulation can cause voluntary agreements to achieve little more 
than a minimal consensus.232  
The Montreux Document ostensibly marks a new approach that reflects the growing 
dissatisfaction with voluntary agreements. PSC representatives were invited to consult, but 
excluded from the final stages of the negotiations.233 Moreover, the Montreux Document is 
intended less as a regulatory tool in its own right than as a template for internationally 
harmonized, binding formal regulation.234  
The literature’s objections to voluntary agreements and collective self-regulation hinge on 
the notion that violating them supposedly entails no legal consequences. In contrast, the 
previous section argued that regulation can have an impact even if it is not supported by 
effective enforcement: PSCs are not indifferent about their reputation and, more 
importantly, neither is their “bottom line”. Moreover, PSCs rely on professional norms to 
deal with internal conflicts and uncertainty.235 Voluntary compliance and adherence to 
professional norms are important signals to customers and creditors, fostering their goodwill 
and trust.236 While there are limits to PSCs’ willingness to accept regulatory scrutiny in 
exchange for greater legitimacy, up to that point voluntary agreements and collective self-
regulation have considerable regulatory potential despite their lack of legal force.     
Contracts and Market Pressure  
A desire to hold the ‘“demand-side”’, especially governments, accountable for their use of 
PSCs has spurred an interest in regulation through contracts.237 Indeed, integrating public 
law values into private law vehicles, i.e. contracts,238 offers considerable regulatory 
advantages: contract-based regulation is easily implemented, as it does not require any new 
laws or regulatory authorities,239 it allows for significantly greater flexibility in responding to 
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different regulatory needs240 and it is easily, yet effectively enforced, due to its direct link to 
PSCs’ ‘purse-strings’.241  
Yet, so far these advantages remain mostly theoretical, as especially the US government’s 
contract management has been widely criticized.242 There has been an overreliance on often 
poorly designed no-bid and cost-plus contracts,243 often by government institutions other 
than the Pentagon,244 and contracts were awarded to insufficiently vetted companies.245 A 
lack of institutional capacity, especially the low number of contracting officers246 and ‘their 
lack of knowledge of the security market’, further aggravated the US government’s poor 
contract management.247  
While the proponents of regulation through contract respond to this criticism with calls for 
increased resources and contractual reform,248 unwillingness rather than inability may be to 
blame for poor contract management. The costs of “punishing” PSCs may indeed motivate a 
lenient approach to misconduct. Significant sanctions may cause the contractual relationship 
and thus the provision of security services to cease, which would expose the client to 
significant physical risks if a replacement cannot be found immediately.249 In this sense, the 
effectiveness of regulation through contracts is determined by the underlying market: 
Unless customers have a realistic option to switch PSCs upon discovering misconduct, 
regulation through contract has limited deterrent value. Many authors moreover contend 
that the lack of competition in the PSI makes the replacement of a contractor prohibitively 
expensive.250 To make matters worse, there seems to be a lack of contingency planning 
when it comes to replacing contractors.251     
In conclusion, contracts are seen as one source of regulatory influence on the PSI, which has 
significant potential - potential that has yet to be fully realized. In addition to contractual 
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reform, clients have to accept their regulatory responsibilities for regulation through 
contract to be successful.252 Among private sector clients, whose contract management 
capabilities may be limited, there may be little enthusiasm for taking on such 
responsibilities. However, the most significant objection to regulation through contracts 
identified by the literature is that its sanctioning power is restricted to financial penalties.253 
This assessment of regulation through contract, however, fails to appreciate both its 
strength and the de facto weaknesses of regulatory alternatives. Governments can 
encourage PSC customers to accept their regulatory responsibility, for example, by 
otherwise excluding them from competition for public sector reconstruction contracts. 
While this may not extend regulation through contract to cover the PSI in its entirety, it 
would affect a large number of the PSI’s private sector clients, due to the importance of 
reconstruction funds in the recent PSC boom. Once such standard is widely adopted, 
reputational pressure may extend it to the remaining, unregulated customers. Moreover, 
while formal regulation theoretically offers stronger sanctions, effective international and 
domestic regulation has yet to be created. Meanwhile, in interviews, PSC representatives 
identified contractual provisions about vetting and SOPs as having the strongest effect on 
the quotidian activities of PSCs.254  
Civil Suits  
The PSC literature is even more sceptical about the regulatory effectiveness of civil suits.255 
In general, PSCs cannot be prosecuted in territorial states, because a functioning legal 
system is often unavailable or highly politicized in post-conflict environments and PSCs are 
granted immunity from local jurisdiction.256 Suing PSCs in home or contracting states is only 
possible in exceptional cases, e.g. through the US Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) for significant 
IHL violations,257 and it entails ‘daunting costs and complexities’.258 Even where plaintiffs can 
rely on home/contracting state jurisdiction, PSCs can try to shield themselves from liability 
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by using the “government contractor defence”, which stipulates that companies cannot be 
held liable if they provide services ‘in line with government specifications’.259 
Interestingly, the literature seems to associate civil suits solely as a means for addressing 
third party grievances. This, however, ignores the possibility of employees and clients suing 
PSCs. Moreover, contrary to the PSC literature’s assertions, interviews indicate that civil suits 
do constitute a major concern for PSCs.260 In addition to their tangible costs, i.e. legal fees 
and damages,261 interviews suggest that PSCs worry primarily about the reputational costs 
associated with a civil suit.262 Indeed, some PSC representatives predicted that PSCs’ desire 
to minimize the risk of litigation rather than the fear of regulation will be the source of 
standard-setting in the PSI.263  
Private sector customers seem to be particularly attentive to the reputation of their partners 
in the PSI. While interviews with PSC customers attributed this to concerns about 
reputational costs,264 one PSC representative claimed that victims of misconduct may not 
sue PSCs but their clients, as the latter tend to have “deeper pockets”.265 Either way, civil 
suits create a strong incentive for clients to hold PSCs accountable and this yet has to be fully 
recognised by the literature. Likewise, the criticism that civil suits can only address 
grievances ‘post facto’266 ignores the preventive measures PSCs pursue to minimize the risk 
of litigation,267 such as the adoption of ISO norms.268 Finally, another largely overlooked 
benefit of ATCA-based civil suits is their ability to offer the individual victim, who would 
otherwise have no recourse to the law, a chance to get her/his day in court.269 
The literature, therefore, seems to underestimate the regulatory potential of civil suits. Said 
potential, however, admittedly comes at a cost. Given the prospect of highly punitive 
damages being awarded against them, civil suits could induce over-deterrence in PSCs and 
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their customers.270 Legal experts consider the effect of over-deterrence ‘unlikely to be 
significant’, arguing that PSCs, ‘as private companies […] have plenty of incentive to find 
their way to the most efficient outcome’.271 However, the most efficient outcome for PSCs 
may well be to hide misconduct rather than to prevent it. Even if PSCs were to increase their 
preventive efforts to avoid civil suits, these efforts would likely be inefficient and ineffective. 
Effective and efficient prevention is conditional on an established precedent or guidance 
from lawmakers on what constitutes lawful behaviour. To date, such guidance is largely 
absent. Finally, rather than focusing on prevention, PSCs may instead minimise the costs of 
civil suits by insuring against them, which would make their products more expensive. 
Alternatively, PSCs could reduce their investments in an effort to cap their losses in case of a 
civil suit, which would do little to prevent misconduct and would instead reduce the quality 
of their product.  
Conclusion 
The stark contrast between the literature’s and the industry’s views on the regulatory 
impact of civil suits offers an interesting insight into how the regulatory impact is assessed. 
The literature focuses far more on the limited ability of civil suits to provide restitution in 
individual cases of misconduct rather than on its ability to affect future PSC behaviour. With 
respect to the latter, civil suits have considerable regulatory potential, provided that they 
receive clear guidance as to what constitutes lawful behaviour. An important role in 
providing said guidance could fall to voluntary agreements, collective self-regulation and 
regulation through contract. Even if a specific PSC is not party to either, such agreements 
could define a standard of behaviour for the PSI against which individual PSCs could be 
judged in civil suits.    
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Conclusion Part II: Regulatory “Fig Leaves” and the “Illusion of 
Attainability”  
While the potential of informal regulation is increasingly being recognized, scepticism about 
its regulatory effectiveness prevails in the current literature. Critics are particularly 
concerned about its sanctioning power being limited to financial penalties, which are 
considered inappropriate, given the ‘gravity of some allegations about PMSC conduct’.272 It is 
feared that relying on informal regulation could create a regulatory ‘fig leaf’ – regulation 
whose existence legitimizes, but fails to effectively control PSCs, while lessening the political 
pressure to impose effective formal regulation.273 Hence, even its proponents seem to agree 
that informal regulation can at best supplement, but not substitute formal regulation.274 This 
rejection of informal regulation is arguably partly based on an “illusion of attainability” of 
international and domestic regulation. However, the political obstacles and costs involved in 
creating and maintaining effective international and/or domestic regulation appear to be 
prohibitive. At the moment, the choice is thus not between informal and formal regulation, 
but between informal and no regulation.  
Whether this is likely to change in the future is hard to project. Barring a major incident of 
misconduct, progress seems unlikely, given the costs and complexities involved in regulating 
the PSI.275 Moreover, a future push for regulation may produce an outcome that differs 
considerably from the literature’s suggestions. For instance, the UK government does not 
seem to share the literature’s concerns about the likelihood of PSC misconduct and the 
resulting need for sanctions based on criminal law.276 Instead, in its newest Public 
Consultation on PSC regulation, the UK government abandoned earlier plans for a licensing 
regime in favour of regulation through contract.277 This suggests that, irrespective of the 
literature’s calls for more formal regulation, informal regulation will play a significant role in 
the PSI.278 Such across-the-board use of informal regulation would require significantly more 
research, particularly on its, to date, largely unknown costs and risks. Moreover, such 
research would require a more sophisticated understanding of the economic aspects of PSC 
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behaviour than the current literature can arguably offer, given the reliance of informal 
regulation on market pressure to achieve its regulatory aims.        
    
Section Ten: Conclusion: The Regulatory Matrix  
The previous nine sections of this Chapter provided a critical appraisal of the literature’s 
approach on PSC regulation. This chapter first assessed the historical influences on the 
debate about PSC regulation, before reviewing the need and reasons for regulation. Finally, 
it discussed the literature’s position on the different types of PSC regulation and their 
prospects for addressing the aforementioned need for regulation. The various sections 
highlighted problems with the literature’s view on regulation. To reiterate but a few: 
- its notion of continuity between PSCs and traditional private security providers,  
- its focus on the need, rather than the costs and limits of regulation, 
- its disregard for the benefits of PSC use and for the industry’s concerns about 
regulation, 
- its limited engagement with regulatory alternatives, 
- its optimistic assessment of international and domestic law and its pessimistic 
evaluation of informal regulation, 
- its focus on what is desirable, rather than on what is politically and economically 
feasible. 
This chapter demonstrated that the literature’s view of PSC regulation, i.e. its reliance on the 
prevalent behavioural model, which is encapsulated in the zero-sum approach to PSC 
regulation, is largely responsible for these problems.  
This concluding section focuses on the literature’s preferred regulatory solution. Rather than 
advocating the use of a single type of regulation, the literature proposes combining the 
various types of regulation to create a so-called regulatory matrix.279 Partly, this approach is 
driven by pragmatism. The status quo with its mix of international, domestic and informal 
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regulations arguably already constitutes a regulatory matrix of sorts,280 and adding to it is 
easier than to start “from scratch”.281  However, the matrix aspires to being more than an 
eclectic collection of laws: Authors hope that combining the different types of regulation to 
form a ‘complex of overlapping [regulatory] systems’ allows the different types of regulation 
to compensate for their respective weaknesses.282 In sum, the resulting regulatory amalgam 
aspires to be more than the sum of its part.   
The Risk of Under-Regulation 
Despite the literature’s growing interest in the regulatory matrix, its risks and limitations 
have yet to be explored. Its fatal flaw may be the issue of international coordination. While 
its importance is widely acknowledged,283 authors have yet to explain how to achieve the 
necessary international agreement on PSC regulation. Using the matrix approach without 
international coordination would limit its regulatory effectiveness and could have 
devastating consequences for the PSI. One possible consequence could be that, if the 
regulatory matrix fails to produce a global standard, PSCs could engage in regulatory 
arbitration and thus ‘evade direction or carve out spheres of discretion’.284 Moreover, as the 
PSI continues to prosper, individual states may compete for market shares by opting for 
increasing leniency to assure their domestic industry’s competitiveness. As a result, the 
process of developing PSC regulation could become a race to the bottom, producing a 
regulatory matrix that would be little more than a fig leaf, removing the stigma of being 
unregulated from PSCs, while exerting little effective control over the industry.  
The Risk of Over-Regulation 
While a race to the bottom is theoretically feasible, it appears to be an ultimately unlikely 
outcome, as public pressure for regulation remains too strong to for governments to bear 
the political costs of regulatory inaction. A more likely outcome would be that governments, 
possibly in response to a future scandal, would bow to public pressure and add regulations 
without international coordination.285 The regulatory effectiveness of such a resulting 
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uncoordinated matrix depends on the specific regulations added to it, but it would 
ultimately be no more than the sum of its parts. However, its effects on the PSI could 
potentially be devastating. Such uncoordinated combination of regulation from a multitude 
of sources would force PSCs to develop different compliance strategies for each jurisdiction. 
Moreover, in deciding on what level of regulatory burden is acceptable, policy-makers would 
likely focus on the regulatory impact their particular proposals would impose, rather than on 
the overall regulatory burden PSC would have to bear. Indeed, uncertainty about the 
effectiveness of PSC regulation elsewhere would likely cause policy-makers to over-regulate 
to avoid politically costly accusations of complacency. As a result, the regulatory burden 
imposed on PSCs would increase substantially.  
The level of attention that the literature devotes to analysing the costs of regulation 
suggests that it has yet to be recognized as a serious problem. Indeed, some authors seem to 
suggest that almost any level of regulatory costs is justified because of the profit margins of 
PSCs. Sheehy et al even claim that PSC regulation does not have to be ‘objectively fair’.286 
This underestimates the market impact of a substantial increase in the regulatory burden. 
Essentially, the increased regulatory costs functions as a barrier to entry, possibly forcing 
smaller PSCs to exit the market and preventing new entrants from entering.287 As a result, 
competitive pressure in the PSI would decrease and the already high pace of supply-side 
market concentration would further accelerate.288 A reduced supply of PSC services would 
likely increase prices, as PSCs seek to pass on regulatory costs to their customers. As a result, 
clients with insufficiently deep pockets, among them many NGOs, could no longer be able to 
afford PSC services. As prices go up in the PSI, substitute products also increase in 
attractiveness, which may lead clients to switch from PSCs to relatively more problematic 
local security providers. Worse, clients may accept greater risk exposure, reversing a recent 
trend of greater awareness of the impact of political risks on the corporate world.289 The 
latter point is particularly salient, as companies are increasingly held liable for the well-being 
of their employees, e.g. through the UK Corporate Manslaughter Act and the US 
Sabanes/Oxley Act.290 Alternatively, if the costs of security increase significantly, companies 
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may forego otherwise lucrative opportunities in high-risk environments, thus generate 
welfare losses.291 Moreover, this would also slow the pace of reconstruction in high-risk 
post-conflict environments. The potential harm an increased regulatory burden could 
therefore cause is considerable and neither limited to financial costs nor to costs exclusively 
accruing to the PSI but to wider society. 
Moreover, it is far from certain that the literature’s regulatory proposals would achieve their 
primary objective of improving control over the behaviour of PSCs. Adding ‘more strands’ to 
the regulatory web would defy the industry’s regulatory aims, specifically its wish for greater 
clarity about the legal status of its operations.292 In addition to the risk of overwhelming the 
limited means PSCs have at their disposal for addressing regulatory compliance, 
implementing such regulation could further decrease the industry’s enthusiasm for 
regulation as a whole. Moreover, the PSC literature’s preference for regulation through 
coercion may decrease the effectiveness and potential of cooperation-based informal 
regulation, such as the BAPSC’s and IPOA’s collective self-regulation schemes. It is unclear, 
given the obstacles outlined in this chapter, that the literature’s proposed regulatory matrix 
could over-compensate this loss. To stay within the web metaphor: Adding to the web may 
tear new holes, rather than fill existing ones.  
This discussion does not seek to argue that there is no need for regulation nor that all forms 
of regulatory intervention would only make matters worse. Instead, this chapter’s discussion 
suggests that the PSC literature’s regulatory approach and its reliance on the prevalent 
behavioural model risks creating ineffective and inefficient regulation. This chapter therefore 
emphatically disputes the initial proposal that policy-makers may exclusively rely on the 
prevalent behavioural model when creating PSC regulation. Without a thorough 
understanding of PSC behaviour, policy-makers are indeed likely to do more harm than good 
in their otherwise laudable efforts to create PSC regulation. Chapter Seven will outline a 
possible alternative regulatory approach based on this thesis’ behavioural model and will 
discuss why such regulatory proposal would likely be more successful in effectively 
controlling PSC behaviour.  
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‘For every complex problem, there is a solution that is simple, neat, and wrong‘ 
Henry Louis Mencken 
As the military missions in Iraq and Afghanistan come to a close, the pressure to regulate 
PSCs has seemingly abated for the moment. However, given the ongoing reconstruction 
efforts in both countries, demand for private security services is likely to remain high and 
could even increase following the military withdrawal.1  Yet, even if demand in Iraq and 
Afghanistan should decrease, renewed attention to maritime security and the increase in 
insecurity in the wake of the Arab Spring suggest that public and private sector use of PSC 
services will continue in the foreseeable future. More importantly, the Nisour Square 
Incident and the ad hoc manner in which it brought about profound regulatory change has 
shown that pressure to regulate PSCs can increase with little prior warning. Complacency, 
thus, is not advisable and, indeed, the Montreux Document and the negotiations 
surrounding the International Code of Conduct (ICoC) show that the process of developing 
PSC regulation is ongoing.2    
As LeGrand notes, any market intervention, such as the creation of PSC regulation, relies on 
a behavioural model.3 Policy-makers need to know how and why PSCs behave the way they 
do to create effective regulation that encourages desired and discourages undesired 
behaviour. Against this background, a mismatch emerged between, on the one hand, the 
way in which the literature characterized PSC behaviour and, on the other hand, the 
available empirical evidence of PSC behaviour in Iraq and Afghanistan - the empirical puzzle 
at the heart of this study. It is with respect to resolving this puzzle and, thus, the creation of 
effective regulation that this thesis aimed to make an original contribution to the PSC 
literature. 
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The Empirical Puzzle 
If PSCs are, indeed, as solely motivated by their self-interested desire for financial profit and 
if their client relations are as abundant with opportunities to shirk as the PSC literature 
suggests, one should expect there to be plenty of evidence for PSCs’ misconduct. After all, 
PSCs have been widely used in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003 and without effective 
regulation in place to deter them from engaging in such behaviour. However, while there is 
some evidence of PSC misconduct, there is insufficient proof for it constituting PSCs’ default 
behavioural option. Instead, UK PSCs in particular seem to have largely executed their duties 
in a loyal and reliable manner and there is even evidence of altruistic behaviour.  
To solve this puzzle, this thesis applied concepts from economics, sociology and economic 
sociology to one of three aggregates in which economic activity takes place in the UK PSI: 
Chapter Three focused on decision-making processes within individual UK PSCs. It argued 
that PSCs are not motivated by a coherent interest in corporate profit, but that the interests 
of PSC representatives and employees differ considerably. It further stressed the important 
role military professionalism plays in the UK PSI and, specifically, in generating the consensus 
necessary to overcome conflicts of interests within UK PSCs.  
Chapter Four concentrated on the market for PSC services and on how competitive pressure 
influences UK PSC behaviour. Using Porter’s FFF, it showed that competition in this market is 
strong enough to discourage companies from engaging in problematic behaviour without 
being so strong that PSCs would be forced to engage in problematic behaviour to assure 
their short-term corporate survival.  
Chapter Five discussed the relationship between UK PSCs and their public and private sector 
clients. It showed that UK PSI client relations offer clients plenty of opportunity to hold UK 
PSCs accountable and, if necessary, to effectively sanction their behaviour. More 
importantly, it showed that the high level of uncertainty UK PSCs are exposed to provides 
them with strong incentives to cooperate with their contractual partners, rather than to 
shirk.  
Building onto a detailed critique of the prevalent conceptualization of PSC behaviour, this 
thesis proposed an alternative model of PSC behaviour, which better accommodates the 
available empirical evidence. This innovative conceptualization of PSC behaviour constitutes 
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one of the original contributions this study has made to the PSC literature. This conclusion 
highlights further ways in which the thesis contributes to the PSC literature, contemplates its 
limitations and problems, points out policy recommendations and suggests avenues for 
further research.    
Outline 
Part one, section one, highlights the broader significance and implications of the thesis’ 
conclusions. Part two, section two to four, critically reviews the thesis. Section two 
contemplates to what extent this thesis’ narrow focus limits the applicability of its 
conclusions to the global PSI. Section three discusses the UK PSI’s development since 2009 
and its implications for this thesis. Section four critically reviews this thesis’ methodology, its 
choice of data and supporting literature. Part three, section five, analyses the thesis’ 
implications for the regulatory debate. Part four, section six, concludes this thesis by 
highlighting its original contribution as well as avenues for further research. 
Part I: Significance and Implications 
As noted, by proposing an alternative behavioural model, this thesis made an important 
original contribution to the debate about PSCs. This section highlights differences between 
the prevalent and proposed behavioural models, discusses its broader implications and 
notes further ways in which the thesis made original contributions to the PSC literature.  
Section One: An Alternative Conceptualization of PSC Behaviour 
The literature views PSCs as coherent actors that are exclusively motivated by financial 
profit. Their behaviour is thus not only reduced to their economic actions, but said economic 
actions are atomised from their broader social context, which, in turn, is accorded little 
significance in PSC decision-making. Moreover, the literature’s view of PSCs’ economic 
actions is highly simplistic, i.e. it pays little attention to the long-term consequences of 
business decisions or to how contractual partners may respond to or even anticipate PSC 
behaviour.     
In contrast, the alternative model proposed by this thesis views PSCs as a “coalition of 
participants” with different, often conflicting interests that are by no means solely financial 
in nature. It stresses the extent to which PSCs are “embedded” in a social context that exerts 
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considerable influence on PSC decision-making. The proposed model further views PSCs as 
parties to strategic interactions, i.e. their actions are partly determined by the anticipated 
response said actions are likely to elicit from current and prospective clients, competitors 
and policy-makers. Moreover, rather than the “Hobbesian” view of PSI client relations taken 
by the PSC literature, the proposed model stresses the extent to which PSCs are eager to 
cooperate with their clients. Such cooperation is partly inspired by their social context, i.e. 
the notion that it is “the right thing to do”. Yet, it also reflects their self-interest, as it allows 
PSCs to reduce their uncertainty exposure and, thus, assures their corporate survival.4 
Crucially, the proposed model disputes neither the presence of problematic behaviour nor 
its potentially significant consequences. Yet, such behaviour often occurs despite, not 
because of PSCs’ best efforts. Misconduct may also have an involuntary quality, e.g. a PSC 
may feel forced to shirk to assure its short-term corporate survival. Specifically, the thesis 
proposed that the extent to which PSCs cooperate with their clients is delineated by a bell-
curve. At the extremes, where there is no competition or absolute competition, the social 
context matter little. On the fringes, where competition is either very strong or very weak, 
its effect is low. However, in the middle, where the vast majority of economic action in the 
PSI takes place, market and social pressures combine in PSC decision-making, causing PSCs 
to conform with conventions and cooperate with their contractual partner   
 
Implications 
The proposed alternative behavioural model has several important implications for the 
debate about PSC regulation. For instance, while Chapter Six already demonstrated how 
existing regulatory proposals are influenced by the prevalent behavioural model, Part III 
discusses how the proposed and the prevalent behavioural model differ from one another in 
their respective advice to policy-makers. Part III also draws attention to the potentially 
negative, yet often overlooked effect strict formal regulation has on private sector clients. 
Crucially, Part III will argue that strict regulation, supported by intrusive monitoring and 
severe sanctions may make PSC misconduct more rather than less likely. In contrast, the 
often underestimated potential benefits of informal regulation will be highlighted. Thus, this 
thesis’ second claim to originality lies in the novel way of looking at PSC regulation.  
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 See Chapter 3 Section 10. 
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Additionally, the thesis has significant implications for the PSC literature itself and for its 
further development. While professionalism, competition and the P/A problem have played 
an important part in the debate about PSCs, the applicable literatures in sociology and 
economics have so far received little attention in the PSC literature. In contrast, this thesis 
has shown that a more thorough engagement with the disciplines of economics and 
sociology can provide important insights into PSC behaviour. Moreover, the combination of 
the two disciplines – through the application of economic sociology – constitutes a third 
original contribution to the analysis of PSCs.  
A fourth claim to originality is based on the thesis’ use of data. Not only has this thesis made 
extensive use of interview data, it has expanded said interviews from PSC representatives to 
include PSC employees and PSC clients – two groups that had previously received little 
attention in the PSC literature. The inclusion of private sector PSC clients, in particular, 
offered important insights into the market for PSC services and PSI client relations and 
provided an important means to triangulate interview data from PSC representatives. More 
importantly, the thesis complemented these interview data with the use of corporate 




Part II: Potential Criticism 
Before discussing its implications for policy-makers, clients and the PSC literature any 
further, however, it seems prudent to critically review this thesis, its results as well as the 
methods by which it reached them. The following sections focus on three aspects in 
particular: (1) on the thesis’ narrow focus on the UK PSI, (2) on changes in the market for PSC 
services since 2008 and their consequences for this thesis’ results and (3) on the thesis’ 
methodology, particularly on its use of data and supporting literature.    
Section Two: The Narrow Focus on the UK PSI 
Regardless of whether they agree with its conclusions, critics are likely to admonish the 
narrow scope of this thesis. As a result, the alternative behavioural model can only explain 
and predict the behaviour of a narrow range of actors, namely UK PSCs that provide armed 
personal, perimeter and convoy security in Iraq and Afghanistan between 2003 and 2008. 
This approach stands in stark contrast to the PSC literature, which not only relies on a global 
focus, but also defines PSCs to cover a much broader array of companies, including not just 
PMCs like EO and Sandline, but also logistics companies like KBR.5  
Chapters one and two already anticipated this criticism and pointed out a host of reasons 
why the thesis’ narrow focus is justified. In short, they argued that the UK PSI is sufficiently 
important in and of itself to merit closer attention and noted that UK PSCs are considerably 
different from their US counterparts, from example, when it comes to their clientele, the 
composition of their workforce and their size and access to credit.6 If they restrict the 
applicability of this thesis’ conclusions, these differences and their likely behavioural 
implications raise the question how the PSC literature can produce any meaningful 
explanations and predictions with respect to PSC behaviour using their broad approach. 
Indeed, closer scrutiny of the literature’s statements about PSC behaviour suggested that 
they are often based in little more than assertions about the behavioural impact of the 
                                                     
5
 See, for example, Chapter Two’s discussion of Singer’s Tip of the Spear Typology. Hence, some authors use 
the term PSMC (see for example, Pattison (2010), p. 425) or PMC (see, for example, Petersohn (2008), p. 2) 
rather than PSC.  
6
 Thompson (2011). Dyncorp is a pertinent example for this.  
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organizational structure of PSCs, notably their private, for-profit status.7 Insofar as the 
narrow focus on the UK PSI is therefore a limitation, it is arguably unavoidable.  
Applicability of the Behavioural Model beyond the UK PSI 
Moreover, while the alternative behavioural model is derived from a study of the UK PSI, 
some aspects of the model are likely applicable beyond its narrow scope. Competitive 
pressure (CH4), for instance, should be an important factor in the decision-making of PSCs 
outside of the UK PSI, once allowances for regional variations in their specific competitive 
environment are made. For example, while US and UK PSCs often compete with one another 
in a global market-place, US PSCs are far more focused on public sector clients and, more 
importantly, their business activities take place in a different legal environment. Likewise, 
client relations (CH5) are likely an influence of similar importance for UK and non-UK PSCs 
alike. However, the nature of those clients and how they choose to manage their interaction 
is subject to regional variation and may produce a different dynamic in non-Uk PSC decision-
making processes. Finally, the notion that PSCs are “coalitions of participants” with 
conflicting interest (CH3) should apply to non-UK PSCs as well. Yet again, the specific 
interests of “participants” will likely vary: While residual military professionalism is likely to 
play a role in US PSCs, the different nature of US military professionalism may produce 
different behavioural outcomes. Thus, while the specific dynamics discussed in this thesis 
may be limited to the UK PSI, its broader conceptual claims are likely also applicable to non-
UK PSCs: Motives other than profit influence and, at times, determine PSC behaviour and 
that PSCs’ individual decision-making processes, their competitive market environment and 
their client relations are important conduits through which these non-profit motives 
influence PSC behaviour.  
 
Section Three: Changes in the UK PSI since 2008 
As the previous section noted, the thesis supported its choice of focus partly by highlighting 
the inherent importance of the UK PSI. Changes in the market for PSC services in recent 
years, especially since 2008, seemingly undermine this exceptional status of the UK PSI and, 
thus, could limit the applicability of the thesis’ result beyond its narrow temporal scope. This 
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 See Chapter 2 Section 2.  
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section will argue that both centripetal forces, which homogenize the trade in PSC services, 
and centrifugal forces, which emphasise the exceptional status of the UK PSI, are 
simultaneously at play.  
Centripetal Forces 
One important development that seemingly undermined the exceptional status of the UK PSI 
was the significant increase in public sector demand for PSC services that is commonly 
associated with the “bubble”. The “bubble” allowed new entrants to enter the UK PSI, 
notably Aegis, which had previously been characterized by close personal relationships. 
Moreover, it caused public sector demand to become a significant source of revenue for UK 
PSCs, which had previously focused primarily on private sector clients. To staff their large 
public sector contracts, UK PSCs used off-shore subsidiaries to avoid UK taxes and labour 
regulation, which caused some companies to eventually move their operation overseas 
altogether.8 Another development that has decreased the exceptional status of the UK PSI is 
the consolidation the industry has gone through since 2005. As a result, several UK PSCs 
have been bought by larger competitors. While Aegis purchase of Rubicon was less 
problematic in this respect, as it occurred within the UK PSC, but about Triple Canopy’s 
acquisition of EI and G4S’s successful bid for Armorgroup the same cannot be said. Finally, 
the UK PSI has suffered significantly from the global financial crisis, which diminished UK 
PSCs’ position in the market for PSC services. While companies with a strong private sector 
focus, such as CRG, red24 and Janusian, have seen their profits decline since 2007, Aegis, 
which focuses primarily on public sector contracts, has seen its profits increase significantly. 
Prima fazie, these centripedal forces seem to undermine the UK PSI’s exceptional status 
within the market for PSC services.           
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 See Chapter 2 Section 7.  
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Figure 7-0-1 Operating Profits/Losses for Select UK PSCs from 2004-2010 in GBP 
 
Centrifugal Forces 
Closer scrutiny of the developments in the UK PSI both during the period covered by this 
thesis and since then suggest a more ambivalent picture. For instance, while there are still 
new entrants to the UK PSI, their number is believed to have declined and they are largely 
limited to small companies providing maritime security.9 While the financial crisis  has 
caused a decline in UK PSC profits, it also highlighted that, with few exceptions, the UK PSI 
has retained its focus on private sector demand. There is some indication that said demand 
may stabilize or even increase in the coming years. For instance, a 2007 study by Lloyds of 
London found that three out of five business executives predict an increase of business risk 
due to violence and that ‘nearly twice as many companies buy terrorism coverage today [in 
2006] than they did in 2001’.10 Government actions have further made an increase in private 
sector demand more likely: Regulation, such as the UK Corporate Manslaughter Act and the 
US Sabanes-Oxley Act, increasingly holds management accountable under criminal law for 
the misconduct of their companies,11 thus creating a strong incentive for companies to 
delegate some liability to a PSC.12 Finally, while UK PSCs’ attempts to diversify have yielded 
very mixed results, they indicate a clear willingness to move away from providing PSC 
                                                     
9
 Toyne-Sewell (2011), Beese (2011), Phillips (2010). 
10
 Lloyds (2007), p. 7 and 17. 
11
 Bill Waite in Spear’s Wealth Management Survey (2008 III), Hugh Martin in Spear’s Wealth Management 
Survey (2008 V). 
12
 Toyne-Sewell (2011), Ashwell (2008). 
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services to public sector clients into areas like travel and data security, screening services 
and integrated security systems.13 Indeed, in interviews, UK PSC representatives repeatedly 
voiced their concern about the future of large scale public sector demand for PSC services14 
and, given the experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is likely that the UK and US government 
have lost their appetite for the sort of man-power intensive expeditionary operation that 
would necessitate the large-scale use of PSC services.    
Thus, barring another “bubble”, it is likely that the UK PSI with its strong focus on private 
sector demand will continue to exist in the foreseeable future. Indeed, interviews suggest 
that the negotiations for the ICoC and the founding of the SCEG have greatly increased 
cooperation between UK PSCs.15 This further strengthened the influence of networks in the 
UK PSI that had not unexpectantly diminished somewhat due to the significant increase of 
PSC representatives and employees during the “bubble”. However, the above discussion has 
highlighted an important aspect of the UK PSI: The profit figures cited above clearly show 
that the provision of PSC services is by no means the lucrative business the PSC literature 
makes it out to be. This is particularly noteworthy with respect to the prevalent calls for 
stricter regulation, intrusive monitoring and severe sanctions, as such regulation would 
impose a significant additional burden on UK PSCs. Should this additional burden be imposed 
on a UK PSC that is already in a precarious financial situation, it may encourage the very 
behaviour it seeks to avert: The PSC in question would find itself in a situation in which 
engaging in problematic behaviour may seem like its only chance of assuring short-term 
corporate survival.  
 
  
                                                     
13
 CRG (no year), CRG (2008 II), p. 8, CRG (2009), p. 8. See also Thompson (2008), Beese (2011). 
14
 Clissitt (2010), Phillips (2010), Claridge (2010), Beese (2011), Toyne-Sewell (2011). See also Bill Waite in 
Spear’s Wealth Management Survey (2008 III). 
15
 Phillips (2010), Toyne-Sewell (2011). 
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Section Four: Choice of Data and Supporting Literature 
Finally, Part II concludes by critically reviewing the thesis’ methodology, specifically its choice 
of data and supporting literature. Specifically, this section aims to illustrate the rationale 
underlying the thesis’ choice of foci and highlight issues that emerged in the course of the 
research that it would have ideally done differently.    
Choice of Data 
In its choice of data, the thesis greatly relied on interviews, especially compared to its use of 
UK PSCs’ annual reports. One reason for this imbalance is the fact that corporate reports are 
often not or only partially available.16 Given that many UK PSCs are incorporated overseas, 
they publish only limited information about their business.17 Moreover, PSCs often claim the 
status of a small business to file only abbreviated accounts.18 Thus, the data from PSCs’ 
corporate reports may at times provide an incomplete and distorted picture of the UK PSI. 
Said data also often lack context. For instance, A UK PSC may post a significant loss because 
its business is failing or said loss may be due to a one-off investment, while the overall 
company prospers. Even if a company turn a profit, this says little about its market-position. 
As Figure 7-1 shows, CRG has remained profitable between 2004 and 2010. However, given 
its turnover (see Figure 7-2), its return on investment has deteriorated from bad to worse, 
while red24 earned a much better return on investment, despite turning a far smaller profit. 
Thus, while a greater balance between corporate reports and interview data would have 
been desirable, the necessary data to achieve it were not available. However, the data 
included in the corporate reports proved invaluable during interviews. Not only did it 
provide an additional means of triangulating interview data, it also helped in overcoming PSC 
representatives’ initial concerns to discuss their company’s or competitors’ business 
performance. Being able to show that such data, however incomplete, were already publicly 
available would elicit a much more open attitude from most interviewees.  
  
                                                     
16
 A request for Drum Cussac’s annual reports in Jersey yielded a one page document detailing nothing but the 
number of shares the company has given out (Drum Cussac (2011). 
17
 Even when companies publishes extensive information, e.g. CRG and Aegis, they exclude their off-shore 
subsidiaries, leaving an incomplete picture of their activites.  
18
 See Erinys Ltd. (2010), Hart Security UK Limited (2005). 
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Figure 7-2: Revenue for Select UK PSCs from 2004-2010 in GBP 
 
Likewise, a greater balance would have been desirable within the interview data, which 
favour PSCs representatives over their employees and clients. Unfortunately, the response 
rate among PSC employees and clients was even lower than that for PSC representatives and 
snowballing proved to be far less effective when it comes to PSC employees and clients, 
largely because PSC representatives were unwilling to initiate such contacts. As noted in 
Chapter One, this thesis compensated for the relatively low number of interviews with PSC 
employees by interviewing “information nodes”, i.e. PSC employees that maintain a blog or 
newsgroup and thus could reflect the views of their audience as well as their own.19 
Likewise, PSC client interviews focused on “information nodes” in the form of insurance 
providers, who are often a go-between for PSCs and their clients and can thus channel the 
latter’s views. Interviewing such “nodes” is an imperfect solution, as it is at times difficult to 
distinguish between the interviewee’s own views and those of PSC employees/clients in 
general. One way to overcome this problem may be to focus more on the Linkedin and 
Facebook groups that PSC employees and clients have recently started to use to initiate 
contact and possibly even conduct interviews.20    
Choice of Focus and Supporting Literature    
While the central aspects of this thesis - the interests and institutions within PSCs, the nature 
and intensity of competition and the relationship between PSCs and their clients - constitute 
important contextual influences on PSC decision-making, they are not a holistic 
                                                     
19
 Chapter 1 Section 8. 
20
 Thompson (2011). The use of social media to conduct interviews is also something that one may wish to keep 
in mind when designing interviews and contempating research ethics. 
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representation of the market ecology in the UK PSI.  Instead, this thesis chose to focus on 
certain aspects of the market ecology in which UK companies are embedded. As Chapter 
One noted, this choice of focus was in part inspired by early interviews with PSC 
representatives, employees and clients, in whose descriptions of the PSI concepts like 
professionalism, competition, networks and power featured prominently. Moreover, 
professionalism, competition and the P/A problem also feature prominently in the PSC 
literature and, thus, offered a useful point of departure to analyse UK PSC behaviour.  
However, other concepts that featured less frequently in interviews, that only came up later 
in the thesis’ progression or that had no obvious link to the PSC literature necessarily had to 
be set aside. Indeed, Part IV of this conclusion will pick up on these concepts when it 
discusses avenues for future research.       
Moreover, the thesis’ research question and intended audience also determined the method 
by which to approach the concepts identified in interviews and the PSC literature. Here, the 
thesis drew not only on economic-sociology to understand PSC behaviour, but also on 
traditional economic analysis, e.g. in the discussion about PSC employees’ interests and the 
analysis of competition in the PSI, and sociological analysis, i.e. the study of professions. By 
doing so, it showed that that the two are not only compatible, but that they can 
complement one another. After all, while economic and non-economic behaviour can 
temporary dominate PSC behaviour,21 neither discipline can fully account for PSC behaviour 
on its own. However, the emphasis on the “embeddedness” of PSCs‘ economic actions in 
their social context does not obviate the need for purely economic or sociological analysis of 
PSCs and their behaviour.22 If anything, this thesis repeatedly highlighted the need for a 
more thorough engagement with economic and sociological concepts in the analysis of 
security privatization. 
Implications of the Thesis’ Use of Sociological and Economic Concepts 
Indeed, one constraint of the thesis is that it is limited to describing the effect of economic 
and sociological concepts, such as competitive pressure and embeddedness, on the 
behaviour of PSCs and contributes few new insights to the understanding of these concepts 
within their respective fields. Partly, this limitation is a function of the available data and 
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 See the bell-curve model of competition in Chapter 1 Section 6, Chapter 4 Section 3. 
22
 Chapter 2 Section 9. 
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how it was generated. To make a genuine contribution to the field of sociology, for example 
by describing how networks among PSC employees and organizational structures within UK 
PSCs evolve, the sample would have to contain a larger number of PSC employees and, more 
importantly, a significant part of the interview would have had to address these issues. 
Likewise, a contribution to the field of economics/management studies, e.g. by analysing 
pricing and strategy development in the UK PSI, would have required a different emphasis in 
the interview sample and a different approach to the interviews themselves. Such a shift in 
emphasis and approach to the interviews would have been incompatible with the scope of 
the thesis as set out by the research question. Rather than describing PSC behaviour from an 
industry perspective, a narrower focus would be needed that focuses, for example, 
exclusively on networks in the PSI. Moreover, an in-depth engagement with the respective 
discussions in the fields of sociology and economics/management studies also seems ill-
advised given the thesis’ intended audience, i.e. the PSC literature.  
That being said, further inquiry into how military professionalism travels beyond the military 
into the PSI is but one example of how the understanding of embeddedness and corporate 
culture and thus the field of sociology may benefit from a more thorough engagement with 
the PSI. Indeed, Section 6 of this conclusion will discuss what form further research aimed at 
making a genuine contribution to the fields of sociology and economics/management 
studies may take and what results it may yield.   
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Section Five: Regulatory Implications 
Chapter Six showed that prevalent regulatory proposals favour strict regulation, intrusive 
monitoring and severe sanctions and it showed that the costs of such a regulatory system, 
both for the regulator as well as for PSCs, receives relatively little attention in the PSC 
literature. This inattention to the costs of regulation is attributable to the literature’s view of 
PSC regulation as a zero-sum game with high stakes: Unless every aspect of their behaviour 
is tightly controlled, PSCs will exploit any regulatory leniency to engage in misconduct. 
Moreover, even significant regulatory costs are deemed acceptable, given the likelihood and 
significant potential costs of regulatory failure.23 Chapter Six criticized this approach to PSC 
regulation, but it limited its criticism to highlighting how this approach to regulation 
misjudges the relative merits of international, domestic and, especially, informal regulation24 
and how it is prone to under-/over-regulation.25 In essence, Chapter Six mainly argued that 
the prevalent regulatory proposal is wasteful, not necessarily that it is ineffective.   
An Alternative View on Antagonistic Regulation 
In contrast, the alternative behavioural model provides a vastly more powerful argument 
against any such antagonistic regulation. First of all, if PSCs are, indeed, more likely to 
cooperate than to shirk, antagonistic regulation as outlined above is wasteful from the 
regulator’s point of view: The regulator has to bear the considerable costs of imposing strict 
and intrusive regulation of PSCs, which are in no way justified by averting misconduct, as 
said misconduct would not have occurred in the first place. Likewise, PSCs have to bear 
considerable compliance costs, which shrink their profit margins, but which are equally 
wasteful in most instances, as the PSCs in question would have preferred cooperation over 
shirking in any case. Here, the first outright problematic implication of the aforementioned 
antagonistic approach becomes visible: The increased compliance costs may push some PSCs 
into a situation where shirking may seem like the only way to assure their short-term 
corporate survival. Moreover, analogue to the problem of false punishments in PSC client 
relations that was discussed in Chapter Five,26 this antagonistic regulatory approach may 
even be harmful, for instance, when problematic behaviour occurs despite, rather than 
because of a PSC’s best effort. However, it is the response in the market for PSC services that 
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 Chapter 6 Conclusion Part I. 
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 Chapter 6 Section 7-9. 
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 Chapter 6 Section 10.  
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 Chapter 5 Section 5. 
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such antagonistic regulation would elicit that causes it to be particularly problematic. 
Increased compliance costs and the risk of false punishments would force most PSCs, i.e. 
those that would cooperate rather than shirk, out of the market. Only for PSCs, whose 
frequent shirking would off-set the high costs of compliance and  of false punishments, 
would it be lucrative to remain in the market.  
Thus, an antagonistic approach to PSC regulation risks the very behaviour it sets out to stop. 
Indeed, LeGrand describes a similar conundrum in his seminal work Motivation, Agency, and 
Public Policy in terms of “knights” and “knaves”: If regulation is crafted under the 
assumption that those to be regulated are all knaves, i.e. purely self-interested actors, rather 
than knights, i.e. altruistic actors, it is rational for knights to adopt knavish behaviour.27 ‘If 
people are treated as though they need to be whipped to achieve results, then they may 
behave as though they do need to be [whipped]’.28 Fortunately, the alternative behavioural 
model suggests several ways in which policy-makers and, more importantly, clients can 
control PSC behaviour short of “cracking the whip”.      
Implications for Policy-Makers 
Possibly the most important implication of the discussion above for policy-makers is to 
acknowledge the impotence of strict formal regulation. However, while the costs and 
difficulties in enacting and implementing such regulation are widely acknowledged,29 the risk 
of “false punishments” and their detrimental effect on the market for PSC services has yet to 
be recognized. Faced with mounting public pressure to act, policy-makers may not be able to 
avoid enacting such strict regulation. However, the threat that further scandals could trigger 
an antagonistic regulatory response could provide PSCs with an additional incentive to 
engage in effective self-regulation.    
Moreover, regulators should do their utmost to avoid false punishments, for example, by 
providing PSCs with incentives to come forward in cases of unintentional problematic 
behaviour. Such incentives could even include anonymity and an exemption from 
punishment. Chapter Two further suggested that regulators could use their conflict of 
interest to play PSCs off against their employees and vice versa. This would require lines of 
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 LeGrand (2003), p. 13ff, LeGrand (1997), p. 162. Indeed, a number of scholars struggle with this problem (see 
Ayres/Braithwaite (1992), p. 22ff).  
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 LeGrand (2003), p. 103. 
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 See Chapter 6 Section 7 and 8. 
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contact to PSC employees independent of their employer as well as further incentives.30 
Such lines of communication could be established through mandatory training courses for 
government contracts. 
To avoid that PSCs engaging in shirking as a last resort, policy-makers could create a bail-out 
facility that would allow PSCs to extract themselves from a situation that would otherwise 
have required them to shirk to assure their short-term survival. Moreover, Chapter Four 
further recommended the creation of a substitute that would replace PSCs with a in the 
short-term, should their behaviour become problematic.31  
Finally, Chapter Five suggested that trust between contractual parties plays a crucial role in a 
PSC’s determination whether to shirk or to cooperate: High trust makes cooperation likely, 
while low trust suggests shirking.32 While trust is primarily a matter between the contractual 
parties, there are several ways in which policy-makers can encourage “socially-oriented” 
trust. For instance, Chapter Three suggested that greater recognition of the PSI’s expertise in 
providing security services by the military could strengthen military professionalism in the 
PSI, which, in turn, could foster greater between PSCs and their clients.33 Discussions in 
Chapter Five and Six further suggest that public support for networks in the PSI, for example 
among PSC clients, and for collective self-regulation could likewise greatly bolster trust.34 
The suggestions above are not fully fledged policy proposals. Further research is needed to 
assure that these proposals fulfil their intended function as suggested without bringing 
about the sort of unintended consequences that cause the antagonistic regulatory approach 
to be so problematic. Instead, these example are meant to show that policy-makers have a 
wealth of options at their disposal to influence PSC behaviour without resorting to the strict, 
formal regulatory proposals that the PSC literature seems to favour.       
Implications for PSC Clients 
The alternative behavioural model arguably awards an even more crucial role to their clients 
than to policy-makers when it comes to influencing PSC behaviour. Through their contractual 
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relationship, clients can reduce PSCs’ uncertainty and generate trust, while just as easily 
sanction PSC misconduct – be it by changing their supplier or by taking their contractual 
partner to court.35 As Chapters Four and Five note, the market for PSC services imbues 
clients with considerable power over “their” PSC36 and their contractual relationship offers 
them an easy means to bring said power to bear in order to influence PSC behaviour.  
One way in which clients, especially in the public sector, limit their ability to influence PSC 
behaviour is through their pursuit of “one-stop solutions”, i.e. the tendency to concentrate 
contracting on a single providers. A 2009 SIGIR report, for example, notes that the DoS 
‘originally envisioned using only one PSC to service Iraq for management convenience’.37 
“One-stop solutions” are a seemingly neat solution for clients that lack the administrative 
capacity to manage multiple contracts and it is thus also widely used among private sector 
customers.38 Moreover, “one-stop solutions” are great sources of self-interested trust, as 
they promise significant future business. Should a PSC prove to be unreliable or disloyal, 
however, replacing a “one-stop solution” is often quite difficult, especially for public sector 
clients, given the size of their contract.39 Likewise, the increasing costs of competing for large 
government contracts, which Chapter Four highlighted, curbs the ability of public sector 
clients to control PSC behaviour, because it segments the market for PSC services into two 
tiers. 
Moreover, to influence PSC behaviour effectively, clients have to become much more aware 
of the market for PSC service. Interviews suggest that, while most private sector clients 
profess faith in the quality of their contractual management, they lacked a dedicated set of 
metrics to measure contractor performance.40 Rather than constantly monitoring the 
market, several clients suggested that they rely on personal contacts to evaluate service 
quality as they need it and Chapter Five already highlighted importance of networks in that 
respect.41 Moreover, one interviewee suggested that she considers the “burden of proof” 
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with respect to her contractual partner’s performance to lie with the PSC in question.42 
While this may be problematic from a regulatory point of view, from a management point of 
view aimed at influencing the behaviour of a contractor,  it is fairly unproblematic. 
Moreover, it neatly connects to an earlier observation in Chapter Five that clients, unlike 
regulators do not need incontrovertible proof to punish and that their punishment need not 
be befitting the “crime”.43    
Again, these implications for clients are not fully developed policy recommendation. Instead, 
they aim to show that, like policy-makers, clients have ample opportunity to influence PSC 
behaviour aside from the use of an antagonistic regulatory approach.   
         
Section Six: Avenues for Future Research 
This conclusion indicated four ways in which this thesis has made an original contribution to 
the PSC literature: (1) First and foremost, it provided an innovative conceptualization of PSC 
behaviour, (2) it suggested a novel way to look at PSC regulation, (3) through the 
combination of economic and sociological concepts, it applied a new analytical approach to 
the study of PSCs and (4) it generated original data, i.e. interviews with UK PSC employees 
and clients, and used previously neglected sources of data, i.e. UK PSCs’ annual reports, in its 
analysis. Crucially, this thesis propagated a new approach to the study of PSCs away from the 
abstract analysis of PSC behaviour at a distance towards a closer engagement with the 
available empirical evidence of actual PSC behaviour. This novel approach and the challenge 
this thesis poses to prevalent notions about PSC behaviour a number of interesting avenues 
for future research, some of which this section will discuss in greater detail.   
Private Security Elsewhere  
Earlier, this conclusion expressed confidence that the thesis’ broader conceptual claims 
apply beyond the UK PSI. Of course, this claim has yet to be confirmed by further research 
and, more importantly, said research also has to determine how regional variations in the 
internal decision-making processes of PSCs, their competitive environment and their client 
relations produce different behavioural outcomes for the PSCs in question. 
                                                     
42
 Marshall (2011). 
43
 Chapter 5 Section 4 and 5. 
290 
 
One interesting question in that respect is how different types of military professionalism 
affect the internal decision-making processes of PSCs. Do Chinese or Russian companies face 
similar influences from their employees as UK PSCs? Also, can different military 
professionalisms mix in a single company and how does that process take place? Another 
interesting question would be how contractual situations with multiple principals affect the 
client relations and, ultimately, the behaviour of PSCs. A possible example for such a 
situation would be third-party funding for a local development NGOs that use PSC services.44 
Another interesting question concerns the influence of the informal economy on the market 
environment PSCs compete in. The Afghan government’s decision to ban foreign PSC 
combined with the prevalence of corruption could, for example, create a situation in which 
very different dynamics dominate the market for PSC services, while the competitive 
pressures envisioned in the FFF become secondary concerns. The question implicit in this 
last point – what are the limits of the proposed behavioural model – should not be 
considered a detriment to this thesis’ findings. Instead, the thesis provides a fundamental 
challenge to prevalent understandings of PSC behaviour that will produce a wealth of further 
research and with it a sorely needed emphasis on the economics of PSI – the outcome of 
which will be a more thorough understanding of what makes PSCs, in the UK and beyond, 
behave the way they do.  
How the thesis’ findings can be usefully applied beyond the UK PSI is exemplified by the PSIs 
in Germany and France. Earlier, this thesis speculated, that the UK PSI may resemble the 
German and French PSI more closely than the US PSI, because, like the UK government, their 
respective public sector demand for PSC services is comparatively low.45 Market dynamics in 
their respective PSIs and the client relations of German and French PSCs are likely driven by 
private sector demand and should therefore be similar to those in the UK PSI. Significant 
similarities are also likely to come from the fact that many German companies have already 
used UK PSCs and their notions about service quality are likely to be shaped by said 
experience.46 Finally, similarities in the corporate reporting laws and their respective 
governments’ approach to PSC regulation provide further connections between the UK and 
German PSI that make it likely that the thesis’ findings can be fruitfully applied to its study.  
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However, the thesis’ findings need to be limited to the German and French PSIs, but may be 
partially applicable to the US PSI as well, despite the aforementioned focus of US PSCs on 
public sector demand. US private sector demand for PSC services has so far received little 
attention, except for those companies that served as prime contractors in Iraq and 
Afghanistan in the context of the respective reconstruction missions. Given the high number 
of US multinational companies that operate globally and the robust corporate social 
responsibility regulation in the USA, there could be substantial private sector demand for 
PSC services in the USA.47 Further research into US private sector demand for PSC services 
may well show that the market environment and client relations it creates are fairly similar 
to those in the UK PSI. Crucially, such a discovery would suggest that the US government 
demand for PSC services, which continues to dominate the debate in the PSC literature, is 
quite exceptional and has very little in common with the use of PSCs elsewhere.48   
The discussion above shows that, despite its narrow focus, there is ample reason to suggest 
that the thesis’ findings can be extended beyond its narrow focus on the UK PSI. So far, this 
section has focused on the avenues for further research that a widening of the thesis’ 
geographical scope may open up. Throughout the remainder, avenues for future research 
concerning conceptual issues, specifically organizational structure, regulation and 
professionalism, will be discussed.              
Organizational Structures 
This thesis’ emphasis on decision-making processes in individual PSCs provides renewed 
interest in an aspect of the PSI that has received scant attention to date: the analysis of 
organizational structures in the PSI.  What little research there is, notably Kinsey’s 2005 
article, has been limited to senior management’s perspective on the relative merits of 
various organizational forms. However, given the aforementioned differences in motivation 
between PSC representatives and employees, a broader appreciation for the organizational 
structure of PSCs seems in order. This echoes an earlier criticism, namely the need to look 
inside, rather than at PSCs to understand their behaviour. So far, the assumption seems to 
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have been that PSCs can enforce their corporate policies without any friction throughout 
their company. This thesis’ emphasis on PSCs as a “coalition of participants“ with often 
divergent interests shines a light on coordination processes within PSCs that have yet to be 
recognized. Moreover, should UK PSCs continue to, as Kinsey suggests, develop more 
hierarchical organizational structures to cope with their increasing need for specialization 
and differentiation,49 is there a point at which this approach chafes against the more free-
spirited mindset among UK PSC employees?      
Beyond Formal and Informal Regulation 
Comparisons between Chapter Six’s analysis of the debate about PSC regulation and the 
policy advice developed in the preceding section suggest that the two approaches have fairly 
little in common beyond a shared desire to control PSC behaviour. An interesting question 
would be whether the two approaches can be integrated into a coherent whole. For 
example, can the current, very legalistic and normative debate about PSC regulation 
incorporate elements that are primarily inspired by the need to manage and thus maintain a 
PSI client relationship. How, for example, do notions about accountability and transparency 
fit into a client relationship that relies heavily on mutual trust? 
However, the debate above highlights a problem in the discussion about PSC regulation that 
has yet to be fully recognized. The debate about PSC regulation is completely separate from 
the contract management debate. Thus, the former can contemplate solutions to regulatory 
problems with little concern for their impact on, for example, PSI client relation. Especially 
with respect to the unintended consequences of regulation, e.g. the regulatory burden it 
puts on PSCs and their clients, this separation is troublesome.     
The UK PSI and Professionalism 
Finally, an interesting area for further research would be the prospects of professionalism in 
the UK PSI. Chapter Three provided but a glance at an issue that is so far poorly understood: 
There are evidently elements of military professionalism in the PSI, but little is known about 
how knowledge is distributed, let alone developed in PSCs? How are professional disputes 
adjudicated and how resilient is military professionalism in UK PSCs. The latter question is 
especially important with respect to the organizational structure questions outline above: 
Does military professionalism benefit from the move towards a more hierarchical 
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organizational structure or does it wither as a result? Also, what happens if military 
professionalism does lose its meaning? Again, the UK PSI is an interesting case to consider in 
this respect, because a fairly large number of PSC employees stay in the industry for an 
uncharacteristically long time, i.e. in excess of ten years,50 and given the UK PSI’s relatively 
long history, a large enough sample to study this issue should be available. Finally, the 
question how the military and PSCs can co-exist and compete for professional jurisdiction 
still remains very much an open question.       
Implications for  Economics/Management Studies and Sociology 
Such further research into organizational structures, regulation and professionalism raises 
the question whether and how the resulting discussion may make a genuine contribution to 
the understanding of these and other important concepts in economics/management 
studies and sociology. Earlier, this conclusion argued that its scope, data and intended 
audience does not permit this thesis to make such a contribution. That being said, the thesis’ 
findings clearly raise a number of interesting questions that may have important 
reverberations for the understanding of key concepts within sociology. For instance, Chapter 
Three noted that sociologists generally believe that, to become a member of a profession, 
applicants have to undergo some form of formal training (doctors, lawyers) or informal 
apprenticeship (journalists) to teach them the rules of their profession. The UK PSI, however, 
seems to integrate its members without recourse to such formal or informal mechanisms, 
which seems to contradict this structural view of professionalism and thus raises questions 
about the nature of professionalism.51 Likewise, the thesis poses interesting questions for 
the field of economics/management studies. One example for this is the aforementioned 
risk of a “race to the bottom” in the PSI, i.e. a situation in which a lack of information about 
service quality causes price competition to increase to a point at which the market for PSC 
services becomes dysfunctional.52 Earlier, this thesis suggested that service quality is hard to 
measure and easily misperceived, because the risk of an attack is essentially unknowable.53 
As a result, a high quality provider may be overwhelmed by an exceptionally strong assailant, 
while a low quality provider may benefit from a lack of attacks or from an incompetent 
assailant. In the eyes of a customer, the latter may falsely appear more proficient than the 
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former. This raises the question whether such a lack of information (rather than an 
information asymmetry) constitutes a market failure and, if so, if this possibly necessitates a 
broader understanding of market failure in situations where information is scarce.  
However, to make genuine contribution to the respective fields of economics/management 
studies and sociology necessitates a different approach than the one taken in this thesis. 
Earlier, this Conclusion suggested that a different approach to the process of data generation 
constitutes one of these necessary changes.54 Such a change would not just require a shift in 
emphasis within the interview, but also a different sample and thus would have to overcome 
the problems of access and data reliability discussed earlier.55 This is not to suggest that 
these problems are insurmountable, but, to increase the share of PSC employees within the 
sample, interesting ways in which their participation can be encouraged need to be 
developed. Another clear example is the extent to which such research would have to 
engage with the applicable literatures in sociology and economics/management studies. 
With few exceptions, this thesis limited itself to literature that tries to apply sociological and 
economic theories and has largely ignored the works upon which said theories are based. A 
genuine contribution to the understanding of embeddedness within sociology, for example, 
would require an engagement not just with Granovetter’s work on the subject, but also with 
its roots in Karl Polanyi’s oeuvre, particularly in The Great Transformation. Even on 
professionalism, where this thesis reaches its most thorough engagement with the 
applicable literature in sociology, key works, such as Max Weber’s writings about 
professionalism, find little mention. Likewise, a genuine contribution to the field of 
economics/management studies would require a more in-depth engagement with the 
applicable literature in the respective fields. In addition to the literature on market failure,56 
the renewed debate about culture and economics, specifically the writings of George 
Akerloff and Rachel Kranton, would require some attention if further research would want to 
make a genuine contribution to economics/management studies. Alternatively, an in-depth 
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engagement with the economic literature on how markets develop may be a suitable point 
of departure for further research aimed at making such a contribution.57    
Concluding Thoughts   
Cowen argues that ‘contractors do not set the tone but rather reflect the sins and virtues of 
their customers, namely their sponsoring governments’.58 This thesis has shown this notion 
to be utterly false with respect to the UK PSI. Instead, in the absence of effective regulation, 
most UK PSCs have conducted themselves remarkable well. Indeed, one may argue that, in 
light of the various fruitless attempts of the UK government to regulate UK PSCs, starting 
with the 2002 Green Paper, the UK PSI has conducted itself considerably better than its 
government. It has consistently embraced regulatory initiatives, individually,59 through the 
BAPSC,60 the, more recently, as part of the ICoC and the SCEG.61    
Through the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the PSI has changed significantly and it is yet 
unclear what direction the market for PSC services will take. Is there sustainable demand 
near current levels for PSC services in the private sector or will the public sector remain the 
dominant source of demand it has been since 2003? Will the UK PSI, in particular, continue 
its shift away from the provision of PSC services, i.e. armed personal, perimeter and convoy 
security in high risk environments, or will a renewed need for such services emerge as a 
result of the Arab Spring. Possibly the UK PSI is facing an “Age of Turbulence” in which a 
clear paradigm to describe its work does not emerge, as UK PSCs pursue a diverse set of 
business activities. 
As a result, what is now described as the UK PSI may fragment into various smaller groups – 
a development that the increasing number of UK PSCs relocating overseas seems to presage 
in a worrying manner.  Such a development would complicate government intervention into 
industry matters considerably. Indeed, the UK PSCs ability to influence PSC behaviour, to 
strengthen its ties and to retain the close relationship it currently enjoys is, therefore, by no 
means assured and should not go unused. Greater cooperation with the aim of engendering 
mutual trust, based on a thorough understanding of what motivates PSCs is therefore 
                                                     
57
 Douglass North oeuvre seems very relevant in that respect.   
58
 Cowen (2007). Cowen actual words are ‚ contractors do not set the tone but rather reflect the sins and virtues 
of their customers, namely their sponsoring governments‘. 
59
 Beese (2004), Westropp (2004).  
60
 Schulz (2007).  
61
 Toyne-Sewell (2011). The largest number of signatory companies to the ICoC comes from the UK. 
296 
 
greatly needed. It is with respect to this last aspect that this thesis hopes to have made a 
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Appendix I  
DoD PSC Contracting in Iraq, August 2007 – October 2011    
Date of Report Total US Citizen TCN Local 
September 0762 6,068 456 3,987 1,625 
December 07 9,952 830 7,590 1,532 
March 08 7,259 515 5,061 1,683 
June 08 7,704 1,540 4,481 1,683 
August 08 7,121 1,359 4,230 1,532 
November 08 9,863 823 7,883 1,207 
February 09 8,701 727 6,909 1,065 
May 09 10,743 502 9,382 859 
August 09 13,232 623 11,580 1,029 
November 09 11,162 590 8,567 2,005 
February 10 9,431 660 7,758 1,013 
May 10 11,029 1,027 8,907 1,095 
September 1063 11,413 1,030 9,699 684 
December 10 11,628 1,017 9,713 898 
January 11 8,327 791 7,424 112 
April 11 9,207 917 7,727 563 
July 11 10,414 935 8,839 640 
October 11 9,554 844 8,293 417 
 
 
                                                     
62
 The data for 09/07-06/08 is taken from Schwartz (2010), p.22. 
63
 From 09/2010 onwards, DoD reports no longer distinguish between armed and unarmed PSC employees. The 




DoD PSC Contracting in Afghanistan, 08/2007 – 10/2011    
Date of Report Total US Citizen TCN Local 
September 0764 3,152 6 4 3,142 
December 07 2,998 19 30 2,949 
March 08 2,986 32 72 2,882 
June 08 3,537 5 15 3,517 
August 08 3,206 5 0 3,205 
November 08 3,144 4 20 3,120 
February 09 3,184 12 18 3,154 
May 09 4,111 16 25 4,070 
August 09 5,165 13 257 4,895 
November 09 10,712 71 1,002 9,639 
February 10 13,717 108 389 13,220 
May 10 16,398 137 960 15,301 
September 1065 17,932 152 1,093 16,687 
December 10 18,869 197 858 17,814 
January 11 18,919 250 731 17,938 
April 11 18,971 250 732 17,989 
July 11 15,305 693 1,282 13,330 




                                                     
64
 The data for 09/07-06/08 is taken from Schwartz (2010), p.22. 
65
 From 09/2010 onwards, DoD reports no longer distinguish between armed and unarmed PSC employees. The 
last report that did make said distinction, 05/2010, about 2% of all PSC employees were unarmed. 
